jif
5b22a8e5b1
## Why
Multi-agent v2 messages need a consistent, model-visible envelope that
identifies what kind of interaction occurred, who sent it, and which
agent it targets. Previously, encrypted deliveries exposed only
`encrypted_content`, while child completion used the legacy
`<subagent_notification>` shape. That meant the client could not
consistently present `NEW_TASK`, `MESSAGE`, and `FINAL_ANSWER` using the
same format.
This change adds the routing envelope as plaintext while keeping task
and message payloads encrypted. No new Responses API field is required:
an encrypted delivery is represented as an `input_text` header
immediately followed by its existing `encrypted_content` item.
Every envelope now follows this shape:
```text
Message Type: <NEW_TASK | MESSAGE | FINAL_ANSWER>
Task name: <recipient agent path>
Sender: <author agent path>
Payload:
<message payload>
```
## Message types
### `NEW_TASK`
`NEW_TASK` is used when the recipient should begin a new turn, including
an initial `spawn_agent` task and a later `followup_task`.
For a root agent spawning `/root/worker`, the request contains a
plaintext envelope followed by the encrypted task:
```json
{
"type": "agent_message",
"author": "/root",
"recipient": "/root/worker",
"content": [
{
"type": "input_text",
"text": "Message Type: NEW_TASK\nTask name: /root/worker\nSender: /root\nPayload:\n"
},
{
"type": "encrypted_content",
"encrypted_content": "<encrypted task payload>"
}
]
}
```
Conceptually, the model receives:
```text
Message Type: NEW_TASK
Task name: /root/worker
Sender: /root
Payload:
Review the authentication changes and report any regressions.
```
### `MESSAGE`
`MESSAGE` is used for a queued `send_message` delivery. It communicates
with an existing agent without starting a new turn.
For `/root/worker` reporting progress to the root agent, the request
contains:
```json
{
"type": "agent_message",
"author": "/root/worker",
"recipient": "/root",
"content": [
{
"type": "input_text",
"text": "Message Type: MESSAGE\nTask name: /root\nSender: /root/worker\nPayload:\n"
},
{
"type": "encrypted_content",
"encrypted_content": "<encrypted message payload>"
}
]
}
```
Conceptually, the model receives:
```text
Message Type: MESSAGE
Task name: /root
Sender: /root/worker
Payload:
The protocol tests pass; I am checking the resume path now.
```
### `FINAL_ANSWER`
`FINAL_ANSWER` is emitted when a child agent reaches a terminal state
and reports its result to its parent. Completion payloads are already
available locally, so the complete envelope is represented as plaintext
rather than as a plaintext header plus encrypted content.
For `/root/worker` completing work for the root agent, the request
contains:
```json
{
"type": "agent_message",
"author": "/root/worker",
"recipient": "/root",
"content": [
{
"type": "input_text",
"text": "Message Type: FINAL_ANSWER\nTask name: /root\nSender: /root/worker\nPayload:\nNo regressions found."
}
]
}
```
The model-visible form is:
```text
Message Type: FINAL_ANSWER
Task name: /root
Sender: /root/worker
Payload:
No regressions found.
```
Errored, shut down, and missing agents also use `FINAL_ANSWER`, with a
terminal-status description in the payload.
## What changed
- Render `NEW_TASK` or `MESSAGE` in
`InterAgentCommunication::to_model_input_item`, based on whether the
encrypted delivery starts a turn.
- Replace the multi-agent v2 `<subagent_notification>` completion
payload with a model-visible `FINAL_ANSWER` envelope.
- Document `Task name`, `Sender`, and `Payload` consistently in the
multi-agent developer instructions.
- Prevent local-only history projections from treating an encrypted
message's plaintext header as the complete assistant message.
- Preserve rollout-trace interaction edges when an agent message
contains both plaintext and encrypted content.
Legacy multi-agent behavior remains unchanged.
