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codex/codex-rs/core
T
Owen Lin fa1242c83b fix(otel): make HTTP trace export survive app-server runtimes (#14300)
## Summary

This PR fixes OTLP HTTP trace export in runtimes where the previous
exporter setup was unreliable, especially around app-server usage. It
also removes the old `codex_otel::otel_provider` compatibility shim and
switches remaining call sites over to the crate-root
`codex_otel::OtelProvider` export.

## What changed

- Use a runtime-safe OTLP HTTP trace exporter path for Tokio runtimes.
- Add an async HTTP client path for trace export when we are already
inside a multi-thread Tokio runtime.
- Make provider shutdown flush traces before tearing down the tracer
provider.
- Add loopback coverage that verifies traces are actually sent to
`/v1/traces`:
  - outside Tokio
  - inside a multi-thread Tokio runtime
  - inside a current-thread Tokio runtime
- Remove the `codex_otel::otel_provider` shim and update remaining
imports.

## Why

I hit cases where spans were being created correctly but never made it
to the collector. The issue turned out to be in exporter/runtime
behavior rather than the span plumbing itself. This PR narrows that gap
and gives us regression coverage for the actual export path.
fa1242c83b ยท 2026-03-11 12:33:10 -07:00
History
..
2026-03-04 13:00:11 +00:00
2026-03-05 16:22:39 -08:00

codex-core

This crate implements the business logic for Codex. It is designed to be used by the various Codex UIs written in Rust.

Dependencies

Note that codex-core makes some assumptions about certain helper utilities being available in the environment. Currently, this support matrix is:

macOS

Expects /usr/bin/sandbox-exec to be present.

When using the workspace-write sandbox policy, the Seatbelt profile allows writes under the configured writable roots while keeping .git (directory or pointer file), the resolved gitdir: target, and .codex read-only.

Network access and filesystem read/write roots are controlled by SandboxPolicy. Seatbelt consumes the resolved policy and enforces it.

Seatbelt also supports macOS permission-profile extensions layered on top of SandboxPolicy:

  • no extension profile provided: keeps legacy default preferences read access (user-preference-read).
  • extension profile provided with no macos_preferences grant: does not add preferences access clauses.
  • macos_preferences = "readonly": enables cfprefs read clauses and user-preference-read.
  • macos_preferences = "readwrite": includes readonly clauses plus user-preference-write and cfprefs shm write clauses.
  • macos_automation = true: enables broad Apple Events send permissions.
  • macos_automation = ["com.apple.Notes", ...]: enables Apple Events send only to listed bundle IDs.
  • macos_launch_services = true: enables LaunchServices lookups and open/launch operations.
  • macos_accessibility = true: enables com.apple.axserver mach lookup.
  • macos_calendar = true: enables com.apple.CalendarAgent mach lookup.
  • macos_contacts = "read_only": enables Address Book read access and Contacts read services.
  • macos_contacts = "read_write": includes the readonly Contacts clauses plus Address Book writes and keychain/temp helpers required for writes.

Linux

Expects the binary containing codex-core to run the equivalent of codex sandbox linux (legacy alias: codex debug landlock) when arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.

All Platforms

Expects the binary containing codex-core to simulate the virtual apply_patch CLI when arg1 is --codex-run-as-apply-patch. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.