sayan-oai
c53b1dae09
## Why MCP tools were only placed behind `tool_search` when a feature flag was enabled or when there were at least 100 tools. That made the model's tool flow depend on both rollout configuration and the number of installed tools. The searched-tool flow is now the intended behavior. Making it unconditional when the model and provider support it gives every supported setup the same behavior and lets us retire the feature flag safely. ## What changed - Defer all effective MCP tools when `tool_search` and namespaced tools are supported. - Keep exposing MCP tools directly when search cannot be used, so older or unsupported model/provider combinations still work. - Mark `tool_search_always_defer_mcp_tools` as removed and ignore old configured values. - Keep plugin filtering, app-only filtering, file handling, and MCP calls working through the searched-tool flow. ## Why many tests changed Many tests used to act as if the model could see MCP tools in its first request and call them immediately. That is no longer the real flow: the model first receives `tool_search`, searches for a tool, receives the matching MCP tool, and then calls it in the next request. The tests therefore needed an extra search step, and checks for tool names, descriptions, and input fields had to move from the first request to the search result. These are not separate product changes; they make the tests follow what the model will actually see after this change. The plugin tests still check which tools are allowed and where they came from, the file tests still check upload fields and behavior, and the MCP round-trip test still checks a successful call from start to finish. ## Tests - `just test -p codex-features` - Focused `codex-core` tests for MCP exposure and tool planning - `just test -p codex-core explicit_plugin_mentions` - `just test -p codex-core stdio_server_round_trip` - Focused `codex-core` tests for tool search, app-only tools, and MCP file uploads
codex-core
This crate implements the business logic for Codex. It is designed to be used by the various Codex UIs written in Rust.
Wine-exec integration tests
On x86-64 Linux, run the shared suite against the Windows exec server with
bazel test //codex-rs/core:core-all-wine-exec-test. Temporary blockers use a
source-local skip_if_wine_exec! call and reason.
Dependencies
Note that codex-core makes some assumptions about certain helper utilities being available in the environment. Currently, this support matrix is:
macOS
Expects /usr/bin/sandbox-exec to be present.
When using the workspace-write sandbox policy, the Seatbelt profile allows
writes under the configured writable roots while keeping .git (directory or
pointer file), the resolved gitdir: target, and .codex read-only.
Network access and filesystem read/write roots are controlled by
SandboxPolicy. Seatbelt consumes the resolved policy and enforces it.
Seatbelt also keeps the legacy default preferences read access
(user-preference-read) needed for cfprefs-backed macOS behavior.
Linux
Expects the binary containing codex-core to run the equivalent of codex sandbox when arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.
Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on Linux.
They can continue to use the legacy Landlock path when the split filesystem
policy is sandbox-equivalent to the legacy model after cwd resolution.
Split filesystem policies that need direct FileSystemSandboxPolicy
enforcement, such as read-only or denied carveouts under a broader writable
root, automatically route through bubblewrap. The legacy Landlock path is used
only when the split filesystem policy round-trips through the legacy
SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics. That includes overlapping
cases like /repo = write, /repo/a = none, /repo/a/b = write, where the
more specific writable child must reopen under a denied parent.
The Linux sandbox helper prefers the first bwrap found on PATH outside the
current working directory whenever it is available. If bwrap is present but
too old to support --argv0, the helper keeps using system bubblewrap and
switches to a no---argv0 compatibility path for the inner re-exec. If
bwrap is missing, it falls back to the bundled codex-resources/bwrap
binary shipped with Codex and Codex surfaces a startup warning through its
normal notification path instead of printing directly from the sandbox helper.
Codex also surfaces a startup warning when bubblewrap cannot create user
namespaces. WSL2 uses the normal Linux bubblewrap path. WSL1 is not supported
for bubblewrap sandboxing because it cannot create the required user
namespaces, so Codex rejects sandboxed shell commands that would enter the
bubblewrap path before invoking bwrap.
Windows
Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on
Windows. Legacy read-only and workspace-write policies imply full
filesystem read access; exact readable roots are represented by split
filesystem policies instead.
The elevated Windows sandbox also supports:
- legacy
ReadOnlyandWorkspaceWritebehavior - split filesystem policies that need exact readable roots, exact writable roots, or extra read-only carveouts under writable roots
- backend-managed system read roots required for basic execution, such as
C:\Windows,C:\Program Files,C:\Program Files (x86), andC:\ProgramData, when a split filesystem policy requests platform defaults
The unelevated restricted-token backend still supports the legacy full-read
Windows model for legacy ReadOnly and WorkspaceWrite behavior. It also
supports a narrow split-filesystem subset: full-read split policies whose
writable roots still match the legacy WorkspaceWrite root set, but add extra
read-only carveouts under those writable roots.
New [permissions] / split filesystem policies remain supported on Windows
only when they can be enforced directly by the selected Windows backend or
round-trip through the legacy SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics.
Policies that would require direct explicit unreadable carveouts (none) or
reopened writable descendants under read-only carveouts still fail closed
instead of running with weaker enforcement.
All Platforms
Expects the binary containing codex-core to simulate the virtual
apply_patch CLI when arg1 is --codex-run-as-apply-patch. See the
codex-arg0 crate for details.