Michael Bolin
425fff7ad6
## Why
We need a way to auto-reject specific approval prompt categories without
switching all approvals off.
The goal is to let users independently control:
- sandbox escalation approvals,
- execpolicy `prompt` rule approvals,
- MCP elicitation prompts.
## What changed
- Added a new primary approval mode in `protocol/src/protocol.rs`:
```rust
pub enum AskForApproval {
// ...
Reject(RejectConfig),
// ...
}
pub struct RejectConfig {
pub sandbox_approval: bool,
pub rules: bool,
pub mcp_elicitations: bool,
}
```
- Wired `RejectConfig` semantics through approval paths in `core`:
- `core/src/exec_policy.rs`
- rejects rule-driven prompts when `rules = true`
- rejects sandbox/escalation prompts when `sandbox_approval = true`
- preserves rule priority when both rule and sandbox prompt conditions
are present
- `core/src/tools/sandboxing.rs`
- applies `sandbox_approval` to default exec approval decisions and
sandbox-failure retry gating
- `core/src/safety.rs`
- keeps `Reject { all false }` behavior aligned with `OnRequest` for
patch safety
- rejects out-of-root patch approvals when `sandbox_approval = true`
- `core/src/mcp_connection_manager.rs`
- auto-declines MCP elicitations when `mcp_elicitations = true`
- Ensured approval policy used by MCP elicitation flow stays in sync
with constrained session policy updates.
- Updated app-server v2 conversions and generated schema/TypeScript
artifacts for the new `Reject` shape.
## Verification
Added focused unit coverage for the new behavior in:
- `core/src/exec_policy.rs`
- `core/src/tools/sandboxing.rs`
- `core/src/mcp_connection_manager.rs`
- `core/src/safety.rs`
- `core/src/tools/runtimes/apply_patch.rs`
Key cases covered include rule-vs-sandbox prompt precedence, MCP
auto-decline behavior, and patch/sandbox retry behavior under
`RejectConfig`.
codex-core
This crate implements the business logic for Codex. It is designed to be used by the various Codex UIs written in Rust.
Dependencies
Note that codex-core makes some assumptions about certain helper utilities being available in the environment. Currently, this support matrix is:
macOS
Expects /usr/bin/sandbox-exec to be present.
When using the workspace-write sandbox policy, the Seatbelt profile allows
writes under the configured writable roots while keeping .git (directory or
pointer file), the resolved gitdir: target, and .codex read-only.
Network access and filesystem read/write roots are controlled by
SandboxPolicy. Seatbelt consumes the resolved policy and enforces it.
Seatbelt also supports macOS permission-profile extensions layered on top of
SandboxPolicy:
- no extension profile provided:
keeps legacy default preferences read access (
user-preference-read). - extension profile provided with no
macos_preferencesgrant: does not add preferences access clauses. macos_preferences = "readonly": enables cfprefs read clauses anduser-preference-read.macos_preferences = "readwrite": includes readonly clauses plususer-preference-writeand cfprefs shm write clauses.macos_automation = true: enables broad Apple Events send permissions.macos_automation = ["com.apple.Notes", ...]: enables Apple Events send only to listed bundle IDs.macos_accessibility = true: enablescom.apple.axservermach lookup.macos_calendar = true: enablescom.apple.CalendarAgentmach lookup.
Linux
Expects the binary containing codex-core to run the equivalent of codex sandbox linux (legacy alias: codex debug landlock) when arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.
All Platforms
Expects the binary containing codex-core to simulate the virtual apply_patch CLI when arg1 is --codex-run-as-apply-patch. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.