everything-claude-code

Merge pull request #2241 from itkdm/feat/add-vue-ecosystem

feat: add Vue ecosystem review support (vue-reviewer agent, /vue-review command, vue-patterns skill). Duplicate rules/vue/* kept from #2250; catalog counts reconciled.

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-06-15 14:07:31 -04:00

1a08a21ac0

fix: prevent IOC scanner false positives on hook filenames and scan .cursor configs (#2245 )

* fix: prevent IOC scanner false positives on hook filenames and scan .cursor configs

The supply-chain IOC scanner matched CRITICAL_TEXT_INDICATORS with plain
substring search, so legitimate hook filenames that merely end with a known
payload name (e.g. the stock Cursor hook before-shell-execution.js vs the
payload execution.js) were flagged as CRITICAL. Indicator matching now
requires a non-filename character before the match.

Also add .cursor/ to the special config paths so Cursor hooks.json files
(a known persistence vector already listed in PERSISTENCE_FILENAMES) are
actually inspected in normal checkouts - previously they were only scanned
by accident when the repo path happened to contain /.claude/.

* test: cover underscore-prefixed filenames in IOC boundary suppression

Make explicit that '_' is treated as a filename word character, so
snake_case hook names like post_execution.js are intentionally not
flagged by the execution.js indicator (real payload references appear
after '/', quotes, or whitespace).

daiki75 · 2026-06-15 13:48:50 -04:00

e3f18d2376

fix: address Vue review PR feedback

Bujidao · 2026-06-12 19:44:39 +08:00

b5c088d639

fix: make plugin hooks run on Node 21+ and green the suite under modern Node (#2184 )

ROOT CAUSE: hooks load plugin-hook-bootstrap.js via
`node -e "...; process.argv.splice(1,0,s); require(s)"`. On Node 21+,
require.main is `undefined` under --eval, so the `if (require.main === module)`
guard was false and main() never ran — every plugin hook silently no-op'd
(e.g. the MCP-health PreToolUse hook stopped blocking). CI (Node 18/20) hid
this; it only surfaces on Node 21+. Fix: also run main() when require.main is
undefined (the eval-bootstrap case), while staying dormant on real imports.

Also clears pre-existing main debt the full local suite enforces:
- catalog:sync — README/docs agent+skill counts drifted after recent merges
- tests/ci/supply-chain-watch-workflow: update checkout SHA to the merged v6.0.3 (#2183)
- markdownlint + check-unicode-safety --write across docs/skills

Suite: 2683/2683 green under Node v25; lint + unicode clean.

Co-authored-by: ECC Test <ecc@example.test>

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-06-07 16:05:28 +08:00

e755c5f72b

fix(skills): keep curl credentials out of argv (#2175 )

* fix(skills): avoid curl credential argv leaks

* test(ci): guard secret curl examples

Kumario · 2026-06-07 13:25:45 +08:00

70fde3c14f

test: guard broken-symlink tests so the suite passes on Windows (#2176 )

* test: guard broken-symlink tests so the suite passes on Windows

Four test cases create a dangling symlink with fs.symlinkSync() to exercise
statSync catch branches, but did not guard for platforms where symlink
creation is not permitted. On Windows without Developer Mode / admin rights,
fs.symlinkSync throws EPERM, so these tests fail and `npm test` is red:

  - tests/ci/validators.test.js (Round 73, validate-commands skill entry)
  - tests/lib/session-manager.test.js (Round 83, getAllSessions)
  - tests/lib/session-manager.test.js (Round 84, getSessionById)
  - tests/lib/utils.test.js (Round 84, findFiles)

Wrap each symlinkSync in try/catch and skip cleanly on failure, mirroring the
existing convention already used in this repo (validators.test.js Round 57 and
hooks/config-protection.test.js). On Linux/macOS and admin Windows the symlink
still succeeds and the tests run unchanged; only the unsupported-symlink path
now skips instead of failing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: only skip symlink tests on EPERM/EACCES, rethrow other errors

Address CodeRabbit review: the catch blocks swallowed every error, which could
mask a real test/setup failure as a false skip. Inspect err.code and only take
the skip path for EPERM/EACCES (symlink creation blocked, e.g. Windows without
Developer Mode); rethrow anything else so genuine failures still surface.

