Files
codex/codex-rs/core/src/safety_tests.rs
T
viyatb-oai 3c76081876 Make deny canonical for filesystem permission entries (#23493)
## Why
Filesystem permission profiles used `none` for deny-read entries, which
is less direct than the action the entry actually represents. This
change makes `deny` the canonical filesystem permission spelling while
preserving compatibility for older configs that still send `none`.

## What changed
- rename `FileSystemAccessMode::None` to `Deny`
- serialize and generate schemas with `deny` as the canonical value
- retain `none` only as a legacy input alias for temporary config
compatibility
- update filesystem glob diagnostics and regression coverage to use the
canonical spelling
- refresh config and app-server schema fixtures to match the new wire
shape

## Validation
- `cargo test -p codex-protocol`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol`
- `cargo test -p codex-core config_toml_deserializes_permission_profiles
--lib`
- `cargo test -p codex-core
read_write_glob_patterns_still_reject_non_subpath_globs --lib`

Earlier in the session, a broad `cargo test -p codex-core` run reached
unrelated pre-existing failures in timing/snapshot/git-info tests under
this environment; the targeted surfaces touched by this PR passed
cleanly.
2026-05-19 11:03:47 -07:00

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use super::*;
use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
use codex_protocol::protocol::FileSystemAccessMode;
use codex_protocol::protocol::FileSystemPath;
use codex_protocol::protocol::FileSystemSandboxEntry;
use codex_protocol::protocol::FileSystemSpecialPath;
use codex_protocol::protocol::GranularApprovalConfig;
use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
use core_test_support::PathExt;
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
use tempfile::TempDir;
#[test]
fn test_writable_roots_constraint() {
// Use a temporary directory as our workspace to avoid touching
// the real current working directory.
let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let cwd = tmp.path().abs();
let parent = cwd.parent().unwrap();
// Helper to build a singleentry patch that adds a file at `p`.
let make_add_change =
|p: AbsolutePathBuf| ApplyPatchAction::new_add_for_test(&p, "".to_string());
let add_inside = make_add_change(cwd.join("inner.txt"));
let add_outside = make_add_change(parent.join("outside.txt"));
// Policy limited to the workspace only; exclude system temp roots so
// only `cwd` is writable by default.
let workspace_only_file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::workspace_write(
&[],
/*exclude_tmpdir_env_var*/ true,
/*exclude_slash_tmp*/ true,
);
assert!(is_write_patch_constrained_to_writable_paths(
&add_inside,
&workspace_only_file_system_policy,
&cwd,
));
assert!(!is_write_patch_constrained_to_writable_paths(
&add_outside,
&workspace_only_file_system_policy,
&cwd,
));
// With the parent dir explicitly added as a writable root, the
// outside write should be permitted.
let file_system_policy_with_parent = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::workspace_write(
std::slice::from_ref(&parent),
/*exclude_tmpdir_env_var*/ true,
/*exclude_slash_tmp*/ true,
);
assert!(is_write_patch_constrained_to_writable_paths(
&add_outside,
&file_system_policy_with_parent,
&cwd,
));
}
#[test]
fn external_sandbox_auto_approves_in_on_request() {
let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let cwd = tmp.path().abs();
let add_inside_path = cwd.join("inner.txt");
let add_inside = ApplyPatchAction::new_add_for_test(&add_inside_path, "".to_string());
let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::External {
network: NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled,
};
let file_system_sandbox_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::external_sandbox();
assert_eq!(
assess_patch_safety(
&add_inside,
AskForApproval::OnRequest,
&permission_profile,
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
&cwd,
WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled
),
SafetyCheck::AutoApprove {
sandbox_type: SandboxType::None,
user_explicitly_approved: false,
}
);
}
#[test]
fn granular_with_all_flags_true_matches_on_request_for_out_of_root_patch() {
let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let cwd = tmp.path().abs();
let parent = cwd.parent().unwrap();
let outside_path = parent.join("outside.txt");
let add_outside = ApplyPatchAction::new_add_for_test(&outside_path, "".to_string());
let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::workspace_write_with(
&[],
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
/*exclude_tmpdir_env_var*/ true,
/*exclude_slash_tmp*/ true,
);
let file_system_sandbox_policy = permission_profile.file_system_sandbox_policy();
assert_eq!(
assess_patch_safety(
&add_outside,
AskForApproval::OnRequest,
&permission_profile,
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
&cwd,
WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,
),
SafetyCheck::AskUser,
);
assert_eq!(
assess_patch_safety(
&add_outside,
AskForApproval::Granular(GranularApprovalConfig {
sandbox_approval: true,
rules: true,
skill_approval: true,
request_permissions: true,
mcp_elicitations: true,
}),
&permission_profile,
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
&cwd,
WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,
