cooper-oaiandGitHub
df7818c7d1
## Summary - add v2 personal access token support for `codex login --with-access-token` and `CODEX_ACCESS_TOKEN` - classify opaque `at-` tokens separately from legacy Agent Identity JWTs - hydrate required ChatGPT account metadata through AuthAPI `/v1/user-auth-credential/whoami` - use PATs directly as bearer tokens while preserving existing ChatGPT account surfaces - expose PAT-backed auth as the explicit `personalAccessToken` app-server auth mode ## Implementation PAT auth is intentionally small and stateless. Loading a PAT performs one AuthAPI metadata request, stores the hydrated metadata in the in-memory auth object, and redacts the secret from debug output. Legacy Agent Identity JWT handling remains unchanged. The shared access-token classifier lives in a private neutral module because it dispatches between both credential types. PAT hydration fails closed when AuthAPI omits any required metadata, including email. Hydrated metadata is intentionally not persisted: startup performs a live `whoami` preflight so revoked tokens or changed account metadata are not accepted from a stale cache. ## Workspace restriction scope This change intentionally does **not** apply `forced_chatgpt_workspace_id` to PAT authentication. The setting is a client-side config guardrail, not an authorization boundary, and PAT does not currently require workspace-ID parity. The PAT login and `CODEX_ACCESS_TOKEN` paths therefore validate through AuthAPI without threading workspace-restriction state through access-token loading. Existing workspace checks for non-PAT auth remain on their established paths. ## App-server compatibility The public app-server `AuthMode` is shared across v1 and v2, and PAT-backed auth reports `personalAccessToken` through both APIs. Following human review, this intentionally removes the temporary v1 compatibility mapping that reported PATs as `chatgpt`; the deprecated v1 API is kept in parity with v2 rather than maintaining a separate closed enum. Clients with exhaustive auth-mode handling in either API version must add the new case and should generally treat it as ChatGPT-backed unless they need PAT-specific behavior. The v1 auth-status response still omits the raw PAT when `includeToken` is requested because that response cannot carry the account metadata needed to reuse the credential safely. Persisted PAT auth also omits the new enum value so older Codex builds can deserialize `auth.json` and infer PAT auth from the credential field after a rollback. ## Validation Latest review-fix validation: - `CARGO_INCREMENTAL=0 just test -p codex-login` (126 passed) - `CARGO_INCREMENTAL=0 just test -p codex-cli` (263 passed) - `CARGO_INCREMENTAL=0 just test -p codex-cli stored_auth_validation_handles_personal_access_token` - `CARGO_INCREMENTAL=0 just test -p codex-app-server-protocol` (226 passed) - `CARGO_INCREMENTAL=0 just test -p codex-models-manager refresh_available_models_uses_remote_only_catalog_for_chatgpt_auth` - `CARGO_INCREMENTAL=0 just test -p codex-tui existing_non_oauth_chatgpt_login_counts_as_signed_in` - `CARGO_INCREMENTAL=0 just fix -p codex-login -p codex-app-server-protocol -p codex-models-manager -p codex-tui -p codex-cli` - `just fmt` - `git diff --check` The broader `codex-tui` suite previously compiled and ran 2,834 tests. Three unrelated environment-sensitive guardian/IDE-socket tests failed after retries; the PAT-relevant TUI coverage passed.
codex-core
This crate implements the business logic for Codex. It is designed to be used by the various Codex UIs written in Rust.
Dependencies
Note that codex-core makes some assumptions about certain helper utilities being available in the environment. Currently, this support matrix is:
macOS
Expects /usr/bin/sandbox-exec to be present.
When using the workspace-write sandbox policy, the Seatbelt profile allows
writes under the configured writable roots while keeping .git (directory or
pointer file), the resolved gitdir: target, and .codex read-only.
Network access and filesystem read/write roots are controlled by
SandboxPolicy. Seatbelt consumes the resolved policy and enforces it.
Seatbelt also keeps the legacy default preferences read access
(user-preference-read) needed for cfprefs-backed macOS behavior.
Linux
Expects the binary containing codex-core to run the equivalent of codex sandbox when arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.
Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on Linux.
They can continue to use the legacy Landlock path when the split filesystem
policy is sandbox-equivalent to the legacy model after cwd resolution.
Split filesystem policies that need direct FileSystemSandboxPolicy
enforcement, such as read-only or denied carveouts under a broader writable
root, automatically route through bubblewrap. The legacy Landlock path is used
only when the split filesystem policy round-trips through the legacy
SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics. That includes overlapping
cases like /repo = write, /repo/a = none, /repo/a/b = write, where the
more specific writable child must reopen under a denied parent.
The Linux sandbox helper prefers the first bwrap found on PATH outside the
current working directory whenever it is available. If bwrap is present but
too old to support --argv0, the helper keeps using system bubblewrap and
switches to a no---argv0 compatibility path for the inner re-exec. If
bwrap is missing, it falls back to the bundled codex-resources/bwrap
binary shipped with Codex and Codex surfaces a startup warning through its
normal notification path instead of printing directly from the sandbox helper.
Codex also surfaces a startup warning when bubblewrap cannot create user
namespaces. WSL2 uses the normal Linux bubblewrap path. WSL1 is not supported
for bubblewrap sandboxing because it cannot create the required user
namespaces, so Codex rejects sandboxed shell commands that would enter the
bubblewrap path before invoking bwrap.
Windows
Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on
Windows. Legacy read-only and workspace-write policies imply full
filesystem read access; exact readable roots are represented by split
filesystem policies instead.
The elevated Windows sandbox also supports:
- legacy
ReadOnlyandWorkspaceWritebehavior - split filesystem policies that need exact readable roots, exact writable roots, or extra read-only carveouts under writable roots
- backend-managed system read roots required for basic execution, such as
C:\Windows,C:\Program Files,C:\Program Files (x86), andC:\ProgramData, when a split filesystem policy requests platform defaults
The unelevated restricted-token backend still supports the legacy full-read
Windows model for legacy ReadOnly and WorkspaceWrite behavior. It also
supports a narrow split-filesystem subset: full-read split policies whose
writable roots still match the legacy WorkspaceWrite root set, but add extra
read-only carveouts under those writable roots.
New [permissions] / split filesystem policies remain supported on Windows
only when they can be enforced directly by the selected Windows backend or
round-trip through the legacy SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics.
Policies that would require direct explicit unreadable carveouts (none) or
reopened writable descendants under read-only carveouts still fail closed
instead of running with weaker enforcement.
All Platforms
Expects the binary containing codex-core to simulate the virtual
apply_patch CLI when arg1 is --codex-run-as-apply-patch. See the
codex-arg0 crate for details.