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core: stop threading SandboxPolicy through exec (#25700)

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## Why

#25450 attempts a broad `SandboxPolicy` removal across several unrelated
surfaces, which makes it hard to review and still leaves new helper code
moving legacy policies around. This PR is a narrower alternative:
migrate only the exec-side Windows sandbox plumbing so the review can
focus on one production path and one compatibility boundary.

The goal is to stop threading `SandboxPolicy` through exec code without
expanding the migration into app-server, protocol, telemetry, config, or
session behavior.

## What changed

- Removed `ExecRequest::compatibility_sandbox_policy()`.
- Changed the Windows restricted-token and elevated filesystem override
helpers to accept `PermissionProfile` plus the split filesystem/network
policies instead of a `SandboxPolicy`.
- Kept the remaining legacy projection local to the writable-root
comparison that still needs to compare split policy behavior against the
legacy Windows backend model.
- Rejected restricted split filesystem policies that still grant
full-disk writes before using the Windows restricted-token backend,
preserving the previous clear-failure behavior for profiles that project
to `ExternalSandbox`.
- Updated the Windows sandbox override tests to exercise the new call
shape and cover the full-write split-profile regression.

## Verification

- `just test -p codex-core windows_restricted_token`
- `just test -p codex-core windows_elevated`
This commit is contained in:
Michael Bolin
2026-06-03 10:41:41 -07:00
committed by GitHub
Unverified
parent a2a9e767f7
commit 52b359b249
10 changed files with 167 additions and 233 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
codex-rs/app-server/src/request_processors/thread_summary.rs
-3
View File
@@ -179,11 +179,8 @@ pub(crate) fn thread_response_sandbox_policy(
permission_profile: &codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile,
cwd: &Path,
) -> codex_app_server_protocol::SandboxPolicy {
let file_system_policy = permission_profile.file_system_sandbox_policy();
let sandbox_policy = codex_sandboxing::compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(
permission_profile,
&file_system_policy,
permission_profile.network_sandbox_policy(),
cwd,
);
sandbox_policy.into()
codex-rs/core/src/codex_thread.rs
-3
View File
@@ -76,11 +76,8 @@ pub struct ThreadConfigSnapshot {
impl ThreadConfigSnapshot {
pub fn sandbox_policy(&self) -> SandboxPolicy {
let file_system_sandbox_policy = self.permission_profile.file_system_sandbox_policy();
codex_sandboxing::compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(
&self.permission_profile,
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
self.permission_profile.network_sandbox_policy(),
self.cwd.as_path(),
)
}
codex-rs/core/src/config/mod.rs
+1 -7
View File
@@ -444,13 +444,7 @@ impl Permissions {
/// Legacy compatibility projection derived from the canonical profile.
pub fn legacy_sandbox_policy(&self, cwd: &Path) -> SandboxPolicy {
let permission_profile = self.materialized_permission_profile();
let file_system_sandbox_policy = permission_profile.file_system_sandbox_policy();
compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(
&permission_profile,
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
permission_profile.network_sandbox_policy(),
cwd,
)
compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(&permission_profile, cwd)
}
/// Check whether a legacy sandbox policy can be applied to this permission
codex-rs/core/src/exec.rs
+52 -57
View File
@@ -31,19 +31,18 @@ use codex_protocol::error::SandboxErr;
use codex_protocol::exec_output::ExecToolCallOutput;
use codex_protocol::exec_output::StreamOutput;
use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxKind;
use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
use codex_protocol::protocol::Event;
use codex_protocol::protocol::EventMsg;
use codex_protocol::protocol::ExecCommandOutputDeltaEvent;
use codex_protocol::protocol::ExecOutputStream;
use codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
use codex_sandboxing::SandboxCommand;
use codex_sandboxing::SandboxManager;
use codex_sandboxing::SandboxTransformRequest;
use codex_sandboxing::SandboxType;
use codex_sandboxing::SandboxablePreference;
use codex_sandboxing::compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile;
use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
use codex_utils_pty::DEFAULT_OUTPUT_BYTES_CAP;
use codex_utils_pty::process_group::kill_child_process_group;
