## Stack fix: fail closed for unsupported split windows sandboxing #14172 fix: preserve split filesystem semantics in linux sandbox #14173 -> fix: align core approvals with split sandbox policies #14171 refactor: centralize filesystem permissions precedence #14174 ## Why This PR Exists This PR is intentionally narrower than the title may suggest. Most of the original split-permissions migration already landed in the earlier `#13434 -> #13453` stack. In particular: - `#13439` already did the broad runtime plumbing for split filesystem and network policies. - `#13445` already moved `apply_patch` safety onto filesystem-policy semantics. - `#13448` already switched macOS Seatbelt generation to split policies. - `#13449` and `#13453` already handled Linux helper and bubblewrap enforcement. - `#13440` already introduced the first protocol-side helpers for deriving effective filesystem access. The reason this PR still exists is that after the follow-on `[permissions]` work and the new shared precedence helper in `#14174`, a few core approval paths were still deciding behavior from the legacy `SandboxPolicy` projection instead of the split filesystem policy that actually carries the carveouts. That means this PR is mostly a cleanup and alignment pass over the remaining core consumers, not a fresh sandbox backend migration. ## What Is Actually New Here - make unmatched-command fallback decisions consult `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` instead of only legacy `DangerFullAccess` / `ReadOnly` / `WorkspaceWrite` categories - thread `file_system_sandbox_policy` into the shell, unified-exec, and intercepted-exec approval paths so they all use the same split-policy semantics - keep `apply_patch` safety on the same effective-access rules as the shared protocol helper, rather than letting it drift through compatibility projections - add loader-level regression coverage proving legacy `sandbox_mode` config still builds split policies and round-trips back without semantic drift ## What This PR Does Not Do This PR does not introduce new platform backend enforcement on its own. - Linux backend parity remains in `#14173`. - Windows fail-closed handling remains in `#14172`. - The shared precedence/model changes live in `#14174`. ## Files To Focus On - `core/src/exec_policy.rs`: unmatched-command fallback and approval rendering now read the split filesystem policy directly - `core/src/tools/sandboxing.rs`: default exec-approval requirement keys off `FileSystemSandboxPolicy.kind` - `core/src/tools/handlers/shell.rs`: shell approval requests now carry the split filesystem policy - `core/src/unified_exec/process_manager.rs`: unified-exec approval requests now carry the split filesystem policy - `core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rs`: intercepted exec fallback now uses the same split-policy approval semantics - `core/src/safety.rs`: `apply_patch` safety keeps using effective filesystem access rather than legacy sandbox categories - `core/src/config/config_tests.rs`: new regression coverage for legacy `sandbox_mode` no-drift behavior through the split-policy loader ## Notes - `core/src/codex.rs` and `core/src/codex_tests.rs` are just small fallout updates for `RequestPermissionsResponse.scope`; they are not the point of the PR. - If you reviewed the earlier `#13439` / `#13445` stack, the main review question here is simply: “are there any remaining approval or patch-safety paths that still reconstruct semantics from legacy `SandboxPolicy` instead of consuming the split filesystem policy directly?” ## Testing - cargo test -p codex-core legacy_sandbox_mode_config_builds_split_policies_without_drift - cargo test -p codex-core request_permissions - cargo test -p codex-core intercepted_exec_policy - cargo test -p codex-core restricted_sandbox_requires_exec_approval_on_request - cargo test -p codex-core unmatched_on_request_uses_split_filesystem_policy_for_escalation_prompts - cargo test -p codex-core explicit_ - cargo clippy -p codex-core --tests -- -D warnings
codex-core
This crate implements the business logic for Codex. It is designed to be used by the various Codex UIs written in Rust.
Dependencies
Note that codex-core makes some assumptions about certain helper utilities being available in the environment. Currently, this support matrix is:
macOS
Expects /usr/bin/sandbox-exec to be present.
When using the workspace-write sandbox policy, the Seatbelt profile allows
writes under the configured writable roots while keeping .git (directory or
pointer file), the resolved gitdir: target, and .codex read-only.
Network access and filesystem read/write roots are controlled by
SandboxPolicy. Seatbelt consumes the resolved policy and enforces it.
Seatbelt also supports macOS permission-profile extensions layered on top of
SandboxPolicy:
- no extension profile provided:
keeps legacy default preferences read access (
user-preference-read). - extension profile provided with no
macos_preferencesgrant: does not add preferences access clauses. macos_preferences = "readonly": enables cfprefs read clauses anduser-preference-read.macos_preferences = "readwrite": includes readonly clauses plususer-preference-writeand cfprefs shm write clauses.macos_automation = true: enables broad Apple Events send permissions.macos_automation = ["com.apple.Notes", ...]: enables Apple Events send only to listed bundle IDs.macos_launch_services = true: enables LaunchServices lookups and open/launch operations.macos_accessibility = true: enablescom.apple.axservermach lookup.macos_calendar = true: enablescom.apple.CalendarAgentmach lookup.macos_contacts = "read_only": enables Address Book read access and Contacts read services.macos_contacts = "read_write": includes the readonly Contacts clauses plus Address Book writes and keychain/temp helpers required for writes.
Linux
Expects the binary containing codex-core to run the equivalent of codex sandbox linux (legacy alias: codex debug landlock) when arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.
All Platforms
Expects the binary containing codex-core to simulate the virtual apply_patch CLI when arg1 is --codex-run-as-apply-patch. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.