richardopenai
d4ec08b8f0
## Summary - complete unified-exec processes from the ordered event stream instead of issuing a final zero-wait `process/read` - add optional executor sandbox-denial state to `process/exited` - retain `process/read` as a retained-output and compatibility fallback for receiver lag, sequence gaps, and legacy servers - recover sandbox-denial state across transport reconnection - cover the real `TestCodex` remote-exec path without adding a public test-only event constructor ## Why A successful one-shot tool call currently receives its output and terminal notifications, then pays another wide-area `process/read` round trip before returning. Staging traces showed that remote response wait accounted for more than 99.8% of RPC time; local serialization, queueing, and deserialization were below 0.6 ms. ## Measured impact A direct staging A/B used the same build and route and changed only completion mode. Each arm ran three times with 30 one-shot `/usr/bin/true` calls per run. The table reports the median of the three per-run percentiles. | Metric | Final `process/read` | Pushed events | Change | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | | End-to-end completion p50 | 159.5 ms | 118.7 ms | -40.8 ms (-25.6%) | | End-to-end completion p95 | 182.4 ms | 131.7 ms | -50.6 ms (-27.8%) | | Completion-wait p50 | 80.1 ms | 41.5 ms | -38.5 ms (-48.1%) | | Final `process/read` RPC p50 | 79.9 ms | eliminated | -79.9 ms | TCP_NODELAY was enabled in both A/B arms, so its effect cancels out. The successful, complete, in-order event path issued zero final `process/read` calls. ## Compatibility and recovery - new servers send `sandboxDenied` on `process/exited` - legacy servers omit it, which triggers one compatibility `process/read` - broadcast lag or a sequence gap triggers a retained-output read - recovery remains bounded by the server's existing 1 MiB retained-output window - complete, in-order event streams issue no completion read - sandbox denial is attached to the exit event before consumers can observe process completion - server-first and client-first rollouts remain wire-compatible; server-first realizes the latency win immediately ## Integration coverage The `TestCodex` suite exercises four distinct remote-exec contracts: - complete pushed output/exit/close with zero reads - direct pushed sandbox denial with zero reads - legacy missing denial metadata with exactly one compatibility read - count-bounded replay eviction recovered from retained output without duplication ## Validation - `just test -p codex-core exec_command_consumes_pushed_remote_process_events`: 4 passed - `just test -p codex-core unified_exec::process_tests::`: 4 passed - `just test -p codex-exec-server`: 294 passed, 2 skipped - `just test -p codex-exec-server-protocol`: 5 passed - `just test -p codex-rmcp-client`: 89 passed, 2 skipped - focused Bazel `//codex-rs/core:core-all-test`: passed across 16 shards - scoped `just fix` passed for core and exec-server - `just fmt` passed The complete workspace suite was not rerun; focused Cargo and Bazel coverage passed for the changed behavior.
codex-core
This crate implements the business logic for Codex. It is designed to be used by the various Codex UIs written in Rust.
Wine-exec integration tests
On x86-64 Linux, run the shared suite against the Windows exec server with
bazel test //codex-rs/core:core-all-wine-exec-test.
Local execution targets the host OS, Docker targets Linux, and Wine exec targets Windows. Choose the skip macro by what the test depends on:
skip_if_target_windows!: Windows target behavior.skip_if_host_windows!: Windows host constraints.skip_if_remote!: Local-only test behavior.skip_if_no_remote_env!: Remote-only test behavior.skip_if_wine_exec!: Wine-specific runner debt.
Dependencies
Note that codex-core makes some assumptions about certain helper utilities being available in the environment. Currently, this support matrix is:
macOS
Expects /usr/bin/sandbox-exec to be present.
When using the workspace-write sandbox policy, the Seatbelt profile allows
writes under the configured writable roots while keeping .git (directory or
pointer file), the resolved gitdir: target, and .codex read-only.
Network access and filesystem read/write roots are controlled by
SandboxPolicy. Seatbelt consumes the resolved policy and enforces it.
Seatbelt also keeps the legacy default preferences read access
(user-preference-read) needed for cfprefs-backed macOS behavior.
Linux
Expects the binary containing codex-core to run the equivalent of codex sandbox when arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.
Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on Linux.
They can continue to use the legacy Landlock path when the split filesystem
policy is sandbox-equivalent to the legacy model after cwd resolution.
Split filesystem policies that need direct FileSystemSandboxPolicy
enforcement, such as read-only or denied carveouts under a broader writable
root, automatically route through bubblewrap. The legacy Landlock path is used
only when the split filesystem policy round-trips through the legacy
SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics. That includes overlapping
cases like /repo = write, /repo/a = none, /repo/a/b = write, where the
more specific writable child must reopen under a denied parent.
The Linux sandbox helper prefers the first bwrap found on PATH outside the
current working directory whenever it is available. If bwrap is present but
too old to support --argv0, the helper keeps using system bubblewrap and
switches to a no---argv0 compatibility path for the inner re-exec. If
bwrap is missing, it falls back to the bundled codex-resources/bwrap
binary shipped with Codex and Codex surfaces a startup warning through its
normal notification path instead of printing directly from the sandbox helper.
Codex also surfaces a startup warning when bubblewrap cannot create user
namespaces. WSL2 uses the normal Linux bubblewrap path. WSL1 is not supported
for bubblewrap sandboxing because it cannot create the required user
namespaces, so Codex rejects sandboxed shell commands that would enter the
bubblewrap path before invoking bwrap.
Windows
Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on
Windows. Legacy read-only and workspace-write policies imply full
filesystem read access; exact readable roots are represented by split
filesystem policies instead.
The elevated Windows sandbox also supports:
- legacy
ReadOnlyandWorkspaceWritebehavior - split filesystem policies that need exact readable roots, exact writable roots, or extra read-only carveouts under writable roots
- backend-managed system read roots required for basic execution, such as
C:\Windows,C:\Program Files,C:\Program Files (x86), andC:\ProgramData, when a split filesystem policy requests platform defaults
The unelevated restricted-token backend still supports the legacy full-read
Windows model for legacy ReadOnly and WorkspaceWrite behavior. It also
supports a narrow split-filesystem subset: full-read split policies whose
writable roots still match the legacy WorkspaceWrite root set, but add extra
read-only carveouts under those writable roots.
New [permissions] / split filesystem policies remain supported on Windows
only when they can be enforced directly by the selected Windows backend or
round-trip through the legacy SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics.
Policies that would require direct explicit unreadable carveouts (none) or
reopened writable descendants under read-only carveouts still fail closed
instead of running with weaker enforcement.
All Platforms
Expects the binary containing codex-core to simulate the virtual
apply_patch CLI when arg1 is --codex-run-as-apply-patch. See the
codex-arg0 crate for details.