Per the repo coding guideline: never silently swallow errors.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

Johnson K C · 2026-06-07 13:25:43 +08:00

40673a89fa

feat: add dynamic workflow team orchestration surface

Adds dynamic workflow/team orchestration skills, the content pack, and control-pane work-item/Kanban state DB support. Includes reviewer hardening for state-db CLI validation, optional state DB failure handling, and mergeStateStatus projection.

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-06-04 21:45:13 +08:00

bc8e12bb80

security: scope release oidc publishing

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-18 13:41:10 -04:00

7911af4a39

fix: ignore defensive ioc deny rules

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-18 02:29:59 -04:00

04d4d81938

test(ci): coverage for round-1 fixes (quoted write-all, dedup, lifecycle scope)

Three test changes in response to the round-1 review:

1. **Add quoted-write-all coverage** (cubic P0 follow-up).
   Two new cases assert the regex now matches the double-quoted and
   single-quoted YAML forms of `permissions: "write-all"`:
     - `rejects double-quoted permissions: "write-all"`
     - `rejects single-quoted permissions: 'write-all'`
   Both fixtures trigger only the persist-credentials gate, so they
   exercise the WRITE_ALL_PATTERN OR-clause in isolation.

2. **Add expression+ref dedup coverage** (greptile P2 follow-up).
   `emits a single violation when both expressionPattern and refPattern
   match the same step` — uses `refs/pull/${{ … head.sha }}/merge` as
   the fixture (which matches both patterns) and counts ERROR lines for
   the `pull_request_target` rule, asserting exactly one. Re-introducing
   the duplicate-push bug would re-fail this test immediately.

3. **Drop the `npm ci without --ignore-scripts under write-all` test**
   (greptile P2). That test happened to pass under the previous
   `--ignore-scripts` regex, but `UNSAFE_INSTALL_PATTERNS` (added in
   `f7035b56`) fires unconditionally for every workflow regardless of
   permissions. So the test was exercising a pre-existing code path
   that has nothing to do with WRITE_ALL_PATTERN. Reviewer flagged this
   could mislead future contributors into thinking lifecycle-script
   enforcement is gated on write permissions.

   Replaced by the surrounding `rejects checkout credential persistence
   in workflows with permissions: write-all` test (already present) and
   the new quoted-form tests above, which all exercise the actual
   persist-credentials gate that the WRITE_ALL_PATTERN clause newly
   activates.

Test count: 22 → 24 (added 3 new, dropped 1). All green; `yarn lint`
clean.

The cohort comment above the write-all block was also tightened to
explicitly note that "the lifecycle-script gate already fires
unconditionally for every workflow" so the next reader sees the
distinction up front.

Jamkris · 2026-05-17 21:19:29 -04:00

7bb3172041

fix(ci): flag refs/pull checkouts under pull_request_target

The `pull_request_target` rule's `expressionPattern` matches only
the canonical `github.event.pull_request.head.{ref,sha,repo.full_name}`
interpolations. It does not match the second canonical form of
the same exploit — fetching `refs/pull/<N>/{head,merge}` directly:

  - uses: actions/checkout@v4
    with:
      ref: refs/pull/${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}/merge

The merge-ref variant is what GitHub's own security guidance calls
out as the highest-severity privilege-escalation pattern under
`pull_request_target`: it materialises the PR's merge commit
(attacker code spliced with base), executes inside a workflow that
has full repo-scoped tokens, and gives the attacker the chance to
exfiltrate secrets or push to default branches. `refs/pull/N/head`
is functionally equivalent — same source, same trust boundary.

Reproduced on `main` before this commit:

  $ cat /tmp/bad.yml
  name: bad
  on: { pull_request_target: { types: [opened] } }
  permissions: { contents: read }
  jobs:
    do:
      runs-on: ubuntu-latest
      steps:
        - uses: actions/checkout@v4
          with:
            ref: refs/pull/${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}/merge
            persist-credentials: false
        - run: npm ci --ignore-scripts

  $ ECC_WORKFLOWS_DIR=/tmp node scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js
  Validated workflow security for 1 workflow files
  $ echo $?
  0

Expected: violation flagging the refs/pull checkout under pull_request_target.
Actual: passes silently.

