viyatb-oai
25fa974166
## Summary - treat `requirements.toml` `allowed_domains` and `denied_domains` as managed network baselines for the proxy - in restricted modes by default, build the effective runtime policy from the managed baseline plus user-configured allowlist and denylist entries, so common hosts can be pre-approved without blocking later user expansion - add `experimental_network.managed_allowed_domains_only = true` to pin the effective allowlist to managed entries, ignore user allowlist additions, and hard-deny non-managed domains without prompting - apply `managed_allowed_domains_only` anywhere managed network enforcement is active, including full access, while continuing to respect denied domains from all sources - add regression coverage for merged-baseline behavior, managed-only behavior, and full-access managed-only enforcement ## Behavior Assuming `requirements.toml` defines both `experimental_network.allowed_domains` and `experimental_network.denied_domains`. ### Default mode - By default, the effective allowlist is `experimental_network.allowed_domains` plus user or persisted allowlist additions. - By default, the effective denylist is `experimental_network.denied_domains` plus user or persisted denylist additions. - Allowlist misses can go through the network approval flow. - Explicit denylist hits and local or private-network blocks are still hard-denied. - When `experimental_network.managed_allowed_domains_only = true`, only managed `allowed_domains` are respected, user allowlist additions are ignored, and non-managed domains are hard-denied without prompting. - Denied domains continue to be respected from all sources. ### Full access - With managed requirements present, the effective allowlist is pinned to `experimental_network.allowed_domains`. - With managed requirements present, the effective denylist is pinned to `experimental_network.denied_domains`. - There is no allowlist-miss approval path in full access. - Explicit denylist hits are hard-denied. - `experimental_network.managed_allowed_domains_only = true` now also applies in full access, so managed-only behavior remains in effect anywhere managed network enforcement is active.
codex-core
This crate implements the business logic for Codex. It is designed to be used by the various Codex UIs written in Rust.
Dependencies
Note that codex-core makes some assumptions about certain helper utilities being available in the environment. Currently, this support matrix is:
macOS
Expects /usr/bin/sandbox-exec to be present.
When using the workspace-write sandbox policy, the Seatbelt profile allows
writes under the configured writable roots while keeping .git (directory or
pointer file), the resolved gitdir: target, and .codex read-only.
Network access and filesystem read/write roots are controlled by
SandboxPolicy. Seatbelt consumes the resolved policy and enforces it.
Seatbelt also supports macOS permission-profile extensions layered on top of
SandboxPolicy:
- no extension profile provided:
keeps legacy default preferences read access (
user-preference-read). - extension profile provided with no
macos_preferencesgrant: does not add preferences access clauses. macos_preferences = "readonly": enables cfprefs read clauses anduser-preference-read.macos_preferences = "readwrite": includes readonly clauses plususer-preference-writeand cfprefs shm write clauses.macos_automation = true: enables broad Apple Events send permissions.macos_automation = ["com.apple.Notes", ...]: enables Apple Events send only to listed bundle IDs.macos_accessibility = true: enablescom.apple.axservermach lookup.macos_calendar = true: enablescom.apple.CalendarAgentmach lookup.
Linux
Expects the binary containing codex-core to run the equivalent of codex sandbox linux (legacy alias: codex debug landlock) when arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.
All Platforms
Expects the binary containing codex-core to simulate the virtual apply_patch CLI when arg1 is --codex-run-as-apply-patch. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.