@@ -419,22 +418,17 @@ pub fn build_exec_request(
exec_req.windows_sandbox_level,
exec_req.network.is_some(),
);
let sandbox_policy = exec_req.compatibility_sandbox_policy();
exec_req.windows_sandbox_filesystem_overrides = if use_windows_elevated_backend {
resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
exec_req.sandbox,
&sandbox_policy,
&exec_req.file_system_sandbox_policy,
exec_req.network_sandbox_policy,
&exec_req.permission_profile,
sandbox_cwd,
use_windows_elevated_backend,
)
} else {
resolve_windows_restricted_token_filesystem_overrides(
exec_req.sandbox,
&sandbox_policy,
&exec_req.file_system_sandbox_policy,
exec_req.network_sandbox_policy,
&exec_req.permission_profile,
sandbox_cwd,
exec_req.windows_sandbox_level,
)
@@ -1004,34 +998,28 @@ async fn exec(
}
#[cfg_attr(not(target_os = "windows"), allow(dead_code))]
fn should_use_windows_restricted_token_sandbox(
sandbox: SandboxType,
sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
fn permission_profile_supports_windows_restricted_token_sandbox(
permission_profile: &PermissionProfile,
) -> bool {
sandbox == SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken
&& file_system_sandbox_policy.kind == FileSystemSandboxKind::Restricted
&& !matches!(
sandbox_policy,
SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess | SandboxPolicy::ExternalSandbox { .. }
)
match permission_profile {
PermissionProfile::Managed { file_system, .. } => {
!file_system.to_sandbox_policy().has_full_disk_write_access()
}
PermissionProfile::Disabled | PermissionProfile::External { .. } => false,
}
}
#[cfg_attr(not(test), allow(dead_code))]
pub(crate) fn unsupported_windows_restricted_token_sandbox_reason(
sandbox: SandboxType,
sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
permission_profile: &PermissionProfile,
sandbox_policy_cwd: &AbsolutePathBuf,
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel,
) -> Option<String> {
if windows_sandbox_level == WindowsSandboxLevel::Elevated {
resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
sandbox,
sandbox_policy,
file_system_sandbox_policy,
network_sandbox_policy,
permission_profile,
sandbox_policy_cwd,
windows_sandbox_level == WindowsSandboxLevel::Elevated,
)
@@ -1039,9 +1027,7 @@ pub(crate) fn unsupported_windows_restricted_token_sandbox_reason(
} else {
resolve_windows_restricted_token_filesystem_overrides(
sandbox,
sandbox_policy,
file_system_sandbox_policy,
network_sandbox_policy,
permission_profile,
sandbox_policy_cwd,
windows_sandbox_level,
)
@@ -1051,9 +1037,7 @@ pub(crate) fn unsupported_windows_restricted_token_sandbox_reason(
pub(crate) fn resolve_windows_restricted_token_filesystem_overrides(
sandbox: SandboxType,
sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
permission_profile: &PermissionProfile,
sandbox_policy_cwd: &AbsolutePathBuf,
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel,
) -> std::result::Result<Option<WindowsSandboxFilesystemOverrides>, String> {
@@ -1063,25 +1047,22 @@ pub(crate) fn resolve_windows_restricted_token_filesystem_overrides(
return Ok(None);
}
let (file_system_sandbox_policy, network_sandbox_policy) =
permission_profile.to_runtime_permissions();
let needs_direct_runtime_enforcement = file_system_sandbox_policy
.needs_direct_runtime_enforcement(network_sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy_cwd);
if should_use_windows_restricted_token_sandbox(
sandbox,
sandbox_policy,
file_system_sandbox_policy,
) && !needs_direct_runtime_enforcement
if permission_profile_supports_windows_restricted_token_sandbox(permission_profile)
&& !needs_direct_runtime_enforcement
{
return Ok(None);
}
if !should_use_windows_restricted_token_sandbox(
sandbox,
sandbox_policy,
file_system_sandbox_policy,
) {
if !permission_profile_supports_windows_restricted_token_sandbox(permission_profile) {
let permission_profile_name = permission_profile_display_name(permission_profile);
return Err(format!(
"windows sandbox backend cannot enforce file_system={:?}, network={network_sandbox_policy:?}, legacy_policy={sandbox_policy:?}; refusing to run unsandboxed",
"windows sandbox backend cannot enforce file_system={:?}, network={network_sandbox_policy:?}, permission_profile={permission_profile_name}; refusing to run unsandboxed",
file_system_sandbox_policy.kind,
));
}
@@ -1090,7 +1071,7 @@ pub(crate) fn resolve_windows_restricted_token_filesystem_overrides(
// but its WRITE_RESTRICTED token does not make capability SID deny-read ACEs
// participate in read access checks. Read restrictions therefore require the
// elevated backend, even when the filesystem root remains readable.
