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Abhinav a5a94ee5a7 Constrain Windows sandbox requirements (#23766 )

# Why

Managed requirements can already constrain sandbox policy choices, but
Windows sandbox implementation selection was still resolved
independently from those requirements. That left the TUI able to
continue through the unelevated fallback even when an organization wants
to require the elevated Windows sandbox implementation.

# What

- Add `[windows].allowed_sandbox_implementations` requirements support
for the Windows `elevated` and `unelevated` implementations.
- Apply that allowlist during core config resolution so disallowed
configured or feature-selected Windows sandbox implementations fall back
to an allowed implementation with the existing requirements warning
path.
- Reuse the existing TUI Windows setup prompts to block disallowed
unelevated continuation, keep required elevated setup in front of the
user, and refuse to persist a TUI-selected Windows sandbox mode that
requirements disallow.

# Semantics

| Allowed | Selected | Effective |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `["elevated"]` | `unelevated` / unset | `elevated` |
| `["unelevated"]` | `elevated` / unset | `unelevated` |
| `["elevated", "unelevated"]` | `elevated` | `elevated` |
| `["elevated", "unelevated"]` | `unelevated` | `unelevated` |
| `["elevated", "unelevated"]` | unset | `elevated` |

Availability is handled by interactive setup surfaces after allowlist
resolution. If the effective elevated implementation is not ready,
elevated-only requirements block on setup. When unelevated is also
allowed, the UI may offer the existing unelevated fallback.

## TUI Screens

If elevated setup is not already complete:
```
  Your organization requires the default Codex agent sandbox to continue. Set it up to protect your files and control
  network access.
  Learn more <https://developers.openai.com/codex/windows>

› 1. Set up default sandbox (requires Administrator permissions)
  2. Quit
```

If admin setup fails under `["elevated"]`:
```
  Couldn't set up your sandbox with Administrator permissions

  Your organization requires the default sandbox before Codex can continue.
  Learn more <https://developers.openai.com/codex/windows>

› 1. Try setting up admin sandbox again
  2. Quit
```

# Next Steps


- extend the requirements/readout surface, such as
`configRequirements/read`, so clients can inspect the loaded
`[windows].allowed_sandbox_implementations` requirement instead of
inferring it from Windows setup state
- consider extending `windowsSandbox/readiness` as well
- update the App startup guide, setup flow, and banner surfaces so an
elevated-only requirement omits any continue-unelevated escape hatch and
blocks startup until a permitted implementation is ready;
- preserve the existing unelevated fallback path when requirements allow
it, including the `["unelevated"]` case where elevated is disallowed

a5a94ee5a7 · 2026-05-29 16:31:33 -07:00

History

src

Constrain Windows sandbox requirements (#23766 )

2026-05-29 16:31:33 -07:00

templates

goal: pause continuation loops on usage limits and blockers (#23094 )

2026-05-18 11:28:53 -07:00

tests

[codex] Wait for MCP readiness in core integration tests (#24964 )

2026-05-29 10:22:27 -07:00

BUILD.bazel

Remove CODEX_RS_SSE_FIXTURE test hook (#22413 )

2026-05-13 03:08:01 +00:00

Cargo.toml

package: include zsh fork in Codex package (#23756 )

2026-05-22 17:54:07 -07:00

config.schema.json

[codex] Fix Vim normal mode editing (#25022 )

2026-05-29 14:01:27 -07:00

gpt_5_1_prompt.md

Assemble sandbox/approval/network prompts dynamically (#8961 )

2026-01-12 23:12:59 +00:00

gpt_5_2_prompt.md

Assemble sandbox/approval/network prompts dynamically (#8961 )

2026-01-12 23:12:59 +00:00

gpt_5_codex_prompt.md

Assemble sandbox/approval/network prompts dynamically (#8961 )

2026-01-12 23:12:59 +00:00

gpt-5.1-codex-max_prompt.md

Assemble sandbox/approval/network prompts dynamically (#8961 )

