everything-claude-code

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-18 02:29:59 -04:00

04d4d81938

fix(ci): match quoted write-all + dedupe duplicate checkout violations

Two round-1 review findings, fixed together because they touch the
same regex/loop region of `findViolations`:

1. **cubic P0 — quoted write-all bypass**.
   `WRITE_ALL_PATTERN` was `/^\s*permissions:\s*write-all\b/m`, which
   does not match the perfectly valid YAML forms
   `permissions: "write-all"` and `permissions: 'write-all'`. A
   workflow that quoted the shorthand slipped right through the
   persist-credentials gate the previous commit was supposed to close.

   Reproduced before this commit:
     $ cat /tmp/q.yml
     name: bad
     on: [push]
     permissions: "write-all"
     jobs:
       do:
         runs-on: ubuntu-latest
         steps:
           - uses: actions/checkout@v4
     $ ECC_WORKFLOWS_DIR=/tmp node scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js
     Validated workflow security for 1 workflow files
     exit=0

   Fix: tighten the regex to
     /^\s*permissions:\s*["']?write-all["']?\s*$/m
   which accepts the bare, double-quoted, and single-quoted YAML forms
   while still anchoring on the `permissions:` key. The trailing `\s*$`
   prevents accidentally matching keys whose value happens to start
   with `write-all` (e.g. some future literal `write-all-something`).

2. **greptile P2 — duplicate violation when both patterns match**.
   A `ref: refs/pull/${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}/merge`
   value matches both the `pull_request_target` rule's
   `expressionPattern` (the `head.sha` interpolation) and its
   `refPattern` (the `refs/pull/` literal). Each push generates an
   ERROR line with the same description and just a different
   `expression:` echo, so the reviewer sees the same violation twice.

   Fix: track `stepFlagged` inside the per-step loop and skip the
   `refPattern` fallback once any `expressionPattern` match has already
   produced a violation for this step. The `refPattern` is a fallback
   for ref-only forms (`refs/pull/123/head`, `${{ env.X }}` whose
   resolved value is a PR ref); when the more specific expression
   already fires, the fallback is redundant by definition.

After both fixes, the round-1 reproductions resolve cleanly:

  $ # quoted form now blocks
  $ ECC_WORKFLOWS_DIR=/tmp/q1/.github/workflows node scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js
  ERROR: quoted.yml:8 - workflows with write permissions must disable checkout credential persistence
  exit=1

  $ # combined head.sha + refs/pull now prints one ERROR, not two
  $ ECC_WORKFLOWS_DIR=/tmp/q2/.github/workflows node scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js
  ERROR: dup.yml:10 - pull_request_target must not checkout an untrusted pull_request head ref/repository
    Unsafe expression: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
  exit=1

Test additions land in the next commit.

Jamkris · 2026-05-17 21:19:29 -04:00

e06d038257

fix(ci): flag refs/pull checkouts under pull_request_target

The `pull_request_target` rule's `expressionPattern` matches only
the canonical `github.event.pull_request.head.{ref,sha,repo.full_name}`
interpolations. It does not match the second canonical form of
the same exploit — fetching `refs/pull/<N>/{head,merge}` directly:

  - uses: actions/checkout@v4
    with:
      ref: refs/pull/${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}/merge

The merge-ref variant is what GitHub's own security guidance calls
out as the highest-severity privilege-escalation pattern under
`pull_request_target`: it materialises the PR's merge commit
(attacker code spliced with base), executes inside a workflow that
has full repo-scoped tokens, and gives the attacker the chance to
exfiltrate secrets or push to default branches. `refs/pull/N/head`
is functionally equivalent — same source, same trust boundary.

Reproduced on `main` before this commit:

  $ cat /tmp/bad.yml
  name: bad
  on: { pull_request_target: { types: [opened] } }
  permissions: { contents: read }
  jobs:
    do:
      runs-on: ubuntu-latest
      steps:
        - uses: actions/checkout@v4
          with:
            ref: refs/pull/${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}/merge
            persist-credentials: false
        - run: npm ci --ignore-scripts

  $ ECC_WORKFLOWS_DIR=/tmp node scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js
  Validated workflow security for 1 workflow files
  $ echo $?
  0

Expected: violation flagging the refs/pull checkout under pull_request_target.
Actual: passes silently.

