viyatb-oai
6ed0440611
## Why `codex sandbox` is useful for exercising sandbox behavior directly, but before this stack the CLI only picked up permission profiles indirectly from the active config. The existing debug-sandbox path already compiled `[permissions]` profiles through normal config loading, as covered by the existing profile tests in [`debug_sandbox.rs`](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/de2ccf94735a3d8a2a7077e6a5292026413867cf/codex-rs/cli/src/debug_sandbox.rs#L715-L760). This adds the smallest stable entry point first: an explicit profile selector that reuses the same config machinery as normal Codex config, so standalone testing becomes possible without changing current no-selector behavior. ## What changed - Add additive `--permissions-profile NAME` support to `codex sandbox macos|linux|windows`. - Resolve built-in and user-defined profile names by feeding `default_permissions` through the existing config compilation path instead of inventing a sandbox-only parser. - Make an explicit selector win over an ambient active profile's legacy `sandbox_mode`. - Keep the existing no-selector behavior unchanged. ## Stack 1. #20117 `sandbox-ui-profile` --> this PR 2. #20118 `sandbox-ui-config` Both PRs are additive. Replay JSON is intentionally deferred to a follow-up design pass. ## Tests ran - `cargo test -p codex-cli debug_sandbox` - `cargo test -p codex-cli sandbox_macos_parses_permissions_profile` - `cargo test -p codex-core cli_override_takes_precedence_over_profile_sandbox_mode` - macOS branch-binary smoke on the rebased top of stack: built-in `:workspace` and user-defined profiles both executed successfully through `--permissions-profile`. - Linux devbox branch-binary smoke on the rebased top of stack: built-in `:workspace` and user-defined profiles both executed successfully through `--permissions-profile`.
codex-core
This crate implements the business logic for Codex. It is designed to be used by the various Codex UIs written in Rust.
Dependencies
Note that codex-core makes some assumptions about certain helper utilities being available in the environment. Currently, this support matrix is:
macOS
Expects /usr/bin/sandbox-exec to be present.
When using the workspace-write sandbox policy, the Seatbelt profile allows
writes under the configured writable roots while keeping .git (directory or
pointer file), the resolved gitdir: target, and .codex read-only.
Network access and filesystem read/write roots are controlled by
SandboxPolicy. Seatbelt consumes the resolved policy and enforces it.
Seatbelt also keeps the legacy default preferences read access
(user-preference-read) needed for cfprefs-backed macOS behavior.
Linux
Expects the binary containing codex-core to run the equivalent of codex sandbox linux (legacy alias: codex debug landlock) when arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.
Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on Linux.
They can continue to use the legacy Landlock path when the split filesystem
policy is sandbox-equivalent to the legacy model after cwd resolution.
Split filesystem policies that need direct FileSystemSandboxPolicy
enforcement, such as read-only or denied carveouts under a broader writable
root, automatically route through bubblewrap. The legacy Landlock path is used
only when the split filesystem policy round-trips through the legacy
SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics. That includes overlapping
cases like /repo = write, /repo/a = none, /repo/a/b = write, where the
more specific writable child must reopen under a denied parent.
The Linux sandbox helper prefers the first bwrap found on PATH outside the
current working directory whenever it is available. If bwrap is present but
too old to support --argv0, the helper keeps using system bubblewrap and
switches to a no---argv0 compatibility path for the inner re-exec. If
bwrap is missing, it falls back to the vendored bubblewrap path compiled into
the binary and Codex surfaces a startup warning through its normal notification
path instead of printing directly from the sandbox helper. Codex also surfaces
a startup warning when bubblewrap cannot create user namespaces. WSL2 uses the
normal Linux bubblewrap path. WSL1 is not supported for bubblewrap sandboxing
because it cannot create the required user namespaces, so Codex rejects
sandboxed shell commands that would enter the bubblewrap path before invoking
bwrap.
Windows
Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on
Windows. Legacy read-only and workspace-write policies imply full
filesystem read access; exact readable roots are represented by split
filesystem policies instead.
The elevated Windows sandbox also supports:
- legacy
ReadOnlyandWorkspaceWritebehavior - split filesystem policies that need exact readable roots, exact writable roots, or extra read-only carveouts under writable roots
- backend-managed system read roots required for basic execution, such as
C:\Windows,C:\Program Files,C:\Program Files (x86), andC:\ProgramData, when a split filesystem policy requests platform defaults
The unelevated restricted-token backend still supports the legacy full-read
Windows model for legacy ReadOnly and WorkspaceWrite behavior. It also
supports a narrow split-filesystem subset: full-read split policies whose
writable roots still match the legacy WorkspaceWrite root set, but add extra
read-only carveouts under those writable roots.
New [permissions] / split filesystem policies remain supported on Windows
only when they can be enforced directly by the selected Windows backend or
round-trip through the legacy SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics.
Policies that would require direct explicit unreadable carveouts (none) or
reopened writable descendants under read-only carveouts still fail closed
instead of running with weaker enforcement.
All Platforms
Expects the binary containing codex-core to simulate the virtual
apply_patch CLI when arg1 is --codex-run-as-apply-patch. See the
codex-arg0 crate for details.