## Summary
Tighten the `js_repl` freeform Lark grammar to block the most common
malformed payload wrappers before they reach runtime validation.
## What Changed
- Replaced the overly permissive `js_repl` freeform grammar (`start:
/[\s\S]*/`) with a structured grammar that still supports:
- plain JS source
- optional first-line `// codex-js-repl:` pragma followed by JS source
- Added grammar-level filtering for common bad payload shapes by
rejecting inputs whose first significant token starts with:
- `{` (JSON object wrapper like `{"code":"..."}`)
- `"` (quoted code string)
- `` ``` `` (markdown code fences)
- Implemented the grammar without regex lookahead/lookbehind because the
API-side Lark regex engine does not support look-around.
- Added a unit test to validate the grammar shape and guard against
reintroducing unsupported lookaround.
## Why
`js_repl` is a freeform tool, but the model sometimes emits wrapped
payloads (JSON, quoted strings, markdown fences) instead of raw
JavaScript. We already reject those at runtime, but this change moves
the constraint into the tool grammar so the model is less likely to
generate invalid tool-call payloads in the first place.
## Testing
- `cargo test -p codex-core
js_repl_freeform_grammar_blocks_common_non_js_prefixes`
- `cargo test -p codex-core parse_freeform_args_rejects_`
## Notes
- This intentionally over-blocks a few uncommon valid JS starts (for
example top-level `{ ... }` blocks or top-level quoted directives like
`"use strict";`) in exchange for preventing the common wrapped-payload
mistakes.
#### [git stack](https://github.com/magus/git-stack-cli)
- 👉 `1` https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/12300
- ⏳ `2` https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/12275
- ⏳ `3` https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/12205
- ⏳ `4` https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/12185
- ⏳ `5` https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/10673
codex-core
This crate implements the business logic for Codex. It is designed to be used by the various Codex UIs written in Rust.
Dependencies
Note that codex-core makes some assumptions about certain helper utilities being available in the environment. Currently, this support matrix is:
macOS
Expects /usr/bin/sandbox-exec to be present.
When using the workspace-write sandbox policy, the Seatbelt profile allows
writes under the configured writable roots while keeping .git (directory or
pointer file), the resolved gitdir: target, and .codex read-only.
Network access and filesystem read/write roots are controlled by
SandboxPolicy. Seatbelt consumes the resolved policy and enforces it.
Seatbelt also supports macOS permission-profile extensions layered on top of
SandboxPolicy:
- no extension profile provided:
keeps legacy default preferences read access (
user-preference-read). - extension profile provided with no
macos_preferencesgrant: does not add preferences access clauses. macos_preferences = "readonly": enables cfprefs read clauses anduser-preference-read.macos_preferences = "readwrite": includes readonly clauses plususer-preference-writeand cfprefs shm write clauses.macos_automation = true: enables broad Apple Events send permissions.macos_automation = ["com.apple.Notes", ...]: enables Apple Events send only to listed bundle IDs.macos_accessibility = true: enablescom.apple.axservermach lookup.macos_calendar = true: enablescom.apple.CalendarAgentmach lookup.
Linux
Expects the binary containing codex-core to run the equivalent of codex sandbox linux (legacy alias: codex debug landlock) when arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.
All Platforms
Expects the binary containing codex-core to simulate the virtual apply_patch CLI when arg1 is --codex-run-as-apply-patch. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.