Charley Cunningham
e84ee33cc0
## Summary - add the guardian reviewer flow for `on-request` approvals in command, patch, sandbox-retry, and managed-network approval paths - keep guardian behind `features.guardian_approval` instead of exposing a public `approval_policy = guardian` mode - route ordinary `OnRequest` approvals to the guardian subagent when the feature is enabled, without changing the public approval-mode surface ## Public model - public approval modes stay unchanged - guardian is enabled via `features.guardian_approval` - when that feature is on, `approval_policy = on-request` keeps the same approval boundaries but sends those approval requests to the guardian reviewer instead of the user - `/experimental` only persists the feature flag; it does not rewrite `approval_policy` - CLI and app-server no longer expose a separate `guardian` approval mode in this PR ## Guardian reviewer - the reviewer runs as a normal subagent and reuses the existing subagent/thread machinery - it is locked to a read-only sandbox and `approval_policy = never` - it does not inherit user/project exec-policy rules - it prefers `gpt-5.4` when the current provider exposes it, otherwise falls back to the parent turn's active model - it fail-closes on timeout, startup failure, malformed output, or any other review error - it currently auto-approves only when `risk_score < 80` ## Review context and policy - guardian mirrors `OnRequest` approval semantics rather than introducing a separate approval policy - explicit `require_escalated` requests follow the same approval surface as `OnRequest`; the difference is only who reviews them - managed-network allowlist misses that enter the approval flow are also reviewed by guardian - the review prompt includes bounded recent transcript history plus recent tool call/result evidence - transcript entries and planned-action strings are truncated with explicit `<guardian_truncated ... />` markers so large payloads stay bounded - apply-patch reviews include the full patch content (without duplicating the structured `changes` payload) - the guardian request layout is snapshot-tested using the same model-visible Responses request formatter used elsewhere in core ## Guardian network behavior - the guardian subagent inherits the parent session's managed-network allowlist when one exists, so it can use the same approved network surface while reviewing - exact session-scoped network approvals are copied into the guardian session with protocol/port scope preserved - those copied approvals are now seeded before the guardian's first turn is submitted, so inherited approvals are available during any immediate review-time checks ## Out of scope / follow-ups - the sandbox-permission validation split was pulled into a separate PR and is not part of this diff - a future follow-up can enable `serde_json` preserve-order in `codex-core` and then simplify the guardian action rendering further --------- Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
codex-core
This crate implements the business logic for Codex. It is designed to be used by the various Codex UIs written in Rust.
Dependencies
Note that codex-core makes some assumptions about certain helper utilities being available in the environment. Currently, this support matrix is:
macOS
Expects /usr/bin/sandbox-exec to be present.
When using the workspace-write sandbox policy, the Seatbelt profile allows
writes under the configured writable roots while keeping .git (directory or
pointer file), the resolved gitdir: target, and .codex read-only.
Network access and filesystem read/write roots are controlled by
SandboxPolicy. Seatbelt consumes the resolved policy and enforces it.
Seatbelt also supports macOS permission-profile extensions layered on top of
SandboxPolicy:
- no extension profile provided:
keeps legacy default preferences read access (
user-preference-read). - extension profile provided with no
macos_preferencesgrant: does not add preferences access clauses. macos_preferences = "readonly": enables cfprefs read clauses anduser-preference-read.macos_preferences = "readwrite": includes readonly clauses plususer-preference-writeand cfprefs shm write clauses.macos_automation = true: enables broad Apple Events send permissions.macos_automation = ["com.apple.Notes", ...]: enables Apple Events send only to listed bundle IDs.macos_accessibility = true: enablescom.apple.axservermach lookup.macos_calendar = true: enablescom.apple.CalendarAgentmach lookup.
Linux
Expects the binary containing codex-core to run the equivalent of codex sandbox linux (legacy alias: codex debug landlock) when arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.
All Platforms
Expects the binary containing codex-core to simulate the virtual apply_patch CLI when arg1 is --codex-run-as-apply-patch. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.