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codex/codex-rs/core/tests/suite/approvals.rs
T
Michael BolinandGitHub bc10e5b390 runtime: prepend zsh fork bin dir to PATH (#23768) 
## Why

#23756 makes packaged Codex builds include and default to the bundled
zsh fork. The important reason to put that fork's directory at the front
of `PATH` is to keep executable-level escalation working after a command
leaves the original shell and later re-enters zsh through `env`.

The expected chain is:

1. The zsh fork runs the top-level shell command.
2. That command launches another program, such as `python3`, while
inheriting the `EXEC_WRAPPER` environment and the escalation socket fd.
3. That program spawns a shell script whose shebang is `#!/usr/bin/env
zsh` rather than `#!/bin/zsh`, and it does not close the escalation fd.
4. `/usr/bin/env` resolves `zsh` through `PATH`, so it must find the
packaged zsh fork before the system zsh.
5. Commands inside that nested script are intercepted by the zsh fork
and can still request escalation from Codex.

If `PATH` resolves `zsh` to the system shell instead, the nested script
loses zsh-fork exec interception. Commands that should request
escalation can then run only in the original sandbox, or fail there,
without Codex ever receiving the approval request.

Shell snapshots make this slightly more subtle: a snapshot can restore
an older `PATH` after the child shell starts. This PR treats the zsh
fork `PATH` prepend as an explicit environment override so snapshot
wrapping preserves it.

## What Changed

- Added shared zsh-fork runtime helpers that prepend the configured zsh
executable parent directory to `PATH` without duplicate entries.
- Applied the zsh fork `PATH` prepend to both zsh-fork `shell_command`
launches and unified-exec zsh-fork launches before sandbox command
construction.
- Kept the shell-command zsh-fork backend API narrow: it derives the
configured zsh path from session services and rebuilds its sandbox
environment from `req.env`, rather than accepting a second, competing
environment map or a separately threaded bin dir.
- Kept Unix-only zsh-fork `PATH` mutation out of Windows clippy-visible
mutability.
- Added coverage for duplicate `PATH` entries, for preserving the zsh
fork prepend through shell snapshot wrapping, and for the nested
`python3` -> `#!/usr/bin/env zsh` escalation flow.

## Testing

- `just fmt`
- `just fix -p codex-core`

I left final test validation to CI after the latest review-comment
cleanup. Before that cleanup, `just test -p codex-core zsh_fork` passed
locally for the zsh-fork-focused tests.
2026-05-28 14:10:40 -07:00

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#![allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used)]
use anyhow::Context;
use anyhow::Result;
use codex_config::types::ApprovalsReviewer;
use codex_core::CodexThread;
use codex_core::config::Constrained;
use codex_core::sandboxing::SandboxPermissions;
use codex_features::Feature;
use codex_protocol::approvals::NetworkApprovalProtocol;
use codex_protocol::approvals::NetworkPolicyAmendment;
use codex_protocol::approvals::NetworkPolicyRuleAction;
use codex_protocol::protocol::ApplyPatchApprovalRequestEvent;
use codex_protocol::protocol::AskForApproval;
use codex_protocol::protocol::EventMsg;
use codex_protocol::protocol::ExecApprovalRequestEvent;
use codex_protocol::protocol::ExecPolicyAmendment;
use codex_protocol::protocol::GranularApprovalConfig;
use codex_protocol::protocol::Op;
use codex_protocol::protocol::ReviewDecision;
use codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
use codex_protocol::user_input::UserInput;
use core_test_support::managed_network_requirements_loader;
use core_test_support::responses::ev_apply_patch_custom_tool_call;
use core_test_support::responses::ev_assistant_message;
use core_test_support::responses::ev_completed;
use core_test_support::responses::ev_function_call;
use core_test_support::responses::ev_function_call_with_namespace;
use core_test_support::responses::ev_response_created;
use core_test_support::responses::mount_sse_once;
use core_test_support::responses::mount_sse_once_match;
use core_test_support::responses::sse;
use core_test_support::responses::start_mock_server;
use core_test_support::skip_if_no_network;
use core_test_support::test_codex::TestCodex;
use core_test_support::test_codex::test_codex;
use core_test_support::test_codex::turn_permission_fields;
use core_test_support::wait_for_event;
use core_test_support::wait_for_event_with_timeout;
use core_test_support::zsh_fork::build_zsh_fork_test;
use core_test_support::zsh_fork::restrictive_workspace_write_profile;
use core_test_support::zsh_fork::zsh_fork_runtime;
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
use regex_lite::Regex;
use serde_json::Value;
use serde_json::json;
use std::env;
use std::fs;
#[cfg(unix)]
use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::Duration;
use tempfile::TempDir;
use test_case::test_case;
use wiremock::Mock;
use wiremock::MockServer;
use wiremock::Request;
use wiremock::ResponseTemplate;
use wiremock::matchers::method;
use wiremock::matchers::path;
#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
enum TargetPath {
Workspace(&'static str),
OutsideWorkspace(&'static str),
}
impl TargetPath {
fn resolve_for_patch(self, test: &TestCodex) -> (PathBuf, String) {
match self {
TargetPath::Workspace(name) => {
let path = test.cwd.path().join(name);
(path, name.to_string())
}
TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace(name) => {
let path = env::current_dir()
.expect("current dir should be available")
.join(name);
(path.clone(), path.display().to_string())
}
}
}
}
#[derive(Clone)]
enum ActionKind {
WriteFile {
target: TargetPath,
content: &'static str,
},
FetchUrlNoProxy {
endpoint: &'static str,
response_body: &'static str,
},
FetchUrl {
endpoint: &'static str,
response_body: &'static str,
},
RunCommand {
command: &'static str,
},
RunCommandWithPolicy {
command: &'static str,
policy_src: &'static str,
},
RunCommandWithPrefixRule {
command: &'static str,
prefix_rule: &'static [&'static str],
},
RunUnifiedExecCommand {
command: &'static str,
justification: Option<&'static str>,
},
ApplyPatchFreeform {
target: TargetPath,
content: &'static str,
},
ApplyPatchShell {
target: TargetPath,
content: &'static str,
},
}
const DEFAULT_UNIFIED_EXEC_JUSTIFICATION: &str =
"Requires escalated permissions to bypass the sandbox in tests.";
impl ActionKind {
fn policy_src(&self) -> Option<&'static str> {
match self {
ActionKind::RunCommandWithPolicy { policy_src, .. } => Some(*policy_src),
ActionKind::WriteFile { .. }
| ActionKind::FetchUrlNoProxy { .. }
| ActionKind::FetchUrl { .. }
| ActionKind::RunCommand { .. }
| ActionKind::RunCommandWithPrefixRule { .. }
| ActionKind::RunUnifiedExecCommand { .. }
| ActionKind::ApplyPatchFreeform { .. }
| ActionKind::ApplyPatchShell { .. } => None,
}
}
async fn prepare(
&self,
test: &TestCodex,
server: &MockServer,
call_id: &str,
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions,
) -> Result<(Value, Option<String>)> {
match self {
ActionKind::WriteFile { target, content } => {
let (path, _) = target.resolve_for_patch(test);
let _ = fs::remove_file(&path);
let path_str = path.display().to_string();
let script = format!(
"from pathlib import Path; path = Path({path_str:?}); content = {content:?}; path.write_text(content, encoding='utf-8'); print(path.read_text(encoding='utf-8'), end='')",
);
let command = format!("python3 -c {script:?}");
let event = shell_event(
call_id,
&command,
/*timeout_ms*/ 5_000,
sandbox_permissions,
)?;
Ok((event, Some(command)))
}
ActionKind::FetchUrl {
endpoint,
response_body,
} => {
Mock::given(method("GET"))
.and(path(*endpoint))
.respond_with(
ResponseTemplate::new(200).set_body_string(response_body.to_string()),
)
.mount(server)
.await;
let url = format!("{}{}", server.uri(), endpoint);
let escaped_url = url.replace('\'', "\\'");
let script = format!(
"import sys\nimport urllib.request\nurl = '{escaped_url}'\ntry:\n data = urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=2).read().decode()\n print('OK:' + data.strip())\nexcept Exception as exc:\n print('ERR:' + exc.__class__.__name__)\n sys.exit(1)",
);
let command = format!("python3 -c \"{script}\"");
let event = shell_event(
call_id,
&command,
/*timeout_ms*/ 5_000,
sandbox_permissions,
)?;
Ok((event, Some(command)))
}
ActionKind::FetchUrlNoProxy {
endpoint,
response_body,
} => {
Mock::given(method("GET"))
.and(path(*endpoint))
.respond_with(
ResponseTemplate::new(200).set_body_string(response_body.to_string()),
)
.mount(server)
.await;
let url = format!("{}{}", server.uri(), endpoint);
let escaped_url = url.replace('\'', "\\'");
let script = format!(
"import sys\nimport urllib.request\nurl = '{escaped_url}'\nopener = urllib.request.build_opener(urllib.request.ProxyHandler({{}}))\ntry:\n data = opener.open(url, timeout=2).read().decode()\n print('OK:' + data.strip())\nexcept Exception as exc:\n print('ERR:' + exc.__class__.__name__)\n sys.exit(1)",
);
let command = format!("python3 -c \"{script}\"");
let event = shell_event(
call_id,
&command,
/*timeout_ms*/ 5_000,
sandbox_permissions,
)?;
Ok((event, Some(command)))
}
ActionKind::RunCommand { command } => {
// Bazel Linux runners can be heavily oversubscribed while this
// matrix runs, so avoid making scheduling latency look like an
// approval behavior failure.
let event = shell_event(
call_id,
command,
/*timeout_ms*/ 30_000,
sandbox_permissions,
)?;
Ok((event, Some(command.to_string())))
}
ActionKind::RunCommandWithPolicy { command, .. } => {
// Bazel Linux runners can be heavily oversubscribed while this
// matrix runs, so avoid making scheduling latency look like an
// approval behavior failure.
