Won Park
8033b6a449
## Why Auto-review can deny an action that the user later decides they want to retry. Today there is no TUI surface for selecting a recent denial and sending explicit approval context back into the session, so users have to restate intent manually and the retry can be reviewed without the original denied action context. This adds a narrow TUI-driven path for approving a recent denied action while still keeping the retry inside the normal auto-review flow. ## What Changed - Added `/auto-review-denials` to open a picker of recent denied auto-review actions. - Added a small in-memory TUI store for the 10 most recent denied auto-review events. - Selecting a denial sends the structured denied event back through the existing core/app-server op path. - Core now injects a developer message containing the approved action JSON rather than the full assessment event. - Auto-review transcript collection now preserves this specific approval developer message so follow-up review sessions can see the user approval context. - Added TUI snapshot/unit coverage for the picker and approval dispatch path. - Added core coverage for retaining the approval developer message in the auto-review transcript. ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-core collect_guardian_transcript_entries_keeps_manual_approval_developer_message` - `cargo test -p codex-tui auto_review_denials` - `cargo test -p codex-tui approving_recent_denial_emits_structured_core_op_once` ## Notes This intentionally keeps retries going through auto-review. The approval signal is context for the exact previously denied action, not a blanket bypass for similar future actions.
codex-core
This crate implements the business logic for Codex. It is designed to be used by the various Codex UIs written in Rust.
Dependencies
Note that codex-core makes some assumptions about certain helper utilities being available in the environment. Currently, this support matrix is:
macOS
Expects /usr/bin/sandbox-exec to be present.
When using the workspace-write sandbox policy, the Seatbelt profile allows
writes under the configured writable roots while keeping .git (directory or
pointer file), the resolved gitdir: target, and .codex read-only.
Network access and filesystem read/write roots are controlled by
SandboxPolicy. Seatbelt consumes the resolved policy and enforces it.
Seatbelt also keeps the legacy default preferences read access
(user-preference-read) needed for cfprefs-backed macOS behavior.
Linux
Expects the binary containing codex-core to run the equivalent of codex sandbox linux (legacy alias: codex debug landlock) when arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.
Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on Linux.
They can continue to use the legacy Landlock path when the split filesystem
policy is sandbox-equivalent to the legacy model after cwd resolution.
Split filesystem policies that need direct FileSystemSandboxPolicy
enforcement, such as read-only or denied carveouts under a broader writable
root, automatically route through bubblewrap. The legacy Landlock path is used
only when the split filesystem policy round-trips through the legacy
SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics. That includes overlapping
cases like /repo = write, /repo/a = none, /repo/a/b = write, where the
more specific writable child must reopen under a denied parent.
The Linux sandbox helper prefers the first bwrap found on PATH outside the
current working directory whenever it is available. If bwrap is present but
too old to support --argv0, the helper keeps using system bubblewrap and
switches to a no---argv0 compatibility path for the inner re-exec. If
bwrap is missing, it falls back to the vendored bubblewrap path compiled into
the binary and Codex surfaces a startup warning through its normal notification
path instead of printing directly from the sandbox helper. Codex also surfaces
a startup warning when bubblewrap cannot create user namespaces. WSL2 uses the
normal Linux bubblewrap path. WSL1 is not supported for bubblewrap sandboxing
because it cannot create the required user namespaces, so Codex rejects
sandboxed shell commands that would enter the bubblewrap path before invoking
bwrap.
Windows
Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on
Windows. Legacy read-only and workspace-write policies imply full
filesystem read access; exact readable roots are represented by split
filesystem policies instead.
The elevated Windows sandbox also supports:
- legacy
ReadOnlyandWorkspaceWritebehavior - split filesystem policies that need exact readable roots, exact writable roots, or extra read-only carveouts under writable roots
- backend-managed system read roots required for basic execution, such as
C:\Windows,C:\Program Files,C:\Program Files (x86), andC:\ProgramData, when a split filesystem policy requests platform defaults
The unelevated restricted-token backend still supports the legacy full-read
Windows model for legacy ReadOnly and WorkspaceWrite behavior. It also
supports a narrow split-filesystem subset: full-read split policies whose
writable roots still match the legacy WorkspaceWrite root set, but add extra
read-only carveouts under those writable roots.
New [permissions] / split filesystem policies remain supported on Windows
only when they can be enforced directly by the selected Windows backend or
round-trip through the legacy SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics.
Policies that would require direct explicit unreadable carveouts (none) or
reopened writable descendants under read-only carveouts still fail closed
instead of running with weaker enforcement.
All Platforms
Expects the binary containing codex-core to simulate the virtual
apply_patch CLI when arg1 is --codex-run-as-apply-patch. See the
codex-arg0 crate for details.