feat: merge skill permission profiles into the turn sandbox for zsh-fork execs (#13496)

## Summary

This changes the Unix shell escalation path for skill-matched
executables to apply a skill's `PermissionProfile` as additive
permissions on top of the existing turn/request sandbox policy.

Previously, skill-matched executables compiled the skill permission
profile into a standalone sandbox policy and executed against that
replacement policy. Now they go through the same
`additional_permissions` merge path used elsewhere in shell sandbox
preparation.

## What Changed

- Changed `skill_escalation_execution()` to return
`EscalationPermissions::PermissionProfile(...)` for non-empty skill
permission profiles.
- Kept empty or missing skill permission profiles on the `TurnDefault`
path.
- Added tests covering the new additive skill-permission behavior.
- Added inline comments in `prepare_escalated_exec()` clarifying the
difference between additive permission merging and fully specified
replacement sandbox policies.
- Removed the now-unused skill permission compiler module after
switching this path away from standalone compiled skill sandbox
policies.

## Testing

- Ran `just fmt` in `codex-rs`
- Ran `cargo test -p codex-core`

`cargo test -p codex-core` still hits an unrelated existing failure:
`shell_snapshot::tests::snapshot_shell_does_not_inherit_stdin`

## Follow-up

This change intentionally does not merge skill-specific macOS seatbelt
profile extensions through the `additional_permissions` path yet.
Filesystem and network permissions now follow the additive merge path,
but seatbelt extension permissions still need separate handling in a
follow-up PR.
This commit is contained in:
Celia Chen
2026-03-05 12:05:35 -08:00
committed by GitHub
Unverified
parent 9fcbbeb5ae
commit a63624a61a
4 changed files with 118 additions and 503 deletions
-1
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ pub(crate) mod invocation_utils;
pub mod loader;
pub mod manager;
pub mod model;
pub mod permissions;
pub mod remote;
pub mod render;
pub mod system;
-454
View File
@@ -1,454 +0,0 @@
#[cfg(any(unix, test))]
use std::collections::HashSet;
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
use codex_protocol::models::MacOsAutomationValue;
#[cfg(any(unix, test))]
use codex_protocol::models::MacOsPermissions;
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
use codex_protocol::models::MacOsPreferencesValue;
#[cfg(any(unix, test))]
use codex_protocol::models::MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions;
#[cfg(any(unix, test))]
use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
#[cfg(any(unix, test))]
use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
#[cfg(any(unix, test))]
use dunce::canonicalize as canonicalize_path;
#[cfg(any(unix, test))]
use tracing::warn;
#[cfg(any(unix, test))]
use crate::config::Constrained;
#[cfg(any(unix, test))]
use crate::config::Permissions;
#[cfg(any(unix, test))]
use crate::config::types::ShellEnvironmentPolicy;
#[cfg(any(unix, test))]
use crate::protocol::AskForApproval;
#[cfg(any(unix, test))]
use crate::protocol::ReadOnlyAccess;
#[cfg(any(unix, test))]
use crate::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
/// Compiles a skill `PermissionProfile` for the Unix shell escalation path.
///
/// Normal Windows builds do not currently call this helper, so it is only
/// compiled on Unix and in tests.