let event = shell_event(
call_id,
command,
/*timeout_ms*/ 30_000,
sandbox_permissions,
)?;
Ok((event, Some(command.to_string())))
}
ActionKind::RunCommandWithPrefixRule {
command,
prefix_rule,
} => {
let event = shell_event_with_prefix_rule(
call_id,
command,
/*timeout_ms*/ 30_000,
sandbox_permissions,
Some(prefix_rule.iter().map(|part| (*part).to_string()).collect()),
)?;
Ok((event, Some(command.to_string())))
}
ActionKind::RunUnifiedExecCommand {
command,
justification,
} => {
let event = exec_command_event(
call_id,
command,
Some(1000),
sandbox_permissions,
*justification,
)?;
Ok((event, Some(command.to_string())))
}
ActionKind::ApplyPatchFreeform { target, content } => {
let (path, patch_path) = target.resolve_for_patch(test);
let _ = fs::remove_file(&path);
let patch = build_add_file_patch(&patch_path, content);
Ok((ev_apply_patch_custom_tool_call(call_id, &patch), None))
}
ActionKind::ApplyPatchShell { target, content } => {
let (path, patch_path) = target.resolve_for_patch(test);
let _ = fs::remove_file(&path);
let patch = build_add_file_patch(&patch_path, content);
let command = shell_apply_patch_command(&patch);
// Bazel may need to launch the configured Codex helper binary
// to apply the verified patch, which can exceed the normal
// short command timeout on slower CI runners.
let timeout_ms = 30_000;
let event = shell_event(call_id, &command, timeout_ms, sandbox_permissions)?;
Ok((event, Some(command)))
}
}
}
}
fn build_add_file_patch(patch_path: &str, content: &str) -> String {
format!("*** Begin Patch\n*** Add File: {patch_path}\n+{content}\n*** End Patch\n")
}
fn shell_apply_patch_command(patch: &str) -> String {
let mut script = String::from("apply_patch <<'PATCH'\n");
script.push_str(patch);
if !patch.ends_with('\n') {
script.push('\n');
}
script.push_str("PATCH\n");
script
}
fn shell_event(
call_id: &str,
command: &str,
timeout_ms: u64,
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions,
) -> Result<Value> {
shell_event_with_prefix_rule(
call_id,
command,
timeout_ms,
sandbox_permissions,
/*prefix_rule*/ None,
)
}
fn shell_event_with_prefix_rule(
call_id: &str,
command: &str,
timeout_ms: u64,
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions,
prefix_rule: Option<Vec<String>>,
) -> Result<Value> {
let mut args = json!({
"command": command,
"timeout_ms": timeout_ms,
});
if sandbox_permissions.requests_sandbox_override() {
args["sandbox_permissions"] = json!(sandbox_permissions);
}
if let Some(prefix_rule) = prefix_rule {
args["prefix_rule"] = json!(prefix_rule);
}
let args_str = serde_json::to_string(&args)?;
Ok(ev_function_call(call_id, "shell_command", &args_str))
}
fn exec_command_event(
call_id: &str,
cmd: &str,
yield_time_ms: Option<u64>,
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions,
justification: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<Value> {
let mut args = json!({
"cmd": cmd.to_string(),
});
if let Some(yield_time_ms) = yield_time_ms {
args["yield_time_ms"] = json!(yield_time_ms);
}
if sandbox_permissions.requests_sandbox_override() {
args["sandbox_permissions"] = json!(sandbox_permissions);
let reason = justification.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_UNIFIED_EXEC_JUSTIFICATION);
args["justification"] = json!(reason);
}
let args_str = serde_json::to_string(&args)?;
Ok(ev_function_call(call_id, "exec_command", &args_str))
}
#[derive(Clone)]
enum Expectation {
FileCreated {
target: TargetPath,
content: &'static str,
},
FileCreatedNoExitCode {
target: TargetPath,
content: &'static str,
},
PatchApplied {
target: TargetPath,
content: &'static str,
},
FileNotCreated {
target: TargetPath,
message_contains: &'static [&'static str],
},
NetworkSuccess {
body_contains: &'static str,
},
NetworkSuccessNoExitCode {
body_contains: &'static str,
},
NetworkFailure {
expect_tag: &'static str,
},
CommandSuccess {
stdout_contains: &'static str,
},
CommandSuccessNoExitCode {
stdout_contains: &'static str,
},
CommandFailure {
output_contains: &'static str,
},
}
impl Expectation {
fn verify(&self, test: &TestCodex, result: &CommandResult) -> Result<()> {
match self {
Expectation::FileCreated { target, content } => {
let (path, _) = target.resolve_for_patch(test);
assert_eq!(
result.exit_code,
Some(0),
"expected successful exit for {path:?}"
);
assert!(
result.stdout.contains(content),
"stdout missing {content:?}: {}",
result.stdout
);
let file_contents = fs::read_to_string(&path)?;
assert!(
file_contents.contains(content),
"file contents missing {content:?}: {file_contents}"
);
let _ = fs::remove_file(path);
}
Expectation::FileCreatedNoExitCode { target, content } => {
let (path, _) = target.resolve_for_patch(test);
assert!(
result.exit_code.is_none() || result.exit_code == Some(0),
"expected no exit code for {path:?}",
);
assert!(
result.stdout.contains(content),
"stdout missing {content:?}: {}",
result.stdout
);
let file_contents = fs::read_to_string(&path)?;
assert!(
file_contents.contains(content),
"file contents missing {content:?}: {file_contents}"
);
let _ = fs::remove_file(path);
}
Expectation::PatchApplied { target, content } => {
let (path, _) = target.resolve_for_patch(test);
match result.exit_code {
Some(0) | None => {
if result.exit_code.is_none() {
assert!(
result.stdout.contains("Success."),
"patch output missing success indicator: {}",
result.stdout
);
}
}
Some(code) => panic!(
"expected successful patch exit for {:?}, got {code} with stdout {}",
path, result.stdout
),
}
let file_contents = fs::read_to_string(&path)?;
assert!(
file_contents.contains(content),
"patched file missing {content:?}: {file_contents}"
);
let _ = fs::remove_file(path);
}
Expectation::FileNotCreated {
target,
message_contains,
} => {
let (path, _) = target.resolve_for_patch(test);
assert_ne!(
result.exit_code,
Some(0),
"expected non-zero exit for {path:?}"
);
for needle in *message_contains {
if needle.contains('|') {
let options: Vec<&str> = needle.split('|').collect();
let matches_any =
options.iter().any(|option| result.stdout.contains(option));
assert!(
matches_any,
"stdout missing one of {options:?}: {}",
result.stdout
);
} else {
assert!(
result.stdout.contains(needle),
"stdout missing {needle:?}: {}",
result.stdout
);
}
}
assert!(
!path.exists(),
"command should not create {path:?}, but file exists"
);
}
Expectation::NetworkSuccess { body_contains } => {
assert_eq!(
result.exit_code,
Some(0),
"expected successful network exit: {}",
result.stdout
);
assert!(
result.stdout.contains("OK:"),
"stdout missing OK prefix: {}",
result.stdout
);
assert!(
result.stdout.contains(body_contains),
"stdout missing body text {body_contains:?}: {}",
result.stdout
);
}
Expectation::NetworkSuccessNoExitCode { body_contains } => {
assert!(
result.exit_code.is_none() || result.exit_code == Some(0),
"expected no exit code for successful network call: {}",
result.stdout
);
assert!(
result.stdout.contains("OK:"),
"stdout missing OK prefix: {}",
result.stdout
);
assert!(
result.stdout.contains(body_contains),
"stdout missing body text {body_contains:?}: {}",
result.stdout
);
}
Expectation::NetworkFailure { expect_tag } => {
assert_ne!(
result.exit_code,
Some(0),
"expected non-zero exit for network failure: {}",
result.stdout
);
assert!(
result.stdout.contains("ERR:"),
"stdout missing ERR prefix: {}",
result.stdout
);
assert!(
result.stdout.contains(expect_tag),
"stdout missing expected tag {expect_tag:?}: {}",
result.stdout
);
}
Expectation::CommandSuccess { stdout_contains } => {
assert_eq!(
result.exit_code,
Some(0),
"expected successful trusted command exit: {}",
result.stdout
);
assert!(
result.stdout.contains(stdout_contains),
"trusted command stdout missing {stdout_contains:?}: {}",
result.stdout
);
}
Expectation::CommandSuccessNoExitCode { stdout_contains } => {
assert!(
result.exit_code.is_none() || result.exit_code == Some(0),
"expected no exit code for trusted command: {}",
result.stdout
);
assert!(
result.stdout.contains(stdout_contains),
"trusted command stdout missing {stdout_contains:?}: {}",
result.stdout
);
}
Expectation::CommandFailure { output_contains } => {
assert_ne!(
result.exit_code,
Some(0),
"expected non-zero exit for command failure: {}",
result.stdout
);
assert!(
result.stdout.contains(output_contains),
"command failure stderr missing {output_contains:?}: {}",
result.stdout
);
}
}
Ok(())
}
}
#[derive(Clone)]
enum Outcome {
Auto,
ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision,
expected_reason: Option<&'static str>,
},
ExecApprovalWithAmendment {
decision: ReviewDecision,
expected_reason: Option<&'static str>,
expected_execpolicy_amendment: Option<&'static [&'static str]>,
},
PatchApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision,
expected_reason: Option<&'static str>,
},
}
#[derive(Clone)]
struct ScenarioSpec {
name: &'static str,
approval_policy: AskForApproval,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
action: ActionKind,
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions,
features: Vec<Feature>,
model_override: Option<&'static str>,
outcome: Outcome,
expectation: Expectation,
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
enum ScenarioGroup {
DangerFullAccess,
ReadOnly,
WorkspaceWrite,
ApplyPatch,
UnifiedExec,
}
struct CommandResult {
exit_code: Option<i64>,
stdout: String,
}
async fn submit_turn(
test: &TestCodex,
prompt: &str,
approval_policy: AskForApproval,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
) -> Result<()> {
let session_model = test.session_configured.model.clone();
test.codex
.submit(Op::UserInput {
items: vec![UserInput::Text {
text: prompt.into(),
text_elements: Vec::new(),
}],
environments: None,
final_output_json_schema: None,
responsesapi_client_metadata: None,
additional_context: Default::default(),
thread_settings: codex_protocol::protocol::ThreadSettingsOverrides {
cwd: Some(test.cwd.path().to_path_buf()),
approval_policy: Some(approval_policy),
approvals_reviewer: Some(ApprovalsReviewer::User),
sandbox_policy: Some(sandbox_policy),
collaboration_mode: Some(codex_protocol::config_types::CollaborationMode {
mode: codex_protocol::config_types::ModeKind::Default,
settings: codex_protocol::config_types::Settings {
model: session_model,
reasoning_effort: None,
developer_instructions: None,
},
}),
..Default::default()
},
})
.await?;
Ok(())
}
fn parse_result(item: &Value) -> CommandResult {
let output_str = item
.get("output")
.and_then(Value::as_str)
.expect("shell output payload");
match serde_json::from_str::<Value>(output_str) {
Ok(parsed) => {
let exit_code = parsed["metadata"]["exit_code"].as_i64();
let stdout = parsed["output"].as_str().unwrap_or_default().to_string();
CommandResult { exit_code, stdout }
}
Err(_) => {
let structured = Regex::new(r"(?s)^Exit code:\s*(-?\d+).*?Output:\n(.*)$").unwrap();
let regex =
Regex::new(r"(?s)^.*?Process exited with code (\d+)\n.*?Output:\n(.*)$").unwrap();
// parse freeform output
if let Some(captures) = structured.captures(output_str) {
let exit_code = captures.get(1).unwrap().as_str().parse::<i64>().unwrap();
let output = captures.get(2).unwrap().as_str();
CommandResult {
exit_code: Some(exit_code),
stdout: output.to_string(),
}
} else if let Some(captures) = regex.captures(output_str) {
let exit_code = captures.get(1).unwrap().as_str().parse::<i64>().unwrap();
let output = captures.get(2).unwrap().as_str();
CommandResult {
exit_code: Some(exit_code),
stdout: output.to_string(),
}
} else {
CommandResult {
exit_code: None,
stdout: output_str.to_string(),
}
}
}
}
}
async fn expect_exec_approval(
test: &TestCodex,
expected_command: &str,
) -> ExecApprovalRequestEvent {
let event = wait_for_event(&test.codex, |event| {
matches!(
event,
EventMsg::ExecApprovalRequest(_) | EventMsg::TurnComplete(_)
)
})
.await;
match event {
EventMsg::ExecApprovalRequest(approval) => {
let last_arg = approval
.command
.last()
.map(std::string::String::as_str)
.unwrap_or_default();
assert_eq!(last_arg, expected_command);
approval
}
EventMsg::TurnComplete(_) => panic!("expected approval request before completion"),
other => panic!("unexpected event: {other:?}"),
}
}
