feat(amp): require API key authentication for management routes

All Amp management endpoints (e.g., /api/user, /threads) are now protected by the standard API key authentication middleware. This ensures that all management operations require a valid API key, significantly improving security.

As a result of this change:
- The `restrict-management-to-localhost` setting now defaults to `false`. API key authentication provides a stronger and more flexible security control than IP-based restrictions, improving usability in containerized environments.
- The reverse proxy logic now strips the client's `Authorization` header after authenticating the initial request. It then injects the configured `upstream-api-key` for the request to the upstream Amp service.

BREAKING CHANGE: Amp management endpoints now require a valid API key for authentication. Requests without a valid API key in the `Authorization` header will be rejected with a 401 Unauthorized error.

config.example.yaml

@@ -136,8 +136,8 @@ ws-auth: false
 #   upstream-url: "https://ampcode.com"
 #   # Optional: Override API key for Amp upstream (otherwise uses env or file)
 #   upstream-api-key: ""
-#   # Restrict Amp management routes (/api/auth, /api/user, etc.) to localhost only (recommended)
+#   # Restrict Amp management routes (/api/auth, /api/user, etc.) to localhost only (default: false)
-#   restrict-management-to-localhost: true
+#   restrict-management-to-localhost: false
 #   # Force model mappings to run before checking local API keys (default: false)
 #   force-model-mappings: false
 #   # Amp Model Mappings

internal/api/modules/amp/amp.go

@@ -137,7 +137,8 @@ func (m *AmpModule) Register(ctx modules.Context) error {
 		m.registerProviderAliases(ctx.Engine, ctx.BaseHandler, auth)
 
 		// Register management proxy routes once; middleware will gate access when upstream is unavailable.
-		m.registerManagementRoutes(ctx.Engine, ctx.BaseHandler)
+		// Pass auth middleware to require valid API key for all management routes.
+		m.registerManagementRoutes(ctx.Engine, ctx.BaseHandler, auth)
 
 		// If no upstream URL, skip proxy routes but provider aliases are still available
 		if upstreamURL == "" {
@@ -187,9 +188,6 @@ func (m *AmpModule) OnConfigUpdated(cfg *config.Config) error {
 
 	if oldSettings != nil && oldSettings.RestrictManagementToLocalhost != newSettings.RestrictManagementToLocalhost {
 		m.setRestrictToLocalhost(newSettings.RestrictManagementToLocalhost)
-		if !newSettings.RestrictManagementToLocalhost {
-			log.Warnf("amp management routes now accessible from any IP - this is insecure!")
-		}
 	}
 
 	newUpstreamURL := strings.TrimSpace(newSettings.UpstreamURL)

internal/api/modules/amp/fallback_handlers.go

@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ func logAmpRouting(routeType AmpRouteType, requestedModel, resolvedModel, provid
 		fields["cost"] = "amp_credits"
 		fields["source"] = "ampcode.com"
 		fields["model_id"] = requestedModel // Explicit model_id for easy config reference
-		log.WithFields(fields).Warnf("forwarding to ampcode.com (uses amp credits) - model_id: %s | To use local proxy, add to config: amp-model-mappings: [{from: \"%s\", to: \"<your-local-model>\"}]", requestedModel, requestedModel)
+		log.WithFields(fields).Warnf("forwarding to ampcode.com (uses amp credits) - model_id: %s | To use local provider, add to config: ampcode.model-mappings: [{from: \"%s\", to: \"<your-local-model>\"}]", requestedModel, requestedModel)
 
 	case RouteTypeNoProvider:
 		fields["cost"] = "none"

internal/api/modules/amp/proxy.go

@@ -41,6 +41,11 @@ func createReverseProxy(upstreamURL string, secretSource SecretSource) (*httputi
 		originalDirector(req)
 		req.Host = parsed.Host
 
+		// Remove client's Authorization header - it was only used for CLI Proxy API authentication
+		// We will set our own Authorization using the configured upstream-api-key
+		req.Header.Del("Authorization")
+		req.Header.Del("X-Api-Key")
+
 		// Preserve correlation headers for debugging
 		if req.Header.Get("X-Request-ID") == "" {
 			// Could generate one here if needed
@@ -50,7 +55,7 @@ func createReverseProxy(upstreamURL string, secretSource SecretSource) (*httputi
 		// Users going through ampcode.com proxy are paying for the service and should get all features
 		// including 1M context window (context-1m-2025-08-07)
 
