Files
codex/codex-rs/core/tests/suite/approvals.rs
T
4d9d4b7b0f Stabilize approval matrix write-file command (#14968)
## What is flaky
The approval-matrix `WriteFile` scenario is flaky. It sometimes fails in
CI even though the approval logic is unchanged, because the test
delegates the file write and readback to shell parsing instead of
deterministic file I/O.

## Why it was flaky
The test generated a command shaped like `printf ... > file && cat
file`. That means the scenario depended on shell quoting, redirection,
newline handling, and encoding behavior in addition to the approval
system it was actually trying to validate. If the shell interpreted the
payload differently, the test would report an approval failure even
though the product logic was fine.

That also made failures hard to diagnose, because the test did not log
the exact generated command or the parsed result payload.

## How this PR fixes it
This PR replaces the shell-redirection path with a deterministic
`python3 -c` script that writes the file with `Path.write_text(...,
encoding='utf-8')` and then reads it back with the same UTF-8 path. It
also logs the generated command and the resulting exit code/stdout for
the approval scenario so any future failure is directly attributable.

## Why this fix fixes the flakiness
The scenario no longer depends on shell parsing and redirection
semantics. The file contents are produced and read through explicit
UTF-8 file I/O, so the approval test is measuring approval behavior
instead of shell behavior. The added diagnostics mean a future failure
will show the exact command/result pair instead of looking like a
generic intermittent mismatch.

Co-authored-by: Ahmed Ibrahim <219906144+aibrahim-oai@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-03-17 13:52:36 -07:00

2608 lines
94 KiB
Rust

#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used)]
use anyhow::Result;
use codex_core::config::Constrained;
use codex_core::config_loader::ConfigLayerStack;
use codex_core::config_loader::ConfigLayerStackOrdering;
use codex_core::config_loader::NetworkConstraints;
use codex_core::config_loader::NetworkRequirementsToml;
use codex_core::config_loader::RequirementSource;
use codex_core::config_loader::Sourced;
use codex_core::features::Feature;
use codex_core::sandboxing::SandboxPermissions;
use codex_protocol::approvals::NetworkApprovalProtocol;
use codex_protocol::approvals::NetworkPolicyAmendment;
use codex_protocol::approvals::NetworkPolicyRuleAction;
use codex_protocol::protocol::ApplyPatchApprovalRequestEvent;
use codex_protocol::protocol::AskForApproval;
use codex_protocol::protocol::EventMsg;
use codex_protocol::protocol::ExecApprovalRequestEvent;
use codex_protocol::protocol::ExecPolicyAmendment;
use codex_protocol::protocol::Op;
use codex_protocol::protocol::ReviewDecision;
use codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
use codex_protocol::user_input::UserInput;
use core_test_support::responses::ev_apply_patch_function_call;
use core_test_support::responses::ev_assistant_message;
use core_test_support::responses::ev_completed;
use core_test_support::responses::ev_function_call;
use core_test_support::responses::ev_response_created;
use core_test_support::responses::mount_sse_once;
use core_test_support::responses::sse;
use core_test_support::responses::start_mock_server;
use core_test_support::skip_if_no_network;
use core_test_support::test_codex::TestCodex;
use core_test_support::test_codex::test_codex;
use core_test_support::wait_for_event;
use core_test_support::wait_for_event_with_timeout;
use core_test_support::zsh_fork::build_zsh_fork_test;
use core_test_support::zsh_fork::restrictive_workspace_write_policy;
use core_test_support::zsh_fork::zsh_fork_runtime;
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
use regex_lite::Regex;
use serde_json::Value;
use serde_json::json;
use std::env;
use std::fs;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::sync::Arc;
use tempfile::TempDir;
use wiremock::Mock;
use wiremock::MockServer;
use wiremock::ResponseTemplate;
use wiremock::matchers::method;
use wiremock::matchers::path;
#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
enum TargetPath {
Workspace(&'static str),
OutsideWorkspace(&'static str),
}
impl TargetPath {
fn resolve_for_patch(self, test: &TestCodex) -> (PathBuf, String) {
match self {
TargetPath::Workspace(name) => {
let path = test.cwd.path().join(name);
(path, name.to_string())
}
TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace(name) => {
let path = env::current_dir()
.expect("current dir should be available")
.join(name);
(path.clone(), path.display().to_string())
}
}
}
}
#[derive(Clone)]
enum ActionKind {
WriteFile {
target: TargetPath,
content: &'static str,
},
FetchUrlNoProxy {
endpoint: &'static str,
response_body: &'static str,
},
FetchUrl {
endpoint: &'static str,
response_body: &'static str,
},
RunCommand {
command: &'static str,
},
RunUnifiedExecCommand {
command: &'static str,
justification: Option<&'static str>,
},
ApplyPatchFunction {
target: TargetPath,
content: &'static str,
},
ApplyPatchShell {
target: TargetPath,
content: &'static str,
},
}
const DEFAULT_UNIFIED_EXEC_JUSTIFICATION: &str =
"Requires escalated permissions to bypass the sandbox in tests.";
impl ActionKind {
async fn prepare(
&self,
test: &TestCodex,
server: &MockServer,
call_id: &str,
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions,
) -> Result<(Value, Option<String>)> {
match self {
ActionKind::WriteFile { target, content } => {
let (path, _) = target.resolve_for_patch(test);
let _ = fs::remove_file(&path);
let path_str = path.display().to_string();
let script = format!(
"from pathlib import Path; path = Path({path_str:?}); content = {content:?}; path.write_text(content, encoding='utf-8'); print(path.read_text(encoding='utf-8'), end='')",
);
let command = format!("python3 -c {script:?}");
let event = shell_event(call_id, &command, 5_000, sandbox_permissions)?;
Ok((event, Some(command)))
}
ActionKind::FetchUrl {
endpoint,
response_body,
} => {
Mock::given(method("GET"))
.and(path(*endpoint))
.respond_with(
ResponseTemplate::new(200).set_body_string(response_body.to_string()),
)
.mount(server)
.await;
let url = format!("{}{}", server.uri(), endpoint);
let escaped_url = url.replace('\'', "\\'");
let script = format!(
"import sys\nimport urllib.request\nurl = '{escaped_url}'\ntry:\n data = urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=2).read().decode()\n print('OK:' + data.strip())\nexcept Exception as exc:\n print('ERR:' + exc.__class__.__name__)\n sys.exit(1)",
);
let command = format!("python3 -c \"{script}\"");
let event = shell_event(call_id, &command, 5_000, sandbox_permissions)?;
Ok((event, Some(command)))
}
ActionKind::FetchUrlNoProxy {
endpoint,
response_body,
} => {
Mock::given(method("GET"))
.and(path(*endpoint))
.respond_with(
ResponseTemplate::new(200).set_body_string(response_body.to_string()),
)
.mount(server)
.await;
let url = format!("{}{}", server.uri(), endpoint);
let escaped_url = url.replace('\'', "\\'");
let script = format!(
"import sys\nimport urllib.request\nurl = '{escaped_url}'\nopener = urllib.request.build_opener(urllib.request.ProxyHandler({{}}))\ntry:\n data = opener.open(url, timeout=2).read().decode()\n print('OK:' + data.strip())\nexcept Exception as exc:\n print('ERR:' + exc.__class__.__name__)\n sys.exit(1)",
);
let command = format!("python3 -c \"{script}\"");
let event = shell_event(call_id, &command, 5_000, sandbox_permissions)?;
Ok((event, Some(command)))
}
ActionKind::RunCommand { command } => {
let event = shell_event(call_id, command, 1_000, sandbox_permissions)?;
Ok((event, Some(command.to_string())))
}
ActionKind::RunUnifiedExecCommand {
command,
justification,
} => {
let event = exec_command_event(
call_id,
command,
Some(1000),
sandbox_permissions,
*justification,
)?;
Ok((event, Some(command.to_string())))
}
ActionKind::ApplyPatchFunction { target, content } => {
let (path, patch_path) = target.resolve_for_patch(test);
let _ = fs::remove_file(&path);
let patch = build_add_file_patch(&patch_path, content);
Ok((ev_apply_patch_function_call(call_id, &patch), None))
}
ActionKind::ApplyPatchShell { target, content } => {
let (path, patch_path) = target.resolve_for_patch(test);
let _ = fs::remove_file(&path);
let patch = build_add_file_patch(&patch_path, content);
let command = shell_apply_patch_command(&patch);
let event = shell_event(call_id, &command, 5_000, sandbox_permissions)?;
Ok((event, Some(command)))
}
}
}
}
fn build_add_file_patch(patch_path: &str, content: &str) -> String {
format!("*** Begin Patch\n*** Add File: {patch_path}\n+{content}\n*** End Patch\n")
}
fn shell_apply_patch_command(patch: &str) -> String {
let mut script = String::from("apply_patch <<'PATCH'\n");
script.push_str(patch);
if !patch.ends_with('\n') {
script.push('\n');
}
script.push_str("PATCH\n");
script
}
fn shell_event(
call_id: &str,
command: &str,
timeout_ms: u64,
