Files
codex/codex-rs/network-proxy/src/mitm_tests.rs
T
Celia Chen dd30c8eedd chore: refactor network permissions to use explicit domain and unix socket rule maps (#15120)
## Summary

This PR replaces the legacy network allow/deny list model with explicit
rule maps for domains and unix sockets across managed requirements,
permissions profiles, the network proxy config, and the app server
protocol.

Concretely, it:

- introduces typed domain (`allow` / `deny`) and unix socket permission
(`allow` / `none`) entries instead of separate `allowed_domains`,
`denied_domains`, and `allow_unix_sockets` lists
- updates config loading, managed requirements merging, and exec-policy
overlays to read and upsert rule entries consistently
- exposes the new shape through protocol/schema outputs, debug surfaces,
and app-server config APIs
- rejects the legacy list-based keys and updates docs/tests to reflect
the new config format

## Why

The previous representation split related network policy across multiple
parallel lists, which made merging and overriding rules harder to reason
about. Moving to explicit keyed permission maps gives us a single source
of truth per host/socket entry, makes allow/deny precedence clearer, and
gives protocol consumers access to the full rule state instead of
derived projections only.

## Backward Compatibility

### Backward compatible

- Managed requirements still accept the legacy
`experimental_network.allowed_domains`,
`experimental_network.denied_domains`, and
`experimental_network.allow_unix_sockets` fields. They are normalized
into the new canonical `domains` and `unix_sockets` maps internally.
- App-server v2 still deserializes legacy `allowedDomains`,
`deniedDomains`, and `allowUnixSockets` payloads, so older clients can
continue reading managed network requirements.
- App-server v2 responses still populate `allowedDomains`,
`deniedDomains`, and `allowUnixSockets` as legacy compatibility views
derived from the canonical maps.
- `managed_allowed_domains_only` keeps the same behavior after
normalization. Legacy managed allowlists still participate in the same
enforcement path as canonical `domains` entries.

### Not backward compatible

- Permissions profiles under `[permissions.<profile>.network]` no longer
accept the legacy list-based keys. Those configs must use the canonical
`[domains]` and `[unix_sockets]` tables instead of `allowed_domains`,
`denied_domains`, or `allow_unix_sockets`.
- Managed `experimental_network` config cannot mix canonical and legacy
forms in the same block. For example, `domains` cannot be combined with
`allowed_domains` or `denied_domains`, and `unix_sockets` cannot be
combined with `allow_unix_sockets`.
- The canonical format can express explicit `"none"` entries for unix
sockets, but those entries do not round-trip through the legacy
compatibility fields because the legacy fields only represent allow/deny
lists.
## Testing
`/target/debug/codex sandbox macos --log-denials /bin/zsh -c 'curl
https://www.example.com' ` gives 200 with config
```
[permissions.workspace.network.domains]
"www.example.com" = "allow"
```
and fails when set to deny: `curl: (56) CONNECT tunnel failed, response
403`.

Also tested backward compatibility path by verifying that adding the
following to `/etc/codex/requirements.toml` works:
```
[experimental_network]
allowed_domains = ["www.example.com"]
```
2026-03-27 06:17:59 +00:00

114 lines
3.6 KiB
Rust

use super::*;
use crate::config::NetworkProxySettings;
use crate::reasons::REASON_METHOD_NOT_ALLOWED;
use crate::reasons::REASON_NOT_ALLOWED_LOCAL;
use crate::runtime::network_proxy_state_for_policy;
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
use rama_http::Body;
use rama_http::Method;
use rama_http::Request;
use rama_http::StatusCode;
fn policy_ctx(
app_state: Arc<NetworkProxyState>,
mode: NetworkMode,
target_host: &str,
target_port: u16,
) -> MitmPolicyContext {
MitmPolicyContext {
target_host: target_host.to_string(),
target_port,
mode,
app_state,
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn mitm_policy_blocks_disallowed_method_and_records_telemetry() {
let app_state = Arc::new(network_proxy_state_for_policy({
let mut network = NetworkProxySettings::default();
network.set_allowed_domains(vec!["example.com".to_string()]);
network
}));
let ctx = policy_ctx(app_state.clone(), NetworkMode::Limited, "example.com", 443);
let req = Request::builder()
.method(Method::POST)
.uri("/v1/responses?api_key=secret")
.header(HOST, "example.com")
.body(Body::empty())
.unwrap();
let response = mitm_blocking_response(&req, &ctx)
.await
.unwrap()
.expect("POST should be blocked in limited mode");
assert_eq!(response.status(), StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
assert_eq!(
response.headers().get("x-proxy-error").unwrap(),
"blocked-by-method-policy"
);
let blocked = app_state.drain_blocked().await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(blocked.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(blocked[0].reason, REASON_METHOD_NOT_ALLOWED);
assert_eq!(blocked[0].method.as_deref(), Some("POST"));
assert_eq!(blocked[0].host, "example.com");
assert_eq!(blocked[0].port, Some(443));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn mitm_policy_rejects_host_mismatch() {
let app_state = Arc::new(network_proxy_state_for_policy({
let mut network = NetworkProxySettings::default();
network.set_allowed_domains(vec!["example.com".to_string()]);
network
}));
let ctx = policy_ctx(app_state.clone(), NetworkMode::Full, "example.com", 443);
let req = Request::builder()
.method(Method::GET)
.uri("/")
.header(HOST, "evil.example")
.body(Body::empty())
.unwrap();
let response = mitm_blocking_response(&req, &ctx)
.await
.unwrap()
.expect("mismatched host should be rejected");
assert_eq!(response.status(), StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
assert_eq!(app_state.blocked_snapshot().await.unwrap().len(), 0);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn mitm_policy_rechecks_local_private_target_after_connect() {
let app_state = Arc::new(network_proxy_state_for_policy({
let mut network = NetworkProxySettings::default();
network.set_allowed_domains(vec!["example.com".to_string()]);
network.allow_local_binding = false;
network
}));
let ctx = policy_ctx(app_state.clone(), NetworkMode::Full, "10.0.0.1", 443);
let req = Request::builder()
.method(Method::GET)
.uri("/health?token=secret")
.header(HOST, "10.0.0.1")
.body(Body::empty())
.unwrap();
let response = mitm_blocking_response(&req, &ctx)
.await
.unwrap()
.expect("local/private target should be blocked on inner request");
assert_eq!(response.status(), StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
let blocked = app_state.drain_blocked().await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(blocked.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(blocked[0].reason, REASON_NOT_ALLOWED_LOCAL);
assert_eq!(blocked[0].host, "10.0.0.1");
assert_eq!(blocked[0].port, Some(443));
}