async fn expect_patch_approval(
test: &TestCodex,
expected_call_id: &str,
) -> ApplyPatchApprovalRequestEvent {
let event = wait_for_event(&test.codex, |event| {
matches!(
event,
EventMsg::ApplyPatchApprovalRequest(_) | EventMsg::TurnComplete(_)
)
})
.await;
match event {
EventMsg::ApplyPatchApprovalRequest(approval) => {
assert_eq!(approval.call_id, expected_call_id);
approval
}
EventMsg::TurnComplete(_) => panic!("expected patch approval request before completion"),
other => panic!("unexpected event: {other:?}"),
}
}
async fn wait_for_completion_without_approval(test: &TestCodex) {
let event = wait_for_event(&test.codex, |event| {
matches!(
event,
EventMsg::ExecApprovalRequest(_) | EventMsg::TurnComplete(_)
)
})
.await;
match event {
EventMsg::TurnComplete(_) => {}
EventMsg::ExecApprovalRequest(event) => {
panic!("unexpected approval request: {:?}", event.command)
}
other => panic!("unexpected event: {other:?}"),
}
}
async fn wait_for_completion(test: &TestCodex) {
wait_for_event(&test.codex, |event| {
matches!(event, EventMsg::TurnComplete(_))
})
.await;
}
fn body_contains(req: &Request, text: &str) -> bool {
let is_zstd = req
.headers
.get("content-encoding")
.and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok())
.is_some_and(|value| {
value
.split(',')
.any(|entry| entry.trim().eq_ignore_ascii_case("zstd"))
});
let bytes = if is_zstd {
zstd::stream::decode_all(std::io::Cursor::new(&req.body)).ok()
} else {
Some(req.body.clone())
};
bytes
.and_then(|body| String::from_utf8(body).ok())
.is_some_and(|body| body.contains(text))
}
async fn wait_for_spawned_thread(test: &TestCodex) -> Result<Arc<CodexThread>> {
let deadline = tokio::time::Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(2);
loop {
let ids = test.thread_manager.list_thread_ids().await;
if let Some(thread_id) = ids
.iter()
.find(|id| **id != test.session_configured.thread_id)
{
return test
.thread_manager
.get_thread(*thread_id)
.await
.map_err(anyhow::Error::from);
}
if tokio::time::Instant::now() >= deadline {
anyhow::bail!("timed out waiting for spawned thread");
}
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(10)).await;
}
}
fn scenarios() -> Vec<ScenarioSpec> {
use AskForApproval::*;
let workspace_write = |network_access| SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
};
vec![
ScenarioSpec {
name: "danger_full_access_on_request_allows_outside_write",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("dfa_on_request.txt"),
content: "danger-on-request",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.2"),
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::FileCreated {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("dfa_on_request.txt"),
content: "danger-on-request",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "danger_full_access_on_request_allows_outside_write_gpt_5_1_no_exit",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("dfa_on_request_5_1.txt"),
content: "danger-on-request",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.4"),
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::FileCreated {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("dfa_on_request_5_1.txt"),
content: "danger-on-request",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "danger_full_access_on_request_allows_network",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
action: ActionKind::FetchUrlNoProxy {
endpoint: "/dfa/network",
response_body: "danger-network-ok",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.2"),
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::NetworkSuccess {
body_contains: "danger-network-ok",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "danger_full_access_on_request_allows_network_gpt_5_1_no_exit",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
action: ActionKind::FetchUrlNoProxy {
endpoint: "/dfa/network",
response_body: "danger-network-ok",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.4"),
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::NetworkSuccessNoExitCode {
body_contains: "danger-network-ok",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "trusted_command_unless_trusted_runs_without_prompt",
approval_policy: UnlessTrusted,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
action: ActionKind::RunCommand {
command: "echo trusted-unless",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.2"),
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::CommandSuccess {
stdout_contains: "trusted-unless",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "trusted_command_unless_trusted_runs_without_prompt_gpt_5_1_no_exit",
approval_policy: UnlessTrusted,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
action: ActionKind::RunCommand {
command: "echo trusted-unless",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.4"),
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::CommandSuccessNoExitCode {
stdout_contains: "trusted-unless",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "cat_redirect_unless_trusted_requires_approval",
approval_policy: UnlessTrusted,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::RunCommand {
command: r#"cat < "hello" > /var/test.txt"#,
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.2"),
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Denied,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::CommandFailure {
output_contains: "rejected by user",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "cat_redirect_on_request_requires_approval",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::RunCommand {
command: r#"cat < "hello" > /var/test.txt"#,
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.2"),
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Denied,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::CommandFailure {
output_contains: "rejected by user",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "known_safe_escalation_on_request_requires_approval",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::RunCommand {
command: "echo known-safe-escalation",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.2"),
outcome: Outcome::ExecApprovalWithAmendment {
decision: ReviewDecision::Denied,
expected_reason: None,
expected_execpolicy_amendment: Some(&["echo", "known-safe-escalation"]),
},
expectation: Expectation::CommandFailure {
output_contains: "rejected by user",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "known_safe_escalation_granular_sandbox_disabled_rejects",
approval_policy: Granular(GranularApprovalConfig {
sandbox_approval: false,
rules: true,
skill_approval: true,
request_permissions: true,
mcp_elicitations: true,
}),
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::RunCommand {
command: "echo known-safe-escalation-granular-disabled",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.2"),
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::CommandFailure {
output_contains: "you should not ask for escalated permissions",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "cat_heredoc_file_redirect_prefix_rule_requires_escalation_approval",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::RunCommandWithPrefixRule {
command: r#"cat <<'EOF' > /tmp/out.txt
hello
EOF"#,
prefix_rule: &["cat"],
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.2"),
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Denied,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::CommandFailure {
output_contains: "rejected by user",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "cat_heredoc_variable_assignment_policy_requires_escalation_approval",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::RunCommandWithPolicy {
command: r#"PATH=/tmp/evil:$PATH cat <<'EOF'
hello
EOF"#,
policy_src: r#"prefix_rule(pattern=["cat"], decision="allow")"#,
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.2"),
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Denied,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::CommandFailure {
output_contains: "rejected by user",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "python_heredoc_requested_prefix_rule_omits_amendment",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::RunCommandWithPrefixRule {
command: r#"python3 <<'PY'
print('hello')
PY"#,
prefix_rule: &["python3"],
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.2"),
outcome: Outcome::ExecApprovalWithAmendment {
decision: ReviewDecision::Denied,
expected_reason: None,
expected_execpolicy_amendment: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::CommandFailure {
output_contains: "rejected by user",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "danger_full_access_on_failure_allows_outside_write",
approval_policy: OnFailure,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("dfa_on_failure.txt"),
content: "danger-on-failure",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.2"),
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::FileCreated {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("dfa_on_failure.txt"),
content: "danger-on-failure",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "danger_full_access_on_failure_allows_outside_write_gpt_5_1_no_exit",
approval_policy: OnFailure,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("dfa_on_failure_5_1.txt"),
content: "danger-on-failure",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.4"),
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::FileCreatedNoExitCode {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("dfa_on_failure_5_1.txt"),
content: "danger-on-failure",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "danger_full_access_unless_trusted_requests_approval",
approval_policy: UnlessTrusted,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("dfa_unless_trusted.txt"),
content: "danger-unless-trusted",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.2"),
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::FileCreated {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("dfa_unless_trusted.txt"),
content: "danger-unless-trusted",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "danger_full_access_unless_trusted_requests_approval_gpt_5_1_no_exit",
approval_policy: UnlessTrusted,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("dfa_unless_trusted_5_1.txt"),
content: "danger-unless-trusted",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.4"),
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::FileCreatedNoExitCode {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("dfa_unless_trusted_5_1.txt"),
content: "danger-unless-trusted",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "danger_full_access_never_allows_outside_write",
approval_policy: Never,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("dfa_never.txt"),
content: "danger-never",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.2"),
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::FileCreated {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("dfa_never.txt"),
content: "danger-never",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "danger_full_access_never_allows_outside_write_gpt_5_1_no_exit",
approval_policy: Never,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("dfa_never_5_1.txt"),
content: "danger-never",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.4"),
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::FileCreatedNoExitCode {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("dfa_never_5_1.txt"),
content: "danger-never",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "read_only_on_request_requires_approval",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("ro_on_request.txt"),
content: "read-only-approval",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.2"),
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::FileCreated {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("ro_on_request.txt"),
content: "read-only-approval",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "read_only_on_request_requires_approval_gpt_5_1_no_exit",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("ro_on_request_5_1.txt"),