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions,
) -> Result<Value> {
shell_event_with_prefix_rule(call_id, command, timeout_ms, sandbox_permissions, None)
}
fn shell_event_with_prefix_rule(
call_id: &str,
command: &str,
timeout_ms: u64,
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions,
prefix_rule: Option<Vec<String>>,
) -> Result<Value> {
let mut args = json!({
"command": command,
"timeout_ms": timeout_ms,
});
if sandbox_permissions.requests_sandbox_override() {
args["sandbox_permissions"] = json!(sandbox_permissions);
}
if let Some(prefix_rule) = prefix_rule {
args["prefix_rule"] = json!(prefix_rule);
}
let args_str = serde_json::to_string(&args)?;
Ok(ev_function_call(call_id, "shell_command", &args_str))
}
fn exec_command_event(
call_id: &str,
cmd: &str,
yield_time_ms: Option<u64>,
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions,
justification: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<Value> {
let mut args = json!({
"cmd": cmd.to_string(),
});
if let Some(yield_time_ms) = yield_time_ms {
args["yield_time_ms"] = json!(yield_time_ms);
}
if sandbox_permissions.requests_sandbox_override() {
args["sandbox_permissions"] = json!(sandbox_permissions);
let reason = justification.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_UNIFIED_EXEC_JUSTIFICATION);
args["justification"] = json!(reason);
}
let args_str = serde_json::to_string(&args)?;
Ok(ev_function_call(call_id, "exec_command", &args_str))
}
#[derive(Clone)]
enum Expectation {
FileCreated {
target: TargetPath,
content: &'static str,
},
FileCreatedNoExitCode {
target: TargetPath,
content: &'static str,
},
PatchApplied {
target: TargetPath,
content: &'static str,
},
FileNotCreated {
target: TargetPath,
message_contains: &'static [&'static str],
},
NetworkSuccess {
body_contains: &'static str,
},
NetworkSuccessNoExitCode {
body_contains: &'static str,
},
NetworkFailure {
expect_tag: &'static str,
},
CommandSuccess {
stdout_contains: &'static str,
},
CommandSuccessNoExitCode {
stdout_contains: &'static str,
},
CommandFailure {
output_contains: &'static str,
},
}
impl Expectation {
fn verify(&self, test: &TestCodex, result: &CommandResult) -> Result<()> {
match self {
Expectation::FileCreated { target, content } => {
let (path, _) = target.resolve_for_patch(test);
assert_eq!(
result.exit_code,
Some(0),
"expected successful exit for {path:?}"
);
assert!(
result.stdout.contains(content),
"stdout missing {content:?}: {}",
result.stdout
);
let file_contents = fs::read_to_string(&path)?;
assert!(
file_contents.contains(content),
"file contents missing {content:?}: {file_contents}"
);
let _ = fs::remove_file(path);
}
Expectation::FileCreatedNoExitCode { target, content } => {
let (path, _) = target.resolve_for_patch(test);
assert!(
result.exit_code.is_none() || result.exit_code == Some(0),
"expected no exit code for {path:?}",
);
assert!(
result.stdout.contains(content),
"stdout missing {content:?}: {}",
result.stdout
);
let file_contents = fs::read_to_string(&path)?;
assert!(
file_contents.contains(content),
"file contents missing {content:?}: {file_contents}"
);
let _ = fs::remove_file(path);
}
Expectation::PatchApplied { target, content } => {
let (path, _) = target.resolve_for_patch(test);
match result.exit_code {
Some(0) | None => {
if result.exit_code.is_none() {
assert!(
result.stdout.contains("Success."),
"patch output missing success indicator: {}",
result.stdout
);
}
}
Some(code) => panic!(
"expected successful patch exit for {:?}, got {code} with stdout {}",
path, result.stdout
),
}
let file_contents = fs::read_to_string(&path)?;
assert!(
file_contents.contains(content),
"patched file missing {content:?}: {file_contents}"
);
let _ = fs::remove_file(path);
}
Expectation::FileNotCreated {
target,
message_contains,
} => {
let (path, _) = target.resolve_for_patch(test);
assert_ne!(
result.exit_code,
Some(0),
"expected non-zero exit for {path:?}"
);
for needle in *message_contains {
if needle.contains('|') {
let options: Vec<&str> = needle.split('|').collect();
let matches_any =
options.iter().any(|option| result.stdout.contains(option));
assert!(
matches_any,
"stdout missing one of {options:?}: {}",
result.stdout
);
} else {
assert!(
result.stdout.contains(needle),
"stdout missing {needle:?}: {}",
result.stdout
);
}
}
assert!(
!path.exists(),
"command should not create {path:?}, but file exists"
);
}
Expectation::NetworkSuccess { body_contains } => {
assert_eq!(
result.exit_code,
Some(0),
"expected successful network exit: {}",
result.stdout
);
assert!(
result.stdout.contains("OK:"),
"stdout missing OK prefix: {}",
result.stdout
);
assert!(
result.stdout.contains(body_contains),
"stdout missing body text {body_contains:?}: {}",
result.stdout
);
}
Expectation::NetworkSuccessNoExitCode { body_contains } => {
assert!(
result.exit_code.is_none() || result.exit_code == Some(0),
"expected no exit code for successful network call: {}",
result.stdout
);
assert!(
result.stdout.contains("OK:"),
"stdout missing OK prefix: {}",
result.stdout
);
assert!(
result.stdout.contains(body_contains),
"stdout missing body text {body_contains:?}: {}",
result.stdout
);
}
Expectation::NetworkFailure { expect_tag } => {
assert_ne!(
result.exit_code,
Some(0),
"expected non-zero exit for network failure: {}",
result.stdout
);
assert!(
result.stdout.contains("ERR:"),
"stdout missing ERR prefix: {}",
result.stdout
);
assert!(
result.stdout.contains(expect_tag),
"stdout missing expected tag {expect_tag:?}: {}",
result.stdout
);
}
Expectation::CommandSuccess { stdout_contains } => {
assert_eq!(
result.exit_code,
Some(0),
"expected successful trusted command exit: {}",
result.stdout
);
assert!(
result.stdout.contains(stdout_contains),
"trusted command stdout missing {stdout_contains:?}: {}",
result.stdout
);
}
Expectation::CommandSuccessNoExitCode { stdout_contains } => {
assert!(
result.exit_code.is_none() || result.exit_code == Some(0),
"expected no exit code for trusted command: {}",
result.stdout
);
assert!(
result.stdout.contains(stdout_contains),
"trusted command stdout missing {stdout_contains:?}: {}",
result.stdout
);
}
Expectation::CommandFailure { output_contains } => {
assert_ne!(
result.exit_code,
Some(0),
"expected non-zero exit for command failure: {}",
result.stdout
);
assert!(
result.stdout.contains(output_contains),
"command failure stderr missing {output_contains:?}: {}",
result.stdout
);
}
}
Ok(())
}
}
#[derive(Clone)]
enum Outcome {
Auto,
ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision,
expected_reason: Option<&'static str>,
},
PatchApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision,
expected_reason: Option<&'static str>,
},
}
#[derive(Clone)]
struct ScenarioSpec {
name: &'static str,
approval_policy: AskForApproval,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
action: ActionKind,
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions,
features: Vec<Feature>,
model_override: Option<&'static str>,
outcome: Outcome,
expectation: Expectation,
}
struct CommandResult {
exit_code: Option<i64>,
stdout: String,
}
async fn submit_turn(
test: &TestCodex,
prompt: &str,
approval_policy: AskForApproval,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
) -> Result<()> {
let session_model = test.session_configured.model.clone();
test.codex
.submit(Op::UserTurn {
items: vec![UserInput::Text {
text: prompt.into(),
text_elements: Vec::new(),
}],
final_output_json_schema: None,
cwd: test.cwd.path().to_path_buf(),
approval_policy,
sandbox_policy,
model: session_model,
effort: None,
summary: None,
service_tier: None,
collaboration_mode: None,
personality: None,
})
.await?;
Ok(())
}
fn parse_result(item: &Value) -> CommandResult {
let output_str = item
.get("output")
.and_then(Value::as_str)
.expect("shell output payload");
match serde_json::from_str::<Value>(output_str) {
Ok(parsed) => {
let exit_code = parsed["metadata"]["exit_code"].as_i64();
let stdout = parsed["output"].as_str().unwrap_or_default().to_string();
CommandResult { exit_code, stdout }
}
Err(_) => {
let structured = Regex::new(r"(?s)^Exit code:\s*(-?\d+).*?Output:\n(.*)$").unwrap();
let regex =
Regex::new(r"(?s)^.*?Process exited with code (\d+)\n.*?Output:\n(.*)$").unwrap();
// parse freeform output
if let Some(captures) = structured.captures(output_str) {
let exit_code = captures.get(1).unwrap().as_str().parse::<i64>().unwrap();
let output = captures.get(2).unwrap().as_str();
CommandResult {
exit_code: Some(exit_code),
stdout: output.to_string(),
}
} else if let Some(captures) = regex.captures(output_str) {
let exit_code = captures.get(1).unwrap().as_str().parse::<i64>().unwrap();
let output = captures.get(2).unwrap().as_str();
CommandResult {
exit_code: Some(exit_code),
stdout: output.to_string(),
}
} else {
CommandResult {
exit_code: None,
stdout: output_str.to_string(),
}
}
}
}
}
async fn expect_exec_approval(
test: &TestCodex,
expected_command: &str,
) -> ExecApprovalRequestEvent {
let event = wait_for_event(&test.codex, |event| {
matches!(
event,
