codex/codex-rs/protocol/src/permissions.rs

use std::collections::HashSet;
use std::ffi::OsStr;
use std::io;
use std::path::Path;
use std::path::PathBuf;

use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
use schemars::JsonSchema;
use serde::Deserialize;
use serde::Serialize;
use strum_macros::Display;
use tracing::error;
use ts_rs::TS;

use crate::protocol::NetworkAccess;
use crate::protocol::ReadOnlyAccess;
use crate::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
use crate::protocol::WritableRoot;

#[derive(
    Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize, Display, Default, JsonSchema, TS,
)]
#[serde(rename_all = "kebab-case")]
#[strum(serialize_all = "kebab-case")]
pub enum NetworkSandboxPolicy {
    #[default]
    Restricted,
    Enabled,
}

impl NetworkSandboxPolicy {
    pub fn is_enabled(self) -> bool {
        matches!(self, NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled)
    }
}

/// Access mode for a filesystem entry.
///
/// When two equally specific entries target the same path, we compare these by
/// conflict precedence rather than by capability breadth: `none` beats
/// `write`, and `write` beats `read`.
#[derive(
    Debug,
    Clone,
    Copy,
    PartialEq,
    Eq,
    PartialOrd,
    Ord,
    Serialize,
    Deserialize,
    Display,
    JsonSchema,
    TS,
)]
#[serde(rename_all = "lowercase")]
#[strum(serialize_all = "lowercase")]
pub enum FileSystemAccessMode {
    Read,
    Write,
    None,
}

impl FileSystemAccessMode {
    pub fn can_read(self) -> bool {
        !matches!(self, FileSystemAccessMode::None)
    }

    pub fn can_write(self) -> bool {
        matches!(self, FileSystemAccessMode::Write)
    }
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(tag = "kind", rename_all = "snake_case")]
#[ts(tag = "kind")]
pub enum FileSystemSpecialPath {
    Root,
    Minimal,
    CurrentWorkingDirectory,
    ProjectRoots {
        #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
        #[ts(optional)]
        subpath: Option<PathBuf>,
    },
    Tmpdir,
    SlashTmp,
    /// WARNING: `:special_path` tokens are part of config compatibility.
    /// Do not make older runtimes reject newly introduced tokens.
    /// New parser support should be additive, while unknown values must stay
    /// representable so config from a newer Codex degrades to warn-and-ignore
    /// instead of failing to load. Codex 0.112.0 rejected unknown values here,
    /// which broke forward compatibility for newer config.
    /// Preserves future special-path tokens so older runtimes can ignore them
    /// without rejecting config authored by a newer release.
    Unknown {
        path: String,
        #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
        #[ts(optional)]
        subpath: Option<PathBuf>,
    },
}

impl FileSystemSpecialPath {
    pub fn project_roots(subpath: Option<PathBuf>) -> Self {
        Self::ProjectRoots { subpath }
    }

    pub fn unknown(path: impl Into<String>, subpath: Option<PathBuf>) -> Self {
        Self::Unknown {
            path: path.into(),
            subpath,
        }
    }
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize, JsonSchema, TS)]
pub struct FileSystemSandboxEntry {
    pub path: FileSystemPath,
    pub access: FileSystemAccessMode,
}

#[derive(
    Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize, Display, Default, JsonSchema, TS,
)]
#[serde(rename_all = "kebab-case")]
#[strum(serialize_all = "kebab-case")]
pub enum FileSystemSandboxKind {
    #[default]
    Restricted,
    Unrestricted,
    ExternalSandbox,
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize, JsonSchema, TS)]
pub struct FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
    pub kind: FileSystemSandboxKind,
    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
    pub entries: Vec<FileSystemSandboxEntry>,
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
struct ResolvedFileSystemEntry {
    path: AbsolutePathBuf,
    access: FileSystemAccessMode,
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
struct FileSystemSemanticSignature {
    has_full_disk_read_access: bool,
    has_full_disk_write_access: bool,
    include_platform_defaults: bool,
    readable_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
    writable_roots: Vec<WritableRoot>,
    unreadable_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
}