if !windows_policy_has_root_read_access(file_system_sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy_cwd) {
if !windows_policy_has_root_read_access(&file_system_sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy_cwd) {
return Err(
"windows unelevated restricted-token sandbox cannot enforce split filesystem read restrictions directly; refusing to run unsandboxed"
.to_string(),
@@ -1098,7 +1079,7 @@ pub(crate) fn resolve_windows_restricted_token_filesystem_overrides(
}
let additional_deny_read_paths = codex_windows_sandbox::resolve_windows_deny_read_paths(
file_system_sandbox_policy,
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
sandbox_policy_cwd,
)?;
if !additional_deny_read_paths.is_empty() {
@@ -1108,7 +1089,11 @@ pub(crate) fn resolve_windows_restricted_token_filesystem_overrides(
);
}
let legacy_writable_roots = sandbox_policy.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(sandbox_policy_cwd);
let legacy_projection = compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(
permission_profile,
sandbox_policy_cwd.as_path(),
);
let legacy_writable_roots = legacy_projection.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(sandbox_policy_cwd);
let split_writable_roots =
file_system_sandbox_policy.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(sandbox_policy_cwd);
let legacy_root_paths: BTreeSet<PathBuf> = legacy_writable_roots
@@ -1204,9 +1189,7 @@ fn windows_policy_has_root_read_access(
pub(crate) fn resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
sandbox: SandboxType,
sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
permission_profile: &PermissionProfile,
sandbox_policy_cwd: &AbsolutePathBuf,
use_windows_elevated_backend: bool,
) -> std::result::Result<Option<WindowsSandboxFilesystemOverrides>, String> {
@@ -1214,19 +1197,19 @@ pub(crate) fn resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
return Ok(None);
}
if !should_use_windows_restricted_token_sandbox(
sandbox,
sandbox_policy,
file_system_sandbox_policy,
) {
let (file_system_sandbox_policy, network_sandbox_policy) =
permission_profile.to_runtime_permissions();
if !permission_profile_supports_windows_restricted_token_sandbox(permission_profile) {
let permission_profile_name = permission_profile_display_name(permission_profile);
return Err(format!(
"windows sandbox backend cannot enforce file_system={:?}, network={network_sandbox_policy:?}, legacy_policy={sandbox_policy:?}; refusing to run unsandboxed",
"windows sandbox backend cannot enforce file_system={:?}, network={network_sandbox_policy:?}, permission_profile={permission_profile_name}; refusing to run unsandboxed",
file_system_sandbox_policy.kind,
));
}
let additional_deny_read_paths = codex_windows_sandbox::resolve_windows_deny_read_paths(
file_system_sandbox_policy,
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
sandbox_policy_cwd,
)?;
@@ -1242,7 +1225,11 @@ pub(crate) fn resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
let needs_direct_runtime_enforcement = file_system_sandbox_policy
.needs_direct_runtime_enforcement(network_sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy_cwd);
let normalize_path = |path: PathBuf| dunce::canonicalize(&path).unwrap_or(path);
let legacy_writable_roots = sandbox_policy.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(sandbox_policy_cwd);
let legacy_projection = compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(
permission_profile,
sandbox_policy_cwd.as_path(),
);
let legacy_writable_roots = legacy_projection.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(sandbox_policy_cwd);
let legacy_root_paths: BTreeSet<PathBuf> = legacy_writable_roots
.iter()
.map(|root| normalize_path(root.root.to_path_buf()))
@@ -1264,7 +1251,7 @@ pub(crate) fn resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
// whether the baseline still reads from the filesystem root and only needs
// additional deny ACLs layered on top.