EventMsg::ExecApprovalRequest(_) | EventMsg::TurnComplete(_)
)
})
.await;
match event {
EventMsg::ExecApprovalRequest(approval) => {
let last_arg = approval
.command
.last()
.map(std::string::String::as_str)
.unwrap_or_default();
assert_eq!(last_arg, expected_command);
approval
}
EventMsg::TurnComplete(_) => panic!("expected approval request before completion"),
other => panic!("unexpected event: {other:?}"),
}
}
async fn expect_patch_approval(
test: &TestCodex,
expected_call_id: &str,
) -> ApplyPatchApprovalRequestEvent {
let event = wait_for_event(&test.codex, |event| {
matches!(
event,
EventMsg::ApplyPatchApprovalRequest(_) | EventMsg::TurnComplete(_)
)
})
.await;
match event {
EventMsg::ApplyPatchApprovalRequest(approval) => {
assert_eq!(approval.call_id, expected_call_id);
approval
}
EventMsg::TurnComplete(_) => panic!("expected patch approval request before completion"),
other => panic!("unexpected event: {other:?}"),
}
}
async fn wait_for_completion_without_approval(test: &TestCodex) {
let event = wait_for_event(&test.codex, |event| {
matches!(
event,
EventMsg::ExecApprovalRequest(_) | EventMsg::TurnComplete(_)
)
})
.await;
match event {
EventMsg::TurnComplete(_) => {}
EventMsg::ExecApprovalRequest(event) => {
panic!("unexpected approval request: {:?}", event.command)
}
other => panic!("unexpected event: {other:?}"),
}
}
async fn wait_for_completion(test: &TestCodex) {
wait_for_event(&test.codex, |event| {
matches!(event, EventMsg::TurnComplete(_))
})
.await;
}
fn scenarios() -> Vec<ScenarioSpec> {
use AskForApproval::*;
let workspace_write = |network_access| SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
read_only_access: Default::default(),
network_access,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: false,
exclude_slash_tmp: false,
};
vec![
ScenarioSpec {
name: "danger_full_access_on_request_allows_outside_write",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("dfa_on_request.txt"),
content: "danger-on-request",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5"),
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::FileCreated {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("dfa_on_request.txt"),
content: "danger-on-request",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "danger_full_access_on_request_allows_outside_write_gpt_5_1_no_exit",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("dfa_on_request_5_1.txt"),
content: "danger-on-request",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.1"),
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::FileCreated {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("dfa_on_request_5_1.txt"),
content: "danger-on-request",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "danger_full_access_on_request_allows_network",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
action: ActionKind::FetchUrlNoProxy {
endpoint: "/dfa/network",
response_body: "danger-network-ok",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5"),
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::NetworkSuccess {
body_contains: "danger-network-ok",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "danger_full_access_on_request_allows_network_gpt_5_1_no_exit",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
action: ActionKind::FetchUrlNoProxy {
endpoint: "/dfa/network",
response_body: "danger-network-ok",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.1"),
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::NetworkSuccessNoExitCode {
body_contains: "danger-network-ok",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "trusted_command_unless_trusted_runs_without_prompt",
approval_policy: UnlessTrusted,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
action: ActionKind::RunCommand {
command: "echo trusted-unless",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5"),
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::CommandSuccess {
stdout_contains: "trusted-unless",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "trusted_command_unless_trusted_runs_without_prompt_gpt_5_1_no_exit",
approval_policy: UnlessTrusted,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
action: ActionKind::RunCommand {
command: "echo trusted-unless",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.1"),
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::CommandSuccessNoExitCode {
stdout_contains: "trusted-unless",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "cat_redirect_unless_trusted_requires_approval",
approval_policy: UnlessTrusted,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::RunCommand {
command: r#"cat < "hello" > /var/test.txt"#,
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5"),
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Denied,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::CommandFailure {
output_contains: "rejected by user",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "cat_redirect_on_request_requires_approval",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::RunCommand {
command: r#"cat < "hello" > /var/test.txt"#,
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5"),
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Denied,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::CommandFailure {
output_contains: "rejected by user",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "danger_full_access_on_failure_allows_outside_write",
approval_policy: OnFailure,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("dfa_on_failure.txt"),
content: "danger-on-failure",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5"),
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::FileCreated {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("dfa_on_failure.txt"),
content: "danger-on-failure",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "danger_full_access_on_failure_allows_outside_write_gpt_5_1_no_exit",
approval_policy: OnFailure,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("dfa_on_failure_5_1.txt"),
content: "danger-on-failure",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.1"),
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::FileCreatedNoExitCode {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("dfa_on_failure_5_1.txt"),
content: "danger-on-failure",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "danger_full_access_unless_trusted_requests_approval",
approval_policy: UnlessTrusted,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("dfa_unless_trusted.txt"),
content: "danger-unless-trusted",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5"),
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::FileCreated {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("dfa_unless_trusted.txt"),
content: "danger-unless-trusted",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "danger_full_access_unless_trusted_requests_approval_gpt_5_1_no_exit",
approval_policy: UnlessTrusted,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("dfa_unless_trusted_5_1.txt"),
content: "danger-unless-trusted",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.1"),
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::FileCreatedNoExitCode {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("dfa_unless_trusted_5_1.txt"),
content: "danger-unless-trusted",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "danger_full_access_never_allows_outside_write",
approval_policy: Never,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("dfa_never.txt"),
content: "danger-never",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5"),
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::FileCreated {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("dfa_never.txt"),
content: "danger-never",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "danger_full_access_never_allows_outside_write_gpt_5_1_no_exit",
approval_policy: Never,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("dfa_never_5_1.txt"),
content: "danger-never",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.1"),
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::FileCreatedNoExitCode {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("dfa_never_5_1.txt"),
content: "danger-never",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "read_only_on_request_requires_approval",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("ro_on_request.txt"),
content: "read-only-approval",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5"),
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::FileCreated {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("ro_on_request.txt"),
content: "read-only-approval",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "read_only_on_request_requires_approval_gpt_5_1_no_exit",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("ro_on_request_5_1.txt"),
content: "read-only-approval",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.1"),
