iceweasel-oai
69750a0b5a
updated Windows shell/unified_exec tool descriptions:
`exec_command`
```text
Runs a command in a PTY, returning output or a session ID for ongoing interaction.
Windows safety rules:
- Do not compose destructive filesystem commands across shells. Do not enumerate paths in PowerShell and then pass them to `cmd /c`, batch builtins, or another shell for deletion or moving. Use one shell end-to-end, prefer native PowerShell cmdlets such as `Remove-Item` / `Move-Item` with `-LiteralPath`, and avoid string-built shell commands for file operations.
- Before any recursive delete or move on Windows, verify the resolved absolute target paths stay within the intended workspace or explicitly named target directory. Never issue a recursive delete or move against a computed path if the final target has not been checked.
```
`shell`
```text
Runs a Powershell command (Windows) and returns its output. Arguments to `shell` will be passed to CreateProcessW(). Most commands should be prefixed with ["powershell.exe", "-Command"].
Examples of valid command strings:
- ls -a (show hidden): ["powershell.exe", "-Command", "Get-ChildItem -Force"]
- recursive find by name: ["powershell.exe", "-Command", "Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Filter *.py"]
- recursive grep: ["powershell.exe", "-Command", "Get-ChildItem -Path C:\\myrepo -Recurse | Select-String -Pattern 'TODO' -CaseSensitive"]
- ps aux | grep python: ["powershell.exe", "-Command", "Get-Process | Where-Object { $_.ProcessName -like '*python*' }"]
- setting an env var: ["powershell.exe", "-Command", "$env:FOO='bar'; echo $env:FOO"]
- running an inline Python script: ["powershell.exe", "-Command", "@'\nprint('Hello, world!')\n'@ | python -"]
Windows safety rules:
- Do not compose destructive filesystem commands across shells. Do not enumerate paths in PowerShell and then pass them to `cmd /c`, batch builtins, or another shell for deletion or moving. Use one shell end-to-end, prefer native PowerShell cmdlets such as `Remove-Item` / `Move-Item` with `-LiteralPath`, and avoid string-built shell commands for file operations.
- Before any recursive delete or move on Windows, verify the resolved absolute target paths stay within the intended workspace or explicitly named target directory. Never issue a recursive delete or move against a computed path if the final target has not been checked.
```
`shell_command`
```text
Runs a Powershell command (Windows) and returns its output.
Examples of valid command strings:
- ls -a (show hidden): "Get-ChildItem -Force"
- recursive find by name: "Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Filter *.py"
- recursive grep: "Get-ChildItem -Path C:\\myrepo -Recurse | Select-String -Pattern 'TODO' -CaseSensitive"
- ps aux | grep python: "Get-Process | Where-Object { $_.ProcessName -like '*python*' }"
- setting an env var: "$env:FOO='bar'; echo $env:FOO"
- running an inline Python script: "@'\nprint('Hello, world!')\n'@ | python -"
Windows safety rules:
- Do not compose destructive filesystem commands across shells. Do not enumerate paths in PowerShell and then pass them to `cmd /c`, batch builtins, or another shell for deletion or moving. Use one shell end-to-end, prefer native PowerShell cmdlets such as `Remove-Item` / `Move-Item` with `-LiteralPath`, and avoid string-built shell commands for file operations.
- Before any recursive delete or move on Windows, verify the resolved absolute target paths stay within the intended workspace or explicitly named target directory. Never issue a recursive delete or move against a computed path if the final target has not been checked.
```
codex-core
This crate implements the business logic for Codex. It is designed to be used by the various Codex UIs written in Rust.
Dependencies
Note that codex-core makes some assumptions about certain helper utilities being available in the environment. Currently, this support matrix is:
macOS
Expects /usr/bin/sandbox-exec to be present.
When using the workspace-write sandbox policy, the Seatbelt profile allows
writes under the configured writable roots while keeping .git (directory or
pointer file), the resolved gitdir: target, and .codex read-only.
Network access and filesystem read/write roots are controlled by
SandboxPolicy. Seatbelt consumes the resolved policy and enforces it.
Seatbelt also supports macOS permission-profile extensions layered on top of
SandboxPolicy:
- no extension profile provided:
keeps legacy default preferences read access (
user-preference-read). - extension profile provided with no
macos_preferencesgrant: does not add preferences access clauses. macos_preferences = "readonly": enables cfprefs read clauses anduser-preference-read.macos_preferences = "readwrite": includes readonly clauses plususer-preference-writeand cfprefs shm write clauses.macos_automation = true: enables broad Apple Events send permissions.macos_automation = ["com.apple.Notes", ...]: enables Apple Events send only to listed bundle IDs.macos_launch_services = true: enables LaunchServices lookups and open/launch operations.macos_accessibility = true: enablescom.apple.axservermach lookup.macos_calendar = true: enablescom.apple.CalendarAgentmach lookup.macos_contacts = "read_only": enables Address Book read access and Contacts read services.macos_contacts = "read_write": includes the readonly Contacts clauses plus Address Book writes and keychain/temp helpers required for writes.
Linux
Expects the binary containing codex-core to run the equivalent of codex sandbox linux (legacy alias: codex debug landlock) when arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.
Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on Linux.
They can continue to use the legacy Landlock path when the split filesystem
policy is sandbox-equivalent to the legacy model after cwd resolution.
Split filesystem policies that need direct FileSystemSandboxPolicy
enforcement, such as read-only or denied carveouts under a broader writable
root, automatically route through bubblewrap. The legacy Landlock path is used
only when the split filesystem policy round-trips through the legacy
SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics. That includes overlapping
cases like /repo = write, /repo/a = none, /repo/a/b = write, where the
more specific writable child must reopen under a denied parent.
The Linux sandbox helper prefers /usr/bin/bwrap whenever it is available and
falls back to the vendored bubblewrap path otherwise. When /usr/bin/bwrap is
missing, Codex also surfaces a startup warning through its normal notification
path instead of printing directly from the sandbox helper.
Windows
Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on
Windows.
The elevated setup/runner backend supports legacy ReadOnlyAccess::Restricted
for read-only and workspace-write policies. Restricted read access honors
explicit readable roots plus the command cwd, and keeps writable roots
readable when workspace-write is used.
When include_platform_defaults = true, the elevated Windows backend adds
backend-managed system read roots required for basic execution, such as
C:\Windows, C:\Program Files, C:\Program Files (x86), and
C:\ProgramData. When it is false, those extra system roots are omitted.
The unelevated restricted-token backend still supports the legacy full-read Windows model only. Restricted read-only policies continue to fail closed there instead of running with weaker read enforcement.
New [permissions] / split filesystem policies remain supported on Windows
only when they round-trip through the legacy SandboxPolicy model without
changing semantics. Richer split-only carveouts still fail closed instead of
running with weaker enforcement.
All Platforms
Expects the binary containing codex-core to simulate the virtual apply_patch CLI when arg1 is --codex-run-as-apply-patch. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.