Charley Cunningham
cb1a182bbe
## Summary Today `SandboxPermissions::requires_additional_permissions()` does not actually mean "is `WithAdditionalPermissions`". It returns `true` for any non-default sandbox override, including `RequireEscalated`. That broad behavior is relied on in multiple `main` callsites. The naming is security-sensitive because `SandboxPermissions` is used on shell-like tool calls to tell the executor how a single command should relate to the turn sandbox: - `UseDefault`: run with the turn sandbox unchanged - `RequireEscalated`: request execution outside the sandbox - `WithAdditionalPermissions`: stay sandboxed but widen permissions for that command only ## Problem The old helper name reads as if it only applies to the `WithAdditionalPermissions` variant. In practice it means "this command requested any explicit sandbox override." That ambiguity made it easy to read production checks incorrectly and made the guardian change look like a standalone `main` fix when it is not. On `main` today: - `shell` and `unified_exec` intentionally reject any explicit `sandbox_permissions` request unless approval policy is `OnRequest` - `exec_policy` intentionally treats any explicit sandbox override as prompt-worthy in restricted sandboxes - tests intentionally serialize both `RequireEscalated` and `WithAdditionalPermissions` as explicit sandbox override requests So changing those callsites from the broad helper to a narrow `WithAdditionalPermissions` check would be a behavior change, not a pure cleanup. ## What This PR Does - documents `SandboxPermissions` as a per-command sandbox override, not a generic permissions bag - adds `requests_sandbox_override()` for the broad meaning: anything except `UseDefault` - adds `uses_additional_permissions()` for the narrow meaning: only `WithAdditionalPermissions` - keeps `requires_additional_permissions()` as a compatibility alias to the broad meaning for now - updates the current broad callsites to use the accurately named broad helper - adds unit coverage that locks in the semantics of all three helpers ## What This PR Does Not Do This PR does not change runtime behavior. That is intentional. --------- Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
codex-core
This crate implements the business logic for Codex. It is designed to be used by the various Codex UIs written in Rust.
Dependencies
Note that codex-core makes some assumptions about certain helper utilities being available in the environment. Currently, this support matrix is:
macOS
Expects /usr/bin/sandbox-exec to be present.
When using the workspace-write sandbox policy, the Seatbelt profile allows
writes under the configured writable roots while keeping .git (directory or
pointer file), the resolved gitdir: target, and .codex read-only.
Network access and filesystem read/write roots are controlled by
SandboxPolicy. Seatbelt consumes the resolved policy and enforces it.
Seatbelt also supports macOS permission-profile extensions layered on top of
SandboxPolicy:
- no extension profile provided:
keeps legacy default preferences read access (
user-preference-read). - extension profile provided with no
macos_preferencesgrant: does not add preferences access clauses. macos_preferences = "readonly": enables cfprefs read clauses anduser-preference-read.macos_preferences = "readwrite": includes readonly clauses plususer-preference-writeand cfprefs shm write clauses.macos_automation = true: enables broad Apple Events send permissions.macos_automation = ["com.apple.Notes", ...]: enables Apple Events send only to listed bundle IDs.macos_accessibility = true: enablescom.apple.axservermach lookup.macos_calendar = true: enablescom.apple.CalendarAgentmach lookup.
Linux
Expects the binary containing codex-core to run the equivalent of codex sandbox linux (legacy alias: codex debug landlock) when arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.
All Platforms
Expects the binary containing codex-core to simulate the virtual apply_patch CLI when arg1 is --codex-run-as-apply-patch. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.