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T

Michael Bolin 229b40aa21 core: fix apply_patch request permissions test (#21060 )

## Why

The Bazel test coverage change exposed
`approved_folder_write_request_permissions_unblocks_later_apply_patch`,
and `rust-ci-full.yml` showed the same test failing on `main` on macOS.
There were two separate classes of problems here.

### Clean CI failure

The test emits an `apply_patch` tool call, but its config did not enable
the `apply_patch` tool, so the mocked response completed without an
`apply-patch-call` output. After enabling the tool, the same path also
needs the aggregate `codex-core` test binary to dispatch
`--codex-run-as-fs-helper`; sandboxed `apply_patch` uses that helper
under macOS Seatbelt.

The test now also canonicalizes the temporary patch target before
building the patch payload so the path matches normalized grants on
macOS, where `/var` paths often normalize to `/private/var`.

### Local/enterprise config isolation

The core test harness now builds its default test config with managed
config disabled, so host-managed enterprise config cannot alter these
tests. The request-permissions turns in this test also explicitly use
the user reviewer path, keeping the assertions focused on
`request_permissions` behavior rather than reviewer defaults from the
host.

## What Changed

- Enable `apply_patch` in
`approved_folder_write_request_permissions_unblocks_later_apply_patch`.
- Teach the core integration test binary to dispatch
`CODEX_FS_HELPER_ARG1`, matching the existing apply-patch and
linux-sandbox dispatch paths.
- Canonicalize the tempdir-backed patch target before creating the
patch.
- Ignore managed config in default core test configs and explicitly pin
this test to `ApprovalsReviewer::User`.

## Verification

Run outside the Codex app sandbox because these macOS tests
intentionally spawn Seatbelt:

- `cargo test -p codex-core
approved_folder_write_request_permissions_unblocks_later_apply_patch`
- `cargo test -p codex-core
approved_folder_write_request_permissions_unblocks_later_exec_without_sandbox_args`

229b40aa21 · 2026-05-04 12:48:59 -07:00

History

src

core: preserve last model ids in feedback tags (#21026 )

2026-05-04 12:46:08 -07:00

templates

[tool_suggest] More prompt polishes. (#20566 )

2026-05-02 04:22:12 +00:00

tests

core: fix apply_patch request permissions test (#21060 )

2026-05-04 12:48:59 -07:00

BUILD.bazel

test: increase core-all-test shard count to 16 (#19727 )

2026-04-26 23:10:26 +00:00

Cargo.toml

feat: split memories part 2 (#19860 )

2026-04-28 13:03:28 +02:00

config.schema.json

feat(tui): improve TUI keymap coverage (#20798 )

2026-05-04 19:18:56 +00:00

gpt_5_1_prompt.md

Assemble sandbox/approval/network prompts dynamically (#8961 )

2026-01-12 23:12:59 +00:00

gpt_5_2_prompt.md

Assemble sandbox/approval/network prompts dynamically (#8961 )

2026-01-12 23:12:59 +00:00

gpt_5_codex_prompt.md

Assemble sandbox/approval/network prompts dynamically (#8961 )

2026-01-12 23:12:59 +00:00

gpt-5.1-codex-max_prompt.md

Assemble sandbox/approval/network prompts dynamically (#8961 )

2026-01-12 23:12:59 +00:00

gpt-5.2-codex_prompt.md

Assemble sandbox/approval/network prompts dynamically (#8961 )

2026-01-12 23:12:59 +00:00

hierarchical_agents_message.md

Add hierarchical agent prompt (#8996 )

2026-01-09 13:47:37 -08:00

prompt_with_apply_patch_instructions.md

Assemble sandbox/approval/network prompts dynamically (#8961 )

2026-01-12 23:12:59 +00:00

README.md

permissions: remove legacy read-only access modes (#19449 )

2026-04-24 17:16:58 -07:00

review_prompt.md

docs: Fix markdown list item spacing in codex-rs/core/review_prompt.md (#4144 )

2025-10-30 17:39:21 -07:00

README.md

codex-core

This crate implements the business logic for Codex. It is designed to be used by the various Codex UIs written in Rust.

Dependencies

Note that codex-core makes some assumptions about certain helper utilities being available in the environment. Currently, this support matrix is:

macOS

Expects /usr/bin/sandbox-exec to be present.

When using the workspace-write sandbox policy, the Seatbelt profile allows writes under the configured writable roots while keeping .git (directory or pointer file), the resolved gitdir: target, and .codex read-only.

Network access and filesystem read/write roots are controlled by SandboxPolicy. Seatbelt consumes the resolved policy and enforces it.

Seatbelt also keeps the legacy default preferences read access (user-preference-read) needed for cfprefs-backed macOS behavior.

Linux

Expects the binary containing codex-core to run the equivalent of codex sandbox linux (legacy alias: codex debug landlock) when arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.

Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on Linux. They can continue to use the legacy Landlock path when the split filesystem policy is sandbox-equivalent to the legacy model after cwd resolution. Split filesystem policies that need direct FileSystemSandboxPolicy enforcement, such as read-only or denied carveouts under a broader writable root, automatically route through bubblewrap. The legacy Landlock path is used only when the split filesystem policy round-trips through the legacy SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics. That includes overlapping cases like /repo = write, /repo/a = none, /repo/a/b = write, where the more specific writable child must reopen under a denied parent.

The Linux sandbox helper prefers the first bwrap found on PATH outside the current working directory whenever it is available. If bwrap is present but too old to support --argv0, the helper keeps using system bubblewrap and switches to a no---argv0 compatibility path for the inner re-exec. If bwrap is missing, it falls back to the vendored bubblewrap path compiled into the binary and Codex surfaces a startup warning through its normal notification path instead of printing directly from the sandbox helper. Codex also surfaces a startup warning when bubblewrap cannot create user namespaces. WSL2 uses the normal Linux bubblewrap path. WSL1 is not supported for bubblewrap sandboxing because it cannot create the required user namespaces, so Codex rejects sandboxed shell commands that would enter the bubblewrap path before invoking bwrap.

Windows

Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on Windows. Legacy read-only and workspace-write policies imply full filesystem read access; exact readable roots are represented by split filesystem policies instead.

The elevated Windows sandbox also supports:

legacy ReadOnly and WorkspaceWrite behavior
split filesystem policies that need exact readable roots, exact writable roots, or extra read-only carveouts under writable roots
backend-managed system read roots required for basic execution, such as C:\Windows, C:\Program Files, C:\Program Files (x86), and C:\ProgramData, when a split filesystem policy requests platform defaults

The unelevated restricted-token backend still supports the legacy full-read Windows model for legacy ReadOnly and WorkspaceWrite behavior. It also supports a narrow split-filesystem subset: full-read split policies whose writable roots still match the legacy WorkspaceWrite root set, but add extra read-only carveouts under those writable roots.

New [permissions] / split filesystem policies remain supported on Windows only when they can be enforced directly by the selected Windows backend or round-trip through the legacy SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics. Policies that would require direct explicit unreadable carveouts (none) or reopened writable descendants under read-only carveouts still fail closed instead of running with weaker enforcement.

All Platforms

Expects the binary containing codex-core to simulate the virtual apply_patch CLI when arg1 is --codex-run-as-apply-patch. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.