Winston Howes
bca18cba40
## Stack 1. Parent PR: #18240 uses named MITM permissions config. 2. This PR wires managed MITM CA trust into spawned child processes. ## Why When Codex terminates HTTPS for limited mode or MITM hooks, child HTTPS clients need to trust Codex's managed MITM CA. Exporting proxy URLs alone is not enough, but blindly replacing user CA settings would be wrong: it can break custom enterprise/test roots, leak unreadable CA files into generated bundles, or make the child env disagree with its sandbox policy. ## Summary 1. Build immutable managed CA bundles under `$CODEX_HOME/proxy` that include native roots, the managed MITM CA, and only inherited or command-scoped CA bundles the child is allowed to read. 2. Export curated CA env vars alongside managed proxy env vars while preserving user CA override semantics, including nested Codex `SSL_CERT_FILE` precedence. 3. Thread generated CA bundle paths into child sandbox readable roots, including debug sandbox execution, so the exported env vars work inside sandboxed commands. 4. Remove only Codex-generated MITM CA bundle env when a child intentionally drops managed proxying for escalation or no-proxy retry. 5. Document the managed CA bundle behavior and cover env injection, per-child bundle generation, sandbox readable roots, and no-proxy cleanup in tests. ## Validation 1. Ran `just test -p codex-network-proxy`. 2. Ran `just test -p codex-protocol`. 3. Ran `just fix -p codex-network-proxy -p codex-protocol`. 4. Tried focused `codex-core` validation, but the crate currently fails to compile in `core/tests/suite/guardian_review.rs` because an existing `Op::UserInput` initializer is missing `additional_context`. --------- Co-authored-by: Eva Wong <evawong@openai.com>
codex-core
This crate implements the business logic for Codex. It is designed to be used by the various Codex UIs written in Rust.
Dependencies
Note that codex-core makes some assumptions about certain helper utilities being available in the environment. Currently, this support matrix is:
macOS
Expects /usr/bin/sandbox-exec to be present.
When using the workspace-write sandbox policy, the Seatbelt profile allows
writes under the configured writable roots while keeping .git (directory or
pointer file), the resolved gitdir: target, and .codex read-only.
Network access and filesystem read/write roots are controlled by
SandboxPolicy. Seatbelt consumes the resolved policy and enforces it.
Seatbelt also keeps the legacy default preferences read access
(user-preference-read) needed for cfprefs-backed macOS behavior.
Linux
Expects the binary containing codex-core to run the equivalent of codex sandbox when arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.
Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on Linux.
They can continue to use the legacy Landlock path when the split filesystem
policy is sandbox-equivalent to the legacy model after cwd resolution.
Split filesystem policies that need direct FileSystemSandboxPolicy
enforcement, such as read-only or denied carveouts under a broader writable
root, automatically route through bubblewrap. The legacy Landlock path is used
only when the split filesystem policy round-trips through the legacy
SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics. That includes overlapping
cases like /repo = write, /repo/a = none, /repo/a/b = write, where the
more specific writable child must reopen under a denied parent.
The Linux sandbox helper prefers the first bwrap found on PATH outside the
current working directory whenever it is available. If bwrap is present but
too old to support --argv0, the helper keeps using system bubblewrap and
switches to a no---argv0 compatibility path for the inner re-exec. If
bwrap is missing, it falls back to the bundled codex-resources/bwrap
binary shipped with Codex and Codex surfaces a startup warning through its
normal notification path instead of printing directly from the sandbox helper.
Codex also surfaces a startup warning when bubblewrap cannot create user
namespaces. WSL2 uses the normal Linux bubblewrap path. WSL1 is not supported
for bubblewrap sandboxing because it cannot create the required user
namespaces, so Codex rejects sandboxed shell commands that would enter the
bubblewrap path before invoking bwrap.
Windows
Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on
Windows. Legacy read-only and workspace-write policies imply full
filesystem read access; exact readable roots are represented by split
filesystem policies instead.
The elevated Windows sandbox also supports:
- legacy
ReadOnlyandWorkspaceWritebehavior - split filesystem policies that need exact readable roots, exact writable roots, or extra read-only carveouts under writable roots
- backend-managed system read roots required for basic execution, such as
C:\Windows,C:\Program Files,C:\Program Files (x86), andC:\ProgramData, when a split filesystem policy requests platform defaults
The unelevated restricted-token backend still supports the legacy full-read
Windows model for legacy ReadOnly and WorkspaceWrite behavior. It also
supports a narrow split-filesystem subset: full-read split policies whose
writable roots still match the legacy WorkspaceWrite root set, but add extra
read-only carveouts under those writable roots.
New [permissions] / split filesystem policies remain supported on Windows
only when they can be enforced directly by the selected Windows backend or
round-trip through the legacy SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics.
Policies that would require direct explicit unreadable carveouts (none) or
reopened writable descendants under read-only carveouts still fail closed
instead of running with weaker enforcement.
All Platforms
Expects the binary containing codex-core to simulate the virtual
apply_patch CLI when arg1 is --codex-run-as-apply-patch. See the
codex-arg0 crate for details.