#[cfg(any(unix, test))]
pub(crate) fn compile_permission_profile(
permissions: Option<PermissionProfile>,
) -> Option<Permissions> {
let PermissionProfile {
network,
file_system,
macos,
} = permissions?;
let network_access = network.and_then(|value| value.enabled).unwrap_or_default();
let file_system = file_system.unwrap_or_default();
let fs_read = normalize_permission_paths(
file_system.read.as_deref().unwrap_or_default(),
"permissions.file_system.read",
);
let fs_write = normalize_permission_paths(
file_system.write.as_deref().unwrap_or_default(),
"permissions.file_system.write",
);
let sandbox_policy = if !fs_write.is_empty() {
SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: fs_write,
read_only_access: if fs_read.is_empty() {
ReadOnlyAccess::FullAccess
} else {
ReadOnlyAccess::Restricted {
include_platform_defaults: true,
readable_roots: fs_read,
}
},
network_access,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: false,
exclude_slash_tmp: false,
}
} else if !fs_read.is_empty() {
SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly {
access: ReadOnlyAccess::Restricted {
include_platform_defaults: true,
readable_roots: fs_read,
},
network_access,
}
} else if network_access {
SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly {
access: ReadOnlyAccess::FullAccess,
network_access: true,
}
} else {
// Default sandbox policy
SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy()
};
let macos_permissions = macos.unwrap_or_default();
let macos_seatbelt_profile_extensions =
build_macos_seatbelt_profile_extensions(&macos_permissions);
Some(Permissions {
approval_policy: Constrained::allow_any(AskForApproval::Never),
sandbox_policy: Constrained::allow_any(sandbox_policy),
network: None,
allow_login_shell: true,
shell_environment_policy: ShellEnvironmentPolicy::default(),
windows_sandbox_mode: None,
macos_seatbelt_profile_extensions,
})
}
#[cfg(any(unix, test))]
fn normalize_permission_paths(values: &[AbsolutePathBuf], field: &str) -> Vec<AbsolutePathBuf> {
let mut paths = Vec::new();
let mut seen = HashSet::new();
for value in values {
let Some(path) = normalize_permission_path(value, field) else {
continue;
};
if seen.insert(path.clone()) {
paths.push(path);
}
}
paths
}
#[cfg(any(unix, test))]
fn normalize_permission_path(value: &AbsolutePathBuf, field: &str) -> Option<AbsolutePathBuf> {
let canonicalized = canonicalize_path(value.as_path()).unwrap_or_else(|_| value.to_path_buf());
match AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(&canonicalized) {
Ok(path) => Some(path),
Err(error) => {
warn!("ignoring {field}: expected absolute path, got {canonicalized:?}: {error}");
None
}
}
}
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
fn build_macos_seatbelt_profile_extensions(
permissions: &MacOsPermissions,
) -> Option<MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions> {
let defaults = MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions::default();
let extensions = MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions {
macos_preferences: resolve_macos_preferences_permission(
permissions.preferences.as_ref(),
defaults.macos_preferences,
),
macos_automation: resolve_macos_automation_permission(
permissions.automations.as_ref(),
defaults.macos_automation,
),
macos_accessibility: permissions
.accessibility
.unwrap_or(defaults.macos_accessibility),
macos_calendar: permissions.calendar.unwrap_or(defaults.macos_calendar),
};
Some(extensions)
}
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
fn resolve_macos_preferences_permission(
value: Option<&MacOsPreferencesValue>,
default: crate::seatbelt_permissions::MacOsPreferencesPermission,
) -> crate::seatbelt_permissions::MacOsPreferencesPermission {
use crate::seatbelt_permissions::MacOsPreferencesPermission;
match value {
Some(MacOsPreferencesValue::Bool(true)) => MacOsPreferencesPermission::ReadOnly,
Some(MacOsPreferencesValue::Bool(false)) => MacOsPreferencesPermission::None,
Some(MacOsPreferencesValue::Mode(mode)) => {
let mode = mode.trim();
if mode.eq_ignore_ascii_case("readonly") || mode.eq_ignore_ascii_case("read-only") {
