## Why
#25450 attempts a broad `SandboxPolicy` removal across several unrelated
surfaces, which makes it hard to review and still leaves new helper code
moving legacy policies around. This PR is a narrower alternative:
migrate only the exec-side Windows sandbox plumbing so the review can
focus on one production path and one compatibility boundary.
The goal is to stop threading `SandboxPolicy` through exec code without
expanding the migration into app-server, protocol, telemetry, config, or
session behavior.
## What changed
- Removed `ExecRequest::compatibility_sandbox_policy()`.
- Changed the Windows restricted-token and elevated filesystem override
helpers to accept `PermissionProfile` plus the split filesystem/network
policies instead of a `SandboxPolicy`.
- Kept the remaining legacy projection local to the writable-root
comparison that still needs to compare split policy behavior against the
legacy Windows backend model.
- Rejected restricted split filesystem policies that still grant
full-disk writes before using the Windows restricted-token backend,
preserving the previous clear-failure behavior for profiles that project
to `ExternalSandbox`.
- Updated the Windows sandbox override tests to exercise the new call
shape and cover the full-write split-profile regression.
## Verification
- `just test -p codex-core windows_restricted_token`
- `just test -p codex-core windows_elevated`
## Why
`#13434` introduces split `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` and
`NetworkSandboxPolicy`, but the runtime still made most execution-time
sandbox decisions from the legacy `SandboxPolicy` projection.
That projection loses information about combinations like unrestricted
filesystem access with restricted network access. In practice, that
means the runtime can choose the wrong platform sandbox behavior or set
the wrong network-restriction environment for a command even when config
has already separated those concerns.
This PR carries the split policies through the runtime so sandbox
selection, process spawning, and exec handling can consult the policy
that actually matters.
## What changed
- threaded `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` and `NetworkSandboxPolicy` through
`TurnContext`, `ExecRequest`, sandbox attempts, shell escalation state,
unified exec, and app-server exec overrides
- updated sandbox selection in `core/src/sandboxing/mod.rs` and
`core/src/exec.rs` to key off `FileSystemSandboxPolicy.kind` plus
`NetworkSandboxPolicy`, rather than inferring behavior only from the
legacy `SandboxPolicy`
- updated process spawning in `core/src/spawn.rs` and the platform
wrappers to use `NetworkSandboxPolicy` when deciding whether to set
`CODEX_SANDBOX_NETWORK_DISABLED`
- kept additional-permissions handling and legacy `ExternalSandbox`
compatibility projections aligned with the split policies, including
explicit user-shell execution and Windows restricted-token routing
- updated callers across `core`, `app-server`, and `linux-sandbox` to
pass the split policies explicitly
## Verification
- added regression coverage in `core/tests/suite/user_shell_cmd.rs` to
verify `RunUserShellCommand` does not inherit
`CODEX_SANDBOX_NETWORK_DISABLED` from the active turn
- added coverage in `core/src/exec.rs` for Windows restricted-token
sandbox selection when the legacy projection is `ExternalSandbox`
- updated Linux sandbox coverage in
`linux-sandbox/tests/suite/landlock.rs` to exercise the split-policy
exec path
- verified the current PR state with `just clippy`
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/13439).
* #13453
* #13452
* #13451
* #13449
* #13448
* #13445
* #13440
* __->__ #13439
---------
Co-authored-by: viyatb-oai <viyatb@openai.com>
## Summary
- avoid setting a new process group when stdio is inherited (keeps child
in foreground PG)
- keep process-group isolation when stdio is redirected so killpg
cleanup still works
- prevents macOS job-control SIGTTIN stops that look like hangs after
output
## Testing
- `cargo build -p codex-cli`
- `GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL=/dev/null GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM=1
CARGO_BIN_EXE_codex=/Users/denis/Code/codex/codex-rs/target/debug/codex
/opt/homebrew/bin/timeout 30m cargo test -p codex-core -p codex-exec`
## Context
This fixes macOS sandbox hangs for commands like `elixir -v` / `erl
-noshell`, where the child was moved into a new process group while
still attached to the controlling TTY. See issue #8690.
## Authorship & collaboration
- This change and analysis were authored by **Codex** (AI coding agent).
- Human collaborator: @seeekr provided repro environment, context, and
review guidance.
- CLI used: `codex-cli 0.77.0`.
- Model: `gpt-5.2-codex (xhigh)`.
Co-authored-by: Eric Traut <etraut@openai.com>
## Summary
- launch shell tool processes in their own process group so Codex owns
the full tree
- on timeout or ctrl-c, send SIGKILL to the process group before
terminating the tracked child
- document that the default shell/unified_exec timeout remains 1000 ms
## Original Bug
Long-lived shell tool commands hang indefinitely because the timeout
handler only terminated the direct child process; any grandchildren it
spawned kept running and held the PTY open, preventing Codex from
regaining control.
## Repro Original Bug
Install next.js and run `next dev` (which is a long-running shell
process with children). On openai:main, it will cause the agent to
permanently get stuck here until human intervention. On this branch,
this command will be terminated successfully after timeout_ms which will
unblock the agent. This is a critical fix for unmonitored / lightly
monitored agents that don't have immediate human observation to unblock
them.
---------
Co-authored-by: Michael Bolin <mbolin@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Michael Bolin <bolinfest@gmail.com>
Previously it was not possible for codex to run commands as the init
process (pid 1) in linux. Commands run in containers tend to see their
own pid as 1. See https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/4198
This pr implements the solution mentioned in that issue.
Co-authored-by: Eric Traut <etraut@openai.com>
To make `--full-auto` safer, this PR updates the Seatbelt policy so that
a `SandboxPolicy` with a `writable_root` that contains a `.git/`
_directory_ will make `.git/` _read-only_ (though as a follow-up, we
should also consider the case where `.git` is a _file_ with a `gitdir:
/path/to/actual/repo/.git` entry that should also be protected).
The two major changes in this PR:
- Updating `SandboxPolicy::get_writable_roots_with_cwd()` to return a
`Vec<WritableRoot>` instead of a `Vec<PathBuf>` where a `WritableRoot`
can specify a list of read-only subpaths.
- Updating `create_seatbelt_command_args()` to honor the read-only
subpaths in `WritableRoot`.
The logic to update the policy is a fairly straightforward update to
`create_seatbelt_command_args()`, but perhaps the more interesting part
of this PR is the introduction of an integration test in
`tests/sandbox.rs`. Leveraging the new API in #1785, we test
`SandboxPolicy` under various conditions, including ones where `$TMPDIR`
is not readable, which is critical for verifying the new behavior.
To ensure that Codex can run its own tests, e.g.:
```
just codex debug seatbelt --full-auto -- cargo test if_git_repo_is_writable_root_then_dot_git_folder_is_read_only
```
I had to introduce the use of `CODEX_SANDBOX=sandbox`, which is
comparable to how `CODEX_SANDBOX_NETWORK_DISABLED=1` was already being
used.
Adding a comparable change for Landlock will be done in a subsequent PR.
At 550 lines, `exec.rs` was a bit large. In particular, I found it hard
to locate the Seatbelt-related code quickly without a file with
`seatbelt` in the name, so this refactors things so:
- `spawn_command_under_seatbelt()` and dependent code moves to a new
`seatbelt.rs` file
- `spawn_child_async()` and dependent code moves to a new `spawn.rs`
file
Michael Bolin ·
pakrym-oai ·
viyatb-oai ·
jif-oai ·
Denis Andrejew ·
Luca King ·
Andrew Dirksen ·
Gabriel Peal ·