mirror of
https://github.com/pchuan98/codex.git
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0d0abe839a
## Summary - adds macOS Seatbelt deny rules for unreadable glob patterns - expands unreadable glob matches on Linux and masks them in bwrap, including canonical symlink targets - keeps Linux glob expansion robust when `rg` is unavailable in minimal or Bazel test environments - adds sandbox integration coverage that runs `shell` and `exec_command` with a `**/*.env = none` policy and verifies the secret contents do not reach the model ## Linux glob expansion ```text Prefer: rg --files --hidden --no-ignore --glob <pattern> -- <search-root> Fallback: internal globset walker when rg is not installed Failure: any other rg failure aborts sandbox construction ``` ``` [permissions.workspace.filesystem] glob_scan_max_depth = 2 [permissions.workspace.filesystem.":project_roots"] "**/*.env" = "none" ``` This keeps the common path fast without making sandbox construction depend on an ambient `rg` binary. If `rg` is present but fails for another reason, the sandbox setup fails closed instead of silently omitting deny-read masks. ## Platform support - macOS: subprocess sandbox enforcement is handled by Seatbelt regex deny rules - Linux: subprocess sandbox enforcement is handled by expanding existing glob matches and masking them in bwrap - Windows: policy/config/direct-tool glob support is already on `main` from #15979; Windows subprocess sandbox paths continue to fail closed when unreadable split filesystem carveouts require runtime enforcement, rather than silently running unsandboxed ## Stack 1. #15979 - merged: cross-platform glob deny-read policy/config/direct-tool support for macOS, Linux, and Windows 2. This PR - macOS/Linux subprocess sandbox enforcement plus Windows fail-closed clarification 3. #17740 - managed deny-read requirements ## Verification - Added integration coverage for `shell` and `exec_command` glob deny-read enforcement - `cargo check -p codex-sandboxing -p codex-linux-sandbox --tests` - `cargo check -p codex-core --test all` - `cargo clippy -p codex-linux-sandbox -p codex-sandboxing --tests` - `just bazel-lock-check` --------- Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
314 lines
11 KiB
Rust
314 lines
11 KiB
Rust
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
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use crate::bwrap::WSL1_BWRAP_WARNING;
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#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
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use crate::bwrap::is_wsl1;
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use crate::landlock::CODEX_LINUX_SANDBOX_ARG0;
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use crate::landlock::allow_network_for_proxy;
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use crate::landlock::create_linux_sandbox_command_args_for_policies;
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use crate::policy_transforms::EffectiveSandboxPermissions;
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use crate::policy_transforms::effective_file_system_sandbox_policy;
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use crate::policy_transforms::effective_network_sandbox_policy;
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use crate::policy_transforms::should_require_platform_sandbox;
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use codex_network_proxy::NetworkProxy;
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use codex_protocol::config_types::WindowsSandboxLevel;
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use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
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use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
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use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
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use codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
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use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
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use std::collections::HashMap;
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use std::ffi::OsString;
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use std::path::Path;
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#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub enum SandboxType {
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None,
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MacosSeatbelt,
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LinuxSeccomp,
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WindowsRestrictedToken,
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}
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impl SandboxType {
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pub fn as_metric_tag(self) -> &'static str {
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match self {
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SandboxType::None => "none",
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SandboxType::MacosSeatbelt => "seatbelt",
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SandboxType::LinuxSeccomp => "seccomp",
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SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken => "windows_sandbox",
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}
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}
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}
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#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub enum SandboxablePreference {
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Auto,
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Require,
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Forbid,
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}
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pub fn get_platform_sandbox(windows_sandbox_enabled: bool) -> Option<SandboxType> {
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if cfg!(target_os = "macos") {
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Some(SandboxType::MacosSeatbelt)
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} else if cfg!(target_os = "linux") {
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Some(SandboxType::LinuxSeccomp)
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} else if cfg!(target_os = "windows") {
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if windows_sandbox_enabled {
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Some(SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken)
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} else {
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None
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}
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} else {
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None
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}
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}
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#[derive(Debug)]
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pub struct SandboxCommand {
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pub program: OsString,
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pub args: Vec<String>,
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pub cwd: AbsolutePathBuf,
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pub env: HashMap<String, String>,
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pub additional_permissions: Option<PermissionProfile>,
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}
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#[derive(Debug)]
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pub struct SandboxExecRequest {
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pub command: Vec<String>,
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pub cwd: AbsolutePathBuf,
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pub env: HashMap<String, String>,
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pub network: Option<NetworkProxy>,
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pub sandbox: SandboxType,
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pub windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel,
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pub windows_sandbox_private_desktop: bool,
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pub sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
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pub file_system_sandbox_policy: FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
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pub network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
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pub arg0: Option<String>,
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}
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/// Bundled arguments for sandbox transformation.