MacOsPreferencesPermission::ReadOnly
} else if mode.eq_ignore_ascii_case("readwrite")
|| mode.eq_ignore_ascii_case("read-write")
{
MacOsPreferencesPermission::ReadWrite
} else {
warn!(
"ignoring permissions.macos.preferences: expected true/false, readonly, or readwrite"
);
default
}
}
None => default,
}
}
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
fn resolve_macos_automation_permission(
value: Option<&MacOsAutomationValue>,
default: crate::seatbelt_permissions::MacOsAutomationPermission,
) -> crate::seatbelt_permissions::MacOsAutomationPermission {
use crate::seatbelt_permissions::MacOsAutomationPermission;
match value {
Some(MacOsAutomationValue::Bool(true)) => MacOsAutomationPermission::All,
Some(MacOsAutomationValue::Bool(false)) => MacOsAutomationPermission::None,
Some(MacOsAutomationValue::BundleIds(bundle_ids)) => {
let bundle_ids = bundle_ids
.iter()
.map(|bundle_id| bundle_id.trim())
.filter(|bundle_id| !bundle_id.is_empty())
.map(ToOwned::to_owned)
.collect::<Vec<String>>();
if bundle_ids.is_empty() {
MacOsAutomationPermission::None
} else {
MacOsAutomationPermission::BundleIds(bundle_ids)
}
}
None => default,
}
}
#[cfg(all(not(target_os = "macos"), any(unix, test)))]
fn build_macos_seatbelt_profile_extensions(
_: &MacOsPermissions,
) -> Option<MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions> {
None
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::compile_permission_profile;
use crate::config::Constrained;
use crate::config::Permissions;
use crate::config::types::ShellEnvironmentPolicy;
use crate::protocol::AskForApproval;
use crate::protocol::ReadOnlyAccess;
use crate::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
use codex_protocol::models::FileSystemPermissions;
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
use codex_protocol::models::MacOsAutomationValue;
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
use codex_protocol::models::MacOsPermissions;
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
use codex_protocol::models::MacOsPreferencesValue;
use codex_protocol::models::NetworkPermissions;
use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
use std::fs;
use std::path::Path;
fn absolute_path(path: &Path) -> AbsolutePathBuf {
AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(path).expect("absolute path")
}
#[test]
fn compile_permission_profile_normalizes_paths() {
let tempdir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
let skill_dir = tempdir.path().join("skill");
fs::create_dir_all(skill_dir.join("scripts")).expect("skill dir");
let read_dir = skill_dir.join("data");
fs::create_dir_all(&read_dir).expect("read dir");
let profile = compile_permission_profile(Some(PermissionProfile {
network: Some(NetworkPermissions {
enabled: Some(true),
}),
file_system: Some(FileSystemPermissions {
read: Some(vec![
absolute_path(&skill_dir.join("data")),
absolute_path(&skill_dir.join("data")),
absolute_path(&skill_dir.join("scripts/../data")),
]),
write: Some(vec![absolute_path(&skill_dir.join("output"))]),
}),
..Default::default()
}))
.expect("profile");
assert_eq!(
profile,
Permissions {
approval_policy: Constrained::allow_any(AskForApproval::Never),
sandbox_policy: Constrained::allow_any(SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![
AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(skill_dir.join("output"))
.expect("absolute output path")
],
read_only_access: ReadOnlyAccess::Restricted {
include_platform_defaults: true,
readable_roots: vec![
AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(
dunce::canonicalize(&read_dir).unwrap_or(read_dir)
)
.expect("absolute read path")
],
},
network_access: true,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: false,
exclude_slash_tmp: false,
}),
network: None,
allow_login_shell: true,
shell_environment_policy: ShellEnvironmentPolicy::default(),
windows_sandbox_mode: None,
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
macos_seatbelt_profile_extensions: Some(
crate::seatbelt_permissions::MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions::default(),