#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case")]
#[ts(tag = "type")]
pub enum FileSystemPath {
    Path { path: AbsolutePathBuf },
    Special { value: FileSystemSpecialPath },
}

impl Default for FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
    fn default() -> Self {
        Self {
            kind: FileSystemSandboxKind::Restricted,
            entries: vec![FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                path: FileSystemPath::Special {
                    value: FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
                },
                access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
            }],
        }
    }
}

impl FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
    fn has_root_access(&self, predicate: impl Fn(FileSystemAccessMode) -> bool) -> bool {
        matches!(self.kind, FileSystemSandboxKind::Restricted)
            && self.entries.iter().any(|entry| {
                matches!(
                    &entry.path,
                    FileSystemPath::Special { value }
                        if matches!(value, FileSystemSpecialPath::Root) && predicate(entry.access)
                )
            })
    }

    fn has_explicit_deny_entries(&self) -> bool {
        matches!(self.kind, FileSystemSandboxKind::Restricted)
            && self
                .entries
                .iter()
                .any(|entry| entry.access == FileSystemAccessMode::None)
    }

    /// Returns true when a restricted policy contains any entry that really
    /// reduces a broader `:root = write` grant.
    ///
    /// Raw entry presence is not enough here: an equally specific `write`
    /// entry for the same target wins under the normal precedence rules, so a
    /// shadowed `read` entry must not downgrade the policy out of full-disk
    /// write mode.
    fn has_write_narrowing_entries(&self) -> bool {
        matches!(self.kind, FileSystemSandboxKind::Restricted)
            && self.entries.iter().any(|entry| {
                if entry.access.can_write() {
                    return false;
                }

                match &entry.path {
                    FileSystemPath::Path { .. } => !self.has_same_target_write_override(entry),
                    FileSystemPath::Special { value } => match value {
                        FileSystemSpecialPath::Root => entry.access == FileSystemAccessMode::None,
                        FileSystemSpecialPath::Minimal | FileSystemSpecialPath::Unknown { .. } => {
                            false
                        }
                        _ => !self.has_same_target_write_override(entry),
                    },
                }
            })
    }

    /// Returns true when a higher-priority `write` entry targets the same
    /// location as `entry`, so `entry` cannot narrow effective write access.
    fn has_same_target_write_override(&self, entry: &FileSystemSandboxEntry) -> bool {
        self.entries.iter().any(|candidate| {
            candidate.access.can_write()
                && candidate.access > entry.access
                && file_system_paths_share_target(&candidate.path, &entry.path)
        })
    }

    pub fn unrestricted() -> Self {
        Self {
            kind: FileSystemSandboxKind::Unrestricted,
            entries: Vec::new(),
        }
    }

    pub fn external_sandbox() -> Self {
        Self {
            kind: FileSystemSandboxKind::ExternalSandbox,
            entries: Vec::new(),
        }
    }

    pub fn restricted(entries: Vec<FileSystemSandboxEntry>) -> Self {
        Self {
            kind: FileSystemSandboxKind::Restricted,
            entries,
        }
    }

    /// Converts a legacy sandbox policy into an equivalent filesystem policy
    /// for the provided cwd.
    ///
    /// Legacy `WorkspaceWrite` policies may list readable roots that live
    /// under an already-writable root. Those paths were redundant in the
    /// legacy model and should not become read-only carveouts when projected
    /// into split filesystem policy.
    pub fn from_legacy_sandbox_policy(sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy, cwd: &Path) -> Self {
        let mut file_system_policy = Self::from(sandbox_policy);
        if matches!(sandbox_policy, SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite { .. }) {
            let legacy_writable_roots = sandbox_policy.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(cwd);
            file_system_policy.entries.retain(|entry| {
                if entry.access != FileSystemAccessMode::Read {
                    return true;
                }

                match &entry.path {
                    FileSystemPath::Path { path } => !legacy_writable_roots
                        .iter()
                        .any(|root| root.is_path_writable(path.as_path())),
                    FileSystemPath::Special { .. } => true,
                }
            });
        }

        file_system_policy
    }

    /// Returns true when filesystem reads are unrestricted.
    pub fn has_full_disk_read_access(&self) -> bool {
        match self.kind {
            FileSystemSandboxKind::Unrestricted | FileSystemSandboxKind::ExternalSandbox => true,
            FileSystemSandboxKind::Restricted => {
                self.has_root_access(FileSystemAccessMode::can_read)
                    && !self.has_explicit_deny_entries()
            }
        }
    }