let split_has_root_read_access =
windows_policy_has_root_read_access(file_system_sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy_cwd);
windows_policy_has_root_read_access(&file_system_sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy_cwd);
let read_roots_override = if split_has_root_read_access {
None
} else {
@@ -1329,6 +1316,14 @@ pub(crate) fn resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
}))
}
fn permission_profile_display_name(permission_profile: &PermissionProfile) -> &'static str {
match permission_profile {
PermissionProfile::Managed { .. } => "Managed",
PermissionProfile::Disabled => "Disabled",
PermissionProfile::External { .. } => "External",
}
}
fn has_reopened_writable_descendant(
writable_roots: &[codex_protocol::protocol::WritableRoot],
) -> bool {
codex-rs/core/src/exec_tests.rs
+106 -133
View File
@@ -379,34 +379,18 @@ async fn process_exec_tool_call_preserves_full_buffer_capture_policy() -> Result
#[test]
fn windows_restricted_token_skips_external_sandbox_policies() {
let policy = SandboxPolicy::ExternalSandbox {
network_access: codex_protocol::protocol::NetworkAccess::Restricted,
let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::External {
network: NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
};
let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&policy);
assert_eq!(
should_use_windows_restricted_token_sandbox(
SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
&policy,
&file_system_policy,
),
false
);
assert!(!permission_profile_supports_windows_restricted_token_sandbox(&permission_profile));
}
#[test]
fn windows_restricted_token_runs_for_legacy_restricted_policies() {
let policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&policy);
fn windows_restricted_token_supports_read_only_profiles() {
let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::read_only();
assert_eq!(
should_use_windows_restricted_token_sandbox(
SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
&policy,
&file_system_policy,
),
true
);
assert!(permission_profile_supports_windows_restricted_token_sandbox(&permission_profile));
}
#[test]
@@ -427,39 +411,64 @@ fn windows_proxy_enforcement_uses_elevated_backend() {
#[test]
fn windows_restricted_token_rejects_network_only_restrictions() {
let policy = SandboxPolicy::ExternalSandbox {
network_access: codex_protocol::protocol::NetworkAccess::Restricted,
};
let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::unrestricted();
let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
&FileSystemSandboxPolicy::unrestricted(),
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
);
let sandbox_policy_cwd = AbsolutePathBuf::current_dir().expect("cwd");
assert_eq!(
unsupported_windows_restricted_token_sandbox_reason(
SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
&policy,
&file_system_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
&permission_profile,
&sandbox_policy_cwd,
WindowsSandboxLevel::RestrictedToken,
),
Some(
"windows sandbox backend cannot enforce file_system=Unrestricted, network=Restricted, legacy_policy=ExternalSandbox { network_access: Restricted }; refusing to run unsandboxed".to_string()
"windows sandbox backend cannot enforce file_system=Unrestricted, network=Restricted, permission_profile=Managed; refusing to run unsandboxed".to_string()
)
);
}
#[test]
fn windows_restricted_token_allows_legacy_restricted_policies() {
let policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&policy);
fn windows_restricted_token_rejects_managed_root_write_profiles() {
let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Special {
value: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
},
access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
},
]);
let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
&file_system_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
);
let sandbox_policy_cwd = AbsolutePathBuf::current_dir().expect("cwd");
assert_eq!(
unsupported_windows_restricted_token_sandbox_reason(
SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
&policy,
&file_system_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
&permission_profile,
&sandbox_policy_cwd,
WindowsSandboxLevel::RestrictedToken,
),
Some(
"windows sandbox backend cannot enforce file_system=Restricted, network=Restricted, permission_profile=Managed; refusing to run unsandboxed"
.to_string()
)
);
}
#[test]
fn windows_restricted_token_allows_read_only_profiles() {
let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::read_only();
let sandbox_policy_cwd = AbsolutePathBuf::current_dir().expect("cwd");
assert_eq!(
unsupported_windows_restricted_token_sandbox_reason(
SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
&permission_profile,
&sandbox_policy_cwd,
WindowsSandboxLevel::RestrictedToken,
),
@@ -468,22 +477,19 @@ fn windows_restricted_token_allows_legacy_restricted_policies() {
}
#[test]
fn windows_restricted_token_allows_legacy_workspace_write_policies() {
let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
};
let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&policy);
fn windows_restricted_token_allows_workspace_write_profiles() {
let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::workspace_write_with(
&[],
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
/*exclude_tmpdir_env_var*/ true,
/*exclude_slash_tmp*/ true,
);
let sandbox_policy_cwd = AbsolutePathBuf::current_dir().expect("cwd");
assert_eq!(
unsupported_windows_restricted_token_sandbox_reason(
SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
&policy,
&file_system_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
&permission_profile,
&sandbox_policy_cwd,
WindowsSandboxLevel::RestrictedToken,
),
@@ -499,22 +505,21 @@ fn windows_elevated_allows_split_restricted_read_policies() {
)
.expect("absolute docs");
std::fs::create_dir_all(docs.as_path()).expect("create docs");
let policy = SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly {
network_access: false,
};
let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Path { path: docs },
access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
},
]);
let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
&file_system_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