),
#[cfg(not(target_os = "macos"))]
macos_seatbelt_profile_extensions: None,
}
);
}
#[test]
fn compile_permission_profile_without_permissions_has_empty_profile() {
let tempdir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
let skill_dir = tempdir.path().join("skill");
fs::create_dir_all(&skill_dir).expect("skill dir");
let profile = compile_permission_profile(None);
assert_eq!(profile, None);
}
#[test]
fn compile_permission_profile_with_network_only_uses_read_only_policy() {
let tempdir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
let skill_dir = tempdir.path().join("skill");
fs::create_dir_all(&skill_dir).expect("skill dir");
let profile = compile_permission_profile(Some(PermissionProfile {
network: Some(NetworkPermissions {
enabled: Some(true),
}),
..Default::default()
}))
.expect("profile");
assert_eq!(
profile,
Permissions {
approval_policy: Constrained::allow_any(AskForApproval::Never),
sandbox_policy: Constrained::allow_any(SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly {
access: ReadOnlyAccess::FullAccess,
network_access: true,
}),
network: None,
allow_login_shell: true,
shell_environment_policy: ShellEnvironmentPolicy::default(),
windows_sandbox_mode: None,
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
macos_seatbelt_profile_extensions: Some(
crate::seatbelt_permissions::MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions::default(),
),
#[cfg(not(target_os = "macos"))]
macos_seatbelt_profile_extensions: None,
}
);
}
#[test]
fn compile_permission_profile_with_network_and_read_only_paths_uses_read_only_policy() {
let tempdir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
let skill_dir = tempdir.path().join("skill");
let read_dir = skill_dir.join("data");
fs::create_dir_all(&read_dir).expect("read dir");
let profile = compile_permission_profile(Some(PermissionProfile {
network: Some(NetworkPermissions {
enabled: Some(true),
}),
file_system: Some(FileSystemPermissions {
read: Some(vec![absolute_path(&skill_dir.join("data"))]),
write: Some(Vec::new()),
}),
..Default::default()
}))
.expect("profile");
assert_eq!(
profile,
Permissions {
approval_policy: Constrained::allow_any(AskForApproval::Never),
sandbox_policy: Constrained::allow_any(SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly {
access: ReadOnlyAccess::Restricted {
include_platform_defaults: true,
readable_roots: vec![
AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(
dunce::canonicalize(&read_dir).unwrap_or(read_dir)
)
.expect("absolute read path")
],
},
network_access: true,
}),
network: None,
allow_login_shell: true,
shell_environment_policy: ShellEnvironmentPolicy::default(),
windows_sandbox_mode: None,
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
macos_seatbelt_profile_extensions: Some(
crate::seatbelt_permissions::MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions::default(),
),
#[cfg(not(target_os = "macos"))]
macos_seatbelt_profile_extensions: None,
}
);
}
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
#[test]
fn compile_permission_profile_builds_macos_permission_file() {
let tempdir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
let skill_dir = tempdir.path().join("skill");
fs::create_dir_all(&skill_dir).expect("skill dir");
let profile = compile_permission_profile(Some(PermissionProfile {
macos: Some(MacOsPermissions {
preferences: Some(MacOsPreferencesValue::Mode("readwrite".to_string())),
automations: Some(MacOsAutomationValue::BundleIds(vec![
"com.apple.Notes".to_string(),
])),
accessibility: Some(true),
calendar: Some(true),
}),
..Default::default()
}))
.expect("profile");
assert_eq!(
profile.macos_seatbelt_profile_extensions,
Some(
crate::seatbelt_permissions::MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions {
macos_preferences:
crate::seatbelt_permissions::MacOsPreferencesPermission::ReadWrite,
macos_automation:
crate::seatbelt_permissions::MacOsAutomationPermission::BundleIds(vec![
"com.apple.Notes".to_string()
],),
macos_accessibility: true,
macos_calendar: true,
}
)
);
}