    /// Returns true when filesystem writes are unrestricted.
    pub fn has_full_disk_write_access(&self) -> bool {
        match self.kind {
            FileSystemSandboxKind::Unrestricted | FileSystemSandboxKind::ExternalSandbox => true,
            FileSystemSandboxKind::Restricted => {
                self.has_root_access(FileSystemAccessMode::can_write)
                    && !self.has_write_narrowing_entries()
            }
        }
    }

    /// Returns true when platform-default readable roots should be included.
    pub fn include_platform_defaults(&self) -> bool {
        !self.has_full_disk_read_access()
            && matches!(self.kind, FileSystemSandboxKind::Restricted)
            && self.entries.iter().any(|entry| {
                matches!(
                    &entry.path,
                    FileSystemPath::Special { value }
                        if matches!(value, FileSystemSpecialPath::Minimal)
                            && entry.access.can_read()
                )
            })
    }

    pub fn resolve_access_with_cwd(&self, path: &Path, cwd: &Path) -> FileSystemAccessMode {
        match self.kind {
            FileSystemSandboxKind::Unrestricted | FileSystemSandboxKind::ExternalSandbox => {
                return FileSystemAccessMode::Write;
            }
            FileSystemSandboxKind::Restricted => {}
        }

        let Some(path) = resolve_candidate_path(path, cwd) else {
            return FileSystemAccessMode::None;
        };

        self.resolved_entries_with_cwd(cwd)
            .into_iter()
            .filter(|entry| path.as_path().starts_with(entry.path.as_path()))
            .max_by_key(resolved_entry_precedence)
            .map(|entry| entry.access)
            .unwrap_or(FileSystemAccessMode::None)
    }

    pub fn can_read_path_with_cwd(&self, path: &Path, cwd: &Path) -> bool {
        self.resolve_access_with_cwd(path, cwd).can_read()
    }

    pub fn can_write_path_with_cwd(&self, path: &Path, cwd: &Path) -> bool {
        self.resolve_access_with_cwd(path, cwd).can_write()
    }

    pub fn needs_direct_runtime_enforcement(
        &self,
        network_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
        cwd: &Path,
    ) -> bool {
        if !matches!(self.kind, FileSystemSandboxKind::Restricted) {
            return false;
        }

        let Ok(legacy_policy) = self.to_legacy_sandbox_policy(network_policy, cwd) else {
            return true;
        };

        self.semantic_signature(cwd)
            != FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(&legacy_policy, cwd)
                .semantic_signature(cwd)
    }

    /// Returns the explicit readable roots resolved against the provided cwd.
    pub fn get_readable_roots_with_cwd(&self, cwd: &Path) -> Vec<AbsolutePathBuf> {
        if self.has_full_disk_read_access() {
            return Vec::new();
        }

        dedup_absolute_paths(
            self.resolved_entries_with_cwd(cwd)
                .into_iter()
                .filter(|entry| entry.access.can_read())
                .filter(|entry| self.can_read_path_with_cwd(entry.path.as_path(), cwd))
                .map(|entry| entry.path)
                .collect(),
            /*normalize_effective_paths*/ true,
        )
    }

    /// Returns the writable roots together with read-only carveouts resolved
    /// against the provided cwd.
    pub fn get_writable_roots_with_cwd(&self, cwd: &Path) -> Vec<WritableRoot> {
        if self.has_full_disk_write_access() {
            return Vec::new();
        }

        let resolved_entries = self.resolved_entries_with_cwd(cwd);
        let writable_entries: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf> = resolved_entries
            .iter()
            .filter(|entry| entry.access.can_write())
            .filter(|entry| self.can_write_path_with_cwd(entry.path.as_path(), cwd))
            .map(|entry| entry.path.clone())
            .collect();