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::FileCreatedNoExitCode {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("ro_on_request_5_1.txt"),
content: "read-only-approval",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "trusted_command_on_request_read_only_runs_without_prompt",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
action: ActionKind::RunCommand {
command: "echo trusted-read-only",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5"),
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::CommandSuccess {
stdout_contains: "trusted-read-only",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "trusted_command_on_request_read_only_runs_without_prompt_gpt_5_1_no_exit",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
action: ActionKind::RunCommand {
command: "echo trusted-read-only",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.1"),
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::CommandSuccessNoExitCode {
stdout_contains: "trusted-read-only",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "read_only_on_request_blocks_network",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
action: ActionKind::FetchUrl {
endpoint: "/ro/network-blocked",
response_body: "should-not-see",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: None,
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::NetworkFailure { expect_tag: "ERR:" },
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "read_only_on_request_denied_blocks_execution",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("ro_on_request_denied.txt"),
content: "should-not-write",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,
features: vec![],
model_override: None,
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Denied,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::FileNotCreated {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("ro_on_request_denied.txt"),
message_contains: &["exec command rejected by user"],
},
},
#[cfg(not(target_os = "linux"))] // TODO (pakrym): figure out why linux behaves differently
ScenarioSpec {
name: "read_only_on_failure_escalates_after_sandbox_error",
approval_policy: OnFailure,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("ro_on_failure.txt"),
content: "read-only-on-failure",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5"),
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
expected_reason: Some("command failed; retry without sandbox?"),
},
expectation: Expectation::FileCreated {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("ro_on_failure.txt"),
content: "read-only-on-failure",
},
},
#[cfg(not(target_os = "linux"))]
ScenarioSpec {
name: "read_only_on_failure_escalates_after_sandbox_error_gpt_5_1_no_exit",
approval_policy: OnFailure,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("ro_on_failure_5_1.txt"),
content: "read-only-on-failure",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.1"),
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
expected_reason: Some("command failed; retry without sandbox?"),
},
expectation: Expectation::FileCreatedNoExitCode {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("ro_on_failure_5_1.txt"),
content: "read-only-on-failure",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "read_only_on_request_network_escalates_when_approved",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
action: ActionKind::FetchUrl {
endpoint: "/ro/network-approved",
response_body: "read-only-network-ok",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5"),
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::NetworkSuccess {
body_contains: "read-only-network-ok",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "read_only_on_request_network_escalates_when_approved_gpt_5_1_no_exit",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
action: ActionKind::FetchUrl {
endpoint: "/ro/network-approved",
response_body: "read-only-network-ok",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.1"),
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::NetworkSuccessNoExitCode {
body_contains: "read-only-network-ok",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "apply_patch_shell_command_requires_patch_approval",
approval_policy: UnlessTrusted,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::ApplyPatchShell {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("apply_patch_shell.txt"),
content: "shell-apply-patch",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: None,
outcome: Outcome::PatchApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::PatchApplied {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("apply_patch_shell.txt"),
content: "shell-apply-patch",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "apply_patch_function_auto_inside_workspace",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
action: ActionKind::ApplyPatchFunction {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("apply_patch_function.txt"),
content: "function-apply-patch",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.1-codex"),
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::PatchApplied {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("apply_patch_function.txt"),
content: "function-apply-patch",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "apply_patch_function_danger_allows_outside_workspace",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
action: ActionKind::ApplyPatchFunction {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("apply_patch_function_danger.txt"),
content: "function-patch-danger",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![Feature::ApplyPatchFreeform],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.1-codex"),
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::PatchApplied {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("apply_patch_function_danger.txt"),
content: "function-patch-danger",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "apply_patch_function_outside_requires_patch_approval",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::ApplyPatchFunction {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("apply_patch_function_outside.txt"),
content: "function-patch-outside",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.1-codex"),
outcome: Outcome::PatchApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::PatchApplied {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("apply_patch_function_outside.txt"),
content: "function-patch-outside",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "apply_patch_function_outside_denied_blocks_patch",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::ApplyPatchFunction {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("apply_patch_function_outside_denied.txt"),
content: "function-patch-outside-denied",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.1-codex"),
outcome: Outcome::PatchApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Denied,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::FileNotCreated {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("apply_patch_function_outside_denied.txt"),
message_contains: &["patch rejected by user"],
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "apply_patch_shell_command_outside_requires_patch_approval",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::ApplyPatchShell {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("apply_patch_shell_outside.txt"),
content: "shell-patch-outside",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: None,
outcome: Outcome::PatchApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::PatchApplied {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("apply_patch_shell_outside.txt"),
content: "shell-patch-outside",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "apply_patch_function_unless_trusted_requires_patch_approval",
approval_policy: UnlessTrusted,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::ApplyPatchFunction {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("apply_patch_function_unless_trusted.txt"),
content: "function-patch-unless-trusted",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.1-codex"),
outcome: Outcome::PatchApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::PatchApplied {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("apply_patch_function_unless_trusted.txt"),
content: "function-patch-unless-trusted",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "apply_patch_function_never_rejects_outside_workspace",
approval_policy: Never,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::ApplyPatchFunction {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("apply_patch_function_never.txt"),
content: "function-patch-never",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.1-codex"),
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::FileNotCreated {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("apply_patch_function_never.txt"),
message_contains: &[