Fix: add a `refPattern` to the `pull_request_target` rule:

    /^\s*ref:\s*['"]?[^'"\n]*refs\/(?:remotes\/)?pull\/[^'"\n\s]+/m

and apply it per checkout step inside the existing
event-gated loop. The pattern matches the ref VALUE so it catches
all interpolation shapes — `refs/pull/123/head`,
`refs/pull/${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}/merge`,
`${{ env.FOO }}/refs/pull/N/head` — without enumerating the
possible interpolations themselves.

Scoping: the rule is already gated on the workflow containing
`pull_request_target:`, so non-privileged `pull_request` workflows
that legitimately check out a PR ref are not affected.

After this commit the reproduction above exits 1 with:

  ERROR: bad.yml:10 - pull_request_target must not checkout an untrusted pull_request head ref/repository

Three new regression tests in `tests/ci/validate-workflow-security.test.js`:
  - rejects pull_request_target + refs/pull/<N>/merge
  - rejects pull_request_target + hardcoded refs/pull/<N>/head
  - allows pull_request_target with no `with.ref:` (base-ref checkout —
    the safe pattern from GitHub's own guidance)

Test count: 17 → 20 in this file; full `yarn test` still green.

Together with the previous commit, this closes the two
independent `validate-workflow-security.js` bypasses I found.

Jamkris · 2026-05-17 21:19:29 -04:00

cdbc925d89

fix(ci): treat 'permissions: write-all' as a write-permission gate

`WRITE_PERMISSION_PATTERN` in `validate-workflow-security.js`
enumerates named GitHub Actions scopes (`contents: write`,
`issues: write`, etc.) to decide whether a workflow needs to:
  - disable `persist-credentials` on `actions/checkout`
  - pass `--ignore-scripts` to `npm ci`

The pattern misses the top-level shorthand `permissions:
write-all`, which is the strictly broader form — it grants every
named scope write access in a single line. As a result, a
workflow that opts into write-all currently slips both gates.

Reproduced on `main` before this commit:

  $ cat /tmp/bad.yml
  name: bad
  on: [push]
  permissions: write-all
  jobs:
    do:
      runs-on: ubuntu-latest
      steps:
        - uses: actions/checkout@v4
        - run: npm ci

  $ ECC_WORKFLOWS_DIR=/tmp node scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js
  Validated workflow security for 1 workflow files
  $ echo $?
  0

Expected: at least two violations (missing `persist-credentials:
false`, missing `--ignore-scripts`).
Actual: passes silently.

Fix: add a sibling pattern `WRITE_ALL_PATTERN` that matches
`^\s*permissions:\s*write-all\b` and OR it with
`WRITE_PERMISSION_PATTERN` at the single gate. Both top-level
and job-level `permissions:` blocks satisfy the `^\s*` prefix.

After this commit the reproduction above exits 1 with:

  ERROR: bad.yml:8 - workflows with write permissions must disable checkout credential persistence
  ERROR: bad.yml:9 - workflows with write permissions must install npm dependencies with --ignore-scripts

Three new regression tests in `tests/ci/validate-workflow-security.test.js`:
  - rejects write-all + credential-persisting checkout
  - rejects write-all + `npm ci` without `--ignore-scripts`
  - allows write-all when both gates are satisfied (no over-block)

Test count: 14 → 17 in this file; full `yarn test` still green.

A separate `refs/pull/N/merge` bypass under `pull_request_target`
exists in the same validator and is fixed in the next commit.

Jamkris · 2026-05-17 21:19:29 -04:00

7f971b7e6f

security: cover gh-token-monitor token persistence

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-17 17:46:35 -04:00

36d390aa7d

fix: tighten supply-chain ioc markers

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-17 06:48:01 -04:00

fb6d4a7104

fix: tighten supply-chain IOC package matching

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-16 03:30:30 -04:00

7420441512

Cover advisory source renderer branches

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-15 23:09:54 -04:00

714200fd20

Cover advisory source refresh branches

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-15 23:09:54 -04:00

2b387fb761

Add supply-chain advisory source refresh

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-15 23:09:54 -04:00

a8e3bcb00f

Harden CI installs against supply-chain lifecycle hooks

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-15 17:29:03 -04:00

f7035b5644

Add scheduled supply-chain watch workflow

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-15 16:56:49 -04:00

6951b8d5d2

expand ioc user config targets (#1933 )

