Josh McKinneyandGitHub
fc073c9c5b
### Motivation - Git subcommand matching was being classified as "dangerous" and caused benign developer workflows (for example `git push --force-with-lease`) to be blocked by the preflight policy. - The change aligns behavior with the intent to reserve the dangerous checklist for truly destructive shell ops (e.g. `rm -rf`) and avoid surprising developer-facing blocks. ### Description - Remove git-specific subcommand checks from `is_dangerous_to_call_with_exec` in `codex-rs/shell-command/src/command_safety/is_dangerous_command.rs`, leaving only explicit `rm` and `sudo` passthrough checks. - Deleted the git-specific helper logic that classified `reset`, `branch`-delete, `push` (force/delete/refspec) and `clean --force` as dangerous. - Updated unit tests in the same file to assert that various `git reset`/`git branch`/`git push`/`git clean` variants are no longer classified as dangerous. - Kept `find_git_subcommand` (used by safe-command classification) intact so safe/unsafe parsing elsewhere remains functional. ### Testing - Ran formatter with `just fmt` successfully. - Ran unit tests with `cargo test -p codex-shell-command` and all tests passed (`144 passed; 0 failed`). ------ [Codex Task](https://chatgpt.com/codex/tasks/task_i_698d19dedb4883299c3ceb5bbc6a0dcf)
codex-core
This crate implements the business logic for Codex. It is designed to be used by the various Codex UIs written in Rust.
Dependencies
Note that codex-core makes some assumptions about certain helper utilities being available in the environment. Currently, this support matrix is:
macOS
Expects /usr/bin/sandbox-exec to be present.
When using the workspace-write sandbox policy, the Seatbelt profile allows
writes under the configured writable roots while keeping .git (directory or
pointer file), the resolved gitdir: target, and .codex read-only.
Network access and filesystem read/write roots are controlled by
SandboxPolicy. Seatbelt consumes the resolved policy and enforces it.
Seatbelt also supports macOS permission-profile extensions layered on top of
SandboxPolicy:
- no extension profile provided:
keeps legacy default preferences read access (
user-preference-read). - extension profile provided with no
macos_preferencesgrant: does not add preferences access clauses. macos_preferences = "readonly": enables cfprefs read clauses anduser-preference-read.macos_preferences = "readwrite": includes readonly clauses plususer-preference-writeand cfprefs shm write clauses.macos_automation = true: enables broad Apple Events send permissions.macos_automation = ["com.apple.Notes", ...]: enables Apple Events send only to listed bundle IDs.macos_accessibility = true: enablescom.apple.axservermach lookup.macos_calendar = true: enablescom.apple.CalendarAgentmach lookup.
Linux
Expects the binary containing codex-core to run the equivalent of codex sandbox linux (legacy alias: codex debug landlock) when arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.
All Platforms
Expects the binary containing codex-core to simulate the virtual apply_patch CLI when arg1 is --codex-run-as-apply-patch. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.