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jif bd2968a4db Carry sandbox intent to remote exec servers (#29108 )

## What changed

PR #29099 stopped sending the orchestrator's concrete sandbox wrapper to
a remote exec-server. Remote commands now arrive as plain native argv.

This PR adds the next piece: Codex also sends portable sandbox intent
next to that plain argv.

For a remote unified-exec command, the request can now include:

- the canonical permission profile before local workspace-root
materialization
- the sandbox cwd and workspace roots as `PathUri` values
- Windows sandbox settings
- the legacy Landlock setting
- whether managed networking must be enforced

The important part is that symbolic entries such as `:workspace_roots`
stay symbolic while crossing the boundary. The executor can then bind
them to its own workspace-root paths instead of receiving
orchestrator-local absolute paths.

The data travels through `ExecRequest` into `ExecParams`. Older
exec-servers can still deserialize requests because the new fields have
defaults.

## Why

The orchestrator should not decide how another machine implements
sandboxing.

For example:

- a local macOS Codex would normally build a Seatbelt command
- a remote Linux executor needs a Linux sandbox command instead

The orchestrator now sends the plain command plus the policy it intended
to enforce. A later PR can let the exec-server choose and build the
correct sandbox for its own operating system.

## Important detail

This keeps the portable intent separate from the local `SandboxType`.

`SandboxType::None` is ambiguous:

- it can mean the command was explicitly approved to run without a
sandbox
- it can also mean the orchestrator host has no concrete sandbox
implementation available

Those cases are different for remote execution. This PR adds
`sandbox_requested` so an executor can still receive sandbox intent when
the orchestrator cannot build a local wrapper. Explicit unsandboxed
retries still send no sandbox context.

## Behavior today

This PR only transports the intent. The exec-server accepts the new
fields but does not apply them yet.

Remote commands therefore remain unsandboxed after this PR, just as they
are after PR #29099.

## Follow-up

The next PR will make exec-server read this portable intent, bind
symbolic workspace permissions to executor-native roots, choose the
sandbox for its own operating system, build the wrapper locally, and
then spawn the command.

bd2968a4db · 2026-06-21 12:33:21 +02:00

History

src

Carry sandbox intent to remote exec servers (#29108 )

2026-06-21 12:33:21 +02:00

templates

[codex] Consolidate shared prompts in codex-prompts (#25151 )

2026-06-01 18:45:07 +00:00

tests

[codex] simplify token budget context (#29295 )

2026-06-20 21:50:09 -07:00

BUILD.bazel

Run core integration tests against a Wine-backed Windows executor (#28401 )

2026-06-16 00:38:41 +00:00

Cargo.toml

Use PathUri in filesystem permission paths for exec-server (#28165 )

2026-06-15 23:55:23 +00:00

config.schema.json

[codex] add configurable token budget compaction reminder (#29255 )

2026-06-20 19:13:42 -07:00

gpt_5_1_prompt.md

…

gpt_5_2_prompt.md

…

gpt_5_codex_prompt.md

…

gpt-5.1-codex-max_prompt.md

…

gpt-5.2-codex_prompt.md

…

prompt_with_apply_patch_instructions.md

…

README.md

Run core integration tests against a Wine-backed Windows executor (#28401 )

2026-06-16 00:38:41 +00:00

README.md

codex-core

This crate implements the business logic for Codex. It is designed to be used by the various Codex UIs written in Rust.

Wine-exec integration tests

On x86-64 Linux, run the shared suite against the Windows exec server with bazel test //codex-rs/core:core-all-wine-exec-test. Temporary blockers use a source-local skip_if_wine_exec! call and reason.

Dependencies

Note that codex-core makes some assumptions about certain helper utilities being available in the environment. Currently, this support matrix is:

macOS

Expects /usr/bin/sandbox-exec to be present.

When using the workspace-write sandbox policy, the Seatbelt profile allows writes under the configured writable roots while keeping .git (directory or pointer file), the resolved gitdir: target, and .codex read-only.

Network access and filesystem read/write roots are controlled by SandboxPolicy. Seatbelt consumes the resolved policy and enforces it.

Seatbelt also keeps the legacy default preferences read access (user-preference-read) needed for cfprefs-backed macOS behavior.

Linux

Expects the binary containing codex-core to run the equivalent of codex sandbox when arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.

Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on Linux. They can continue to use the legacy Landlock path when the split filesystem policy is sandbox-equivalent to the legacy model after cwd resolution. Split filesystem policies that need direct FileSystemSandboxPolicy enforcement, such as read-only or denied carveouts under a broader writable root, automatically route through bubblewrap. The legacy Landlock path is used only when the split filesystem policy round-trips through the legacy SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics. That includes overlapping cases like /repo = write, /repo/a = none, /repo/a/b = write, where the more specific writable child must reopen under a denied parent.

The Linux sandbox helper prefers the first bwrap found on PATH outside the current working directory whenever it is available. If bwrap is present but too old to support --argv0, the helper keeps using system bubblewrap and switches to a no---argv0 compatibility path for the inner re-exec. If bwrap is missing, it falls back to the bundled codex-resources/bwrap binary shipped with Codex and Codex surfaces a startup warning through its normal notification path instead of printing directly from the sandbox helper. Codex also surfaces a startup warning when bubblewrap cannot create user namespaces. WSL2 uses the normal Linux bubblewrap path. WSL1 is not supported for bubblewrap sandboxing because it cannot create the required user namespaces, so Codex rejects sandboxed shell commands that would enter the bubblewrap path before invoking bwrap.

Windows

Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on Windows. Legacy read-only and workspace-write policies imply full filesystem read access; exact readable roots are represented by split filesystem policies instead.

The elevated Windows sandbox also supports:

legacy ReadOnly and WorkspaceWrite behavior
split filesystem policies that need exact readable roots, exact writable roots, or extra read-only carveouts under writable roots
backend-managed system read roots required for basic execution, such as C:\Windows, C:\Program Files, C:\Program Files (x86), and C:\ProgramData, when a split filesystem policy requests platform defaults

The unelevated restricted-token backend still supports the legacy full-read Windows model for legacy ReadOnly and WorkspaceWrite behavior. It also supports a narrow split-filesystem subset: full-read split policies whose writable roots still match the legacy WorkspaceWrite root set, but add extra read-only carveouts under those writable roots.

New [permissions] / split filesystem policies remain supported on Windows only when they can be enforced directly by the selected Windows backend or round-trip through the legacy SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics. Policies that would require direct explicit unreadable carveouts (none) or reopened writable descendants under read-only carveouts still fail closed instead of running with weaker enforcement.

All Platforms

Expects the binary containing codex-core to simulate the virtual apply_patch CLI when arg1 is --codex-run-as-apply-patch. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.