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-15 13:20:01 -04:00

c0bac4d6ce

feat: add platform and supply-chain audit commands (#1926 )

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-15 08:06:26 -04:00

13585f1092

security: add node-ipc IOC coverage (#1924 )

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-15 06:56:57 -04:00

ee85e1482e

Expand Mini Shai-Hulud IOC coverage (#1921 )

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-15 03:20:10 -04:00

f04702bdac

fix: harden supply-chain IOC scan (#1918 )

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-15 02:50:50 -04:00

e8e9df52a6

fix: harden dashboard canary and IOC coverage

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-15 02:06:46 -04:00

9af04f3965

feat: add command registry and coverage checks (#1906 )

Salvages the useful parts of #1897 without generated .caliber state or stale counts.

- adds a deterministic command registry generator and drift check
- commits the current command registry for 75 commands
- validates the rc.1 README catalog summary against live counts
- adds a single Ubuntu Node 20 coverage job instead of running coverage in every matrix cell

Co-authored-by: jodunk <jodunk@users.noreply.github.com>

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-14 22:02:36 -04:00

f7315016c0

security: add supply-chain IOC scanner (#1904 )

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-14 21:15:35 -04:00

7d15a2282b

ci: disable checkout credential persistence in privileged workflows (#1851 )

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-13 01:15:49 -04:00

209abd403b

docs: add supply-chain incident response playbook

Add a repo-level supply-chain incident response playbook for npm/GitHub Actions package-registry incidents, anchored on the May 2026 TanStack compromise and prior Shai-Hulud-style npm incidents.

- add `docs/security/supply-chain-incident-response.md` with exposure checks, immediate response steps, workflow rules, publication rules, and escalation triggers
- link the playbook from `SECURITY.md`
- reject `pull_request_target` workflows that restore or save shared dependency caches
- add a regression test for the new `pull_request_target + actions/cache` guardrail

Validation:
- node tests/ci/validate-workflow-security.test.js (12 passed, 0 failed)
- node scripts/ci/validate-workflow-security.js (validated 7 workflow files)
- npx markdownlint-cli 'SECURITY.md' 'docs/security/supply-chain-incident-response.md'
- npx markdownlint-cli '**/*.md' --ignore node_modules
- git diff --check
- node tests/run-all.js (2377 passed, 0 failed)
- GitHub CI for #1848 green across Ubuntu, Windows, and macOS

No release, tag, npm publish, plugin tag, marketplace submission, or announcement was performed.

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-13 00:22:28 -04:00

cbecf5689d

ci: require npm audit signature checks

Require npm registry signature verification wherever workflow npm audit checks run.

- add npm audit signatures to CI Security Scan and maintenance security audit jobs
- teach the workflow security validator to reject npm audit without signature verification
- keep the repair and Copilot prompt tests portable across Windows path/case and CRLF frontmatter behavior

Validation:
- node tests/run-all.js (2376 passed, 0 failed)
- CI current-head matrix green on #1846

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-12 23:48:56 -04:00

797f283036

ci: harden workflow install boundaries

- run non-test workflow installs with npm ci --ignore-scripts where lifecycle scripts are not needed\n- reject plain npm ci in workflows with write permissions\n- reject actions/cache in id-token: write workflows to reduce OIDC publish cache-poisoning risk

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-12 21:55:36 -04:00

daf0355531

feat: salvage code-reviewer false-positive guardrails (#1817 )

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-12 15:01:46 -04:00

df60af9619

feat: add machine learning engineering workflow

(cherry picked from commit 4b0eeacd66)

Divyesh Thirukonda · 2026-05-11 17:55:50 -04:00

240d52d27f

docs: salvage focused stale PR contributions

- add Vite and Redis pattern skills from closed stale PRs

- add frontend-slides support assets

- port skill-comply runner fixes and LLM prompt/provider regressions

- harden agent frontmatter validation and sync catalog counts

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-11 05:31:12 -04:00

b39d2244cf

fix: harden CI validators

Ports personal-path validator hardening and quoted checkout detection onto current main.

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-11 03:08:43 -04:00

e674a7dbd7

fix: sync skill frontmatter and catalog counts

Adds missing skill frontmatter, normalizes strict YAML metadata, syncs README catalog counts, and extends catalog validation for README/plugin/marketplace count drift.