content: "read-only-approval",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.4"),
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::FileCreatedNoExitCode {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("ro_on_request_5_1.txt"),
content: "read-only-approval",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "trusted_command_on_request_read_only_runs_without_prompt",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
action: ActionKind::RunCommand {
command: "echo trusted-read-only",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.2"),
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::CommandSuccess {
stdout_contains: "trusted-read-only",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "trusted_command_on_request_read_only_runs_without_prompt_gpt_5_1_no_exit",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
action: ActionKind::RunCommand {
command: "echo trusted-read-only",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.4"),
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::CommandSuccessNoExitCode {
stdout_contains: "trusted-read-only",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "read_only_on_request_blocks_network",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
action: ActionKind::FetchUrl {
endpoint: "/ro/network-blocked",
response_body: "should-not-see",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: None,
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::NetworkFailure { expect_tag: "ERR:" },
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "read_only_on_request_denied_blocks_execution",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("ro_on_request_denied.txt"),
content: "should-not-write",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,
features: vec![],
model_override: None,
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Denied,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::FileNotCreated {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("ro_on_request_denied.txt"),
message_contains: &["exec command rejected by user"],
},
},
#[cfg(not(target_os = "linux"))] // TODO (pakrym): figure out why linux behaves differently
ScenarioSpec {
name: "read_only_on_failure_escalates_after_sandbox_error",
approval_policy: OnFailure,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("ro_on_failure.txt"),
content: "read-only-on-failure",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.2"),
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
expected_reason: Some("command failed; retry without sandbox?"),
},
expectation: Expectation::FileCreated {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("ro_on_failure.txt"),
content: "read-only-on-failure",
},
},
#[cfg(not(target_os = "linux"))]
ScenarioSpec {
name: "read_only_on_failure_escalates_after_sandbox_error_gpt_5_1_no_exit",
approval_policy: OnFailure,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("ro_on_failure_5_1.txt"),
content: "read-only-on-failure",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.4"),
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
expected_reason: Some("command failed; retry without sandbox?"),
},
expectation: Expectation::FileCreatedNoExitCode {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("ro_on_failure_5_1.txt"),
content: "read-only-on-failure",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "read_only_on_request_network_escalates_when_approved",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
action: ActionKind::FetchUrl {
endpoint: "/ro/network-approved",
response_body: "read-only-network-ok",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.2"),
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::NetworkSuccess {
body_contains: "read-only-network-ok",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "read_only_on_request_network_escalates_when_approved_gpt_5_1_no_exit",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
action: ActionKind::FetchUrl {
endpoint: "/ro/network-approved",
response_body: "read-only-network-ok",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.4"),
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::NetworkSuccessNoExitCode {
body_contains: "read-only-network-ok",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "apply_patch_shell_command_requires_patch_approval",
approval_policy: UnlessTrusted,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::ApplyPatchShell {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("apply_patch_shell.txt"),
content: "shell-apply-patch",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: None,
outcome: Outcome::PatchApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::PatchApplied {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("apply_patch_shell.txt"),
content: "shell-apply-patch",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "apply_patch_freeform_auto_inside_workspace",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
action: ActionKind::ApplyPatchFreeform {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("apply_patch_freeform.txt"),
content: "freeform-apply-patch",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.4"),
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::PatchApplied {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("apply_patch_freeform.txt"),
content: "freeform-apply-patch",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "apply_patch_freeform_danger_allows_outside_workspace",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
action: ActionKind::ApplyPatchFreeform {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("apply_patch_freeform_danger.txt"),
content: "freeform-patch-danger",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.4"),
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::PatchApplied {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("apply_patch_freeform_danger.txt"),
content: "freeform-patch-danger",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "apply_patch_freeform_outside_requires_patch_approval",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::ApplyPatchFreeform {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("apply_patch_freeform_outside.txt"),
content: "freeform-patch-outside",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.4"),
outcome: Outcome::PatchApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::PatchApplied {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("apply_patch_freeform_outside.txt"),
content: "freeform-patch-outside",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "apply_patch_freeform_outside_denied_blocks_patch",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::ApplyPatchFreeform {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("apply_patch_freeform_outside_denied.txt"),
content: "freeform-patch-outside-denied",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.4"),
outcome: Outcome::PatchApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Denied,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::FileNotCreated {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("apply_patch_freeform_outside_denied.txt"),
message_contains: &["patch rejected by user"],
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "apply_patch_shell_command_outside_requires_patch_approval",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::ApplyPatchShell {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("apply_patch_shell_outside.txt"),
content: "shell-patch-outside",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: None,
outcome: Outcome::PatchApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::PatchApplied {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("apply_patch_shell_outside.txt"),
content: "shell-patch-outside",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "apply_patch_freeform_unless_trusted_requires_patch_approval",
approval_policy: UnlessTrusted,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::ApplyPatchFreeform {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("apply_patch_freeform_unless_trusted.txt"),
content: "freeform-patch-unless-trusted",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.4"),
outcome: Outcome::PatchApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::PatchApplied {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("apply_patch_freeform_unless_trusted.txt"),
content: "freeform-patch-unless-trusted",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "apply_patch_freeform_never_rejects_outside_workspace",
approval_policy: Never,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::ApplyPatchFreeform {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("apply_patch_freeform_never.txt"),
content: "freeform-patch-never",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.4"),
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::FileNotCreated {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("apply_patch_freeform_never.txt"),
message_contains: &[
"patch rejected: writing outside of the project; rejected by user approval settings",
],
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "read_only_unless_trusted_requires_approval",
approval_policy: UnlessTrusted,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("ro_unless_trusted.txt"),
content: "read-only-unless-trusted",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.2"),
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::FileCreated {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("ro_unless_trusted.txt"),
content: "read-only-unless-trusted",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "read_only_unless_trusted_requires_approval_gpt_5_1_no_exit",
approval_policy: UnlessTrusted,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("ro_unless_trusted_5_1.txt"),
content: "read-only-unless-trusted",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.4"),
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::FileCreatedNoExitCode {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("ro_unless_trusted_5_1.txt"),
content: "read-only-unless-trusted",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "read_only_never_reports_sandbox_failure",
approval_policy: Never,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("ro_never.txt"),
content: "read-only-never",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: None,
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::FileNotCreated {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("ro_never.txt"),
message_contains: if cfg!(target_os = "linux") {
&["Permission denied|Read-only file system"]
} else {
&[
"Permission denied|Operation not permitted|operation not permitted|\
Read-only file system",
]
},
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "trusted_command_never_runs_without_prompt",
approval_policy: Never,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
action: ActionKind::RunCommand {
command: "echo trusted-never",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.2"),
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::CommandSuccess {
stdout_contains: "trusted-never",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "workspace_write_on_request_allows_workspace_write",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("ww_on_request.txt"),
content: "workspace-on-request",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.2"),
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::FileCreated {
target: TargetPath::Workspace("ww_on_request.txt"),
content: "workspace-on-request",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "workspace_write_network_disabled_blocks_network",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::FetchUrl {
endpoint: "/ww/network-blocked",
response_body: "workspace-network-blocked",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: None,
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::NetworkFailure { expect_tag: "ERR:" },
