Andrei Eternal
eed0e07825
Fixes #16246. ## Why `exec_command` already emits `PreToolUse`, but long-running unified exec commands that finish on a later `write_stdin` poll could miss the matching `PostToolUse`. That left the Bash hook lifecycle inconsistent, broke expectations around `tool_use_id` and `tool_input.command`, and meant `PostToolUse` block/replacement feedback could fail to replace the final session output before it reached model context. This keeps the fix scoped to the `exec_command` / `write_stdin` lifecycle. Broader non-Bash hook expansion is still out of scope here and remains tracked separately in #16732. ## What changed - Compute and store `PostToolUsePayload` while handlers still have access to their concrete output type, and carry `tool_use_id` through that payload. - Preserve the original hook-facing `exec_command` string through unified exec state (`ExecCommandRequest`, `ProcessEntry`, `PreparedProcessHandles`, and `ExecCommandToolOutput`) via `hook_command`, and remove the now-unused `session_command` output metadata. - Emit exactly one Bash `PostToolUse` for long-running `exec_command` sessions when a later `write_stdin` poll observes final completion, using the original `exec_command` call id and hook-facing command. - Keep one-shot `exec_command` behavior aligned with the same payload construction, including interactive completions that return a final result directly. - Apply `PostToolUse` block/replacement feedback before the final `write_stdin` completion output is sent back to the model. - Keep `write_stdin` itself out of `PreToolUse` matching so it continues to act as transport/polling for the original Bash tool call. - Restore plain matcher behavior for tool-name matchers such as `Bash` and `Edit|Write`, while still treating patterns with regex characters (for example `mcp__.*`) as regexes. - Add unit coverage for unified exec payload construction and parallel session separation, plus a core integration regression that verifies a blocked `PostToolUse` replaces the final `write_stdin` output in model context. ## Testing - `cargo test -p codex-hooks` - `cargo test -p codex-core post_tool_use_payload` - `cargo test -p codex-core post_tool_use_blocks_when_exec_session_completes_via_write_stdin`
codex-core
This crate implements the business logic for Codex. It is designed to be used by the various Codex UIs written in Rust.
Dependencies
Note that codex-core makes some assumptions about certain helper utilities being available in the environment. Currently, this support matrix is:
macOS
Expects /usr/bin/sandbox-exec to be present.
When using the workspace-write sandbox policy, the Seatbelt profile allows
writes under the configured writable roots while keeping .git (directory or
pointer file), the resolved gitdir: target, and .codex read-only.
Network access and filesystem read/write roots are controlled by
SandboxPolicy. Seatbelt consumes the resolved policy and enforces it.
Seatbelt also keeps the legacy default preferences read access
(user-preference-read) needed for cfprefs-backed macOS behavior.
Linux
Expects the binary containing codex-core to run the equivalent of codex sandbox linux (legacy alias: codex debug landlock) when arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.
Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on Linux.
They can continue to use the legacy Landlock path when the split filesystem
policy is sandbox-equivalent to the legacy model after cwd resolution.
Split filesystem policies that need direct FileSystemSandboxPolicy
enforcement, such as read-only or denied carveouts under a broader writable
root, automatically route through bubblewrap. The legacy Landlock path is used
only when the split filesystem policy round-trips through the legacy
SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics. That includes overlapping
cases like /repo = write, /repo/a = none, /repo/a/b = write, where the
more specific writable child must reopen under a denied parent.
The Linux sandbox helper prefers the first bwrap found on PATH outside the
current working directory whenever it is available. If bwrap is present but
too old to support --argv0, the helper keeps using system bubblewrap and
switches to a no---argv0 compatibility path for the inner re-exec. If
bwrap is missing, it falls back to the vendored bubblewrap path compiled into
the binary and Codex surfaces a startup warning through its normal notification
path instead of printing directly from the sandbox helper. Codex also surfaces
a startup warning when bubblewrap cannot create user namespaces. WSL2 uses the
normal Linux bubblewrap path. WSL1 is not supported for bubblewrap sandboxing
because it cannot create the required user namespaces, so Codex rejects
sandboxed shell commands that would enter the bubblewrap path before invoking
bwrap.
Windows
Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on
Windows.
The elevated setup/runner backend supports legacy ReadOnlyAccess::Restricted
for read-only and workspace-write policies. Restricted read access honors
explicit readable roots plus the command cwd, and keeps writable roots
readable when workspace-write is used.
When include_platform_defaults = true, the elevated Windows backend adds
backend-managed system read roots required for basic execution, such as
C:\Windows, C:\Program Files, C:\Program Files (x86), and
C:\ProgramData. When it is false, those extra system roots are omitted.
The elevated Windows sandbox also supports:
- legacy
ReadOnlyandWorkspaceWritebehavior - split filesystem policies that need exact readable roots, exact writable roots, or extra read-only carveouts under writable roots
The unelevated restricted-token backend still supports the legacy full-read
Windows model for legacy ReadOnly and WorkspaceWrite behavior. It also
supports a narrow split-filesystem subset: full-read split policies whose
writable roots still match the legacy WorkspaceWrite root set, but add extra
read-only carveouts under those writable roots.
New [permissions] / split filesystem policies remain supported on Windows
only when they can be enforced directly by the selected Windows backend or
round-trip through the legacy SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics.
Policies that would require direct explicit unreadable carveouts (none) or
reopened writable descendants under read-only carveouts still fail closed
instead of running with weaker enforcement.
All Platforms
Expects the binary containing codex-core to simulate the virtual
apply_patch CLI when arg1 is --codex-run-as-apply-patch. See the
codex-arg0 crate for details.