);
assert_eq!(
unsupported_windows_restricted_token_sandbox_reason(
SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
&policy,
&file_system_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
&permission_profile,
&temp_dir.path().abs(),
WindowsSandboxLevel::Elevated,
),
@@ -527,12 +532,6 @@ fn windows_restricted_token_rejects_split_only_filesystem_policies() {
let temp_dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
let docs = temp_dir.path().join("docs");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&docs).expect("create docs");
let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
};
let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Special {
@@ -550,13 +549,15 @@ fn windows_restricted_token_rejects_split_only_filesystem_policies() {
access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
},
]);
let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
&file_system_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
);
assert_eq!(
unsupported_windows_restricted_token_sandbox_reason(
SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
&policy,
&file_system_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
&permission_profile,
&temp_dir.path().abs(),
WindowsSandboxLevel::RestrictedToken,
),
@@ -572,12 +573,6 @@ fn windows_restricted_token_rejects_root_write_read_only_carveouts() {
let temp_dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
let docs = temp_dir.path().join("docs");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&docs).expect("create docs");
let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
};
let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Special {
@@ -593,13 +588,15 @@ fn windows_restricted_token_rejects_root_write_read_only_carveouts() {
access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
},
]);
let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
&file_system_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
);
assert_eq!(
unsupported_windows_restricted_token_sandbox_reason(
SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
&policy,
&file_system_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
&permission_profile,
&temp_dir.path().abs(),
WindowsSandboxLevel::RestrictedToken,
),
@@ -618,12 +615,6 @@ fn windows_restricted_token_supports_full_read_split_write_read_carveouts() {
.abs();
let docs = cwd.join("docs");
std::fs::create_dir_all(docs.as_path()).expect("create docs");
let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
};
let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Special {
@@ -644,17 +635,20 @@ fn windows_restricted_token_supports_full_read_split_write_read_carveouts() {
access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
},
]);
let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
&file_system_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
);
// The legacy workspace-write root already protects top-level `.codex`, so
// the restricted-token overlay only needs the extra read-only docs carveout.
// The workspace-write compatibility projection already protects top-level
// `.codex`, so the restricted-token overlay only needs the extra read-only
// docs carveout.
let expected_deny_write_paths = vec![docs];
assert_eq!(
resolve_windows_restricted_token_filesystem_overrides(
SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
&policy,
&file_system_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
&permission_profile,
&cwd,
WindowsSandboxLevel::RestrictedToken,
),
@@ -676,12 +670,6 @@ fn windows_restricted_token_rejects_unreadable_split_carveouts() {
.abs();
let blocked = cwd.join("blocked");
std::fs::create_dir_all(blocked.as_path()).expect("create blocked");
let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
};
let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Special {
@@ -702,13 +690,15 @@ fn windows_restricted_token_rejects_unreadable_split_carveouts() {
access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Deny,
},
]);
let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
&file_system_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
);
assert_eq!(
resolve_windows_restricted_token_filesystem_overrides(
SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
&policy,
&file_system_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
&permission_profile,
&cwd,
WindowsSandboxLevel::RestrictedToken,
),
@@ -725,9 +715,6 @@ fn windows_elevated_supports_split_restricted_read_roots() {
let docs = temp_dir.path().join("docs");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&docs).expect("create docs");
let expected_docs = dunce::canonicalize(&docs).expect("canonical docs");
let policy = SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly {
network_access: false,
};
let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Path {
@@ -737,13 +724,15 @@ fn windows_elevated_supports_split_restricted_read_roots() {
access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
},
]);
let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
&file_system_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
);
assert_eq!(
resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
&policy,
&file_system_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
&permission_profile,
&temp_dir.path().abs(),
/*use_windows_elevated_backend*/ true,
),
@@ -763,12 +752,6 @@ fn windows_elevated_supports_split_write_read_carveouts() {
let docs = temp_dir.path().join("docs");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&docs).expect("create docs");
let expected_docs = dunce::canonicalize(&docs).expect("canonical docs");
let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
};
let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Special {
@@ -792,13 +775,15 @@ fn windows_elevated_supports_split_write_read_carveouts() {
access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
},
]);
let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
&file_system_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
);
assert_eq!(
resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
&policy,
&file_system_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
&permission_profile,
&temp_dir.path().abs(),
/*use_windows_elevated_backend*/ true,
),