Fix: add a `refPattern` to the `pull_request_target` rule:

    /^\s*ref:\s*['"]?[^'"\n]*refs\/(?:remotes\/)?pull\/[^'"\n\s]+/m

and apply it per checkout step inside the existing
event-gated loop. The pattern matches the ref VALUE so it catches
all interpolation shapes — `refs/pull/123/head`,
`refs/pull/${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}/merge`,
`${{ env.FOO }}/refs/pull/N/head` — without enumerating the
possible interpolations themselves.

Scoping: the rule is already gated on the workflow containing
`pull_request_target:`, so non-privileged `pull_request` workflows
that legitimately check out a PR ref are not affected.

After this commit the reproduction above exits 1 with:

  ERROR: bad.yml:10 - pull_request_target must not checkout an untrusted pull_request head ref/repository

Three new regression tests in `tests/ci/validate-workflow-security.test.js`:
  - rejects pull_request_target + refs/pull/<N>/merge
  - rejects pull_request_target + hardcoded refs/pull/<N>/head
  - allows pull_request_target with no `with.ref:` (base-ref checkout —
    the safe pattern from GitHub's own guidance)

Test count: 17 → 20 in this file; full `yarn test` still green.

Together with the previous commit, this closes the two
independent `validate-workflow-security.js` bypasses I found.

Jamkris · 2026-05-17 21:19:29 -04:00

cdbc925d89

fix(ci): treat 'permissions: write-all' as a write-permission gate

`WRITE_PERMISSION_PATTERN` in `validate-workflow-security.js`
enumerates named GitHub Actions scopes (`contents: write`,
`issues: write`, etc.) to decide whether a workflow needs to:
  - disable `persist-credentials` on `actions/checkout`
  - pass `--ignore-scripts` to `npm ci`

The pattern misses the top-level shorthand `permissions:
write-all`, which is the strictly broader form — it grants every
named scope write access in a single line. As a result, a
workflow that opts into write-all currently slips both gates.

Reproduced on `main` before this commit:

  $ cat /tmp/bad.yml
  name: bad
  on: [push]
  permissions: write-all
  jobs:
    do:
      runs-on: ubuntu-latest
      steps:
        - uses: actions/checkout@v4
        - run: npm ci

  $ ECC_WORKFLOWS_DIR=/tmp node scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js
  Validated workflow security for 1 workflow files
  $ echo $?
  0

Expected: at least two violations (missing `persist-credentials:
false`, missing `--ignore-scripts`).
Actual: passes silently.

Fix: add a sibling pattern `WRITE_ALL_PATTERN` that matches
`^\s*permissions:\s*write-all\b` and OR it with
`WRITE_PERMISSION_PATTERN` at the single gate. Both top-level
and job-level `permissions:` blocks satisfy the `^\s*` prefix.

After this commit the reproduction above exits 1 with:

  ERROR: bad.yml:8 - workflows with write permissions must disable checkout credential persistence
  ERROR: bad.yml:9 - workflows with write permissions must install npm dependencies with --ignore-scripts

Three new regression tests in `tests/ci/validate-workflow-security.test.js`:
  - rejects write-all + credential-persisting checkout
  - rejects write-all + `npm ci` without `--ignore-scripts`
  - allows write-all when both gates are satisfied (no over-block)

Test count: 14 → 17 in this file; full `yarn test` still green.

A separate `refs/pull/N/merge` bypass under `pull_request_target`
exists in the same validator and is fixed in the next commit.

Jamkris · 2026-05-17 21:19:29 -04:00

7f971b7e6f

fix(installer): harden locale docs install

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-17 20:46:04 -04:00

666b4e2261

security: cover gh-token-monitor token persistence

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-17 17:46:35 -04:00

36d390aa7d

fix: tighten supply-chain ioc markers

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-17 06:48:01 -04:00

fb6d4a7104

fix: tighten supply-chain IOC package matching

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-16 03:30:30 -04:00

7420441512

Add supply-chain advisory source refresh

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-15 23:09:54 -04:00

a8e3bcb00f

Harden CI installs against supply-chain lifecycle hooks

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-15 17:29:03 -04:00

f7035b5644

expand ioc user config targets (#1933 )

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-15 13:20:01 -04:00

c0bac4d6ce

feat: add platform and supply-chain audit commands (#1926 )

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-15 08:06:26 -04:00

13585f1092

security: add node-ipc IOC coverage (#1924 )

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-15 06:56:57 -04:00

ee85e1482e

Expand Mini Shai-Hulud IOC coverage (#1921 )

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-15 03:20:10 -04:00

f04702bdac

fix: harden supply-chain IOC scan (#1918 )

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-15 02:50:50 -04:00

e8e9df52a6

fix: harden dashboard canary and IOC coverage

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-15 02:06:46 -04:00

9af04f3965

feat: add command registry and coverage checks (#1906 )

Salvages the useful parts of #1897 without generated .caliber state or stale counts.