Affaan Mustafa · 2026-05-11 02:33:29 -04:00

27508842b1

fix(ci): flag SKILL.md frontmatter defects in validate-skills (#1669 )

* fix(ci): flag SKILL.md frontmatter defects in validate-skills

Issue #1663 reported two SKILL.md frontmatter defects (missing `name:`
on skill-stocktake; literal block-scalar `description: |-` on
openclaw-persona-forge) that PR #1664 addresses at the data level.

This change is complementary: it extends `scripts/ci/validate-skills.js`
to catch the same class of defect statically going forward, so the
frontmatter-vs-renderer problems do not silently reappear as new skills
land.

## Checks added
- Frontmatter must declare a `name:` field.
- Frontmatter `description:` must not use a literal block scalar
  (`|` / `|-` / `|+`) — these preserve internal newlines and break
  flat-table renderers keyed off `description`. Folded (`>`) and inline
  strings are accepted.

## Behavior
- Frontmatter findings default to WARN (exit 0) so this PR does not
  break CI while the two known offenders are still on main. Pass
  `--strict` or set `CI_STRICT_SKILLS=1` to promote them to ERROR
  (exit 1). Structural findings (missing / empty SKILL.md) remain
  errors as before.
- Today against main, the validator reports exactly two warnings —
  the same two files called out in #1663 — and exits 0. When #1664
  lands, the validator reports zero warnings, at which point strict
  mode can be enabled in CI.

## Parser notes
- Bespoke frontmatter parser mirrors the style of `validate-agents.js`
  (tolerant of UTF-8 BOM and CRLF; no new npm dependency).
- Block-scalar continuation lines are skipped so keys inside a block
  scalar are not mistaken for top-level keys.
- Hidden directories (`.something/`) under skills/ are now skipped.

## Tests
Adds five focused tests to `tests/ci/validators.test.js`:
- warns when frontmatter is missing `name` (default mode)
- errors when frontmatter is missing `name` (--strict mode)
- warns on literal block-scalar description (|-)
- accepts folded (>) and inline descriptions under --strict
- skips hidden directories under skills/

## Docs
Adds two bullets to the `Skill Checklist` in CONTRIBUTING.md covering
the two rules now surfaced by the validator.

Refs #1663. Complements (does not compete with) #1664.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(ci): harden SKILL.md frontmatter checks after bot review

Address findings from CodeRabbit, Greptile, and cubic on #1669:

- Guard empty or whitespace-only `name:` values. Previously
  `name:    ` silently passed because the presence check only
  tested key-set membership; now inspectFrontmatter captures
  trimmed values and validate flags an explicit 'name is empty'
  WARN/ERROR.
- Broaden block-scalar detection to cover YAML 1.2 indent
  indicators (`|2`, `|-2`, `>2-`) and trailing comments
  (`|-  # note`). The old regex required a bare `|`/`>` with
  optional `+`/`-`, which let valid-but-disallowed forms slip
  through.
- Update CONTRIBUTING.md checklist to list `|+` alongside `|`
  and `|-` for parity with the validator.
- Extend runSkillsValidator to accept env overrides and add four
  regression tests: empty name, |+ description, |-2 + comment, and
  CI_STRICT_SKILLS=1.

* fix(ci): address round-2 review on validate-skills frontmatter

- Tighten extractFrontmatter closing delimiter to require a newline or
  end-of-file after the closing `---`, so body lines beginning with
  `---text` are not parsed as frontmatter (CodeRabbit).
- Strip both trailing and comment-only values in inspectFrontmatter, so
  `name: # todo` is surfaced as empty rather than silently passing
  (cubic P2).
- Extract validateSkillDir helper so the per-directory validation
  block moves out of validateSkills, keeping both functions under the
  50-line guideline (CodeRabbit nit).
- Hoist runSkillsValidator to module scope in the test harness and
  share the spawnSync import with execFileSync so the helper stops
  re-requiring child_process on every invocation (CodeRabbit nit).
- Add regression tests: comment-only `name:` values must fail strict
  mode; `---trailing` body lines must not be parsed as frontmatter.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Update tests/ci/validators.test.js

Co-authored-by: cubic-dev-ai[bot] <191113872+cubic-dev-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: cubic-dev-ai[bot] <191113872+cubic-dev-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>