-		// Inject API key from secret source (precedence: config > env > file)
+		// Inject API key from secret source (only uses upstream-api-key from config)
 		if key, err := secretSource.Get(req.Context()); err == nil && key != "" {
 			req.Header.Set("X-Api-Key", key)
 			req.Header.Set("Authorization", fmt.Sprintf("Bearer %s", key))

internal/api/modules/amp/routes.go

@@ -98,7 +98,8 @@ func (m *AmpModule) managementAvailabilityMiddleware() gin.HandlerFunc {
 // registerManagementRoutes registers Amp management proxy routes
 // These routes proxy through to the Amp control plane for OAuth, user management, etc.
 // Uses dynamic middleware and proxy getter for hot-reload support.
-func (m *AmpModule) registerManagementRoutes(engine *gin.Engine, baseHandler *handlers.BaseAPIHandler) {
+// The auth middleware validates Authorization header against configured API keys.
+func (m *AmpModule) registerManagementRoutes(engine *gin.Engine, baseHandler *handlers.BaseAPIHandler, auth gin.HandlerFunc) {
 	ampAPI := engine.Group("/api")
 
 	// Always disable CORS for management routes to prevent browser-based attacks
@@ -107,8 +108,9 @@ func (m *AmpModule) registerManagementRoutes(engine *gin.Engine, baseHandler *ha
 	// Apply dynamic localhost-only restriction (hot-reloadable via m.IsRestrictedToLocalhost())
 	ampAPI.Use(m.localhostOnlyMiddleware())
 
-	if !m.IsRestrictedToLocalhost() {
+	// Apply authentication middleware - requires valid API key in Authorization header
-		log.Warn("amp management routes are NOT restricted to localhost - this is insecure!")
+	if auth != nil {
+		ampAPI.Use(auth)
 	}
 
 	// Dynamic proxy handler that uses m.getProxy() for hot-reload support
@@ -154,6 +156,9 @@ func (m *AmpModule) registerManagementRoutes(engine *gin.Engine, baseHandler *ha
 	// Root-level routes that AMP CLI expects without /api prefix
 	// These need the same security middleware as the /api/* routes (dynamic for hot-reload)
 	rootMiddleware := []gin.HandlerFunc{m.managementAvailabilityMiddleware(), noCORSMiddleware(), m.localhostOnlyMiddleware()}
+	if auth != nil {
+		rootMiddleware = append(rootMiddleware, auth)
+	}
 	engine.GET("/threads/*path", append(rootMiddleware, proxyHandler)...)
 	engine.GET("/threads.rss", append(rootMiddleware, proxyHandler)...)
 	engine.GET("/news.rss", append(rootMiddleware, proxyHandler)...)

internal/config/config.go

@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ type AmpCode struct {
 
 	// RestrictManagementToLocalhost restricts Amp management routes (/api/user, /api/threads, etc.)
 	// to only accept connections from localhost (127.0.0.1, ::1). When true, prevents drive-by
-	// browser attacks and remote access to management endpoints. Default: true (recommended).
+	// browser attacks and remote access to management endpoints. Default: false (API key auth is sufficient).
 	RestrictManagementToLocalhost bool `yaml:"restrict-management-to-localhost" json:"restrict-management-to-localhost"`
 
 	// ModelMappings defines model name mappings for Amp CLI requests.
@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ func LoadConfigOptional(configFile string, optional bool) (*Config, error) {
 	cfg.LoggingToFile = false
 	cfg.UsageStatisticsEnabled = false
 	cfg.DisableCooling = false
-	cfg.AmpCode.RestrictManagementToLocalhost = true // Default to secure: only localhost access
+	cfg.AmpCode.RestrictManagementToLocalhost = false // Default to false: API key auth is sufficient
 	if err = yaml.Unmarshal(data, &cfg); err != nil {
 		if optional {
 			// In cloud deploy mode, if YAML parsing fails, return empty config instead of error.