- adds a deterministic command registry generator and drift check
- commits the current command registry for 75 commands
- validates the rc.1 README catalog summary against live counts
- adds a single Ubuntu Node 20 coverage job instead of running coverage in every matrix cell

Co-authored-by: jodunk <jodunk@users.noreply.github.com>

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-14 22:02:36 -04:00

f7315016c0

security: add supply-chain IOC scanner (#1904 )

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-14 21:15:35 -04:00

7d15a2282b

ci: disable checkout credential persistence in privileged workflows (#1851 )

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-13 01:15:49 -04:00

209abd403b

docs: add supply-chain incident response playbook

Add a repo-level supply-chain incident response playbook for npm/GitHub Actions package-registry incidents, anchored on the May 2026 TanStack compromise and prior Shai-Hulud-style npm incidents.

- add `docs/security/supply-chain-incident-response.md` with exposure checks, immediate response steps, workflow rules, publication rules, and escalation triggers
- link the playbook from `SECURITY.md`
- reject `pull_request_target` workflows that restore or save shared dependency caches
- add a regression test for the new `pull_request_target + actions/cache` guardrail

Validation:
- node tests/ci/validate-workflow-security.test.js (12 passed, 0 failed)
- node scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js (validated 7 workflow files)
- npx markdownlint-cli 'SECURITY.md' 'docs/security/supply-chain-incident-response.md'
- npx markdownlint-cli '**/*.md' --ignore node_modules
- git diff --check
- node tests/run-all.js (2377 passed, 0 failed)
- GitHub CI for #1848 green across Ubuntu, Windows, and macOS

No release, tag, npm publish, plugin tag, marketplace submission, or announcement was performed.

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-13 00:22:28 -04:00

cbecf5689d

ci: require npm audit signature checks

Require npm registry signature verification wherever workflow npm audit checks run.

- add npm audit signatures to CI Security Scan and maintenance security audit jobs
- teach the workflow security validator to reject npm audit without signature verification
- keep the repair and Copilot prompt tests portable across Windows path/case and CRLF frontmatter behavior

Validation:
- node tests/run-all.js (2376 passed, 0 failed)
- CI current-head matrix green on #1846

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-12 23:48:56 -04:00

797f283036

feat: add GitHub Copilot prompt support

Adds GitHub Copilot VS Code instruction and prompt files for ECC workflows, with VS Code prompt frontmatter/settings aligned to current docs and tests covering the surface.

Co-authored-by: Girish Kanjiyani <girish.kanjiyani5040@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Girish Kanjiyani · 2026-05-12 23:00:00 -04:00

766f4ee1d8

ci: harden workflow install boundaries

- run non-test workflow installs with npm ci --ignore-scripts where lifecycle scripts are not needed\n- reject plain npm ci in workflows with write permissions\n- reject actions/cache in id-token: write workflows to reduce OIDC publish cache-poisoning risk

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-12 21:55:36 -04:00

daf0355531

docs: close harness audit readiness gaps

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-11 20:23:27 -04:00

20d862951f

feat: add observability readiness gate

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-11 18:33:14 -04:00

8aa8c32d2a

docs: salvage focused stale PR contributions

- add Vite and Redis pattern skills from closed stale PRs

- add frontend-slides support assets

- port skill-comply runner fixes and LLM prompt/provider regressions

- harden agent frontmatter validation and sync catalog counts

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-11 05:31:12 -04:00

b39d2244cf

fix: harden CI validators

Ports personal-path validator hardening and quoted checkout detection onto current main.

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-11 03:08:43 -04:00

e674a7dbd7

fix: sync skill frontmatter and catalog counts

Adds missing skill frontmatter, normalizes strict YAML metadata, syncs README catalog counts, and extends catalog validation for README/plugin/marketplace count drift.

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-11 02:33:29 -04:00

27508842b1

fix(ci): flag SKILL.md frontmatter defects in validate-skills (#1669 )

* fix(ci): flag SKILL.md frontmatter defects in validate-skills

Issue #1663 reported two SKILL.md frontmatter defects (missing `name:`
on skill-stocktake; literal block-scalar `description: |-` on
openclaw-persona-forge) that PR #1664 addresses at the data level.

