Files
codex/codex-rs/core
d9a403a8c0 [js_repl] Hard-stop active js_repl execs on explicit user interrupts (#13329)
## Summary
- hard-stop `js_repl` only for `TurnAbortReason::Interrupted`,
preserving the persistent REPL across replaced turns
- track the current top-level exec by turn and only reset when the
interrupted turn owns submitted work or a freshly started kernel for the
current exec attempt
- close both interrupt races: the write-window race by marking the exec
as submitted before async pipe writes begin, and the startup-window race
by tracking fresh-kernel ownership until submission
- add regression coverage for interrupted in-flight execs and the
pending-kernel-start window

## Why
Stopping a turn previously surfaced `aborted by user after Xs` even
though the underlying `js_repl` kernel could continue executing. Earlier
fixes also risked resetting the session-scoped REPL too broadly or
missing already-dispatched work. This change keeps cleanup scoped to
explicit stop semantics and makes the interrupt path line up with both
submitted execs and newly started kernels.

## Testing
- `just fmt`
- `cargo test -p codex-core`
- `just fix -p codex-core`

`cargo test -p codex-core` passes the updated `js_repl` coverage,
including the new startup-window regression test, but still has
unrelated integration failures in this environment outside `js_repl`.

---------

Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-03-12 17:51:56 -07:00
..
2026-03-05 16:22:39 -08:00

codex-core

This crate implements the business logic for Codex. It is designed to be used by the various Codex UIs written in Rust.

Dependencies

Note that codex-core makes some assumptions about certain helper utilities being available in the environment. Currently, this support matrix is:

macOS

Expects /usr/bin/sandbox-exec to be present.

When using the workspace-write sandbox policy, the Seatbelt profile allows writes under the configured writable roots while keeping .git (directory or pointer file), the resolved gitdir: target, and .codex read-only.

Network access and filesystem read/write roots are controlled by SandboxPolicy. Seatbelt consumes the resolved policy and enforces it.

Seatbelt also supports macOS permission-profile extensions layered on top of SandboxPolicy:

  • no extension profile provided: keeps legacy default preferences read access (user-preference-read).
  • extension profile provided with no macos_preferences grant: does not add preferences access clauses.
  • macos_preferences = "readonly": enables cfprefs read clauses and user-preference-read.
  • macos_preferences = "readwrite": includes readonly clauses plus user-preference-write and cfprefs shm write clauses.
  • macos_automation = true: enables broad Apple Events send permissions.
  • macos_automation = ["com.apple.Notes", ...]: enables Apple Events send only to listed bundle IDs.
  • macos_launch_services = true: enables LaunchServices lookups and open/launch operations.
  • macos_accessibility = true: enables com.apple.axserver mach lookup.
  • macos_calendar = true: enables com.apple.CalendarAgent mach lookup.
  • macos_contacts = "read_only": enables Address Book read access and Contacts read services.
  • macos_contacts = "read_write": includes the readonly Contacts clauses plus Address Book writes and keychain/temp helpers required for writes.

Linux

Expects the binary containing codex-core to run the equivalent of codex sandbox linux (legacy alias: codex debug landlock) when arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.

All Platforms

Expects the binary containing codex-core to simulate the virtual apply_patch CLI when arg1 is --codex-run-as-apply-patch. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.