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "workspace_write_on_request_requires_approval_outside_workspace",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("ww_on_request_outside.txt"),
content: "workspace-on-request-outside",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.2"),
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::FileCreated {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("ww_on_request_outside.txt"),
content: "workspace-on-request-outside",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "workspace_write_network_enabled_allows_network",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(true),
action: ActionKind::FetchUrl {
endpoint: "/ww/network-ok",
response_body: "workspace-network-ok",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.2"),
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::NetworkSuccess {
body_contains: "workspace-network-ok",
},
},
#[cfg(not(target_os = "linux"))] // TODO (pakrym): figure out why linux behaves differently
ScenarioSpec {
name: "workspace_write_on_failure_escalates_outside_workspace",
approval_policy: OnFailure,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("ww_on_failure.txt"),
content: "workspace-on-failure",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.2"),
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
expected_reason: Some("command failed; retry without sandbox?"),
},
expectation: Expectation::FileCreated {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("ww_on_failure.txt"),
content: "workspace-on-failure",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "workspace_write_unless_trusted_requires_approval_outside_workspace",
approval_policy: UnlessTrusted,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("ww_unless_trusted.txt"),
content: "workspace-unless-trusted",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.2"),
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::FileCreated {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("ww_unless_trusted.txt"),
content: "workspace-unless-trusted",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "workspace_write_never_blocks_outside_workspace",
approval_policy: Never,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::WriteFile {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("ww_never.txt"),
content: "workspace-never",
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![],
model_override: None,
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::FileNotCreated {
target: TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("ww_never.txt"),
message_contains: if cfg!(target_os = "linux") {
&["Permission denied|Read-only file system"]
} else {
&[
"Permission denied|Operation not permitted|operation not permitted|\
Read-only file system",
]
},
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "unified exec on request no approval for safe command",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
action: ActionKind::RunUnifiedExecCommand {
command: "echo \"hello unified exec\"",
justification: None,
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![Feature::UnifiedExec],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.2"),
outcome: Outcome::Auto,
expectation: Expectation::CommandSuccess {
stdout_contains: "hello unified exec",
},
},
#[cfg(not(all(target_os = "linux", target_arch = "aarch64")))]
// Linux sandbox arg0 test workaround doesn't work on ARM
ScenarioSpec {
name: "unified exec on request escalated requires approval",
approval_policy: OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
action: ActionKind::RunUnifiedExecCommand {
command: "python3 -c 'print('\"'\"'escalated unified exec'\"'\"')'",
justification: Some(DEFAULT_UNIFIED_EXEC_JUSTIFICATION),
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,
features: vec![Feature::UnifiedExec],
model_override: Some("gpt-5.2"),
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
expected_reason: Some(DEFAULT_UNIFIED_EXEC_JUSTIFICATION),
},
expectation: Expectation::CommandSuccess {
stdout_contains: "escalated unified exec",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "unified exec on request requires approval unless trusted",
approval_policy: AskForApproval::UnlessTrusted,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
action: ActionKind::RunUnifiedExecCommand {
command: "git reset --hard",
justification: None,
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
features: vec![Feature::UnifiedExec],
model_override: None,
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Denied,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::CommandFailure {
output_contains: "rejected by user",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "safe command with heredoc and redirect still requires approval",
approval_policy: AskForApproval::OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::RunUnifiedExecCommand {
command: "cat <<'EOF' > /tmp/out.txt \nhello\nEOF",
justification: None,
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,
features: vec![Feature::UnifiedExec],
model_override: None,
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Denied,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::CommandFailure {
output_contains: "rejected by user",
},
},
ScenarioSpec {
name: "compound command with one safe command still requires approval",
approval_policy: AskForApproval::OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: workspace_write(false),
action: ActionKind::RunUnifiedExecCommand {
command: "cat ./one.txt && touch ./two.txt",
justification: None,
},
sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,
features: vec![Feature::UnifiedExec],
model_override: None,
outcome: Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision: ReviewDecision::Denied,
expected_reason: None,
},
expectation: Expectation::CommandFailure {
output_contains: "rejected by user",
},
},
]
}
#[test_case(ScenarioGroup::DangerFullAccess ; "danger_full_access")]
#[test_case(ScenarioGroup::ReadOnly ; "read_only")]
#[test_case(ScenarioGroup::WorkspaceWrite ; "workspace_write")]
#[test_case(ScenarioGroup::ApplyPatch ; "apply_patch")]
#[test_case(ScenarioGroup::UnifiedExec ; "unified_exec")]
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
async fn approval_matrix_covers_group(group: ScenarioGroup) -> Result<()> {
run_scenario_group(group).await
}
async fn run_scenario_group(group: ScenarioGroup) -> Result<()> {
skip_if_no_network!(Ok(()));
let scenarios = scenarios()
.into_iter()
.filter(|scenario| scenario_group(scenario) == group)
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
assert!(!scenarios.is_empty(), "expected scenarios for {group:?}");
for scenario in scenarios {
run_scenario(&scenario)
.await
.with_context(|| format!("approval scenario failed: {}", scenario.name))?;
}
Ok(())
}
fn scenario_group(scenario: &ScenarioSpec) -> ScenarioGroup {
match &scenario.action {
ActionKind::ApplyPatchFreeform { .. } | ActionKind::ApplyPatchShell { .. } => {
ScenarioGroup::ApplyPatch
}
ActionKind::RunUnifiedExecCommand { .. } => ScenarioGroup::UnifiedExec,
ActionKind::WriteFile { .. }
| ActionKind::FetchUrlNoProxy { .. }
| ActionKind::FetchUrl { .. }
| ActionKind::RunCommand { .. }
| ActionKind::RunCommandWithPolicy { .. }
| ActionKind::RunCommandWithPrefixRule { .. } => match &scenario.sandbox_policy {
SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess => ScenarioGroup::DangerFullAccess,
SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly { .. } => ScenarioGroup::ReadOnly,
SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite { .. } => ScenarioGroup::WorkspaceWrite,
SandboxPolicy::ExternalSandbox { .. } => ScenarioGroup::WorkspaceWrite,
},
}
}
async fn run_scenario(scenario: &ScenarioSpec) -> Result<()> {
eprintln!("running approval scenario: {}", scenario.name);
let server = start_mock_server().await;
let approval_policy = scenario.approval_policy;
let sandbox_policy = scenario.sandbox_policy.clone();
let features = scenario.features.clone();
let model_override = scenario.model_override;
let model = model_override.unwrap_or("gpt-5.4");
let policy_src = scenario.action.policy_src();
let mut builder = test_codex().with_model(model).with_config(move |config| {
config.permissions.approval_policy = Constrained::allow_any(approval_policy);
config
.set_legacy_sandbox_policy(sandbox_policy.clone())
.expect("set sandbox policy");
for feature in features {
config
.features
.enable(feature)
.expect("test config should allow feature update");
}
});
if let Some(policy_src) = policy_src {
builder = builder.with_pre_build_hook(move |home| {
let rules_dir = home.join("rules");
fs::create_dir_all(&rules_dir).expect("create rules dir");
fs::write(rules_dir.join("default.rules"), policy_src).expect("write policy");
});
}
let test = builder.build(&server).await?;
let call_id = scenario.name;
let (event, expected_command) = scenario
.action
.prepare(&test, &server, call_id, scenario.sandbox_permissions)
.await?;
if let Some(command) = expected_command.as_deref() {
eprintln!("approval scenario {} command: {command}", scenario.name);
}
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-1"),
event,
ev_completed("resp-1"),
]),
)
.await;
let results_mock = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_assistant_message("msg-1", "done"),
ev_completed("resp-2"),
]),
)
.await;
submit_turn(
&test,
scenario.name,
scenario.approval_policy,
scenario.sandbox_policy.clone(),
)
.await?;
match &scenario.outcome {
Outcome::Auto => {
wait_for_completion_without_approval(&test).await;
}
Outcome::ExecApproval {
decision,
expected_reason,
} => {
let command = expected_command
.as_deref()
.expect("exec approval requires shell command");
let approval = expect_exec_approval(&test, command).await;
if let Some(expected_reason) = expected_reason {
assert_eq!(
approval.reason.as_deref(),
Some(*expected_reason),
"unexpected approval reason for {}",
scenario.name
);
}
test.codex
.submit(Op::ExecApproval {
id: approval.effective_approval_id(),
turn_id: None,
decision: decision.clone(),
})
.await?;
wait_for_completion(&test).await;
}
Outcome::ExecApprovalWithAmendment {
decision,
expected_reason,
expected_execpolicy_amendment,
} => {
let command = expected_command
.as_deref()
.expect("exec approval requires shell command");
let approval = expect_exec_approval(&test, command).await;
if let Some(expected_reason) = expected_reason {
assert_eq!(
approval.reason.as_deref(),
Some(*expected_reason),
"unexpected approval reason for {}",
scenario.name
);
}
let expected_execpolicy_amendment = expected_execpolicy_amendment.map(|command| {
ExecPolicyAmendment::new(command.iter().map(|part| (*part).to_string()).collect())
});
assert_eq!(
approval.proposed_execpolicy_amendment, expected_execpolicy_amendment,
"unexpected execpolicy amendment for {}",
scenario.name
);
test.codex
.submit(Op::ExecApproval {
id: approval.effective_approval_id(),
turn_id: None,
decision: decision.clone(),
})
.await?;
wait_for_completion(&test).await;
}
Outcome::PatchApproval {
decision,
expected_reason,
} => {
let approval = expect_patch_approval(&test, call_id).await;
if let Some(expected_reason) = expected_reason {
assert_eq!(
approval.reason.as_deref(),
Some(*expected_reason),
"unexpected patch approval reason for {}",
scenario.name
);
}
test.codex
.submit(Op::PatchApproval {
id: approval.call_id,
decision: decision.clone(),
})
.await?;
wait_for_completion(&test).await;
}
}
let output_request = results_mock.single_request();
let output_item = if matches!(scenario.action, ActionKind::ApplyPatchFreeform { .. }) {
output_request.custom_tool_call_output(call_id)
} else {
output_request.function_call_output(call_id)
};
let result = parse_result(&output_item);
eprintln!(
"approval scenario {} result: exit_code={:?} stdout={:?}",
scenario.name, result.exit_code, result.stdout
);
scenario.expectation.verify(&test, &result)?;
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
#[cfg(unix)]
async fn approving_apply_patch_for_session_skips_future_prompts_for_same_file() -> Result<()> {
skip_if_no_network!(Ok(()));
let server = start_mock_server().await;