),
SafetyCheck::AskUser,
);
}
#[test]
fn granular_sandbox_approval_false_rejects_out_of_root_patch() {
let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let cwd = tmp.path().abs();
let parent = cwd.parent().unwrap();
let outside_path = parent.join("outside.txt");
let add_outside = ApplyPatchAction::new_add_for_test(&outside_path, "".to_string());
let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::workspace_write_with(
&[],
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
/*exclude_tmpdir_env_var*/ true,
/*exclude_slash_tmp*/ true,
);
let file_system_sandbox_policy = permission_profile.file_system_sandbox_policy();
assert_eq!(
assess_patch_safety(
&add_outside,
AskForApproval::Granular(GranularApprovalConfig {
sandbox_approval: false,
rules: true,
skill_approval: true,
request_permissions: true,
mcp_elicitations: true,
}),
&permission_profile,
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
&cwd,
WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,
),
SafetyCheck::Reject {
reason: PATCH_REJECTED_OUTSIDE_PROJECT_REASON.to_string(),
},
);
}
#[test]
fn read_only_policy_rejects_patch_with_read_only_reason() {
let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let cwd = tmp.path().abs();
let inside_path = cwd.join("inside.txt");
let action = ApplyPatchAction::new_add_for_test(&inside_path, "".to_string());
let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::read_only();
let file_system_sandbox_policy = permission_profile.file_system_sandbox_policy();
assert!(!is_write_patch_constrained_to_writable_paths(
&action,
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
&cwd,
));
assert_eq!(
assess_patch_safety(
&action,
AskForApproval::Never,
&permission_profile,
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
&cwd,
WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,
),
SafetyCheck::Reject {
reason: PATCH_REJECTED_READ_ONLY_REASON.to_string(),
},
);
}
#[test]
fn explicit_unreadable_paths_prevent_auto_approval_for_external_sandbox() {
let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let cwd = tmp.path().abs();
let blocked_path = cwd.join("blocked.txt");
let blocked_absolute = blocked_path;
let action = ApplyPatchAction::new_add_for_test(&blocked_absolute, "".to_string());
let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::External {
network: NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
};
let file_system_sandbox_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
},
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path {
path: blocked_absolute,
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Deny,
},
]);
assert!(!is_write_patch_constrained_to_writable_paths(
&action,
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
&cwd,
));
assert_eq!(
assess_patch_safety(
&action,
AskForApproval::OnRequest,
&permission_profile,
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
&cwd,
WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,
),
SafetyCheck::AskUser,
);
}
#[test]
fn explicit_read_only_subpaths_prevent_auto_approval_for_external_sandbox() {
let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let cwd = tmp.path().abs();
let blocked_path = cwd.join("docs").join("blocked.txt");
let blocked_absolute = blocked_path;
let docs_absolute = AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base("docs", &cwd);
let action = ApplyPatchAction::new_add_for_test(&blocked_absolute, "".to_string());
let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::External {
network: NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
};
let file_system_sandbox_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::project_roots(/*subpath*/ None),
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
},
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path {
path: docs_absolute,
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
},
]);
assert!(!is_write_patch_constrained_to_writable_paths(
&action,
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
&cwd,
));
assert_eq!(
assess_patch_safety(
&action,
AskForApproval::OnRequest,
&permission_profile,
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
&cwd,
WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,
),
SafetyCheck::AskUser,
);
}
#[test]
fn missing_project_dot_codex_config_requires_approval() {
let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let cwd = tmp.path().abs();
let config_path = cwd.join(".codex").join("config.toml");
let action = ApplyPatchAction::new_add_for_test(&config_path, "".to_string());
let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::workspace_write_with(
&[],
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
/*exclude_tmpdir_env_var*/ true,
/*exclude_slash_tmp*/ true,
);
let mut file_system_sandbox_policy = permission_profile.file_system_sandbox_policy();
file_system_sandbox_policy
.entries
.push(FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path {
path: cwd.join(".codex"),
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
});
assert!(!is_write_patch_constrained_to_writable_paths(
&action,
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
&cwd,
));
assert_eq!(
assess_patch_safety(
&action,
AskForApproval::OnRequest,
&permission_profile,
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
&cwd,
WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,
),
SafetyCheck::AskUser,
);
}