This change is complementary: it extends `scripts/ci/validate-skills.js`
to catch the same class of defect statically going forward, so the
frontmatter-vs-renderer problems do not silently reappear as new skills
land.

## Checks added
- Frontmatter must declare a `name:` field.
- Frontmatter `description:` must not use a literal block scalar
  (`|` / `|-` / `|+`) — these preserve internal newlines and break
  flat-table renderers keyed off `description`. Folded (`>`) and inline
  strings are accepted.

## Behavior
- Frontmatter findings default to WARN (exit 0) so this PR does not
  break CI while the two known offenders are still on main. Pass
  `--strict` or set `CI_STRICT_SKILLS=1` to promote them to ERROR
  (exit 1). Structural findings (missing / empty SKILL.md) remain
  errors as before.
- Today against main, the validator reports exactly two warnings —
  the same two files called out in #1663 — and exits 0. When #1664
  lands, the validator reports zero warnings, at which point strict
  mode can be enabled in CI.

## Parser notes
- Bespoke frontmatter parser mirrors the style of `validate-agents.js`
  (tolerant of UTF-8 BOM and CRLF; no new npm dependency).
- Block-scalar continuation lines are skipped so keys inside a block
  scalar are not mistaken for top-level keys.
- Hidden directories (`.something/`) under skills/ are now skipped.

## Tests
Adds five focused tests to `tests/ci/validators.test.js`:
- warns when frontmatter is missing `name` (default mode)
- errors when frontmatter is missing `name` (--strict mode)
- warns on literal block-scalar description (|-)
- accepts folded (>) and inline descriptions under --strict
- skips hidden directories under skills/

## Docs
Adds two bullets to the `Skill Checklist` in CONTRIBUTING.md covering
the two rules now surfaced by the validator.

Refs #1663. Complements (does not compete with) #1664.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(ci): harden SKILL.md frontmatter checks after bot review

Address findings from CodeRabbit, Greptile, and cubic on #1669:

- Guard empty or whitespace-only `name:` values. Previously
  `name:    ` silently passed because the presence check only
  tested key-set membership; now inspectFrontmatter captures
  trimmed values and validate flags an explicit 'name is empty'
  WARN/ERROR.
- Broaden block-scalar detection to cover YAML 1.2 indent
  indicators (`|2`, `|-2`, `>2-`) and trailing comments
  (`|-  # note`). The old regex required a bare `|`/`>` with
  optional `+`/`-`, which let valid-but-disallowed forms slip
  through.
- Update CONTRIBUTING.md checklist to list `|+` alongside `|`
  and `|-` for parity with the validator.
- Extend runSkillsValidator to accept env overrides and add four
  regression tests: empty name, |+ description, |-2 + comment, and
  CI_STRICT_SKILLS=1.

* fix(ci): address round-2 review on validate-skills frontmatter

- Tighten extractFrontmatter closing delimiter to require a newline or
  end-of-file after the closing `---`, so body lines beginning with
  `---text` are not parsed as frontmatter (CodeRabbit).
- Strip both trailing and comment-only values in inspectFrontmatter, so
  `name: # todo` is surfaced as empty rather than silently passing
  (cubic P2).
- Extract validateSkillDir helper so the per-directory validation
  block moves out of validateSkills, keeping both functions under the
  50-line guideline (CodeRabbit nit).
- Hoist runSkillsValidator to module scope in the test harness and
  share the spawnSync import with execFileSync so the helper stops
  re-requiring child_process on every invocation (CodeRabbit nit).
- Add regression tests: comment-only `name:` values must fail strict
  mode; `---trailing` body lines must not be parsed as frontmatter.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Update tests/ci/validators.test.js

Co-authored-by: cubic-dev-ai[bot] <191113872+cubic-dev-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: cubic-dev-ai[bot] <191113872+cubic-dev-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

Gaurav Dubey · 2026-05-11 01:14:38 -04:00

e196f8a4cb

test: cover CI catalog validator

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-04-28 22:14:19 -04:00

b6b5b6d08e

fix: bootstrap plugin-installed hook commands safely

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-04-14 20:24:21 -07:00

1b7c5789fc

fix: block unsafe privileged workflow checkouts

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-04-12 23:23:01 -07:00

3792b69a38

fix: harden claude plugin manifest surfaces

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-04-08 16:27:30 -07:00

2e5e94cb7f

docs: shift repo guidance to skills-first workflows

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-04-01 02:11:24 -07:00

f3db349984

fix: harden install planning and sync tracked catalogs

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-03-31 22:57:48 -07:00

e1bc08fa6e

fix: unblock unicode safety CI lint (#1017 )