        dedup_absolute_paths(
            writable_entries.clone(),
            /*normalize_effective_paths*/ true,
        )
        .into_iter()
        .map(|root| {
            // Filesystem-root policies stay in their effective canonical form
            // so root-wide aliases do not create duplicate top-level masks.
            // Example: keep `/var/...` normalized under `/` instead of
            // materializing both `/var/...` and `/private/var/...`.
            let preserve_raw_carveout_paths = root.as_path().parent().is_some();
            let raw_writable_roots: Vec<&AbsolutePathBuf> = writable_entries
                .iter()
                .filter(|path| normalize_effective_absolute_path((*path).clone()) == root)
                .collect();
            let mut read_only_subpaths = default_read_only_subpaths_for_writable_root(&root);
            // Narrower explicit non-write entries carve out broader writable roots.
            // More specific write entries still remain writable because they appear
            // as separate WritableRoot values and are checked independently.
            // Preserve symlink path components that live under the writable root
            // so downstream sandboxes can still mask the symlink inode itself.
            // Example: if `<root>/.codex -> <root>/decoy`, bwrap must still see
            // `<root>/.codex`, not only the resolved `<root>/decoy`.
            read_only_subpaths.extend(
                resolved_entries
                    .iter()
                    .filter(|entry| !entry.access.can_write())
                    .filter(|entry| !self.can_write_path_with_cwd(entry.path.as_path(), cwd))
                    .filter_map(|entry| {
                        let effective_path = normalize_effective_absolute_path(entry.path.clone());
                        // Preserve the literal in-root path whenever the
                        // carveout itself lives under this writable root, even
                        // if following symlinks would resolve back to the root
                        // or escape outside it. Downstream sandboxes need that
                        // raw path so they can mask the symlink inode itself.
                        // Examples:
                        // - `<root>/linked-private -> <root>/decoy-private`
                        // - `<root>/linked-private -> /tmp/outside-private`
                        // - `<root>/alias-root -> <root>`
                        let raw_carveout_path = if preserve_raw_carveout_paths {
                            if entry.path == root {
                                None
                            } else if entry.path.as_path().starts_with(root.as_path()) {
                                Some(entry.path.clone())
                            } else {
                                raw_writable_roots.iter().find_map(|raw_root| {
                                    let suffix = entry
                                        .path
                                        .as_path()
                                        .strip_prefix(raw_root.as_path())
                                        .ok()?;
                                    if suffix.as_os_str().is_empty() {
                                        return None;
                                    }
                                    root.join(suffix).ok()
                                })
                            }
                        } else {
                            None
                        };

                        if let Some(raw_carveout_path) = raw_carveout_path {
                            return Some(raw_carveout_path);
                        }

                        if effective_path == root
                            || !effective_path.as_path().starts_with(root.as_path())
                        {
                            return None;
                        }

                        Some(effective_path)
                    }),
            );
            WritableRoot {
                root,
                // Preserve literal in-root protected paths like `.git` and
                // `.codex` so downstream sandboxes can still detect and mask
                // the symlink itself instead of only its resolved target.
                read_only_subpaths: dedup_absolute_paths(
                    read_only_subpaths,
                    /*normalize_effective_paths*/ false,
                ),
            }
        })
        .collect()
    }

    /// Returns explicit unreadable roots resolved against the provided cwd.
    pub fn get_unreadable_roots_with_cwd(&self, cwd: &Path) -> Vec<AbsolutePathBuf> {
        if !matches!(self.kind, FileSystemSandboxKind::Restricted) {
            return Vec::new();
        }

        let root = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(cwd)
            .ok()
            .map(|cwd| absolute_root_path_for_cwd(&cwd));

        dedup_absolute_paths(
            self.resolved_entries_with_cwd(cwd)
                .iter()
                .filter(|entry| entry.access == FileSystemAccessMode::None)
                .filter(|entry| !self.can_read_path_with_cwd(entry.path.as_path(), cwd))
                // Restricted policies already deny reads outside explicit allow roots,
                // so materializing the filesystem root here would erase narrower
                // readable carveouts when downstream sandboxes apply deny masks last.
                .filter(|entry| root.as_ref() != Some(&entry.path))
                .map(|entry| entry.path.clone())
                .collect(),
            /*normalize_effective_paths*/ true,
        )
    }

