Michael BolinandGitHub
6a673e7339
## Why [#12964](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/12964) added `host_executable()` support to `codex-execpolicy`, and [#13046](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/13046) adopted it in the zsh-fork interception path. The remaining gap was the preflight execpolicy check in `core/src/exec_policy.rs`. That path derives approval requirements before execution for `shell`, `shell_command`, and `unified_exec`, but it was still using the default exact-token matcher. As a result, a command that already included an absolute executable path, such as `/usr/bin/git status`, could still miss a basename rule like `prefix_rule(pattern = ["git"], ...)` during preflight even when the policy also defined a matching `host_executable(name = "git", ...)` entry. This PR brings the same opt-in `host_executable()` resolution to the preflight approval path when an absolute program path is already present in the parsed command. ## What Changed - updated `ExecPolicyManager::create_exec_approval_requirement_for_command()` in `core/src/exec_policy.rs` to use `check_multiple_with_options(...)` with `MatchOptions { resolve_host_executables: true }` - kept the existing shell parsing flow for approval derivation, but now allow basename rules to match absolute executable paths during preflight when `host_executable()` permits it - updated requested-prefix amendment evaluation to use the same host-executable-aware matching mode, so suggested `prefix_rule()` amendments are checked consistently for absolute-path commands - added preflight coverage for: - absolute-path commands that should match basename rules through `host_executable()` - absolute-path commands whose paths are not in the allowed `host_executable()` mapping - requested prefix-rule amendments for absolute-path commands ## Verification - `just fix -p codex-core` - `cargo test -p codex-core --lib exec_policy::tests::`
codex-core
This crate implements the business logic for Codex. It is designed to be used by the various Codex UIs written in Rust.
Dependencies
Note that codex-core makes some assumptions about certain helper utilities being available in the environment. Currently, this support matrix is:
macOS
Expects /usr/bin/sandbox-exec to be present.
When using the workspace-write sandbox policy, the Seatbelt profile allows
writes under the configured writable roots while keeping .git (directory or
pointer file), the resolved gitdir: target, and .codex read-only.
Network access and filesystem read/write roots are controlled by
SandboxPolicy. Seatbelt consumes the resolved policy and enforces it.
Seatbelt also supports macOS permission-profile extensions layered on top of
SandboxPolicy:
- no extension profile provided:
keeps legacy default preferences read access (
user-preference-read). - extension profile provided with no
macos_preferencesgrant: does not add preferences access clauses. macos_preferences = "readonly": enables cfprefs read clauses anduser-preference-read.macos_preferences = "readwrite": includes readonly clauses plususer-preference-writeand cfprefs shm write clauses.macos_automation = true: enables broad Apple Events send permissions.macos_automation = ["com.apple.Notes", ...]: enables Apple Events send only to listed bundle IDs.macos_accessibility = true: enablescom.apple.axservermach lookup.macos_calendar = true: enablescom.apple.CalendarAgentmach lookup.
Linux
Expects the binary containing codex-core to run the equivalent of codex sandbox linux (legacy alias: codex debug landlock) when arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.
All Platforms
Expects the binary containing codex-core to simulate the virtual apply_patch CLI when arg1 is --codex-run-as-apply-patch. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.