"patch rejected: writing outside of the project; rejected by user approval settings",
],
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "read_only_unless_trusted_requires_approval",
approval_policy: UnlessTrusted,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("ro_unless_trusted.txt"),
content: "read-only-unless-trusted",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5"),
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::FileCreated {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("ro_unless_trusted.txt"),
content: "read-only-unless-trusted",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "read_only_unless_trusted_requires_approval_gpt_5_1_no_exit",
approval_policy: UnlessTrusted,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("ro_unless_trusted_5_1.txt"),
content: "read-only-unless-trusted",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.1"),
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::FileCreatedNoExitCode {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("ro_unless_trusted_5_1.txt"),
content: "read-only-unless-trusted",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "read_only_never_reports_sandbox_failure",
approval_policy: Never,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("ro_never.txt"),
content: "read-only-never",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: None,
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::FileNotCreated {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("ro_never.txt"),
message_contains: if cfg!(target_os = "linux") {
&["Permission denied|Read-only file system"]
} else {
&[
"Permission denied|Operation not permitted|operation not permitted|\
Read-only file system",
]
},
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "trusted_command_never_runs_without_prompt",
approval_policy: Never,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
action: ActionKind::RunCommand {
command: "echo trusted-never",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5"),
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::CommandSuccess {
stdout_contains: "trusted-never",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "workspace_write_on_request_allows_workspace_write",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("ww_on_request.txt"),
content: "workspace-on-request",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5"),
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::FileCreated {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("ww_on_request.txt"),
content: "workspace-on-request",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "workspace_write_network_disabled_blocks_network",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::FetchUrl {
endpoint: "/ww/network-blocked",
response_body: "workspace-network-blocked",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: None,
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::NetworkFailure { expect_tag: "ERR:" },
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "workspace_write_on_request_requires_approval_outside_workspace",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("ww_on_request_outside.txt"),
content: "workspace-on-request-outside",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5"),
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::FileCreated {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("ww_on_request_outside.txt"),
content: "workspace-on-request-outside",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "workspace_write_network_enabled_allows_network",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(true),
action: ActionKind::FetchUrl {
endpoint: "/ww/network-ok",
response_body: "workspace-network-ok",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5"),
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::NetworkSuccess {
body_contains: "workspace-network-ok",
},
},
#[cfg(not(target_os = "linux"))] // TODO (pakrym): figure out why linux behaves differently
ScenarioSpec {
name: "workspace_write_on_failure_escalates_outside_workspace",
approval_policy: OnFailure,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("ww_on_failure.txt"),
content: "workspace-on-failure",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5"),
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
expected_reason: Some("command failed; retry without sandbox?"),
},
expectation: Expectation::FileCreated {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("ww_on_failure.txt"),
content: "workspace-on-failure",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "workspace_write_unless_trusted_requires_approval_outside_workspace",
approval_policy: UnlessTrusted,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("ww_unless_trusted.txt"),
content: "workspace-unless-trusted",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5"),
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::FileCreated {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("ww_unless_trusted.txt"),
content: "workspace-unless-trusted",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "workspace_write_never_blocks_outside_workspace",
approval_policy: Never,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("ww_never.txt"),
content: "workspace-never",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: None,
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::FileNotCreated {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("ww_never.txt"),
message_contains: if cfg!(target_os = "linux") {
&["Permission denied|Read-only file system"]
} else {
&[
"Permission denied|Operation not permitted|operation not permitted|\
Read-only file system",
]
},
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "unified exec on request no approval for safe command",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
action: ActionKind::RunUnifiedExecCommand {
command: "echo \"hello unified exec\"",
justification: None,
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![Feature::UnifiedExec],
model_override: Some("gpt-5"),
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::CommandSuccess {
stdout_contains: "hello unified exec",
},
},
#[cfg(not(all(target_os = "linux", target_arch = "aarch64")))]
// Linux sandbox arg0 test workaround doesn't work on ARM
ScenarioSpec {
name: "unified exec on request escalated requires approval",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
action: ActionKind::RunUnifiedExecCommand {
command: "python3 -c 'print('\"'\"'escalated unified exec'\"'\"')'",
justification: Some(DEFAULT_UNIFIED_EXEC_JUSTIFICATION),
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,
features: vec![Feature::UnifiedExec],
model_override: Some("gpt-5"),
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
expected_reason: Some(DEFAULT_UNIFIED_EXEC_JUSTIFICATION),
},
expectation: Expectation::CommandSuccess {
stdout_contains: "escalated unified exec",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "unified exec on request requires approval unless trusted",
approval_policy: AskForApproval::UnlessTrusted,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
action: ActionKind::RunUnifiedExecCommand {
command: "git reset --hard",
justification: None,
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![Feature::UnifiedExec],
model_override: None,
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Denied,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::CommandFailure {
output_contains: "rejected by user",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "safe command with heredoc and redirect still requires approval",
approval_policy: AskForApproval::OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::RunUnifiedExecCommand {
command: "cat <<'EOF' > /tmp/out.txt \nhello\nEOF",
justification: None,
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,
features: vec![Feature::UnifiedExec],
model_override: None,
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Denied,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::CommandFailure {
output_contains: "rejected by user",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "compound command with one safe command still requires approval",
approval_policy: AskForApproval::OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::RunUnifiedExecCommand {
command: "cat ./one.txt && touch ./two.txt",
justification: None,
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,
features: vec![Feature::UnifiedExec],
model_override: None,
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Denied,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::CommandFailure {
output_contains: "rejected by user",
},
},
]
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
async fn approval_matrix_covers_all_modes() -> Result<()> {
skip_if_no_network!(Ok(()));
for scenario in scenarios() {
run_scenario(&scenario).await?;
}
Ok(())
}
async fn run_scenario(scenario: &ScenarioSpec) -> Result<()> {
eprintln!("running approval scenario: {}", scenario.name);
