Files
codex/codex-rs/process-hardening/src/lib.rs
T
5860481bc4 Fix FreeBSD/OpenBSD builds: target-specific keyring features and BSD hardening (#6680)
## Summary
Builds on FreeBSD and OpenBSD were failing due to globally enabled
Linux-specific keyring features and hardening code paths not gated by
OS. This PR scopes keyring native backends to the
appropriate targets, disables default features at the workspace root,
and adds a BSD-specific hardening function. Linux/macOS/Windows behavior
remains unchanged, while FreeBSD/OpenBSD
  now build and run with a supported backend.

## Key Changes

  - Keyring features:
- Disable keyring default features at the workspace root to avoid
pulling Linux backends on non-Linux.
- Move native backend features into target-specific sections in the
affected crates:
          - Linux: linux-native-async-persistent
          - macOS: apple-native
          - Windows: windows-native
          - FreeBSD/OpenBSD: sync-secret-service
  - Process hardening:
      - Add pre_main_hardening_bsd() for FreeBSD/OpenBSD, applying:
          - Set RLIMIT_CORE to 0
          - Clear LD_* environment variables
- Simplify process-hardening Cargo deps to unconditional libc (avoid
conflicting OS fragments).
  - No changes to CODEX_SANDBOX_* behavior.

## Rationale

- Previously, enabling keyring native backends globally pulled
Linux-only features on BSD, causing build errors.
- Hardening logic was tailored for Linux/macOS; BSD builds lacked a
gated path with equivalent safeguards.
- Target-scoped features and BSD hardening make the crates portable
across these OSes without affecting existing behavior elsewhere.

## Impact by Platform

  - Linux: No functional change; backends now selected via target cfg.
  - macOS: No functional change; explicit apple-native mapping.
  - Windows: No functional change; explicit windows-native mapping.
- FreeBSD/OpenBSD: Builds succeed using sync-secret-service; BSD
hardening applied during startup.

## Testing

- Verified compilation across affected crates with target-specific
features.
- Smoke-checked that Linux/macOS/Windows feature sets remain identical
functionally after scoping.
- On BSD, confirmed keyring resolves to sync-secret-service and
hardening compiles.

## Risks / Compatibility

  - Minimal risk: only feature scoping and OS-gated additions.
- No public API changes in the crates; runtime behavior on non-BSD
platforms is preserved.
- On BSD, the new hardening clears LD_*; this is consistent with
security posture on other Unix platforms.

## Reviewer Notes

- Pay attention to target-specific sections for keyring in the affected
Cargo.toml files.
- Confirm pre_main_hardening_bsd() mirrors the safe subset of
Linux/macOS hardening without introducing Linux-only calls.
- Confirm no references to CODEX_SANDBOX_ENV_VAR or
CODEX_SANDBOX_NETWORK_DISABLED_ENV_VAR were added/modified.

## Checklist

  - Disable keyring default features at workspace root.
- Target-specific keyring features mapped per OS
(Linux/macOS/Windows/BSD).
  - Add BSD hardening (RLIMIT_CORE=0, clear LD_*).
  - Simplify process-hardening dependencies to unconditional libc.
  - No changes to sandbox env var code.
  - Formatting and linting: just fmt + just fix -p for changed crates.
  - Project tests pass for changed crates; broader suite unchanged.