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
#[test]
fn compile_permission_profile_uses_macos_defaults_when_values_missing() {
let tempdir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
let skill_dir = tempdir.path().join("skill");
fs::create_dir_all(&skill_dir).expect("skill dir");
let profile =
compile_permission_profile(Some(PermissionProfile::default())).expect("profile");
assert_eq!(
profile.macos_seatbelt_profile_extensions,
Some(crate::seatbelt_permissions::MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions::default())
);
}
}
@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ use crate::sandboxing::ExecRequest;
use crate::sandboxing::SandboxPermissions;
use crate::shell::ShellType;
use crate::skills::SkillMetadata;
use crate::skills::permissions::compile_permission_profile;
use crate::tools::runtimes::ExecveSessionApproval;
use crate::tools::runtimes::build_command_spec;
use crate::tools::sandboxing::SandboxAttempt;
@@ -332,18 +331,14 @@ impl CoreShellActionProvider {
}
fn skill_escalation_execution(skill: &SkillMetadata) -> EscalationExecution {
compile_permission_profile(skill.permission_profile.clone())
.map(|permissions| {
EscalationExecution::Permissions(EscalationPermissions::Permissions(
EscalatedPermissions {
sandbox_policy: permissions.sandbox_policy.get().clone(),
macos_seatbelt_profile_extensions: permissions
.macos_seatbelt_profile_extensions
.clone(),
},
))
})
.unwrap_or(EscalationExecution::TurnDefault)
let permission_profile = skill.permission_profile.clone().unwrap_or_default();
if permission_profile.is_empty() {
EscalationExecution::TurnDefault
} else {
EscalationExecution::Permissions(EscalationPermissions::PermissionProfile(
permission_profile,
))
}
}
async fn prompt(
@@ -741,11 +736,22 @@ struct CoreShellCommandExecutor {
justification: Option<String>,
arg0: Option<String>,
sandbox_policy_cwd: PathBuf,
#[cfg_attr(not(target_os = "macos"), allow(dead_code))]
macos_seatbelt_profile_extensions: Option<MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions>,
codex_linux_sandbox_exe: Option<PathBuf>,
use_linux_sandbox_bwrap: bool,
}
struct PrepareSandboxedExecParams<'a> {
command: Vec<String>,
workdir: &'a AbsolutePathBuf,
env: HashMap<String, String>,
sandbox_policy: &'a SandboxPolicy,
additional_permissions: Option<PermissionProfile>,
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
macos_seatbelt_profile_extensions: Option<&'a MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions>,
}
#[async_trait::async_trait]
impl ShellCommandExecutor for CoreShellCommandExecutor {
async fn run(
@@ -816,33 +822,46 @@ impl ShellCommandExecutor for CoreShellCommandExecutor {
env,
arg0: Some(first_arg.clone()),
},
EscalationExecution::TurnDefault => self.prepare_sandboxed_exec(
command,
workdir,
env,
&self.sandbox_policy,
None,
self.macos_seatbelt_profile_extensions.as_ref(),
)?,
EscalationExecution::Permissions(EscalationPermissions::PermissionProfile(
permission_profile,
)) => self.prepare_sandboxed_exec(
command,
workdir,
env,
&self.sandbox_policy,
Some(permission_profile),
None,
)?,
EscalationExecution::Permissions(EscalationPermissions::Permissions(permissions)) => {
self.prepare_sandboxed_exec(
EscalationExecution::TurnDefault => {
self.prepare_sandboxed_exec(PrepareSandboxedExecParams {
command,
workdir,
env,
&permissions.sandbox_policy,
None,
permissions.macos_seatbelt_profile_extensions.as_ref(),
)?
sandbox_policy: &self.sandbox_policy,
additional_permissions: None,
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
macos_seatbelt_profile_extensions: self
.macos_seatbelt_profile_extensions
.as_ref(),
})?
}
EscalationExecution::Permissions(EscalationPermissions::PermissionProfile(
permission_profile,
)) => {
// Merge additive permissions into the existing turn/request sandbox policy.
self.prepare_sandboxed_exec(PrepareSandboxedExecParams {
command,
workdir,
env,
sandbox_policy: &self.sandbox_policy,
additional_permissions: Some(permission_profile),
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
macos_seatbelt_profile_extensions: None,
})?