let approval_policy = AskForApproval::OnRequest;
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
};
let sandbox_policy_for_config = sandbox_policy.clone();
let mut builder = test_codex()
.with_model("gpt-5.4")
.with_config(move |config| {
config.permissions.approval_policy = Constrained::allow_any(approval_policy);
config
.set_legacy_sandbox_policy(sandbox_policy_for_config)
.expect("set sandbox policy");
config.approvals_reviewer = ApprovalsReviewer::User;
});
let test = builder.build(&server).await?;
let target = TargetPath::OutsideWorkspace("apply_patch_allow_session.txt");
let (path, patch_path) = target.resolve_for_patch(&test);
let _path_cleanup = tempfile::TempPath::try_from_path(path.clone())?;
let _ = fs::remove_file(&path);
let patch_add = build_add_file_patch(&patch_path, "before");
let patch_update = format!(
"*** Begin Patch\n*** Update File: {patch_path}\n@@\n-before\n+after\n*** End Patch\n"
);
let call_id_1 = "apply_patch_allow_session_1";
let call_id_2 = "apply_patch_allow_session_2";
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-1"),
ev_apply_patch_custom_tool_call(call_id_1, &patch_add),
ev_completed("resp-1"),
]),
)
.await;
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_assistant_message("msg-1", "done"),
ev_completed("resp-2"),
]),
)
.await;
submit_turn(
&test,
"apply_patch allow session",
approval_policy,
sandbox_policy.clone(),
)
.await?;
let approval = expect_patch_approval(&test, call_id_1).await;
test.codex
.submit(Op::PatchApproval {
id: approval.call_id,
decision: ReviewDecision::ApprovedForSession,
})
.await?;
wait_for_completion(&test).await;
assert!(fs::read_to_string(&path)?.contains("before"));
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-3"),
ev_apply_patch_custom_tool_call(call_id_2, &patch_update),
ev_completed("resp-3"),
]),
)
.await;
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_assistant_message("msg-2", "done"),
ev_completed("resp-4"),
]),
)
.await;
submit_turn(
&test,
"apply_patch allow session followup",
approval_policy,
sandbox_policy.clone(),
)
.await?;
let event = wait_for_event(&test.codex, |event| {
matches!(
event,
EventMsg::ApplyPatchApprovalRequest(_) | EventMsg::TurnComplete(_)
)
})
.await;
match event {
EventMsg::TurnComplete(_) => {}
EventMsg::ApplyPatchApprovalRequest(event) => {
panic!("unexpected patch approval request: {:?}", event.call_id)
}
other => panic!("unexpected event: {other:?}"),
}
assert!(fs::read_to_string(&path)?.contains("after"));
let _ = fs::remove_file(path);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
#[cfg(unix)]
async fn approving_execpolicy_amendment_persists_policy_and_skips_future_prompts() -> Result<()> {
let server = start_mock_server().await;
let approval_policy = AskForApproval::UnlessTrusted;
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
let sandbox_policy_for_config = sandbox_policy.clone();
let mut builder = test_codex().with_config(move |config| {
config.permissions.approval_policy = Constrained::allow_any(approval_policy);
config
.set_legacy_sandbox_policy(sandbox_policy_for_config)
.expect("set sandbox policy");
});
let test = builder.build(&server).await?;
let allow_prefix_path = test.cwd.path().join("allow-prefix.txt");
let _ = fs::remove_file(&allow_prefix_path);
let call_id_first = "allow-prefix-first";
let (first_event, expected_command) = ActionKind::RunCommand {
command: "touch allow-prefix.txt",
}
.prepare(
&test,
&server,
call_id_first,
SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
)
.await?;
let expected_command =
expected_command.expect("execpolicy amendment scenario should produce a shell command");
let expected_execpolicy_amendment =
ExecPolicyAmendment::new(vec!["touch".to_string(), "allow-prefix.txt".to_string()]);
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-allow-prefix-1"),
first_event,
ev_completed("resp-allow-prefix-1"),
]),
)
.await;
let first_results = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_assistant_message("msg-allow-prefix-1", "done"),
ev_completed("resp-allow-prefix-2"),
]),
)
.await;
submit_turn(
&test,
"allow-prefix-first",
approval_policy,
sandbox_policy.clone(),
)
.await?;
let approval = expect_exec_approval(&test, expected_command.as_str()).await;
assert_eq!(
approval.proposed_execpolicy_amendment,
Some(expected_execpolicy_amendment.clone())
);
test.codex
.submit(Op::ExecApproval {
id: approval.effective_approval_id(),
turn_id: None,
decision: ReviewDecision::ApprovedExecpolicyAmendment {
proposed_execpolicy_amendment: expected_execpolicy_amendment.clone(),
},
})
.await?;
wait_for_completion(&test).await;
let developer_messages = first_results
.single_request()
.message_input_texts("developer");
assert!(
developer_messages
.iter()
.any(|message| message.contains(r#"["touch", "allow-prefix.txt"]"#)),
"expected developer message documenting saved rule, got: {developer_messages:?}"
);
let policy_path = test.home.path().join("rules").join("default.rules");
let policy_contents = fs::read_to_string(&policy_path)?;
assert!(
policy_contents
.contains(r#"prefix_rule(pattern=["touch", "allow-prefix.txt"], decision="allow")"#),
"unexpected policy contents: {policy_contents}"
);
let first_output = parse_result(
&first_results
.single_request()
.function_call_output(call_id_first),
);
assert_eq!(first_output.exit_code.unwrap_or(0), 0);
assert!(
first_output.stdout.is_empty(),
"unexpected stdout: {}",
first_output.stdout
);
assert_eq!(
fs::read_to_string(&allow_prefix_path)?,
"",
"unexpected file contents after first run"
);
let call_id_second = "allow-prefix-second";
let (second_event, second_command) = ActionKind::RunCommand {
command: "touch allow-prefix.txt",
}
.prepare(
&test,
&server,
call_id_second,
SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
)
.await?;
assert_eq!(second_command.as_deref(), Some(expected_command.as_str()));
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-allow-prefix-3"),
second_event,
ev_completed("resp-allow-prefix-3"),
]),
)
.await;
let second_results = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_assistant_message("msg-allow-prefix-2", "done"),
ev_completed("resp-allow-prefix-4"),
]),
)
.await;
submit_turn(
&test,
"allow-prefix-second",
approval_policy,
sandbox_policy.clone(),
)
.await?;
wait_for_completion_without_approval(&test).await;
let second_output = parse_result(
&second_results
.single_request()
.function_call_output(call_id_second),
);
assert_eq!(second_output.exit_code.unwrap_or(0), 0);
assert!(
second_output.stdout.is_empty(),
"unexpected stdout: {}",
second_output.stdout
);
assert_eq!(
fs::read_to_string(&allow_prefix_path)?,
"",
"unexpected file contents after second run"
);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
async fn spawned_subagent_execpolicy_amendment_propagates_to_parent_session() -> Result<()> {
skip_if_no_network!(Ok(()));
let server = start_mock_server().await;
let approval_policy = AskForApproval::UnlessTrusted;
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
let sandbox_policy_for_config = sandbox_policy.clone();
let mut builder = test_codex().with_config(move |config| {
config.permissions.approval_policy = Constrained::allow_any(approval_policy);
config
.set_legacy_sandbox_policy(sandbox_policy_for_config)
.expect("set sandbox policy");
config
.features
.enable(Feature::Collab)
.expect("test config should allow feature update");
});
let test = builder.build(&server).await?;
const PARENT_PROMPT: &str = "spawn a child that repeats a command";
const CHILD_PROMPT: &str = "run the same command twice";
const SPAWN_CALL_ID: &str = "spawn-child-1";
const CHILD_CALL_ID_1: &str = "child-touch-1";
const PARENT_CALL_ID_2: &str = "parent-touch-2";
let child_file = test.cwd.path().join("subagent-allow-prefix.txt");
let _ = fs::remove_file(&child_file);
let spawn_args = serde_json::to_string(&json!({
"message": CHILD_PROMPT,
}))?;
mount_sse_once_match(
&server,
|req: &Request| body_contains(req, PARENT_PROMPT),
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-parent-1"),
ev_function_call_with_namespace(
SPAWN_CALL_ID,
"multi_agent_v1",
"spawn_agent",
&spawn_args,
),
ev_completed("resp-parent-1"),
]),
)
.await;
let child_cmd_args = serde_json::to_string(&json!({
"command": "touch subagent-allow-prefix.txt",
"timeout_ms": 1_000,
"prefix_rule": ["touch", "subagent-allow-prefix.txt"],
}))?;
mount_sse_once_match(
&server,
|req: &Request| body_contains(req, CHILD_PROMPT) && !body_contains(req, SPAWN_CALL_ID),
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-child-1"),
ev_function_call(CHILD_CALL_ID_1, "shell_command", &child_cmd_args),
ev_completed("resp-child-1"),
]),
)
.await;
mount_sse_once_match(
&server,
|req: &Request| body_contains(req, CHILD_CALL_ID_1),
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-child-2"),
ev_assistant_message("msg-child-2", "child done"),
ev_completed("resp-child-2"),
]),
)
.await;
mount_sse_once_match(
&server,
|req: &Request| body_contains(req, SPAWN_CALL_ID),
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-parent-2"),
ev_assistant_message("msg-parent-2", "parent done"),
ev_completed("resp-parent-2"),
]),
)
.await;
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-parent-3"),
ev_function_call(PARENT_CALL_ID_2, "shell_command", &child_cmd_args),
ev_completed("resp-parent-3"),
]),
)
.await;
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-parent-4"),
ev_assistant_message("msg-parent-4", "parent rerun done"),
ev_completed("resp-parent-4"),
]),
)
.await;
submit_turn(
&test,
PARENT_PROMPT,
approval_policy,
sandbox_policy.clone(),
)
.await?;
let child = wait_for_spawned_thread(&test).await?;
let approval_event = wait_for_event_with_timeout(
&child,
|event| {
matches!(
event,
EventMsg::ExecApprovalRequest(_) | EventMsg::TurnComplete(_)
)
},
Duration::from_secs(2),
)
.await;
let EventMsg::ExecApprovalRequest(approval) = approval_event else {
panic!("expected child approval before completion");
};
let expected_execpolicy_amendment = ExecPolicyAmendment::new(vec![
"touch".to_string(),
"subagent-allow-prefix.txt".to_string(),
]);
assert_eq!(
approval.proposed_execpolicy_amendment,
Some(expected_execpolicy_amendment.clone())
);
child
.submit(Op::ExecApproval {
id: approval.effective_approval_id(),
turn_id: None,
decision: ReviewDecision::ApprovedExecpolicyAmendment {
proposed_execpolicy_amendment: expected_execpolicy_amendment,
},
})
.await?;
let child_event = wait_for_event_with_timeout(
&child,
|event| {
matches!(
event,
EventMsg::ExecApprovalRequest(_) | EventMsg::TurnComplete(_)
)
},
Duration::from_secs(2),
)
.await;
match child_event {
EventMsg::TurnComplete(_) => {}
EventMsg::ExecApprovalRequest(ev) => {
panic!("unexpected second child approval request: {:?}", ev.command)
}
other => panic!("unexpected event: {other:?}"),
}
assert!(
child_file.exists(),
"expected subagent command to create file"
);
fs::remove_file(&child_file)?;
assert!(
!child_file.exists(),
"expected child file to be removed before parent rerun"
);
submit_turn(
&test,
"parent reruns child command",
approval_policy,
sandbox_policy,
)
.await?;
wait_for_completion_without_approval(&test).await;
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
#[cfg(unix)]
async fn env_zsh_script_spawned_by_python_can_request_escalation_under_zsh_fork() -> Result<()> {
skip_if_no_network!(Ok(()));
let Some(runtime) = zsh_fork_runtime("zsh-fork env zsh nested escalation test")? else {
return Ok(());
};
let approval_policy = AskForApproval::OnRequest;
let permission_profile = restrictive_workspace_write_profile();
let outside_dir = tempfile::tempdir_in(std::env::current_dir()?)?;
let outside_path = outside_dir.path().join("zsh-fork-env-zsh-escalated.txt");
let outside_path_arg = shlex::try_join([outside_path.to_string_lossy().as_ref()])?;
let rules = r#"prefix_rule(pattern=["touch"], decision="prompt")"#.to_string();
let server = start_mock_server().await;
let outside_path_for_hook = outside_path.clone();
let test = build_zsh_fork_test(
&server,
runtime,
approval_policy,
permission_profile.clone(),
move |home| {
let _ = fs::remove_file(&outside_path_for_hook);