2026-01-12 23:12:59 +00:00

gpt-5.2-codex_prompt.md

Assemble sandbox/approval/network prompts dynamically (#8961 )

2026-01-12 23:12:59 +00:00

hierarchical_agents_message.md

Add hierarchical agent prompt (#8996 )

2026-01-09 13:47:37 -08:00

prompt_with_apply_patch_instructions.md

Assemble sandbox/approval/network prompts dynamically (#8961 )

2026-01-12 23:12:59 +00:00

README.md

cli: infer host sandbox backend (#24102 )

2026-05-22 10:23:59 -07:00

review_prompt.md

docs: Fix markdown list item spacing in codex-rs/core/review_prompt.md (#4144 )

2025-10-30 17:39:21 -07:00

README.md

codex-core

This crate implements the business logic for Codex. It is designed to be used by the various Codex UIs written in Rust.

Dependencies

Note that codex-core makes some assumptions about certain helper utilities being available in the environment. Currently, this support matrix is:

macOS

Expects /usr/bin/sandbox-exec to be present.

When using the workspace-write sandbox policy, the Seatbelt profile allows writes under the configured writable roots while keeping .git (directory or pointer file), the resolved gitdir: target, and .codex read-only.

Network access and filesystem read/write roots are controlled by SandboxPolicy. Seatbelt consumes the resolved policy and enforces it.

Seatbelt also keeps the legacy default preferences read access (user-preference-read) needed for cfprefs-backed macOS behavior.

Linux

Expects the binary containing codex-core to run the equivalent of codex sandbox when arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.

Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on Linux. They can continue to use the legacy Landlock path when the split filesystem policy is sandbox-equivalent to the legacy model after cwd resolution. Split filesystem policies that need direct FileSystemSandboxPolicy enforcement, such as read-only or denied carveouts under a broader writable root, automatically route through bubblewrap. The legacy Landlock path is used only when the split filesystem policy round-trips through the legacy SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics. That includes overlapping cases like /repo = write, /repo/a = none, /repo/a/b = write, where the more specific writable child must reopen under a denied parent.

The Linux sandbox helper prefers the first bwrap found on PATH outside the current working directory whenever it is available. If bwrap is present but too old to support --argv0, the helper keeps using system bubblewrap and switches to a no---argv0 compatibility path for the inner re-exec. If bwrap is missing, it falls back to the bundled codex-resources/bwrap binary shipped with Codex and Codex surfaces a startup warning through its normal notification path instead of printing directly from the sandbox helper. Codex also surfaces a startup warning when bubblewrap cannot create user namespaces. WSL2 uses the normal Linux bubblewrap path. WSL1 is not supported for bubblewrap sandboxing because it cannot create the required user namespaces, so Codex rejects sandboxed shell commands that would enter the bubblewrap path before invoking bwrap.

Windows

Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on Windows. Legacy read-only and workspace-write policies imply full filesystem read access; exact readable roots are represented by split filesystem policies instead.

The elevated Windows sandbox also supports:

legacy ReadOnly and WorkspaceWrite behavior
split filesystem policies that need exact readable roots, exact writable roots, or extra read-only carveouts under writable roots
backend-managed system read roots required for basic execution, such as C:\Windows, C:\Program Files, C:\Program Files (x86), and C:\ProgramData, when a split filesystem policy requests platform defaults

The unelevated restricted-token backend still supports the legacy full-read Windows model for legacy ReadOnly and WorkspaceWrite behavior. It also supports a narrow split-filesystem subset: full-read split policies whose writable roots still match the legacy WorkspaceWrite root set, but add extra read-only carveouts under those writable roots.

New [permissions] / split filesystem policies remain supported on Windows only when they can be enforced directly by the selected Windows backend or round-trip through the legacy SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics. Policies that would require direct explicit unreadable carveouts (none) or reopened writable descendants under read-only carveouts still fail closed instead of running with weaker enforcement.

All Platforms

Expects the binary containing codex-core to simulate the virtual apply_patch CLI when arg1 is --codex-run-as-apply-patch. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.