}
EscalationExecution::Permissions(EscalationPermissions::Permissions(permissions)) => {
// Use a fully specified sandbox policy instead of merging into the turn policy.
self.prepare_sandboxed_exec(PrepareSandboxedExecParams {
command,
workdir,
env,
sandbox_policy: &permissions.sandbox_policy,
additional_permissions: None,
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
macos_seatbelt_profile_extensions: permissions
.macos_seatbelt_profile_extensions
.as_ref(),
})?
}
};
@@ -853,18 +872,17 @@ impl ShellCommandExecutor for CoreShellCommandExecutor {
impl CoreShellCommandExecutor {
fn prepare_sandboxed_exec(
&self,
command: Vec<String>,
workdir: &AbsolutePathBuf,
env: HashMap<String, String>,
sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
additional_permissions: Option<PermissionProfile>,
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")] macos_seatbelt_profile_extensions: Option<
&MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions,
>,
#[cfg(not(target_os = "macos"))] _macos_seatbelt_profile_extensions: Option<
&MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions,
>,
params: PrepareSandboxedExecParams<'_>,
) -> anyhow::Result<PreparedExec> {
let PrepareSandboxedExecParams {
command,
workdir,
env,
sandbox_policy,
additional_permissions,
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
macos_seatbelt_profile_extensions,
} = params;
let (program, args) = command
.split_first()
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("prepared command must not be empty"))?;
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ use crate::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
use crate::sandboxing::SandboxPermissions;
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
use crate::seatbelt::MACOS_PATH_TO_SEATBELT_EXECUTABLE;
use crate::skills::SkillMetadata;
use codex_execpolicy::Decision;
use codex_execpolicy::Evaluation;
use codex_execpolicy::PolicyParser;
@@ -30,6 +31,7 @@ use codex_protocol::models::FileSystemPermissions;
use codex_protocol::models::MacOsPreferencesPermission;
use codex_protocol::models::MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions;
use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::protocol::SkillScope;
use codex_shell_escalation::EscalationExecution;
use codex_shell_escalation::EscalationPermissions;
use codex_shell_escalation::ExecResult;
@@ -59,6 +61,20 @@ fn starlark_string(value: &str) -> String {
value.replace('\\', "\\\\").replace('"', "\\\"")
}
fn test_skill_metadata(permission_profile: Option<PermissionProfile>) -> SkillMetadata {
SkillMetadata {
name: "skill".to_string(),
description: "description".to_string(),
short_description: None,
interface: None,
dependencies: None,
policy: None,
permission_profile,
path_to_skills_md: PathBuf::from("/tmp/skill/SKILL.md"),
scope: SkillScope::User,
}
}
#[test]
fn extract_shell_script_preserves_login_flag() {
assert_eq!(
@@ -246,6 +262,42 @@ fn shell_request_escalation_execution_is_explicit() {
);
}
#[test]
fn skill_escalation_execution_uses_additional_permissions() {
let requested_permissions = PermissionProfile {
file_system: Some(FileSystemPermissions {
read: None,
write: Some(vec![
AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path("/tmp/output").unwrap(),
]),
}),
..Default::default()
};
assert_eq!(
CoreShellActionProvider::skill_escalation_execution(&test_skill_metadata(Some(
requested_permissions.clone(),
))),
EscalationExecution::Permissions(EscalationPermissions::PermissionProfile(
requested_permissions,
)),
);
}
#[test]
fn skill_escalation_execution_ignores_empty_permissions() {
assert_eq!(
CoreShellActionProvider::skill_escalation_execution(&test_skill_metadata(Some(
PermissionProfile::default(),
))),
EscalationExecution::TurnDefault,
);
assert_eq!(
CoreShellActionProvider::skill_escalation_execution(&test_skill_metadata(None)),
EscalationExecution::TurnDefault,
);
}
#[test]
fn evaluate_intercepted_exec_policy_uses_wrapper_command_when_shell_wrapper_parsing_disabled() {
let policy_src = r#"prefix_rule(pattern = ["npm", "publish"], decision = "prompt")"#;