jif
3095ea9c3d
## Why
Selected plugin metadata is stable, but MCP processes are live runtime
state. They need different lifetimes:
- the MCP extension caches manifest, MCP, and connector declarations for
each stable selected root;
- each model step projects that cached metadata through the roots that
resolved as ready for that exact step;
- the MCP manager is rebuilt only when that availability projection
changes.
This matches executor skills: both features consume the same resolved
step roots instead of inferring readiness from the turn's selected
environments.
## Behavior
```text
E1 not ready for this step
-> no E1 MCP servers or connectors
-> cached plugin metadata stays in ext/mcp
E1 becomes ready
-> reuse cached metadata
-> publish one MCP runtime containing E1 capabilities
same ready roots on the next step
-> reuse the exact runtime; no rediscovery and no MCP restart
resume
-> create new extension thread state and a new MCP runtime
```
All model-facing consumers use the same step snapshot:
```text
resolved selected roots
|
v
extension MCP/connector projection
|
v
{ MCP config, connector snapshot, MCP manager }
|
+-> advertise model tools
+-> build app/connector tools
+-> execute MCP calls
```
## Cache contract
The existing MCP extension owns a cache keyed by the full
`SelectedCapabilityRoot`:
```rust
let state = thread_store.get_or_init(SelectedExecutorPluginMcpState::default);
```
The cache lives with extension thread state. Environment availability
filters projection but does not invalidate metadata. Resume creates new
thread state. There is no file watcher or executor generation because
contents behind a stable environment/root are assumed stable.
## What changes
- Keeps executor plugin discovery and cached metadata in `ext/mcp`.
- Caches MCP and connector declarations together per selected root.
- Uses the step's already-resolved capability roots, including lazy
environments that are not turn environments.
- Reuses the current MCP runtime when the ready-root projection is
unchanged.
- Uses the same step MCP manager and connector snapshot for
model-visible tools and execution.
- Resolves direct thread-scoped MCP requests from the current
selected-root projection.
## Deliberately out of scope
- `app/list` remains based on the latest global host-plugin state; this
PR does not make its response or notifications thread-specific.
- `required = true` startup semantics do not apply to delayed executor
MCP activation.
- No filesystem/content invalidation.
- No transport-disconnect watcher.
- No executor generations or environment replacement semantics.
- No client sharing across complete manager replacements.
## Stack
1. Extension-owned World State sections.
2. Project executor skills through World State.
3. Pin one MCP runtime to each model step.
4. **This PR:** project selected MCP and connector state from
extension-owned metadata.
5. Integration coverage for selected capability availability and resume.
## Verification
-
`selected_plugin_servers_use_managed_requirements_for_the_selected_root_id`
- The stacked integration PR covers unavailable to ready activation,
unchanged-runtime reuse, skills, MCP tools, connector attribution, and
cold resume.
codex-core
This crate implements the business logic for Codex. It is designed to be used by the various Codex UIs written in Rust.
Wine-exec integration tests
On x86-64 Linux, run the shared suite against the Windows exec server with
bazel test //codex-rs/core:core-all-wine-exec-test.
Local execution targets the host OS, Docker targets Linux, and Wine exec targets Windows. Choose the skip macro by what the test depends on:
skip_if_target_windows!: Windows target behavior.skip_if_host_windows!: Windows host constraints.skip_if_remote!: Local-only test behavior.skip_if_no_remote_env!: Remote-only test behavior.skip_if_wine_exec!: Wine-specific runner debt.
Dependencies
Note that codex-core makes some assumptions about certain helper utilities being available in the environment. Currently, this support matrix is:
macOS
Expects /usr/bin/sandbox-exec to be present.
When using the workspace-write sandbox policy, the Seatbelt profile allows
writes under the configured writable roots while keeping .git (directory or
pointer file), the resolved gitdir: target, and .codex read-only.
Network access and filesystem read/write roots are controlled by
SandboxPolicy. Seatbelt consumes the resolved policy and enforces it.
Seatbelt also keeps the legacy default preferences read access
(user-preference-read) needed for cfprefs-backed macOS behavior.
Linux
Expects the binary containing codex-core to run the equivalent of codex sandbox when arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.
Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on Linux.
They can continue to use the legacy Landlock path when the split filesystem
policy is sandbox-equivalent to the legacy model after cwd resolution.
Split filesystem policies that need direct FileSystemSandboxPolicy
enforcement, such as read-only or denied carveouts under a broader writable
root, automatically route through bubblewrap. The legacy Landlock path is used
only when the split filesystem policy round-trips through the legacy
SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics. That includes overlapping
cases like /repo = write, /repo/a = none, /repo/a/b = write, where the
more specific writable child must reopen under a denied parent.
The Linux sandbox helper prefers the first bwrap found on PATH outside the
current working directory whenever it is available. If bwrap is present but
too old to support --argv0, the helper keeps using system bubblewrap and
switches to a no---argv0 compatibility path for the inner re-exec. If
bwrap is missing, it falls back to the bundled codex-resources/bwrap
binary shipped with Codex and Codex surfaces a startup warning through its
normal notification path instead of printing directly from the sandbox helper.
Codex also surfaces a startup warning when bubblewrap cannot create user
namespaces. WSL2 uses the normal Linux bubblewrap path. WSL1 is not supported
for bubblewrap sandboxing because it cannot create the required user
namespaces, so Codex rejects sandboxed shell commands that would enter the
bubblewrap path before invoking bwrap.
Windows
Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on
Windows. Legacy read-only and workspace-write policies imply full
filesystem read access; exact readable roots are represented by split
filesystem policies instead.
The elevated Windows sandbox also supports:
- legacy
ReadOnlyandWorkspaceWritebehavior - split filesystem policies that need exact readable roots, exact writable roots, or extra read-only carveouts under writable roots
- backend-managed system read roots required for basic execution, such as
C:\Windows,C:\Program Files,C:\Program Files (x86), andC:\ProgramData, when a split filesystem policy requests platform defaults
The unelevated restricted-token backend still supports the legacy full-read
Windows model for legacy ReadOnly and WorkspaceWrite behavior. It also
supports a narrow split-filesystem subset: full-read split policies whose
writable roots still match the legacy WorkspaceWrite root set, but add extra
read-only carveouts under those writable roots.
New [permissions] / split filesystem policies remain supported on Windows
only when they can be enforced directly by the selected Windows backend or
round-trip through the legacy SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics.
Policies that would require direct explicit unreadable carveouts (none) or
reopened writable descendants under read-only carveouts still fail closed
instead of running with weaker enforcement.
All Platforms
Expects the binary containing codex-core to simulate the virtual
apply_patch CLI when arg1 is --codex-run-as-apply-patch. See the
codex-arg0 crate for details.