Fix critical security vulnerability in amp-restrict-management-to-localhost
feature where attackers could bypass localhost restriction by spoofing
X-Forwarded-For headers.
Changes:
- Use RemoteAddr (actual TCP connection) instead of ClientIP() in
localhostOnlyMiddleware to prevent header spoofing attacks
- Add comprehensive test coverage for spoofing prevention (6 test cases)
- Update documentation with reverse proxy deployment guidance and
limitations of the RemoteAddr approach
The fix prevents attacks like:
curl -H "X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1" https://server/api/user
Trade-off: Users behind reverse proxies will need to disable the feature
and use alternative security measures (firewall rules, proxy ACLs).
Addresses security review feedback from PR #287.
- Update README.md to present Amp CLI as standard feature, not fork differentiator
- Remove USING_WITH_FACTORY_AND_AMP.md (fork-specific, Factory docs live upstream)
- Add comprehensive docs/amp-cli-integration.md with setup, config, troubleshooting
- Eliminate fork justification messaging throughout documentation
- Prepare Amp CLI integration for upstream merge consideration
This positions Amp CLI support as a natural extension of CLIProxyAPI's
multi-client architecture rather than a fork-specific feature.
