jif
89ac3ec27c
## Why
CCA is moving toward a split runtime where the orchestrator may not have
a filesystem, while executors can expose preinstalled plugins and
skills. A thread therefore needs to select capabilities without asking
app-server or core to interpret executor-owned paths through the
orchestrator's filesystem.
The longer-term model is broader than executor skills:
- A plugin is a bundle of skills, MCP servers, connectors/apps, and
hooks.
- A plugin root can be local, executor-owned, or hosted by a backend.
- Components inside one plugin can use different access and execution
mechanisms. A skill may be read from a filesystem or through backend
tools; an HTTP MCP server can run without an executor; a stdio MCP
server or hook needs an execution environment.
- Core should carry generic extension initialization data. The extension
that owns a component should discover it, expose it to the model, and
invoke it through the appropriate runtime.
This PR establishes that architecture through one complete vertical:
selecting a root on an executor, discovering the skills beneath it,
exposing those skills to the model, and reading an explicitly invoked
`SKILL.md` through the same executor.
## Contract
`thread/start` gains an experimental `selectedCapabilityRoots` field:
```json
{
"selectedCapabilityRoots": [
{
"id": "deploy-plugin@1",
"location": {
"type": "environment",
"environmentId": "workspace",
"path": "/opt/codex/plugins/deploy"
}
}
]
}
```
The root is intentionally not classified as a "plugin" or "skill" in the
API. It can point at a standalone skill, a directory containing several
skills, or a plugin containing skills and other components. This PR only
teaches the skills extension how to consume it; later extensions can
resolve MCP, connector, and hook components from the same selection.
The platform-supplied `id` is stable selection identity. The location
says which runtime owns the root and gives that runtime an opaque path.
App-server does not inspect or canonicalize the path.
## What changed
### Generic thread extension initialization
App-server converts selected roots into `ExtensionDataInit`. Core
carries that generic initialization value until the final thread ID is
known, then creates thread-scoped `ExtensionData` before lifecycle
contributors run.
This keeps `Session` and core independent of the capability-selection
contract. The initialization value is consumed during construction; it
is not retained as another long-lived `Session` field.
### Executor-backed skills
The skills extension now owns an `ExecutorSkillProvider` that:
- resolves the selected environment through `EnvironmentManager`
- discovers, canonicalizes, and reads skills through that environment's
`ExecutorFileSystem`
- contributes the bounded selected-skill catalog as stable developer
context
- reads an explicitly invoked skill body through the authority that
listed it
- warns when an environment or root is unavailable
- never falls back to the orchestrator filesystem for an executor-owned
root
Skill catalog and instruction fragments have hard byte bounds, which
also bound them below the 10K-token per-item context limit. If a
selected executor skill has the same name as a legacy local skill, the
executor selection owns that invocation and the local body is not
injected a second time.
Existing local and bundled skill loading remains in place. Omitting
`selectedCapabilityRoots` therefore preserves current local-only
behavior.
## Current semantics
- Only environment-owned locations are represented in this first
contract.
- Roots are resolved by the destination extension, not by app-server or
core.
- An unavailable executor or invalid root produces a warning and no
capabilities from that root; it does not trigger a local-filesystem
fallback.
- Selection applies to a newly started active thread.
- MCP servers, connectors, and hooks beneath a selected plugin root are
not activated yet.
- Selection is not yet persisted or inherited across resume, fork, or
subagent creation. Existing local capabilities continue to behave as
they do today in those flows.
## Planned vertical follow-ups
1. **Hosted HTTP MCP:** add an extension-backed HTTP MCP source that
works without an executor, then replace the special-purpose MCP plugins
loader with that implementation.
2. **Executor MCP:** register and execute stdio MCP servers through the
environment that owns the selected plugin root.
3. **Backend skills:** add a hosted skill source whose catalog and
bodies are accessed through extension tools rather than a filesystem.
4. **Connectors and hooks:** activate those components through their
owning extensions, using the same selected-root boundary and
component-specific runtime.
5. **Durable selection:** define the desired-selection lifecycle,
persist it, and make resume, fork, and subagent inheritance explicit
rather than accidental.
