iceweasel-oai
ef75171f18
## Why This is the final PR in the Windows fs-helper sandbox stack and contains the actual bug fix. The exec-server filesystem helper is a direct-spawn path: it asks `SandboxManager` for a `SandboxExecRequest`, then launches the returned argv itself. That works on macOS and Linux because the transformed argv is already a self-contained sandbox wrapper. On Windows, the transformed request carried `WindowsRestrictedToken` metadata, but the direct-spawn fs-helper runner still launched the helper argv directly. That means Windows filesystem built-ins backed by the fs-helper could run with the parent Codex process permissions instead of the configured Windows sandbox. This PR makes the direct-spawn transform produce a self-contained Windows wrapper argv before fs-helper launches it. ## What Changed - Added `SandboxManager::transform_for_direct_spawn()` for callers that launch the returned argv themselves. - Wrapped Windows restricted-token direct-spawn requests with `codex.exe --run-as-windows-sandbox` and then marked the outer request as unsandboxed, matching the macOS/Linux wrapper argv shape. - Updated `exec-server/src/fs_sandbox.rs` to use the direct-spawn transform for fs-helper launches. - Materialized the inner `codex.exe --codex-run-as-fs-helper` executable into `.sandbox-bin` so the sandboxed user can run it. - Carried runtime workspace roots through `FileSystemSandboxContext` as `PathUri` values so `:workspace_roots` policies resolve correctly without sending native client paths over exec-server JSON. - Preserved wrapper setup identity environment needed by Windows sandbox setup without changing the serialized inner helper environment. ## Verification - `just bazel-lock-update` - `just bazel-lock-check` - `just test -p codex-sandboxing transform_for_direct_spawn_windows` - `just test -p codex-exec-server fs_sandbox::tests` - `just fix -p codex-windows-sandbox -p codex-sandboxing -p codex-exec-server -p codex-core -p codex-file-system` Local note: `just fmt` completed Rust formatting, but this workstation still fails the non-Rust formatter phases because uv cannot open its cache and the local buildifier/dotslash path is missing.
codex-core
This crate implements the business logic for Codex. It is designed to be used by the various Codex UIs written in Rust.
Wine-exec integration tests
On x86-64 Linux, run the shared suite against the Windows exec server with
bazel test //codex-rs/core:core-all-wine-exec-test. Temporary blockers use a
source-local skip_if_wine_exec! call and reason.
Dependencies
Note that codex-core makes some assumptions about certain helper utilities being available in the environment. Currently, this support matrix is:
macOS
Expects /usr/bin/sandbox-exec to be present.
When using the workspace-write sandbox policy, the Seatbelt profile allows
writes under the configured writable roots while keeping .git (directory or
pointer file), the resolved gitdir: target, and .codex read-only.
Network access and filesystem read/write roots are controlled by
SandboxPolicy. Seatbelt consumes the resolved policy and enforces it.
Seatbelt also keeps the legacy default preferences read access
(user-preference-read) needed for cfprefs-backed macOS behavior.
Linux
Expects the binary containing codex-core to run the equivalent of codex sandbox when arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.
Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on Linux.
They can continue to use the legacy Landlock path when the split filesystem
policy is sandbox-equivalent to the legacy model after cwd resolution.
Split filesystem policies that need direct FileSystemSandboxPolicy
enforcement, such as read-only or denied carveouts under a broader writable
root, automatically route through bubblewrap. The legacy Landlock path is used
only when the split filesystem policy round-trips through the legacy
SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics. That includes overlapping
cases like /repo = write, /repo/a = none, /repo/a/b = write, where the
more specific writable child must reopen under a denied parent.
The Linux sandbox helper prefers the first bwrap found on PATH outside the
current working directory whenever it is available. If bwrap is present but
too old to support --argv0, the helper keeps using system bubblewrap and
switches to a no---argv0 compatibility path for the inner re-exec. If
bwrap is missing, it falls back to the bundled codex-resources/bwrap
binary shipped with Codex and Codex surfaces a startup warning through its
normal notification path instead of printing directly from the sandbox helper.
Codex also surfaces a startup warning when bubblewrap cannot create user
namespaces. WSL2 uses the normal Linux bubblewrap path. WSL1 is not supported
for bubblewrap sandboxing because it cannot create the required user
namespaces, so Codex rejects sandboxed shell commands that would enter the
bubblewrap path before invoking bwrap.
Windows
Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on
Windows. Legacy read-only and workspace-write policies imply full
filesystem read access; exact readable roots are represented by split
filesystem policies instead.
The elevated Windows sandbox also supports:
- legacy
ReadOnlyandWorkspaceWritebehavior - split filesystem policies that need exact readable roots, exact writable roots, or extra read-only carveouts under writable roots
- backend-managed system read roots required for basic execution, such as
C:\Windows,C:\Program Files,C:\Program Files (x86), andC:\ProgramData, when a split filesystem policy requests platform defaults
The unelevated restricted-token backend still supports the legacy full-read
Windows model for legacy ReadOnly and WorkspaceWrite behavior. It also
supports a narrow split-filesystem subset: full-read split policies whose
writable roots still match the legacy WorkspaceWrite root set, but add extra
read-only carveouts under those writable roots.
New [permissions] / split filesystem policies remain supported on Windows
only when they can be enforced directly by the selected Windows backend or
round-trip through the legacy SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics.
Policies that would require direct explicit unreadable carveouts (none) or
reopened writable descendants under read-only carveouts still fail closed
instead of running with weaker enforcement.
All Platforms
Expects the binary containing codex-core to simulate the virtual
apply_patch CLI when arg1 is --codex-run-as-apply-patch. See the
codex-arg0 crate for details.