let server = start_mock_server().await;
let approval_policy = scenario.approval_policy;
let sandbox_policy = scenario.sandbox_policy.clone();
let features = scenario.features.clone();
let model_override = scenario.model_override;
let model = model_override.unwrap_or("gpt-5.1");
let mut builder = test_codex().with_model(model).with_config(move |config| {
config.permissions.approval_policy = Constrained::allow_any(approval_policy);
config.permissions.sandbox_policy = Constrained::allow_any(sandbox_policy.clone());
for feature in features {
config
.features
.enable(feature)
.expect("test config should allow feature update");
}
});
let test = builder.build(&server).await?;
let call_id = scenario.name;
let (event, expected_command) = scenario
.action
.prepare(&test, &server, call_id, scenario.sandbox_permissions)
.await?;
if let Some(command) = expected_command.as_deref() {
eprintln!("approval scenario {} command: {command}", scenario.name);
}
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-1"),
event,
ev_completed("resp-1"),
]),
)
.await;
let results_mock = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_assistant_message("msg-1", "done"),
ev_completed("resp-2"),
]),
)
.await;
submit_turn(
&test,
scenario.name,
scenario.approval_policy,
scenario.sandbox_policy.clone(),
)
.await?;
match &scenario.outcome {
Outcome::Auto => {
wait_for_completion_without_approval(&test).await;
}
Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision,
expected_reason,
} => {
let command = expected_command
.as_deref()
.expect("exec approval requires shell command");
let approval = expect_exec_approval(&test, command).await;
if let Some(expected_reason) = expected_reason {
assert_eq!(
approval.reason.as_deref(),
Some(*expected_reason),
"unexpected approval reason for {}",
scenario.name
);
}
test.codex
.submit(Op::ExecApproval {
id: approval.effective_approval_id(),
turn_id: None,
decision: decision.clone(),
})
.await?;
wait_for_completion(&test).await;
}
Outcome::PatchApproval {
decision,
expected_reason,
} => {
let approval = expect_patch_approval(&test, call_id).await;
if let Some(expected_reason) = expected_reason {
assert_eq!(
approval.reason.as_deref(),
Some(*expected_reason),
"unexpected patch approval reason for {}",
scenario.name
);
}
test.codex
.submit(Op::PatchApproval {
id: approval.call_id,
decision: decision.clone(),
})
.await?;
wait_for_completion(&test).await;
}
}
let output_item = results_mock.single_request().function_call_output(call_id);
let result = parse_result(&output_item);
eprintln!(
"approval scenario {} result: exit_code={:?} stdout={:?}",
scenario.name, result.exit_code, result.stdout
);
scenario.expectation.verify(&test, &result)?;
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
#[cfg(unix)]
async fn approving_apply_patch_for_session_skips_future_prompts_for_same_file() -> Result<()> {
skip_if_no_network!(Ok(()));
let server = start_mock_server().await;
let approval_policy = AskForApproval::OnRequest;
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
read_only_access: Default::default(),
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: false,
exclude_slash_tmp: false,
};
let sandbox_policy_for_config = sandbox_policy.clone();
let mut builder = test_codex()
.with_model("gpt-5.1-codex")
.with_config(move |config| {
config.permissions.approval_policy = Constrained::allow_any(approval_policy);
config.permissions.sandbox_policy = Constrained::allow_any(sandbox_policy_for_config);
});
let test = builder.build(&server).await?;
let target = TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("apply_patch_allow_session.txt");
let (path, patch_path) = target.resolve_for_patch(&test);
let _ = fs::remove_file(&path);
let patch_add = build_add_file_patch(&patch_path, "before");
let patch_update = format!(
"*** Begin Patch\n*** Update File: {patch_path}\n@@\n-before\n+after\n*** End Patch\n"
);
let call_id_1 = "apply_patch_allow_session_1";
let call_id_2 = "apply_patch_allow_session_2";
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-1"),
ev_apply_patch_function_call(call_id_1, &patch_add),
ev_completed("resp-1"),
]),
)
.await;
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_assistant_message("msg-1", "done"),
ev_completed("resp-2"),
]),
)
.await;
submit_turn(
&test,
"apply_patch allow session",
approval_policy,
sandbox_policy.clone(),
)
.await?;
let approval = expect_patch_approval(&test, call_id_1).await;
test.codex
.submit(Op::PatchApproval {
id: approval.call_id,
decision: ReviewDecision::ApprovedForSession,
})
.await?;
wait_for_completion(&test).await;
assert!(fs::read_to_string(&path)?.contains("before"));
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-3"),
ev_apply_patch_function_call(call_id_2, &patch_update),
ev_completed("resp-3"),
]),
)
.await;
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_assistant_message("msg-2", "done"),
ev_completed("resp-4"),
]),
)
.await;
submit_turn(
&test,
"apply_patch allow session followup",
approval_policy,
sandbox_policy.clone(),
)
.await?;
let event = wait_for_event(&test.codex, |event| {
matches!(
event,
EventMsg::ApplyPatchApprovalRequest(_) | EventMsg::TurnComplete(_)
)
})
.await;
match event {
EventMsg::TurnComplete(_) => {}
EventMsg::ApplyPatchApprovalRequest(event) => {
panic!("unexpected patch approval request: {:?}", event.call_id)
}
other => panic!("unexpected event: {other:?}"),
}
assert!(fs::read_to_string(&path)?.contains("after"));
let _ = fs::remove_file(path);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
#[cfg(unix)]
async fn approving_execpolicy_amendment_persists_policy_and_skips_future_prompts() -> Result<()> {
let server = start_mock_server().await;
let approval_policy = AskForApproval::UnlessTrusted;
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
let sandbox_policy_for_config = sandbox_policy.clone();
let mut builder = test_codex().with_config(move |config| {
config.permissions.approval_policy = Constrained::allow_any(approval_policy);
config.permissions.sandbox_policy = Constrained::allow_any(sandbox_policy_for_config);
});
let test = builder.build(&server).await?;
let allow_prefix_path = test.cwd.path().join("allow-prefix.txt");
let _ = fs::remove_file(&allow_prefix_path);
let call_id_first = "allow-prefix-first";
let (first_event, expected_command) = ActionKind::RunCommand {
command: "touch allow-prefix.txt",
}
.prepare(
&test,
&server,
call_id_first,
SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
)
.await?;
let expected_command =
expected_command.expect("execpolicy amendment scenario should produce a shell command");
let expected_execpolicy_amendment =
ExecPolicyAmendment::new(vec!["touch".to_string(), "allow-prefix.txt".to_string()]);
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-allow-prefix-1"),
first_event,
ev_completed("resp-allow-prefix-1"),
]),
)
.await;
let first_results = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_assistant_message("msg-allow-prefix-1", "done"),
ev_completed("resp-allow-prefix-2"),
]),
)
.await;
submit_turn(
&test,
"allow-prefix-first",
approval_policy,
sandbox_policy.clone(),
)
.await?;
let approval = expect_exec_approval(&test, expected_command.as_str()).await;
assert_eq!(
approval.proposed_execpolicy_amendment,
Some(expected_execpolicy_amendment.clone())
);
test.codex
.submit(Op::ExecApproval {
id: approval.effective_approval_id(),
turn_id: None,
decision: ReviewDecision::ApprovedExecpolicyAmendment {
proposed_execpolicy_amendment: expected_execpolicy_amendment.clone(),
},
})
.await?;
wait_for_completion(&test).await;
let developer_messages = first_results
.single_request()
.message_input_texts("developer");
assert!(
developer_messages
.iter()
.any(|message| message.contains(r#"["touch", "allow-prefix.txt"]"#)),
"expected developer message documenting saved rule, got: {developer_messages:?}"
);
let policy_path = test.home.path().join("rules").join("default.rules");
let policy_contents = fs::read_to_string(&policy_path)?;
assert!(
policy_contents
.contains(r#"prefix_rule(pattern=["touch", "allow-prefix.txt"], decision="allow")"#),
"unexpected policy contents: {policy_contents}"
);
let first_output = parse_result(
&first_results
.single_request()
.function_call_output(call_id_first),
);
assert_eq!(first_output.exit_code.unwrap_or(0), 0);
assert!(
first_output.stdout.is_empty(),
"unexpected stdout: {}",
first_output.stdout
);
assert_eq!(
fs::read_to_string(&allow_prefix_path)?,
"",
"unexpected file contents after first run"
);
let call_id_second = "allow-prefix-second";
let (second_event, second_command) = ActionKind::RunCommand {
command: "touch allow-prefix.txt",
}
.prepare(
&test,
&server,
call_id_second,
SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
)
.await?;
assert_eq!(second_command.as_deref(), Some(expected_command.as_str()));
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-allow-prefix-3"),
second_event,
ev_completed("resp-allow-prefix-3"),
]),
)
.await;