6. **Local convergence:** incrementally route existing local plugin,
skill, and MCP loading through the same extension model while preserving
current local behavior.
Each follow-up remains reviewable as an end-to-end capability. The
platform selects roots, generic thread extension data carries the
selection, and the owning extension resolves and operates its component.
## Verification
Coverage added for:
- app-server end-to-end discovery and explicit invocation of a skill
inside an executor-selected plugin root
- exclusive invocation when a selected executor skill collides with a
local skill name
- executor filesystem authority for discovery, canonicalization, and
reads
- thread extension initialization before lifecycle contributors run
- stable executor catalog context, explicit invocation, context
rebuilding, hidden skills, and preserved host/remote catalog behavior
Targeted protocol, core-skills, skills-extension, core lifecycle, and
app-server executor-skill tests were run during development.
codex-core
This crate implements the business logic for Codex. It is designed to be used by the various Codex UIs written in Rust.
Dependencies
Note that codex-core makes some assumptions about certain helper utilities being available in the environment. Currently, this support matrix is:
macOS
Expects /usr/bin/sandbox-exec to be present.
When using the workspace-write sandbox policy, the Seatbelt profile allows
writes under the configured writable roots while keeping .git (directory or
pointer file), the resolved gitdir: target, and .codex read-only.
Network access and filesystem read/write roots are controlled by
SandboxPolicy. Seatbelt consumes the resolved policy and enforces it.
Seatbelt also keeps the legacy default preferences read access
(user-preference-read) needed for cfprefs-backed macOS behavior.
Linux
Expects the binary containing codex-core to run the equivalent of codex sandbox when arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.
Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on Linux.
They can continue to use the legacy Landlock path when the split filesystem
policy is sandbox-equivalent to the legacy model after cwd resolution.
Split filesystem policies that need direct FileSystemSandboxPolicy
enforcement, such as read-only or denied carveouts under a broader writable
root, automatically route through bubblewrap. The legacy Landlock path is used
only when the split filesystem policy round-trips through the legacy
SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics. That includes overlapping
cases like /repo = write, /repo/a = none, /repo/a/b = write, where the
more specific writable child must reopen under a denied parent.
The Linux sandbox helper prefers the first bwrap found on PATH outside the
current working directory whenever it is available. If bwrap is present but
too old to support --argv0, the helper keeps using system bubblewrap and
switches to a no---argv0 compatibility path for the inner re-exec. If
bwrap is missing, it falls back to the bundled codex-resources/bwrap
binary shipped with Codex and Codex surfaces a startup warning through its
normal notification path instead of printing directly from the sandbox helper.
Codex also surfaces a startup warning when bubblewrap cannot create user
namespaces. WSL2 uses the normal Linux bubblewrap path. WSL1 is not supported
for bubblewrap sandboxing because it cannot create the required user
namespaces, so Codex rejects sandboxed shell commands that would enter the
bubblewrap path before invoking bwrap.
Windows
Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on
Windows. Legacy read-only and workspace-write policies imply full
filesystem read access; exact readable roots are represented by split
filesystem policies instead.
The elevated Windows sandbox also supports:
- legacy
ReadOnlyandWorkspaceWritebehavior - split filesystem policies that need exact readable roots, exact writable roots, or extra read-only carveouts under writable roots
- backend-managed system read roots required for basic execution, such as
C:\Windows,C:\Program Files,C:\Program Files (x86), andC:\ProgramData, when a split filesystem policy requests platform defaults
The unelevated restricted-token backend still supports the legacy full-read
Windows model for legacy ReadOnly and WorkspaceWrite behavior. It also
supports a narrow split-filesystem subset: full-read split policies whose
writable roots still match the legacy WorkspaceWrite root set, but add extra
read-only carveouts under those writable roots.
New [permissions] / split filesystem policies remain supported on Windows
only when they can be enforced directly by the selected Windows backend or
round-trip through the legacy SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics.
Policies that would require direct explicit unreadable carveouts (none) or
reopened writable descendants under read-only carveouts still fail closed
instead of running with weaker enforcement.
All Platforms
Expects the binary containing codex-core to simulate the virtual
apply_patch CLI when arg1 is --codex-run-as-apply-patch. See the
codex-arg0 crate for details.