jif
9c3b10e5d4
## Why PR #29108 lets the orchestrator send sandbox intent with `process/start` without wrapping the command for its own operating system. This PR completes that boundary by making the executor interpret and enforce the intent using its own filesystem paths and sandbox implementation. For example, a macOS TUI targeting a Linux devbox sends `/bin/bash -lc pwd`. The Linux executor turns that into its own `codex-linux-sandbox ... /bin/bash -lc pwd` launch. ## What changes - Keep `process/start` unchanged when no sandbox intent is present. - Convert sandbox `PathUri` values into native paths on the executor. - Bind symbolic `:workspace_roots` permissions to the executor's native sandbox cwd. - Select the sandbox implementation on the executor and wrap the original command immediately before spawning it. - Reject sandbox-required execution before spawning when the executor cannot enforce the intent. - Pass exec-server runtime paths into process creation so Linux can locate `codex-linux-sandbox`. The boundary is therefore: ```text orchestrator executor original argv + sandbox intent -> select and enforce local sandbox ``` This PR intentionally treats a denied remote command as an ordinary command failure. Draft follow-up #29424 carries a semantic `sandboxDenied` result back to unified exec for the existing approval and retry flow. ## Platform scope Linux and macOS use their existing direct-spawn sandbox transforms. Windows sandboxed remote process launch is intentionally unsupported in this PR. The current Windows direct-spawn wrapper does not correctly preserve arbitrary argv, TTY behavior, or pass the full child environment out of band. The executor rejects the request instead of running it incorrectly or unsandboxed. ## Known follow-ups - The transported permission profile can still contain orchestrator-materialized helper or explicit paths. A `TODO(jif)` marks where the executor boundary should receive pre-host-materialization permission intent. - The sandbox wrapper currently replaces a requested custom inner `arg0`. A `TODO(jif)` marks where this must be preserved or rejected explicitly. - Draft PR #29424 contains the deferred sandbox-denial classification and approval/retry behavior. ## Rollout assumption This executor-sandbox stack is unreleased and its client and executor are expected to move together. This PR does not add mixed-version negotiation with older exec servers.
codex-core
This crate implements the business logic for Codex. It is designed to be used by the various Codex UIs written in Rust.
Wine-exec integration tests
On x86-64 Linux, run the shared suite against the Windows exec server with
bazel test //codex-rs/core:core-all-wine-exec-test. Temporary blockers use a
source-local skip_if_wine_exec! call and reason.
Dependencies
Note that codex-core makes some assumptions about certain helper utilities being available in the environment. Currently, this support matrix is:
macOS
Expects /usr/bin/sandbox-exec to be present.
When using the workspace-write sandbox policy, the Seatbelt profile allows
writes under the configured writable roots while keeping .git (directory or
pointer file), the resolved gitdir: target, and .codex read-only.
Network access and filesystem read/write roots are controlled by
SandboxPolicy. Seatbelt consumes the resolved policy and enforces it.
Seatbelt also keeps the legacy default preferences read access
(user-preference-read) needed for cfprefs-backed macOS behavior.
Linux
Expects the binary containing codex-core to run the equivalent of codex sandbox when arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.
Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on Linux.
They can continue to use the legacy Landlock path when the split filesystem
policy is sandbox-equivalent to the legacy model after cwd resolution.
Split filesystem policies that need direct FileSystemSandboxPolicy
enforcement, such as read-only or denied carveouts under a broader writable
root, automatically route through bubblewrap. The legacy Landlock path is used
only when the split filesystem policy round-trips through the legacy
SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics. That includes overlapping
cases like /repo = write, /repo/a = none, /repo/a/b = write, where the
more specific writable child must reopen under a denied parent.
The Linux sandbox helper prefers the first bwrap found on PATH outside the
current working directory whenever it is available. If bwrap is present but
too old to support --argv0, the helper keeps using system bubblewrap and
switches to a no---argv0 compatibility path for the inner re-exec. If
bwrap is missing, it falls back to the bundled codex-resources/bwrap
binary shipped with Codex and Codex surfaces a startup warning through its
normal notification path instead of printing directly from the sandbox helper.
Codex also surfaces a startup warning when bubblewrap cannot create user
namespaces. WSL2 uses the normal Linux bubblewrap path. WSL1 is not supported
for bubblewrap sandboxing because it cannot create the required user
namespaces, so Codex rejects sandboxed shell commands that would enter the
bubblewrap path before invoking bwrap.
Windows
Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on
Windows. Legacy read-only and workspace-write policies imply full
filesystem read access; exact readable roots are represented by split
filesystem policies instead.
The elevated Windows sandbox also supports:
- legacy
ReadOnlyandWorkspaceWritebehavior - split filesystem policies that need exact readable roots, exact writable roots, or extra read-only carveouts under writable roots
- backend-managed system read roots required for basic execution, such as
C:\Windows,C:\Program Files,C:\Program Files (x86), andC:\ProgramData, when a split filesystem policy requests platform defaults
The unelevated restricted-token backend still supports the legacy full-read
Windows model for legacy ReadOnly and WorkspaceWrite behavior. It also
supports a narrow split-filesystem subset: full-read split policies whose
writable roots still match the legacy WorkspaceWrite root set, but add extra
read-only carveouts under those writable roots.
New [permissions] / split filesystem policies remain supported on Windows
only when they can be enforced directly by the selected Windows backend or
round-trip through the legacy SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics.
Policies that would require direct explicit unreadable carveouts (none) or
reopened writable descendants under read-only carveouts still fail closed
instead of running with weaker enforcement.
All Platforms
Expects the binary containing codex-core to simulate the virtual
apply_patch CLI when arg1 is --codex-run-as-apply-patch. See the
codex-arg0 crate for details.