## Verification
- `just test -p codex-protocol`
- `just test -p codex-rollout-trace`
- `just test -p codex-web-search-extension`
- `just test -p codex-core
encrypted_multi_agent_v2_spawn_sends_agent_message_to_child`
- `just test -p codex-core
plaintext_multi_agent_v2_completion_sends_agent_message`
- `just test -p codex-core
multi_agent_v2_followup_task_completion_notifies_parent_on_every_turn`
- `just test -p codex-core
multi_agent_v2_completion_queues_message_for_direct_parent`
codex-core
This crate implements the business logic for Codex. It is designed to be used by the various Codex UIs written in Rust.
Wine-exec integration tests
On x86-64 Linux, run the shared suite against the Windows exec server with
bazel test //codex-rs/core:core-all-wine-exec-test. Temporary blockers use a
source-local skip_if_wine_exec! call and reason.
Dependencies
Note that codex-core makes some assumptions about certain helper utilities being available in the environment. Currently, this support matrix is:
macOS
Expects /usr/bin/sandbox-exec to be present.
When using the workspace-write sandbox policy, the Seatbelt profile allows
writes under the configured writable roots while keeping .git (directory or
pointer file), the resolved gitdir: target, and .codex read-only.
Network access and filesystem read/write roots are controlled by
SandboxPolicy. Seatbelt consumes the resolved policy and enforces it.
Seatbelt also keeps the legacy default preferences read access
(user-preference-read) needed for cfprefs-backed macOS behavior.
Linux
Expects the binary containing codex-core to run the equivalent of codex sandbox when arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.
Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on Linux.
They can continue to use the legacy Landlock path when the split filesystem
policy is sandbox-equivalent to the legacy model after cwd resolution.
Split filesystem policies that need direct FileSystemSandboxPolicy
enforcement, such as read-only or denied carveouts under a broader writable
root, automatically route through bubblewrap. The legacy Landlock path is used
only when the split filesystem policy round-trips through the legacy
SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics. That includes overlapping
cases like /repo = write, /repo/a = none, /repo/a/b = write, where the
more specific writable child must reopen under a denied parent.
The Linux sandbox helper prefers the first bwrap found on PATH outside the
current working directory whenever it is available. If bwrap is present but
too old to support --argv0, the helper keeps using system bubblewrap and
switches to a no---argv0 compatibility path for the inner re-exec. If
bwrap is missing, it falls back to the bundled codex-resources/bwrap
binary shipped with Codex and Codex surfaces a startup warning through its
normal notification path instead of printing directly from the sandbox helper.
Codex also surfaces a startup warning when bubblewrap cannot create user
namespaces. WSL2 uses the normal Linux bubblewrap path. WSL1 is not supported
for bubblewrap sandboxing because it cannot create the required user
namespaces, so Codex rejects sandboxed shell commands that would enter the
bubblewrap path before invoking bwrap.
Windows
Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on
Windows. Legacy read-only and workspace-write policies imply full
filesystem read access; exact readable roots are represented by split
filesystem policies instead.
The elevated Windows sandbox also supports:
- legacy
ReadOnlyandWorkspaceWritebehavior - split filesystem policies that need exact readable roots, exact writable roots, or extra read-only carveouts under writable roots
- backend-managed system read roots required for basic execution, such as
C:\Windows,C:\Program Files,C:\Program Files (x86), andC:\ProgramData, when a split filesystem policy requests platform defaults
The unelevated restricted-token backend still supports the legacy full-read
Windows model for legacy ReadOnly and WorkspaceWrite behavior. It also
supports a narrow split-filesystem subset: full-read split policies whose
writable roots still match the legacy WorkspaceWrite root set, but add extra
read-only carveouts under those writable roots.
New [permissions] / split filesystem policies remain supported on Windows
only when they can be enforced directly by the selected Windows backend or
round-trip through the legacy SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics.
Policies that would require direct explicit unreadable carveouts (none) or
reopened writable descendants under read-only carveouts still fail closed
instead of running with weaker enforcement.
All Platforms
Expects the binary containing codex-core to simulate the virtual
apply_patch CLI when arg1 is --codex-run-as-apply-patch. See the
codex-arg0 crate for details.