let second_results = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_assistant_message("msg-allow-prefix-2", "done"),
ev_completed("resp-allow-prefix-4"),
]),
)
.await;
submit_turn(
&test,
"allow-prefix-second",
approval_policy,
sandbox_policy.clone(),
)
.await?;
wait_for_completion_without_approval(&test).await;
let second_output = parse_result(
&second_results
.single_request()
.function_call_output(call_id_second),
);
assert_eq!(second_output.exit_code.unwrap_or(0), 0);
assert!(
second_output.stdout.is_empty(),
"unexpected stdout: {}",
second_output.stdout
);
assert_eq!(
fs::read_to_string(&allow_prefix_path)?,
"",
"unexpected file contents after second run"
);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
#[cfg(unix)]
async fn matched_prefix_rule_runs_unsandboxed_under_zsh_fork() -> Result<()> {
skip_if_no_network!(Ok(()));
let Some(runtime) = zsh_fork_runtime("zsh-fork prefix rule unsandboxed test")? else {
return Ok(());
};
let approval_policy = AskForApproval::Never;
let sandbox_policy = restrictive_workspace_write_policy();
let outside_dir = tempfile::tempdir_in(std::env::current_dir()?)?;
let outside_path = outside_dir
.path()
.join("zsh-fork-prefix-rule-unsandboxed.txt");
let command = format!("touch {outside_path:?}");
let rules = r#"prefix_rule(pattern=["touch"], decision="allow")"#.to_string();
let server = start_mock_server().await;
let outside_path_for_hook = outside_path.clone();
let test = build_zsh_fork_test(
&server,
runtime,
approval_policy,
sandbox_policy.clone(),
move |home| {
let _ = fs::remove_file(&outside_path_for_hook);
let rules_dir = home.join("rules");
fs::create_dir_all(&rules_dir).unwrap();
fs::write(rules_dir.join("default.rules"), &rules).unwrap();
},
)
.await?;
let call_id = "zsh-fork-prefix-rule-unsandboxed";
let event = shell_event(call_id, &command, 1_000, SandboxPermissions::UseDefault)?;
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-zsh-fork-prefix-1"),
event,
ev_completed("resp-zsh-fork-prefix-1"),
]),
)
.await;
let results = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_assistant_message("msg-zsh-fork-prefix-1", "done"),
ev_completed("resp-zsh-fork-prefix-2"),
]),
)
.await;
submit_turn(
&test,
"run allowed touch under zsh fork",
approval_policy,
sandbox_policy,
)
.await?;
wait_for_completion_without_approval(&test).await;
let result = parse_result(&results.single_request().function_call_output(call_id));
assert_eq!(result.exit_code.unwrap_or(0), 0);
assert!(
outside_path.exists(),
"expected matched prefix_rule to rerun touch unsandboxed; output: {}",
result.stdout
);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
#[cfg(unix)]
async fn invalid_requested_prefix_rule_falls_back_for_compound_command() -> Result<()> {
let server = start_mock_server().await;
let approval_policy = AskForApproval::OnRequest;
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
let sandbox_policy_for_config = sandbox_policy.clone();
let mut builder = test_codex().with_config(move |config| {
config.permissions.approval_policy = Constrained::allow_any(approval_policy);
config.permissions.sandbox_policy = Constrained::allow_any(sandbox_policy_for_config);
});
let test = builder.build(&server).await?;
let call_id = "invalid-prefix-rule";
let command =
"touch /tmp/codex-fallback-rule-test.txt && echo hello > /tmp/codex-fallback-rule-test.txt";
let event = shell_event_with_prefix_rule(
call_id,
command,
1_000,
SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,
Some(vec!["touch".to_string()]),
)?;
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-invalid-prefix-1"),
event,
ev_completed("resp-invalid-prefix-1"),
]),
)
.await;
submit_turn(
&test,
"invalid-prefix-rule",
approval_policy,
sandbox_policy.clone(),
)
.await?;
let approval = expect_exec_approval(&test, command).await;
let amendment = approval
.proposed_execpolicy_amendment
.expect("should have a proposed execpolicy amendment");
assert!(amendment.command.contains(&command.to_string()));
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
#[cfg(unix)]
async fn approving_fallback_rule_for_compound_command_works() -> Result<()> {
let server = start_mock_server().await;
let approval_policy = AskForApproval::OnRequest;
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
let sandbox_policy_for_config = sandbox_policy.clone();
let mut builder = test_codex().with_config(move |config| {
config.permissions.approval_policy = Constrained::allow_any(approval_policy);
config.permissions.sandbox_policy = Constrained::allow_any(sandbox_policy_for_config);
});
let test = builder.build(&server).await?;
let call_id = "invalid-prefix-rule";
let command =
"touch /tmp/codex-fallback-rule-test.txt && echo hello > /tmp/codex-fallback-rule-test.txt";
let event = shell_event_with_prefix_rule(
call_id,
command,
1_000,
SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,
Some(vec!["touch".to_string()]),
)?;
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-invalid-prefix-1"),
event,
ev_completed("resp-invalid-prefix-1"),
]),
)
.await;
submit_turn(
&test,
"invalid-prefix-rule",
approval_policy,
sandbox_policy.clone(),
)
.await?;
let approval = expect_exec_approval(&test, command).await;
let approval_id = approval.effective_approval_id();
let amendment = approval
.proposed_execpolicy_amendment
.expect("should have a proposed execpolicy amendment");
assert!(amendment.command.contains(&command.to_string()));
test.codex
.submit(Op::ExecApproval {
id: approval_id,
turn_id: None,
decision: ReviewDecision::ApprovedExecpolicyAmendment {
proposed_execpolicy_amendment: amendment.clone(),
},
})
.await?;
wait_for_completion(&test).await;
let call_id = "invalid-prefix-rule-again";
let command =
"touch /tmp/codex-fallback-rule-test.txt && echo hello > /tmp/codex-fallback-rule-test.txt";
let event = shell_event_with_prefix_rule(
call_id,
command,
1_000,
SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,
Some(vec!["touch".to_string()]),
)?;
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-invalid-prefix-1"),
event,
ev_completed("resp-invalid-prefix-1"),
]),
)
.await;
let second_results = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_assistant_message("msg-invalid-prefix-1", "done"),
ev_completed("resp-invalid-prefix-2"),
]),
)
.await;
submit_turn(
&test,
"invalid-prefix-rule",
approval_policy,
sandbox_policy.clone(),
)
.await?;
wait_for_completion_without_approval(&test).await;
let second_output = parse_result(
&second_results
.single_request()
.function_call_output(call_id),
);
assert_eq!(second_output.exit_code.unwrap_or(0), 0);
assert!(
second_output.stdout.is_empty(),
"unexpected stdout: {}",
second_output.stdout
);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
async fn denying_network_policy_amendment_persists_policy_and_skips_future_network_prompt()
-> Result<()> {
skip_if_no_network!(Ok(()));
let server = start_mock_server().await;
let home = Arc::new(TempDir::new()?);
fs::write(
home.path().join("config.toml"),
r#"default_permissions = "workspace"
[permissions.workspace.filesystem]
":minimal" = "read"
[permissions.workspace.network]
enabled = true
mode = "limited"
allow_local_binding = true
"#,
)?;
let approval_policy = AskForApproval::OnFailure;
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
read_only_access: Default::default(),
network_access: true,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: false,
exclude_slash_tmp: false,
};
let sandbox_policy_for_config = sandbox_policy.clone();
let mut builder = test_codex().with_home(home).with_config(move |config| {
config.permissions.approval_policy = Constrained::allow_any(approval_policy);
config.permissions.sandbox_policy = Constrained::allow_any(sandbox_policy_for_config);
let layers = config
.config_layer_stack
.get_layers(ConfigLayerStackOrdering::LowestPrecedenceFirst, true)
.into_iter()
.cloned()
.collect();
let mut requirements = config.config_layer_stack.requirements().clone();
requirements.network = Some(Sourced::new(
NetworkConstraints {
enabled: Some(true),
allow_local_binding: Some(true),
..Default::default()
},
RequirementSource::CloudRequirements,
));
let mut requirements_toml = config.config_layer_stack.requirements_toml().clone();
requirements_toml.network = Some(NetworkRequirementsToml {
enabled: Some(true),
allow_local_binding: Some(true),
..Default::default()
});
config.config_layer_stack = ConfigLayerStack::new(layers, requirements, requirements_toml)
.expect("rebuild config layer stack with network requirements");
});
let test = builder.build(&server).await?;
assert!(
test.config.managed_network_requirements_enabled(),
"expected managed network requirements to be enabled"
);
assert!(
test.config.permissions.network.is_some(),
"expected managed network proxy config to be present"
);
test.session_configured
.network_proxy
.as_ref()
.expect("expected runtime managed network proxy addresses");
let call_id_first = "allow-network-first";
// Use urllib without overriding proxy settings so managed-network sessions
// continue to exercise the env-based proxy routing path under bubblewrap.
