Michael Bolin
c4ec6be4ab
## Why In the `shell_zsh_fork` flow, `codex-shell-escalation` receives the executable path exactly as the shell passed it to `execve()`. That path is not guaranteed to be absolute. For commands such as `./scripts/hello-mbolin.sh`, if the shell was launched with a different `workdir`, resolving the intercepted `file` against the server process working directory makes policy checks and skill matching inspect the wrong executable. This change pushes that fix a step further by keeping the normalized path typed as `AbsolutePathBuf` throughout the rest of the escalation pipeline. That makes the absolute-path invariant explicit, so later code cannot accidentally treat the resolved executable path as an arbitrary `PathBuf`. ## What Changed - record the wrapper process working directory as an `AbsolutePathBuf` - update the escalation protocol so `workdir` is explicitly absolute while `file` remains the raw intercepted exec path - resolve a relative intercepted `file` against the request `workdir` as soon as the server receives the request - thread `AbsolutePathBuf` through `EscalationPolicy`, `CoreShellActionProvider`, and command normalization helpers so the resolved executable path stays type-checked as absolute - replace the `path-absolutize` dependency in `codex-shell-escalation` with `codex-utils-absolute-path` - add a regression test that covers a relative `file` with a distinct `workdir` ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-shell-escalation`
codex-core
This crate implements the business logic for Codex. It is designed to be used by the various Codex UIs written in Rust.
Dependencies
Note that codex-core makes some assumptions about certain helper utilities being available in the environment. Currently, this support matrix is:
macOS
Expects /usr/bin/sandbox-exec to be present.
When using the workspace-write sandbox policy, the Seatbelt profile allows
writes under the configured writable roots while keeping .git (directory or
pointer file), the resolved gitdir: target, and .codex read-only.
Network access and filesystem read/write roots are controlled by
SandboxPolicy. Seatbelt consumes the resolved policy and enforces it.
Seatbelt also supports macOS permission-profile extensions layered on top of
SandboxPolicy:
- no extension profile provided:
keeps legacy default preferences read access (
user-preference-read). - extension profile provided with no
macos_preferencesgrant: does not add preferences access clauses. macos_preferences = "readonly": enables cfprefs read clauses anduser-preference-read.macos_preferences = "readwrite": includes readonly clauses plususer-preference-writeand cfprefs shm write clauses.macos_automation = true: enables broad Apple Events send permissions.macos_automation = ["com.apple.Notes", ...]: enables Apple Events send only to listed bundle IDs.macos_accessibility = true: enablescom.apple.axservermach lookup.macos_calendar = true: enablescom.apple.CalendarAgentmach lookup.
Linux
Expects the binary containing codex-core to run the equivalent of codex sandbox linux (legacy alias: codex debug landlock) when arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.
All Platforms
Expects the binary containing codex-core to simulate the virtual apply_patch CLI when arg1 is --codex-run-as-apply-patch. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.