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///
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/// This keeps call sites self-documenting when several fields are optional.
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pub struct SandboxTransformRequest<'a> {
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pub command: SandboxCommand,
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pub policy: &'a SandboxPolicy,
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pub file_system_policy: &'a FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
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pub network_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
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pub sandbox: SandboxType,
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pub enforce_managed_network: bool,
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// TODO(viyatb): Evaluate switching this to Option<Arc<NetworkProxy>>
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// to make shared ownership explicit across runtime/sandbox plumbing.
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pub network: Option<&'a NetworkProxy>,
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pub sandbox_policy_cwd: &'a Path,
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pub codex_linux_sandbox_exe: Option<&'a Path>,
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pub use_legacy_landlock: bool,
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pub windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel,
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pub windows_sandbox_private_desktop: bool,
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}
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#[derive(Debug)]
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pub enum SandboxTransformError {
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MissingLinuxSandboxExecutable,
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#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
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Wsl1UnsupportedForBubblewrap,
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#[cfg(not(target_os = "macos"))]
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SeatbeltUnavailable,
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}
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impl std::fmt::Display for SandboxTransformError {
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fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
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match self {
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Self::MissingLinuxSandboxExecutable => {
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write!(f, "missing codex-linux-sandbox executable path")
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}
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#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
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Self::Wsl1UnsupportedForBubblewrap => write!(f, "{WSL1_BWRAP_WARNING}"),
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#[cfg(not(target_os = "macos"))]
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Self::SeatbeltUnavailable => write!(f, "seatbelt sandbox is only available on macOS"),
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}
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}
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}
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impl std::error::Error for SandboxTransformError {}
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#[derive(Default)]
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pub struct SandboxManager;
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impl SandboxManager {
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pub fn new() -> Self {
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Self
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}
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pub fn select_initial(
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&self,
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file_system_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
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network_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
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pref: SandboxablePreference,
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windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel,
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has_managed_network_requirements: bool,
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) -> SandboxType {
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match pref {
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SandboxablePreference::Forbid => SandboxType::None,
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SandboxablePreference::Require => {
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get_platform_sandbox(windows_sandbox_level != WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled)
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.unwrap_or(SandboxType::None)
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}
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SandboxablePreference::Auto => {
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if should_require_platform_sandbox(
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file_system_policy,
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network_policy,
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has_managed_network_requirements,
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) {
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get_platform_sandbox(windows_sandbox_level != WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled)
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.unwrap_or(SandboxType::None)
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} else {
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SandboxType::None
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}
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}
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}
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}
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pub fn transform(
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&self,
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request: SandboxTransformRequest<'_>,
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) -> Result<SandboxExecRequest, SandboxTransformError> {
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let SandboxTransformRequest {
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mut command,
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policy,
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file_system_policy,
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network_policy,
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sandbox,
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enforce_managed_network,
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network,
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sandbox_policy_cwd,
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codex_linux_sandbox_exe,
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use_legacy_landlock,
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windows_sandbox_level,
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windows_sandbox_private_desktop,
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} = request;
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let additional_permissions = command.additional_permissions.take();
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let EffectiveSandboxPermissions {
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sandbox_policy: effective_policy,
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} = EffectiveSandboxPermissions::new(policy, additional_permissions.as_ref());
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let effective_file_system_policy = effective_file_system_sandbox_policy(
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file_system_policy,
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additional_permissions.as_ref(),
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);
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let effective_network_policy =
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effective_network_sandbox_policy(network_policy, additional_permissions.as_ref());
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let mut argv = Vec::with_capacity(1 + command.args.len());
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argv.push(command.program);
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argv.extend(command.args.into_iter().map(OsString::from));