* fix: unblock unicode safety CI lint

* fix: unblock shared CI regressions

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-03-30 01:50:17 -04:00

8846210ca2

fix: narrow unicode cleanup scope

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-03-29 21:21:18 -04:00

7483d646e4

fix: harden unicode safety checks

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-03-29 21:21:18 -04:00

866d9ebb53

feat: define skill placement and provenance policy (#748 )

Neha Prasad · 2026-03-22 15:39:48 -07:00

4df960c9d5

fix(ci): enforce catalog count integrity (#525 )

* fix(ci): enforce catalog count integrity

* test: harden catalog structure parsing

Justin Philpott · 2026-03-16 13:37:51 -07:00

01ed1b3b03

fix: harden observer hooks and test discovery (#513 )

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-03-15 21:47:15 -07:00

8878c6d6b0

feat: orchestration harness, selective install, observer improvements

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-03-14 12:55:25 -07:00

4e028bd2d2

fix: align architecture tooling with current hooks docs

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-03-10 19:36:57 -07:00

7705051910

feat: architecture improvements — test discovery, hooks schema, catalog, command map, coverage, cross-harness docs

- AGENTS.md: sync skills count to 65+
- tests/run-all.js: glob-based test discovery for *.test.js
- scripts/ci/validate-hooks.js: validate hooks.json with ajv + schemas/hooks.schema.json
- schemas/hooks.schema.json: hookItem.type enum command|notification
- scripts/ci/catalog.js: catalog agents, commands, skills (--json | --md)
- docs/COMMAND-AGENT-MAP.md: command → agent/skill map
- docs/ARCHITECTURE-IMPROVEMENTS.md: improvement recommendations
- package.json: ajv, c8 devDeps; npm run coverage
- CONTRIBUTING.md: Cross-Harness and Translations section
- .gitignore: coverage/

Made-with: Cursor

kinshukdutta · 2026-03-10 19:36:57 -07:00

a50349181a

feat: deliver v1.8.0 harness reliability and parity updates

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-03-04 14:48:06 -08:00

48b883d741

fix: reject empty/invalid array commands in hooks validator, add 19 tests

validate-hooks.js: Empty arrays [] and arrays with non-string elements
(e.g., [123, null]) passed command validation due to JS truthiness of
empty arrays (![] === false). Added explicit length and element type
checks.

19 new tests covering: non-array event type values, null/string matcher
entries, string/number top-level data, empty string/array commands,
non-string array elements, non-string type field, non-number timeout,
timeout boundary (0), unwrapped hooks format, legacy format error paths,
empty agent directory, whitespace-only command files, valid skill refs,
mixed valid/invalid rules and skills.

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-02-13 02:33:40 -08:00

27dce7794a

fix: reject whitespace-only command/field values in CI validators, add 10 tests

validate-hooks.js: whitespace-only command strings now fail validation
validate-agents.js: whitespace-only model/tools values now fail validation

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-02-13 02:09:22 -08:00

2dbba8877b

fix: greedy regex in validate-commands captures all refs per line, add 18 tests

The command cross-reference regex /^.*`\/(...)`.*$/gm only captured the
LAST command ref per line due to greedy .* consuming earlier refs.
Replaced with line-by-line processing using non-anchored regex to
capture ALL command references.

New tests:
- 4 validate-commands multi-ref-per-line tests (regression)
- 8 evaluate-session threshold boundary tests (new file)
- 6 session-aliases edge case tests (cleanup, rename, path matching)

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-02-13 01:52:30 -08:00

c1919bb879

fix: add input validation, date range checks, and security hardening

- validate-agents.js: reject invalid model names in agent frontmatter
- package-manager.js: validate script/binary names against shell injection
- session-manager.js: reject impossible month/day values in filenames
- utils.js: support options.all for replaceInFile string patterns
- strategic-compact/SKILL.md: fix hook matcher syntax and script reference
- install.sh: warn when overwriting existing rule customizations
- Add 24 new tests covering all validation and edge cases

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-02-12 17:32:04 -08:00

926eba97c5

fix: skip code blocks in command cross-reference validation

The validator was matching example/template content inside fenced code
blocks as real cross-references, causing false positives for evolve.md
(example /new-table command and debugger agent).

- Strip ``` blocks before running cross-reference checks
- Change evolve.md examples to use bold instead of backtick formatting
  for hypothetical outputs

All 261 tests pass.

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-02-12 16:18:50 -08:00

8ff54d8b06

57 Commits