@@ -821,12 +806,6 @@ fn windows_elevated_supports_unreadable_split_carveouts() {
let blocked = temp_dir.path().join("blocked");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&blocked).expect("create blocked");
let expected_blocked = dunce::canonicalize(&blocked).expect("canonical blocked");
let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
};
let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Special {
@@ -850,13 +829,15 @@ fn windows_elevated_supports_unreadable_split_carveouts() {
access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Deny,
},
]);
let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
&file_system_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
);
assert_eq!(
resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
&policy,
&file_system_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
&permission_profile,
&temp_dir.path().abs(),
/*use_windows_elevated_backend*/ true,
),
@@ -884,12 +865,6 @@ fn windows_elevated_supports_unreadable_globs() {
let secret = temp_dir.path().join("app").join(".env");
std::fs::create_dir_all(secret.parent().expect("parent")).expect("create parent");
std::fs::write(&secret, "secret").expect("write secret");
let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
};
let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Special {
@@ -912,13 +887,15 @@ fn windows_elevated_supports_unreadable_globs() {
access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Deny,
},
]);
let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
&file_system_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
);
assert_eq!(
resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
&policy,
&file_system_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
&permission_profile,
&temp_dir.path().abs(),
/*use_windows_elevated_backend*/ true,
),
@@ -941,12 +918,6 @@ fn windows_elevated_rejects_reopened_writable_descendants() {
let docs = temp_dir.path().join("docs");
let nested = docs.join("nested");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&nested).expect("create nested");
let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
};
let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Special {
@@ -977,13 +948,15 @@ fn windows_elevated_rejects_reopened_writable_descendants() {
access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
},
]);
let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
&file_system_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
);
assert_eq!(
unsupported_windows_restricted_token_sandbox_reason(
SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
&policy,
&file_system_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
&permission_profile,
&temp_dir.path().abs(),
WindowsSandboxLevel::Elevated,
),
codex-rs/core/src/sandboxing/mod.rs
-11
View File
@@ -22,10 +22,8 @@ use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
pub use codex_protocol::models::SandboxPermissions;
use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
use codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
use codex_sandboxing::SandboxExecRequest;
use codex_sandboxing::SandboxType;
use codex_sandboxing::compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile;
use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
use std::collections::HashMap;
@@ -102,15 +100,6 @@ impl ExecRequest {
}
}
pub(crate) fn compatibility_sandbox_policy(&self) -> SandboxPolicy {
compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(
&self.permission_profile,
&self.file_system_sandbox_policy,
self.network_sandbox_policy,
self.windows_sandbox_policy_cwd.as_path(),
)
}
pub(crate) fn from_sandbox_exec_request(
request: SandboxExecRequest,
options: ExecOptions,
codex-rs/core/src/session/session.rs
+5 -11
View File
@@ -150,17 +150,11 @@ impl SessionConfiguration {
}
pub(super) fn sandbox_policy(&self) -> SandboxPolicy {
self.permission_profile()
.to_legacy_sandbox_policy(&self.cwd)
.unwrap_or_else(|_| {
let file_system_sandbox_policy = self.file_system_sandbox_policy();
codex_sandboxing::compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(
self.permission_profile_state.permission_profile(),
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
self.network_sandbox_policy(),
&self.cwd,
)
})
let permission_profile = self.permission_profile();
codex_sandboxing::compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(
&permission_profile,
&self.cwd,
)
}
pub(super) fn file_system_sandbox_policy(&self) -> FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
codex-rs/core/src/session/turn_context.rs
-4
View File
@@ -124,12 +124,8 @@ impl TurnContext {
}
pub(crate) fn sandbox_policy(&self) -> SandboxPolicy {
let file_system_sandbox_policy = self.file_system_sandbox_policy();
let network_sandbox_policy = self.network_sandbox_policy();
compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(
&self.permission_profile,
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
network_sandbox_policy,
#[allow(deprecated)]
&self.cwd,
)
codex-rs/core/src/spawn.rs
+1 -1
View File
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ pub enum StdioPolicy {
Inherit,
}
/// Spawns the appropriate child process for the ExecParams and SandboxPolicy,
/// Spawns the appropriate child process for the exec params and sandbox settings,
/// ensuring the args and environment variables used to create the `Command`
/// (and `Child`) honor the configuration.
///
codex-rs/sandboxing/src/manager.rs
+2 -3
View File
@@ -290,19 +290,18 @@ impl SandboxManager {
pub fn compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(
permissions: &PermissionProfile,
file_system_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
network_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
cwd: &Path,
) -> SandboxPolicy {
permissions
.to_legacy_sandbox_policy(cwd)
.unwrap_or_else(|_| {
let (file_system_policy, network_policy) = permissions.to_runtime_permissions();
compatibility_workspace_write_policy(file_system_policy, network_policy, cwd)
})
}
fn compatibility_workspace_write_policy(
file_system_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
file_system_policy: FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
network_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
cwd: &Path,
) -> SandboxPolicy {