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3b5fe5ca35 protocol: keep root carveouts sandboxed (#13452 )

## Why

A restricted filesystem policy that grants `:root` read or write access
but also carries explicit deny entries should still behave like scoped
access with carveouts, not like unrestricted disk access.

Without that distinction, later platform backends cannot preserve
blocked subpaths under root-level permissions because the protocol layer
reports the policy as fully unrestricted.

## What changed

- taught `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` to treat root access plus explicit
deny entries as scoped access rather than full-disk access
- derived readable and writable roots from the filesystem root when root
access is combined with carveouts, while preserving the denied paths as
read-only subpaths
- added protocol coverage for root-write policies with carveouts and a
core sandboxing regression so those policies still require platform
sandboxing

## Verification

- added protocol coverage in `protocol/src/permissions.rs` and
`protocol/src/protocol.rs` for root access with explicit carveouts
- added platform-sandbox regression coverage in
`core/src/sandboxing/mod.rs`
- verified the current PR state with `just clippy`




---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/13452).
* #13453
* __->__ #13452
* #13451
* #13449
* #13448
* #13445
* #13440
* #13439

---------

Co-authored-by: viyatb-oai <viyatb@openai.com>

2026-03-07 21:15:47 -08:00

src

protocol: keep root carveouts sandboxed (#13452 )

2026-03-07 21:15:47 -08:00

templates

nit: citation prompt (#13468 )

2026-03-04 13:00:11 +00:00

tests

seatbelt: honor split filesystem sandbox policies (#13448 )

2026-03-08 00:35:19 +00:00

BUILD.bazel

[bazel] Bump rules_rs and llvm (#13366 )

2026-03-04 01:59:32 +00:00

Cargo.toml

feat: external artifacts builder (#13485 )

2026-03-04 20:22:34 +00:00

config.schema.json

Add guardian approval MVP (#13692 )

2026-03-07 05:40:10 -08:00

gpt_5_1_prompt.md

Assemble sandbox/approval/network prompts dynamically (#8961 )

2026-01-12 23:12:59 +00:00

gpt_5_2_prompt.md

Assemble sandbox/approval/network prompts dynamically (#8961 )

2026-01-12 23:12:59 +00:00

gpt_5_codex_prompt.md

Assemble sandbox/approval/network prompts dynamically (#8961 )

2026-01-12 23:12:59 +00:00

gpt-5.1-codex-max_prompt.md

Assemble sandbox/approval/network prompts dynamically (#8961 )

2026-01-12 23:12:59 +00:00

gpt-5.2-codex_prompt.md

Assemble sandbox/approval/network prompts dynamically (#8961 )

2026-01-12 23:12:59 +00:00

hierarchical_agents_message.md

Add hierarchical agent prompt (#8996 )

2026-01-09 13:47:37 -08:00

models.json

Update models.json (#13617 )

2026-03-05 16:22:39 -08:00

prompt_with_apply_patch_instructions.md

Assemble sandbox/approval/network prompts dynamically (#8961 )

2026-01-12 23:12:59 +00:00

prompt.md

Assemble sandbox/approval/network prompts dynamically (#8961 )

2026-01-12 23:12:59 +00:00

README.md

[feat] add seatbelt permission files (#11639 )

2026-02-12 23:30:22 +00:00

review_prompt.md

docs: Fix markdown list item spacing in codex-rs/core/review_prompt.md (#4144 )

2025-10-30 17:39:21 -07:00

README.md

codex-core

This crate implements the business logic for Codex. It is designed to be used by the various Codex UIs written in Rust.

Dependencies

Note that codex-core makes some assumptions about certain helper utilities being available in the environment. Currently, this support matrix is:

macOS

Expects /usr/bin/sandbox-exec to be present.

When using the workspace-write sandbox policy, the Seatbelt profile allows writes under the configured writable roots while keeping .git (directory or pointer file), the resolved gitdir: target, and .codex read-only.

Network access and filesystem read/write roots are controlled by SandboxPolicy. Seatbelt consumes the resolved policy and enforces it.

Seatbelt also supports macOS permission-profile extensions layered on top of SandboxPolicy:

no extension profile provided: keeps legacy default preferences read access (user-preference-read).
extension profile provided with no macos_preferences grant: does not add preferences access clauses.
macos_preferences = "readonly": enables cfprefs read clauses and user-preference-read.
macos_preferences = "readwrite": includes readonly clauses plus user-preference-write and cfprefs shm write clauses.
macos_automation = true: enables broad Apple Events send permissions.
macos_automation = ["com.apple.Notes", ...]: enables Apple Events send only to listed bundle IDs.
macos_accessibility = true: enables com.apple.axserver mach lookup.
macos_calendar = true: enables com.apple.CalendarAgent mach lookup.

Linux

Expects the binary containing codex-core to run the equivalent of codex sandbox linux (legacy alias: codex debug landlock) when arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.

All Platforms

Expects the binary containing codex-core to simulate the virtual apply_patch CLI when arg1 is --codex-run-as-apply-patch. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.