---------

Co-authored-by: celia-oai <celia@openai.com>
2025-11-17 05:07:34 +00:00

146 lines
4.1 KiB
Rust

/// This is designed to be called pre-main() (using `#[ctor::ctor]`) to perform
/// various process hardening steps, such as
/// - disabling core dumps
/// - disabling ptrace attach on Linux and macOS.
/// - removing dangerous environment variables such as LD_PRELOAD and DYLD_*
pub fn pre_main_hardening() {
#[cfg(any(target_os = "linux", target_os = "android"))]
pre_main_hardening_linux();
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
pre_main_hardening_macos();
// On FreeBSD and OpenBSD, apply similar hardening to Linux/macOS:
#[cfg(any(target_os = "freebsd", target_os = "openbsd"))]
pre_main_hardening_bsd();
#[cfg(windows)]
pre_main_hardening_windows();
}
#[cfg(any(target_os = "linux", target_os = "android"))]
const PRCTL_FAILED_EXIT_CODE: i32 = 5;
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
const PTRACE_DENY_ATTACH_FAILED_EXIT_CODE: i32 = 6;
#[cfg(any(
target_os = "linux",
target_os = "android",
target_os = "macos",
target_os = "freebsd",
target_os = "openbsd"
))]
const SET_RLIMIT_CORE_FAILED_EXIT_CODE: i32 = 7;
#[cfg(any(target_os = "linux", target_os = "android"))]
pub(crate) fn pre_main_hardening_linux() {
// Disable ptrace attach / mark process non-dumpable.
let ret_code = unsafe { libc::prctl(libc::PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0) };
if ret_code != 0 {
eprintln!(
"ERROR: prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0) failed: {}",
std::io::Error::last_os_error()
);
std::process::exit(PRCTL_FAILED_EXIT_CODE);
}
// For "defense in depth," set the core file size limit to 0.
set_core_file_size_limit_to_zero();
// Official Codex releases are MUSL-linked, which means that variables such
// as LD_PRELOAD are ignored anyway, but just to be sure, clear them here.
let ld_keys: Vec<String> = std::env::vars()
.filter_map(|(key, _)| {
if key.starts_with("LD_") {
Some(key)
} else {
None
}
})
.collect();
for key in ld_keys {
unsafe {
std::env::remove_var(key);
}
}
}
#[cfg(any(target_os = "freebsd", target_os = "openbsd"))]
pub(crate) fn pre_main_hardening_bsd() {
// FreeBSD/OpenBSD: set RLIMIT_CORE to 0 and clear LD_* env vars
set_core_file_size_limit_to_zero();
let ld_keys: Vec<String> = std::env::vars()
.filter_map(|(key, _)| {
if key.starts_with("LD_") {
Some(key)
} else {
None
}
})
.collect();
for key in ld_keys {
unsafe {
std::env::remove_var(key);
}
}
}
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
pub(crate) fn pre_main_hardening_macos() {
// Prevent debuggers from attaching to this process.
let ret_code = unsafe { libc::ptrace(libc::PT_DENY_ATTACH, 0, std::ptr::null_mut(), 0) };
if ret_code == -1 {
eprintln!(
"ERROR: ptrace(PT_DENY_ATTACH) failed: {}",
std::io::Error::last_os_error()
);
std::process::exit(PTRACE_DENY_ATTACH_FAILED_EXIT_CODE);
}
// Set the core file size limit to 0 to prevent core dumps.
set_core_file_size_limit_to_zero();
// Remove all DYLD_ environment variables, which can be used to subvert
// library loading.
let dyld_keys: Vec<String> = std::env::vars()
.filter_map(|(key, _)| {
if key.starts_with("DYLD_") {
Some(key)
} else {
None
}
})
.collect();
for key in dyld_keys {
unsafe {
std::env::remove_var(key);
}
}
}
#[cfg(unix)]
fn set_core_file_size_limit_to_zero() {
let rlim = libc::rlimit {
rlim_cur: 0,
rlim_max: 0,
};
let ret_code = unsafe { libc::setrlimit(libc::RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim) };
if ret_code != 0 {
eprintln!(
"ERROR: setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE) failed: {}",
std::io::Error::last_os_error()
);
std::process::exit(SET_RLIMIT_CORE_FAILED_EXIT_CODE);
}
}
#[cfg(windows)]
pub(crate) fn pre_main_hardening_windows() {
// TODO(mbolin): Perform the appropriate configuration for Windows.
}