let rules_dir = home.join("rules");
fs::create_dir_all(&rules_dir).unwrap();
fs::write(rules_dir.join("default.rules"), &rules).unwrap();
},
)
.await?;
let script_path = test.cwd.path().join("runs-under-env-zsh");
fs::write(
&script_path,
format!(
"#!/usr/bin/env zsh\ntouch {outside_path_arg}\nprint -r -- nested-env-zsh-complete\n"
),
)?;
let mut script_permissions = fs::metadata(&script_path)?.permissions();
script_permissions.set_mode(0o755);
fs::set_permissions(&script_path, script_permissions)?;
let script_literal = serde_json::to_string(script_path.to_string_lossy().as_ref())?;
let python_script = format!(
"import subprocess; subprocess.run([{script_literal}], check=True, close_fds=False)"
);
let command = shlex::try_join(["python3", "-c", python_script.as_str()])?;
let call_id = "zsh-fork-env-zsh-nested-escalation";
let event = shell_event(
call_id,
&command,
/*timeout_ms*/ 30_000,
SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
)?;
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-zsh-fork-env-zsh-1"),
event,
ev_completed("resp-zsh-fork-env-zsh-1"),
]),
)
.await;
let results = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_assistant_message("msg-zsh-fork-env-zsh-1", "done"),
ev_completed("resp-zsh-fork-env-zsh-2"),
]),
)
.await;
let session_model = test.session_configured.model.clone();
let (sandbox_policy, permission_profile) =
turn_permission_fields(permission_profile, test.cwd.path());
test.codex
.submit(Op::UserInput {
items: vec![UserInput::Text {
text: "run nested env zsh script through python".into(),
text_elements: Vec::new(),
}],
environments: None,
final_output_json_schema: None,
responsesapi_client_metadata: None,
additional_context: Default::default(),
thread_settings: codex_protocol::protocol::ThreadSettingsOverrides {
cwd: Some(test.cwd.path().to_path_buf()),
approval_policy: Some(approval_policy),
approvals_reviewer: Some(ApprovalsReviewer::User),
sandbox_policy: Some(sandbox_policy),
permission_profile,
collaboration_mode: Some(codex_protocol::config_types::CollaborationMode {
mode: codex_protocol::config_types::ModeKind::Default,
settings: codex_protocol::config_types::Settings {
model: session_model,
reasoning_effort: None,
developer_instructions: None,
},
}),
..Default::default()
},
})
.await?;
let approval_event = wait_for_event_with_timeout(
&test.codex,
|event| {
matches!(
event,
EventMsg::ExecApprovalRequest(_) | EventMsg::TurnComplete(_)
)
},
Duration::from_secs(10),
)
.await;
let EventMsg::ExecApprovalRequest(approval) = approval_event else {
panic!("expected nested zsh script to request approval before completion");
};
assert!(
approval.command.iter().any(|arg| arg.ends_with("/touch"))
&& approval
.command
.iter()
.any(|arg| arg == outside_path.to_string_lossy().as_ref()),
"expected approval for nested touch command, got: {:?}",
approval.command
);
test.codex
.submit(Op::ExecApproval {
id: approval.effective_approval_id(),
turn_id: None,
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
})
.await?;
wait_for_completion(&test).await;
let result = parse_result(&results.single_request().function_call_output(call_id));
assert_eq!(
result.exit_code.unwrap_or(0),
0,
"nested env zsh script should complete successfully: {}",
result.stdout
);
assert!(
result.stdout.contains("nested-env-zsh-complete"),
"nested script did not report completion: {}",
result.stdout
);
assert!(
outside_path.exists(),
"approved nested touch should create the out-of-workspace file"
);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
#[cfg(unix)]
async fn matched_prefix_rule_runs_unsandboxed_under_zsh_fork() -> Result<()> {
skip_if_no_network!(Ok(()));
let Some(runtime) = zsh_fork_runtime("zsh-fork prefix rule unsandboxed test")? else {
return Ok(());
};
let approval_policy = AskForApproval::Never;
let permission_profile = restrictive_workspace_write_profile();
let outside_dir = tempfile::tempdir_in(std::env::current_dir()?)?;
let outside_path = outside_dir
.path()
.join("zsh-fork-prefix-rule-unsandboxed.txt");
let command = format!("touch {outside_path:?}");
let rules = r#"prefix_rule(pattern=["touch"], decision="allow")"#.to_string();
let server = start_mock_server().await;
let outside_path_for_hook = outside_path.clone();
let test = build_zsh_fork_test(
&server,
runtime,
approval_policy,
permission_profile.clone(),
move |home| {
let _ = fs::remove_file(&outside_path_for_hook);
let rules_dir = home.join("rules");
fs::create_dir_all(&rules_dir).unwrap();
fs::write(rules_dir.join("default.rules"), &rules).unwrap();
},
)
.await?;
let call_id = "zsh-fork-prefix-rule-unsandboxed";
let event = shell_event(
call_id,
&command,
/*timeout_ms*/ 1_000,
SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
)?;
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-zsh-fork-prefix-1"),
event,
ev_completed("resp-zsh-fork-prefix-1"),
]),
)
.await;
let results = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_assistant_message("msg-zsh-fork-prefix-1", "done"),
ev_completed("resp-zsh-fork-prefix-2"),
]),
)
.await;
let session_model = test.session_configured.model.clone();
let (sandbox_policy, permission_profile) =
turn_permission_fields(permission_profile, test.cwd.path());
test.codex
.submit(Op::UserInput {
items: vec![UserInput::Text {
text: "run allowed touch under zsh fork".into(),
text_elements: Vec::new(),
}],
environments: None,
final_output_json_schema: None,
responsesapi_client_metadata: None,
additional_context: Default::default(),
thread_settings: codex_protocol::protocol::ThreadSettingsOverrides {
cwd: Some(test.cwd.path().to_path_buf()),
approval_policy: Some(approval_policy),
approvals_reviewer: Some(ApprovalsReviewer::User),
sandbox_policy: Some(sandbox_policy),
permission_profile,
collaboration_mode: Some(codex_protocol::config_types::CollaborationMode {
mode: codex_protocol::config_types::ModeKind::Default,
settings: codex_protocol::config_types::Settings {
model: session_model,
reasoning_effort: None,
developer_instructions: None,
},
}),
..Default::default()
},
})
.await?;
wait_for_completion_without_approval(&test).await;
let result = parse_result(&results.single_request().function_call_output(call_id));
assert_eq!(result.exit_code.unwrap_or(0), 0);
assert!(
outside_path.exists(),
"expected matched prefix_rule to rerun touch unsandboxed; output: {}",
result.stdout
);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
#[cfg(unix)]
async fn invalid_requested_prefix_rule_falls_back_for_compound_command() -> Result<()> {
let server = start_mock_server().await;
let approval_policy = AskForApproval::OnRequest;
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
let sandbox_policy_for_config = sandbox_policy.clone();
let mut builder = test_codex().with_config(move |config| {
config.permissions.approval_policy = Constrained::allow_any(approval_policy);
config
.set_legacy_sandbox_policy(sandbox_policy_for_config)
.expect("set sandbox policy");
});
let test = builder.build(&server).await?;
let call_id = "invalid-prefix-rule";
let command =
"touch /tmp/codex-fallback-rule-test.txt && echo hello > /tmp/codex-fallback-rule-test.txt";
let event = shell_event_with_prefix_rule(
call_id,
command,
/*timeout_ms*/ 1_000,
SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,
Some(vec!["touch".to_string()]),
)?;
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-invalid-prefix-1"),
event,
ev_completed("resp-invalid-prefix-1"),
]),
)
.await;
submit_turn(
&test,
"invalid-prefix-rule",
approval_policy,
sandbox_policy.clone(),
)
.await?;
let approval = expect_exec_approval(&test, command).await;
let amendment = approval
.proposed_execpolicy_amendment
.expect("should have a proposed execpolicy amendment");
assert!(amendment.command.contains(&command.to_string()));
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
#[cfg(unix)]
async fn approving_fallback_rule_for_compound_command_works() -> Result<()> {
let server = start_mock_server().await;
let approval_policy = AskForApproval::OnRequest;
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
let sandbox_policy_for_config = sandbox_policy.clone();
let mut builder = test_codex().with_config(move |config| {
config.permissions.approval_policy = Constrained::allow_any(approval_policy);
config
.set_legacy_sandbox_policy(sandbox_policy_for_config)
.expect("set sandbox policy");
});
let test = builder.build(&server).await?;
let call_id = "invalid-prefix-rule";
let command =
"touch /tmp/codex-fallback-rule-test.txt && echo hello > /tmp/codex-fallback-rule-test.txt";
let event = shell_event_with_prefix_rule(
call_id,
command,
/*timeout_ms*/ 1_000,
SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,
Some(vec!["touch".to_string()]),
)?;
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-invalid-prefix-1"),
event,
ev_completed("resp-invalid-prefix-1"),
]),
)
.await;
submit_turn(
&test,
"invalid-prefix-rule",
approval_policy,
sandbox_policy.clone(),
)
.await?;
let approval = expect_exec_approval(&test, command).await;
let approval_id = approval.effective_approval_id();
let amendment = approval
.proposed_execpolicy_amendment
.expect("should have a proposed execpolicy amendment");
assert!(amendment.command.contains(&command.to_string()));
test.codex
.submit(Op::ExecApproval {
id: approval_id,
turn_id: None,
decision: ReviewDecision::ApprovedExecpolicyAmendment {
proposed_execpolicy_amendment: amendment.clone(),
},
})
.await?;
wait_for_completion(&test).await;
let call_id = "invalid-prefix-rule-again";
let command =
"touch /tmp/codex-fallback-rule-test.txt && echo hello > /tmp/codex-fallback-rule-test.txt";
let event = shell_event_with_prefix_rule(
call_id,
command,
/*timeout_ms*/ 1_000,
SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,
Some(vec!["touch".to_string()]),
)?;
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-invalid-prefix-1"),
event,
ev_completed("resp-invalid-prefix-1"),
]),
)
.await;
let second_results = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_assistant_message("msg-invalid-prefix-1", "done"),
ev_completed("resp-invalid-prefix-2"),
]),
)
.await;
submit_turn(
&test,
"invalid-prefix-rule",
approval_policy,
sandbox_policy.clone(),
)
.await?;
wait_for_completion_without_approval(&test).await;
let second_output = parse_result(
&second_results
.single_request()
.function_call_output(call_id),
);
assert_eq!(second_output.exit_code.unwrap_or(0), 0);
assert!(
second_output.stdout.is_empty(),
"unexpected stdout: {}",
second_output.stdout
);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
async fn denying_network_policy_amendment_persists_policy_and_skips_future_network_prompt()
-> Result<()> {
skip_if_no_network!(Ok(()));
let server = start_mock_server().await;
let home = Arc::new(TempDir::new()?);
fs::write(
home.path().join("config.toml"),
r#"default_permissions = "workspace"
[permissions.workspace.filesystem]
":minimal" = "read"
[permissions.workspace.network]
enabled = true
mode = "limited"
allow_local_binding = true
"#,
)?;
let approval_policy = AskForApproval::OnFailure;
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: true,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
};
let sandbox_policy_for_config = sandbox_policy.clone();
let mut builder = test_codex()
.with_home(home)
.with_cloud_requirements(managed_network_requirements_loader())
.with_config(move |config| {
config.permissions.approval_policy = Constrained::allow_any(approval_policy);
config
.set_legacy_sandbox_policy(sandbox_policy_for_config)
.expect("set sandbox policy");
});
let test = builder.build(&server).await?;
assert!(
test.config.managed_network_requirements_enabled(),
"expected managed network requirements to be enabled"
);
assert!(
test.config.permissions.network.is_some(),
"expected managed network proxy config to be present"
);
test.session_configured
.network_proxy
.as_ref()
.expect("expected runtime managed network proxy addresses");
let call_id_first = "allow-network-first";
// Use urllib without overriding proxy settings so managed-network sessions
// continue to exercise the env-based proxy routing path under bubblewrap.