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let (argv, arg0_override) = match sandbox {
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SandboxType::None => (os_argv_to_strings(argv), None),
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#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
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SandboxType::MacosSeatbelt => {
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use crate::seatbelt::CreateSeatbeltCommandArgsParams;
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use crate::seatbelt::MACOS_PATH_TO_SEATBELT_EXECUTABLE;
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use crate::seatbelt::create_seatbelt_command_args;
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let mut args = create_seatbelt_command_args(CreateSeatbeltCommandArgsParams {
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command: os_argv_to_strings(argv),
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file_system_sandbox_policy: &effective_file_system_policy,
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network_sandbox_policy: effective_network_policy,
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sandbox_policy_cwd,
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enforce_managed_network,
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network,
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extra_allow_unix_sockets: &[],
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});
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let mut full_command = Vec::with_capacity(1 + args.len());
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full_command.push(MACOS_PATH_TO_SEATBELT_EXECUTABLE.to_string());
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full_command.append(&mut args);
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(full_command, None)
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}
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#[cfg(not(target_os = "macos"))]
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SandboxType::MacosSeatbelt => return Err(SandboxTransformError::SeatbeltUnavailable),
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SandboxType::LinuxSeccomp => {
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let exe = codex_linux_sandbox_exe
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.ok_or(SandboxTransformError::MissingLinuxSandboxExecutable)?;
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let allow_proxy_network = allow_network_for_proxy(enforce_managed_network);
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#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
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ensure_linux_bubblewrap_is_supported(
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&effective_file_system_policy,
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use_legacy_landlock,
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allow_proxy_network,
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is_wsl1(),
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)?;
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let mut args = create_linux_sandbox_command_args_for_policies(
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os_argv_to_strings(argv),
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command.cwd.as_path(),
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&effective_policy,
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&effective_file_system_policy,
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effective_network_policy,
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sandbox_policy_cwd,
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use_legacy_landlock,
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allow_proxy_network,
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);
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let mut full_command = Vec::with_capacity(1 + args.len());
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full_command.push(os_string_to_command_component(exe.as_os_str().to_owned()));
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full_command.append(&mut args);
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(full_command, Some(linux_sandbox_arg0_override(exe)))
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}
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#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
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SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken => (os_argv_to_strings(argv), None),
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#[cfg(not(target_os = "windows"))]
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SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken => (os_argv_to_strings(argv), None),
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};
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Ok(SandboxExecRequest {
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command: argv,
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cwd: command.cwd,
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env: command.env,
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network: network.cloned(),
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sandbox,
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windows_sandbox_level,
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windows_sandbox_private_desktop,
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sandbox_policy: effective_policy,
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file_system_sandbox_policy: effective_file_system_policy,
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network_sandbox_policy: effective_network_policy,
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arg0: arg0_override,
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})
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}
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}
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#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
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fn ensure_linux_bubblewrap_is_supported(
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file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
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use_legacy_landlock: bool,
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allow_network_for_proxy: bool,
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is_wsl1: bool,
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) -> Result<(), SandboxTransformError> {
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let requires_bubblewrap = !use_legacy_landlock
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&& (!file_system_sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_write_access() || allow_network_for_proxy);
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if is_wsl1 && requires_bubblewrap {
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return Err(SandboxTransformError::Wsl1UnsupportedForBubblewrap);
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}
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Ok(())
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}
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fn os_argv_to_strings(argv: Vec<OsString>) -> Vec<String> {
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argv.into_iter()
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.map(os_string_to_command_component)
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.collect()
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}
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fn os_string_to_command_component(value: OsString) -> String {
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value
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.into_string()
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.unwrap_or_else(|value| value.to_string_lossy().into_owned())
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}
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fn linux_sandbox_arg0_override(exe: &Path) -> String {
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if exe.file_name().and_then(|name| name.to_str()) == Some(CODEX_LINUX_SANDBOX_ARG0) {
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os_string_to_command_component(exe.as_os_str().to_owned())
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} else {
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CODEX_LINUX_SANDBOX_ARG0.to_string()
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}
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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#[path = "manager_tests.rs"]
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mod tests;
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