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iceweasel-oai 6b3d82daca Use a private desktop for Windows sandbox instead of Winsta0\Default (#14400 )

## Summary
- launch Windows sandboxed children on a private desktop instead of
`Winsta0\Default`
- make private desktop the default while keeping
`windows.sandbox_private_desktop=false` as the escape hatch
- centralize process launch through the shared
`create_process_as_user(...)` path
- scope the private desktop ACL to the launching logon SID

## Why
Today sandboxed Windows commands run on the visible shared desktop. That
leaves an avoidable same-desktop attack surface for window interaction,
spoofing, and related UI/input issues. This change moves sandboxed
commands onto a dedicated per-launch desktop by default so the sandbox
no longer shares `Winsta0\Default` with the user session.

The implementation stays conservative on security with no silent
fallback back to `Winsta0\Default`

If private-desktop setup fails on a machine, users can still opt out
explicitly with `windows.sandbox_private_desktop=false`.

## Validation
- `cargo build -p codex-cli`
- elevated-path `codex exec` desktop-name probe returned
`CodexSandboxDesktop-*`
- elevated-path `codex exec` smoke sweep for shell commands, nested
`pwsh`, jobs, and hidden `notepad` launch
- unelevated-path full private-desktop compatibility sweep via `codex
exec` with `-c windows.sandbox=unelevated`

6b3d82daca · 2026-03-13 10:13:39 -07:00

History

src

Use a private desktop for Windows sandbox instead of Winsta0\Default (#14400 )

2026-03-13 10:13:39 -07:00

templates

Update tool search prompts (#14500 )

2026-03-12 14:28:51 -07:00

tests

Use a private desktop for Windows sandbox instead of Winsta0\Default (#14400 )

2026-03-13 10:13:39 -07:00

BUILD.bazel

fix(ci): restore guardian coverage and bazel unit tests (#13912 )

2026-03-08 12:05:19 -07:00

Cargo.toml

[apps] Add tool_suggest tool. (#14287 )

2026-03-11 22:06:59 -07:00

config.schema.json

Use a private desktop for Windows sandbox instead of Winsta0\Default (#14400 )

2026-03-13 10:13:39 -07:00

gpt_5_1_prompt.md

Assemble sandbox/approval/network prompts dynamically (#8961 )

2026-01-12 23:12:59 +00:00

gpt_5_2_prompt.md

Assemble sandbox/approval/network prompts dynamically (#8961 )

2026-01-12 23:12:59 +00:00

gpt_5_codex_prompt.md

Assemble sandbox/approval/network prompts dynamically (#8961 )

2026-01-12 23:12:59 +00:00

gpt-5.1-codex-max_prompt.md

Assemble sandbox/approval/network prompts dynamically (#8961 )

2026-01-12 23:12:59 +00:00

gpt-5.2-codex_prompt.md

Assemble sandbox/approval/network prompts dynamically (#8961 )

2026-01-12 23:12:59 +00:00

hierarchical_agents_message.md

Add hierarchical agent prompt (#8996 )

2026-01-09 13:47:37 -08:00

models.json

Update models.json (#13617 )

2026-03-05 16:22:39 -08:00

prompt_with_apply_patch_instructions.md

Assemble sandbox/approval/network prompts dynamically (#8961 )

2026-01-12 23:12:59 +00:00

prompt.md

Assemble sandbox/approval/network prompts dynamically (#8961 )

2026-01-12 23:12:59 +00:00

README.md

fix: reopen writable linux carveouts under denied parents (#14514 )

2026-03-13 01:36:06 +00:00

review_prompt.md

docs: Fix markdown list item spacing in codex-rs/core/review_prompt.md (#4144 )

2025-10-30 17:39:21 -07:00

README.md

codex-core

This crate implements the business logic for Codex. It is designed to be used by the various Codex UIs written in Rust.

Dependencies

Note that codex-core makes some assumptions about certain helper utilities being available in the environment. Currently, this support matrix is:

macOS

Expects /usr/bin/sandbox-exec to be present.

When using the workspace-write sandbox policy, the Seatbelt profile allows writes under the configured writable roots while keeping .git (directory or pointer file), the resolved gitdir: target, and .codex read-only.

Network access and filesystem read/write roots are controlled by SandboxPolicy. Seatbelt consumes the resolved policy and enforces it.

Seatbelt also supports macOS permission-profile extensions layered on top of SandboxPolicy:

no extension profile provided: keeps legacy default preferences read access (user-preference-read).
extension profile provided with no macos_preferences grant: does not add preferences access clauses.
macos_preferences = "readonly": enables cfprefs read clauses and user-preference-read.
macos_preferences = "readwrite": includes readonly clauses plus user-preference-write and cfprefs shm write clauses.
macos_automation = true: enables broad Apple Events send permissions.
macos_automation = ["com.apple.Notes", ...]: enables Apple Events send only to listed bundle IDs.
macos_launch_services = true: enables LaunchServices lookups and open/launch operations.
macos_accessibility = true: enables com.apple.axserver mach lookup.
macos_calendar = true: enables com.apple.CalendarAgent mach lookup.
macos_contacts = "read_only": enables Address Book read access and Contacts read services.
macos_contacts = "read_write": includes the readonly Contacts clauses plus Address Book writes and keychain/temp helpers required for writes.

Linux

Expects the binary containing codex-core to run the equivalent of codex sandbox linux (legacy alias: codex debug landlock) when arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.

Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on Linux. They can continue to use the legacy Landlock path when the split filesystem policy is sandbox-equivalent to the legacy model after cwd resolution.

Split filesystem policies that need direct FileSystemSandboxPolicy enforcement, such as read-only or denied carveouts under a broader writable root, automatically route through bubblewrap. The legacy Landlock path is used only when the split filesystem policy round-trips through the legacy SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics. That includes overlapping cases like /repo = write, /repo/a = none, /repo/a/b = write, where the more specific writable child must reopen under a denied parent.

All Platforms

Expects the binary containing codex-core to simulate the virtual apply_patch CLI when arg1 is --codex-run-as-apply-patch. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.