let fetch_command = r#"python3 -c "import urllib.request; opener = urllib.request.build_opener(urllib.request.ProxyHandler()); print('OK:' + opener.open('http://codex-network-test.invalid', timeout=30).read().decode(errors='replace'))""#
.to_string();
let first_event = shell_event(
call_id_first,
&fetch_command,
/*timeout_ms*/ 30_000,
SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
)?;
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-allow-network-1"),
first_event,
ev_completed("resp-allow-network-1"),
]),
)
.await;
let first_results = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_assistant_message("msg-allow-network-1", "done"),
ev_completed("resp-allow-network-2"),
]),
)
.await;
submit_turn(
&test,
"allow-network-first",
approval_policy,
sandbox_policy.clone(),
)
.await?;
let deadline = std::time::Instant::now() + std::time::Duration::from_secs(30);
let approval = loop {
let remaining = deadline
.checked_duration_since(std::time::Instant::now())
.expect("timed out waiting for network approval request");
let event = wait_for_event_with_timeout(
&test.codex,
|event| {
matches!(
event,
EventMsg::ExecApprovalRequest(_) | EventMsg::TurnComplete(_)
)
},
remaining,
)
.await;
match event {
EventMsg::ExecApprovalRequest(approval) => {
if approval.command.first().map(std::string::String::as_str)
== Some("network-access")
{
break approval;
}
test.codex
.submit(Op::ExecApproval {
id: approval.effective_approval_id(),
turn_id: None,
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
})
.await?;
}
EventMsg::TurnComplete(_) => {
panic!("expected network approval request before completion");
}
other => panic!("unexpected event: {other:?}"),
}
};
let network_context = approval
.network_approval_context
.clone()
.expect("expected network approval context");
assert_eq!(network_context.protocol, NetworkApprovalProtocol::Http);
let expected_network_amendments = vec![
NetworkPolicyAmendment {
host: network_context.host.clone(),
action: NetworkPolicyRuleAction::Allow,
},
NetworkPolicyAmendment {
host: network_context.host.clone(),
action: NetworkPolicyRuleAction::Deny,
},
];
assert_eq!(
approval.proposed_network_policy_amendments,
Some(expected_network_amendments.clone())
);
let deny_network_amendment = expected_network_amendments
.into_iter()
.find(|amendment| amendment.action == NetworkPolicyRuleAction::Deny)
.expect("expected deny network policy amendment");
test.codex
.submit(Op::ExecApproval {
id: approval.effective_approval_id(),
turn_id: None,
decision: ReviewDecision::NetworkPolicyAmendment {
network_policy_amendment: deny_network_amendment.clone(),
},
})
.await?;
wait_for_completion(&test).await;
let policy_path = test.home.path().join("rules").join("default.rules");
let policy_contents = fs::read_to_string(&policy_path)?;
let expected_rule = format!(
r#"network_rule(host="{}", protocol="{}", decision="deny", justification="Deny {} access to {}")"#,
deny_network_amendment.host,
match network_context.protocol {
NetworkApprovalProtocol::Http => "http",
NetworkApprovalProtocol::Https => "https_connect",
NetworkApprovalProtocol::Socks5Tcp => "socks5_tcp",
NetworkApprovalProtocol::Socks5Udp => "socks5_udp",
},
match network_context.protocol {
NetworkApprovalProtocol::Http => "http",
NetworkApprovalProtocol::Https => "https_connect",
NetworkApprovalProtocol::Socks5Tcp => "socks5_tcp",
NetworkApprovalProtocol::Socks5Udp => "socks5_udp",
},
deny_network_amendment.host
);
assert!(
policy_contents.contains(&expected_rule),
"unexpected policy contents: {policy_contents}"
);
let first_output = parse_result(
&first_results
.single_request()
.function_call_output(call_id_first),
);
Expectation::CommandFailure {
output_contains: "",
}
.verify(&test, &first_output)?;
let call_id_second = "allow-network-second";
let second_event = shell_event(
call_id_second,
&fetch_command,
/*timeout_ms*/ 30_000,
SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
)?;
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-allow-network-3"),
second_event,
ev_completed("resp-allow-network-3"),
]),
)
.await;
let second_results = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_assistant_message("msg-allow-network-2", "done"),
ev_completed("resp-allow-network-4"),
]),
)
.await;
submit_turn(
&test,
"allow-network-second",
approval_policy,
sandbox_policy.clone(),
)
.await?;
let deadline = std::time::Instant::now() + std::time::Duration::from_secs(30);
loop {
let remaining = deadline
.checked_duration_since(std::time::Instant::now())
.expect("timed out waiting for second turn completion");
let event = wait_for_event_with_timeout(
&test.codex,
|event| {
matches!(
event,
EventMsg::ExecApprovalRequest(_) | EventMsg::TurnComplete(_)
)
},
remaining,
)
.await;
match event {
EventMsg::ExecApprovalRequest(approval) => {
if approval.command.first().map(std::string::String::as_str)
== Some("network-access")
{
panic!(
"unexpected network approval request: {:?}",
approval.command
);
}
test.codex
.submit(Op::ExecApproval {
id: approval.effective_approval_id(),
turn_id: None,
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
})
.await?;
}
EventMsg::TurnComplete(_) => break,
other => panic!("unexpected event: {other:?}"),
}
}
let second_output = parse_result(
&second_results
.single_request()
.function_call_output(call_id_second),
);
Expectation::CommandFailure {
output_contains: "",
}
.verify(&test, &second_output)?;
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
async fn network_approval_flow_survives_danger_full_access_session_start() -> Result<()> {
skip_if_no_network!(Ok(()));
let server = start_mock_server().await;
let home = Arc::new(TempDir::new()?);
fs::write(
home.path().join("config.toml"),
r#"default_permissions = "workspace"
[permissions.workspace.filesystem]
":minimal" = "read"
[permissions.workspace.network]
enabled = true
mode = "limited"
allow_local_binding = true
"#,
)?;
let approval_policy = AskForApproval::OnFailure;
let turn_sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: true,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
};
let mut builder = test_codex()
.with_home(home)
.with_cloud_requirements(managed_network_requirements_loader())
.with_config(move |config| {
config.permissions.approval_policy = Constrained::allow_any(approval_policy);
let cwd = config.cwd.clone();
config
.permissions
.set_legacy_sandbox_policy(SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess, cwd.as_path())
.expect("test setup should allow sandbox policy");
});
let test = builder.build(&server).await?;
assert!(
!test.config.managed_network_requirements_enabled(),
"expected managed network requirements to stay inactive in danger-full-access"
);
assert!(
test.config.permissions.network.is_some(),
"expected managed network proxy config to be present"
);
assert!(
test.session_configured.network_proxy.is_none(),
"expected session configured event to hide managed network proxy in danger-full-access"
);
let call_id = "allow-network-after-yolo";
let fetch_command = r#"python3 -c "import urllib.request; opener = urllib.request.build_opener(urllib.request.ProxyHandler()); print('OK:' + opener.open('http://codex-network-test.invalid', timeout=30).read().decode(errors='replace'))""#
.to_string();
let event = shell_event(
call_id,
&fetch_command,
/*timeout_ms*/ 30_000,
SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
)?;
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-network-after-yolo-1"),
event,
ev_completed("resp-network-after-yolo-1"),
]),
)
.await;
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_assistant_message("msg-network-after-yolo-1", "done"),
ev_completed("resp-network-after-yolo-2"),
]),
)
.await;
submit_turn(
&test,
"allow-network-after-yolo",
approval_policy,
turn_sandbox_policy,
)
.await?;
let deadline = std::time::Instant::now() + std::time::Duration::from_secs(30);
let approval = loop {
let remaining = deadline
.checked_duration_since(std::time::Instant::now())
.expect("timed out waiting for network approval request");
let event = wait_for_event_with_timeout(
&test.codex,
|event| {
matches!(
event,
EventMsg::ExecApprovalRequest(_) | EventMsg::TurnComplete(_)
)
},
remaining,
)
.await;
match event {
EventMsg::ExecApprovalRequest(approval) => {
if approval.command.first().map(std::string::String::as_str)
== Some("network-access")
{
break approval;
}
test.codex
.submit(Op::ExecApproval {
id: approval.effective_approval_id(),
turn_id: None,
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
})
.await?;
}
EventMsg::TurnComplete(_) => {
panic!("expected network approval request before completion");
}
other => panic!("unexpected event: {other:?}"),
}
};
let network_context = approval
.network_approval_context
.clone()
.expect("expected network approval context");
assert_eq!(network_context.protocol, NetworkApprovalProtocol::Http);
test.codex
.submit(Op::ExecApproval {
id: approval.effective_approval_id(),
turn_id: None,
decision: ReviewDecision::Denied,
})
.await?;
wait_for_completion(&test).await;
Ok(())
}
// todo(dylan) add ScenarioSpec support for rules
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
#[cfg(unix)]
async fn compound_command_with_one_safe_command_still_requires_approval() -> Result<()> {
skip_if_no_network!(Ok(()));
let server = start_mock_server().await;
let approval_policy = AskForApproval::UnlessTrusted;
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_workspace_write_policy();
let sandbox_policy_for_config = sandbox_policy.clone();
let mut builder = test_codex().with_config(move |config| {
config.permissions.approval_policy = Constrained::allow_any(approval_policy);
config
.set_legacy_sandbox_policy(sandbox_policy_for_config)
.expect("set sandbox policy");
});
let test = builder.build(&server).await?;
let rules_dir = test.home.path().join("rules");
fs::create_dir_all(&rules_dir)?;
fs::write(
rules_dir.join("default.rules"),
r#"prefix_rule(pattern=["touch", "allow-prefix.txt"], decision="allow")"#,
)?;
let call_id = "heredoc-with-chained-prefix";
let command = "touch ./test.txt && rm ./test.txt";
let (event, expected_command) = ActionKind::RunCommand { command }
.prepare(&test, &server, call_id, SandboxPermissions::UseDefault)
.await?;
let expected_command =
expected_command.expect("compound command should produce a shell command");
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_response_created("resp-heredoc-prefix-1"),
event,
ev_completed("resp-heredoc-prefix-1"),
]),
)
.await;
let _ = mount_sse_once(
&server,
sse(vec![
ev_assistant_message("msg-heredoc-prefix-1", "done"),
ev_completed("resp-heredoc-prefix-2"),
]),
)
.await;
submit_turn(
&test,
"compound command",
approval_policy,
sandbox_policy.clone(),
)
.await?;
let approval = expect_exec_approval(&test, expected_command.as_str()).await;
test.codex
.submit(Op::ExecApproval {
id: approval.effective_approval_id(),
turn_id: None,
decision: ReviewDecision::Denied,
})
.await?;
wait_for_completion(&test).await;
Ok(())
}
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