let fetch_command = r#"python3 -c "import urllib.request; opener = urllib.request.build_opener(urllib.request.ProxyHandler()); print('OK:' + opener.open('http://codex-network-test.invalid', timeout=30).read().decode(errors='replace'))""#
.to_string();
let first_event = shell_event(
call_id_first,
&fetch_command,
30_000,
SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
)?;
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-allow-network-1"),
first_event,
ev_completed("resp-allow-network-1"),
]),
)
.await;
let first_results = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_assistant_message("msg-allow-network-1", "done"),
ev_completed("resp-allow-network-2"),
]),
)
.await;
submit_turn(
&test,
"allow-network-first",
approval_policy,
sandbox_policy.clone(),
)
.await?;
let deadline = std::time::Instant::now() + std::time::Duration::from_secs(30);
let approval = loop {
let remaining = deadline
.checked_duration_since(std::time::Instant::now())
.expect("timed out waiting for network approval request");
let event = wait_for_event_with_timeout(
&test.codex,
|event| {
matches!(
event,
EventMsg::ExecApprovalRequest(_) | EventMsg::TurnComplete(_)
)
},
remaining,
)
.await;
match event {
EventMsg::ExecApprovalRequest(approval) => {
if approval.command.first().map(std::string::String::as_str)
== Some("network-access")
{
break approval;
}
test.codex
.submit(Op::ExecApproval {
id: approval.effective_approval_id(),
turn_id: None,
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
})
.await?;
}
EventMsg::TurnComplete(_) => {
panic!("expected network approval request before completion");
}
other => panic!("unexpected event: {other:?}"),
}
};
let network_context = approval
.network_approval_context
.clone()
.expect("expected network approval context");
assert_eq!(network_context.protocol, NetworkApprovalProtocol::Http);
let expected_network_amendments = vec![
NetworkPolicyAmendment {
host: network_context.host.clone(),
action: NetworkPolicyRuleAction::Allow,
},
NetworkPolicyAmendment {
host: network_context.host.clone(),
action: NetworkPolicyRuleAction::Deny,
},
];
assert_eq!(
approval.proposed_network_policy_amendments,
Some(expected_network_amendments.clone())
);
let deny_network_amendment = expected_network_amendments
.into_iter()
.find(|amendment| amendment.action == NetworkPolicyRuleAction::Deny)
.expect("expected deny network policy amendment");
test.codex
.submit(Op::ExecApproval {
id: approval.effective_approval_id(),
turn_id: None,
decision: ReviewDecision::NetworkPolicyAmendment {
network_policy_amendment: deny_network_amendment.clone(),
},
})
.await?;
wait_for_completion(&test).await;
let policy_path = test.home.path().join("rules").join("default.rules");
let policy_contents = fs::read_to_string(&policy_path)?;
let expected_rule = format!(
r#"network_rule(host="{}", protocol="{}", decision="deny", justification="Deny {} access to {}")"#,
deny_network_amendment.host,
match network_context.protocol {
NetworkApprovalProtocol::Http => "http",
NetworkApprovalProtocol::Https => "https_connect",
NetworkApprovalProtocol::Socks5Tcp => "socks5_tcp",
NetworkApprovalProtocol::Socks5Udp => "socks5_udp",
},
match network_context.protocol {
NetworkApprovalProtocol::Http => "http",
NetworkApprovalProtocol::Https => "https_connect",
NetworkApprovalProtocol::Socks5Tcp => "socks5_tcp",
NetworkApprovalProtocol::Socks5Udp => "socks5_udp",
},
deny_network_amendment.host
);
assert!(
policy_contents.contains(&expected_rule),
"unexpected policy contents: {policy_contents}"
);
let first_output = parse_result(
&first_results
.single_request()
.function_call_output(call_id_first),
);
Expectation::CommandFailure {
output_contains: "",
}
.verify(&test, &first_output)?;
let call_id_second = "allow-network-second";
let second_event = shell_event(
call_id_second,
&fetch_command,
30_000,
SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
)?;
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-allow-network-3"),
second_event,
ev_completed("resp-allow-network-3"),
]),
)
.await;
let second_results = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_assistant_message("msg-allow-network-2", "done"),
ev_completed("resp-allow-network-4"),
]),
)
.await;
submit_turn(
&test,
"allow-network-second",
approval_policy,
sandbox_policy.clone(),
)
.await?;
let deadline = std::time::Instant::now() + std::time::Duration::from_secs(30);
loop {
let remaining = deadline
.checked_duration_since(std::time::Instant::now())
.expect("timed out waiting for second turn completion");
let event = wait_for_event_with_timeout(
&test.codex,
|event| {
matches!(
event,
EventMsg::ExecApprovalRequest(_) | EventMsg::TurnComplete(_)
)
},
remaining,
)
.await;
match event {
EventMsg::ExecApprovalRequest(approval) => {
if approval.command.first().map(std::string::String::as_str)
== Some("network-access")
{
panic!(
"unexpected network approval request: {:?}",
approval.command
);
}
test.codex
.submit(Op::ExecApproval {
id: approval.effective_approval_id(),
turn_id: None,
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
})
.await?;
}
EventMsg::TurnComplete(_) => break,
other => panic!("unexpected event: {other:?}"),
}
}
let second_output = parse_result(
&second_results
.single_request()
.function_call_output(call_id_second),
);
Expectation::CommandFailure {
output_contains: "",
}
.verify(&test, &second_output)?;
Ok(())
}
// todo(dylan) add ScenarioSpec support for rules
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
#[cfg(unix)]
async fn compound_command_with_one_safe_command_still_requires_approval() -> Result<()> {
skip_if_no_network!(Ok(()));
let server = start_mock_server().await;
let approval_policy = AskForApproval::UnlessTrusted;
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_workspace_write_policy();
let sandbox_policy_for_config = sandbox_policy.clone();
let mut builder = test_codex().with_config(move |config| {
config.permissions.approval_policy = Constrained::allow_any(approval_policy);
config.permissions.sandbox_policy = Constrained::allow_any(sandbox_policy_for_config);
});
let test = builder.build(&server).await?;
let rules_dir = test.home.path().join("rules");
fs::create_dir_all(&rules_dir)?;
fs::write(
rules_dir.join("default.rules"),
r#"prefix_rule(pattern=["touch", "allow-prefix.txt"], decision="allow")"#,
)?;
let call_id = "heredoc-with-chained-prefix";
let command = "touch ./test.txt && rm ./test.txt";
let (event, expected_command) = ActionKind::RunCommand { command }
.prepare(&test, &server, call_id, SandboxPermissions::UseDefault)
.await?;
let expected_command =
expected_command.expect("compound command should produce a shell command");
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-heredoc-prefix-1"),
event,
ev_completed("resp-heredoc-prefix-1"),
]),
)
.await;
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_assistant_message("msg-heredoc-prefix-1", "done"),
ev_completed("resp-heredoc-prefix-2"),
]),
)
.await;
submit_turn(
&test,
"compound command",
approval_policy,
sandbox_policy.clone(),
)
.await?;
let approval = expect_exec_approval(&test, expected_command.as_str()).await;
test.codex
.submit(Op::ExecApproval {
id: approval.effective_approval_id(),
turn_id: None,
decision: ReviewDecision::Denied,
})
.await?;
wait_for_completion(&test).await;
Ok(())
}