    pub fn to_legacy_sandbox_policy(
        &self,
        network_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
        cwd: &Path,
    ) -> io::Result<SandboxPolicy> {
        Ok(match self.kind {
            FileSystemSandboxKind::ExternalSandbox => SandboxPolicy::ExternalSandbox {
                network_access: if network_policy.is_enabled() {
                    NetworkAccess::Enabled
                } else {
                    NetworkAccess::Restricted
                },
            },
            FileSystemSandboxKind::Unrestricted => {
                if network_policy.is_enabled() {
                    SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess
                } else {
                    SandboxPolicy::ExternalSandbox {
                        network_access: NetworkAccess::Restricted,
                    }
                }
            }
            FileSystemSandboxKind::Restricted => {
                let cwd_absolute = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(cwd).ok();
                let mut include_platform_defaults = false;
                let mut has_full_disk_read_access = false;
                let mut has_full_disk_write_access = false;
                let mut workspace_root_writable = false;
                let mut writable_roots = Vec::new();
                let mut readable_roots = Vec::new();
                let mut tmpdir_writable = false;
                let mut slash_tmp_writable = false;

                for entry in &self.entries {
                    match &entry.path {
                        FileSystemPath::Path { path } => {
                            if entry.access.can_write() {
                                if cwd_absolute.as_ref().is_some_and(|cwd| cwd == path) {
                                    workspace_root_writable = true;
                                } else {
                                    writable_roots.push(path.clone());
                                }
                            } else if entry.access.can_read() {
                                readable_roots.push(path.clone());
                            }
                        }
                        FileSystemPath::Special { value } => match value {
                            FileSystemSpecialPath::Root => match entry.access {
                                FileSystemAccessMode::None => {}
                                FileSystemAccessMode::Read => has_full_disk_read_access = true,
                                FileSystemAccessMode::Write => {
                                    has_full_disk_read_access = true;
                                    has_full_disk_write_access = true;
                                }
                            },
                            FileSystemSpecialPath::Minimal => {
                                if entry.access.can_read() {
                                    include_platform_defaults = true;
                                }
                            }
                            FileSystemSpecialPath::CurrentWorkingDirectory => {
                                if entry.access.can_write() {
                                    workspace_root_writable = true;
                                } else if entry.access.can_read()
                                    && let Some(path) = resolve_file_system_special_path(
                                        value,
                                        cwd_absolute.as_ref(),
                                    )
                                {
                                    readable_roots.push(path);
                                }
                            }
                            FileSystemSpecialPath::ProjectRoots { subpath } => {
                                if subpath.is_none() && entry.access.can_write() {
                                    workspace_root_writable = true;
                                } else if let Some(path) =
                                    resolve_file_system_special_path(value, cwd_absolute.as_ref())
                                {
                                    if entry.access.can_write() {
                                        writable_roots.push(path);
                                    } else if entry.access.can_read() {
                                        readable_roots.push(path);
                                    }
                                }
                            }
                            FileSystemSpecialPath::Tmpdir => {
                                if entry.access.can_write() {
                                    tmpdir_writable = true;
                                } else if entry.access.can_read()
                                    && let Some(path) = resolve_file_system_special_path(
                                        value,
                                        cwd_absolute.as_ref(),
                                    )
                                {
                                    readable_roots.push(path);
                                }
                            }
                            FileSystemSpecialPath::SlashTmp => {
                                if entry.access.can_write() {
                                    slash_tmp_writable = true;
                                } else if entry.access.can_read()
                                    && let Some(path) = resolve_file_system_special_path(
                                        value,
                                        cwd_absolute.as_ref(),
                                    )
                                {
                                    readable_roots.push(path);
                                }
                            }
                            FileSystemSpecialPath::Unknown { .. } => {}
                        },
                    }
                }

                if has_full_disk_write_access {
                    return Ok(if network_policy.is_enabled() {
                        SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess
                    } else {
                        SandboxPolicy::ExternalSandbox {
                            network_access: NetworkAccess::Restricted,
                        }
                    });
                }

                let read_only_access = if has_full_disk_read_access {
                    ReadOnlyAccess::FullAccess
                } else {
                    ReadOnlyAccess::Restricted {
                        include_platform_defaults,
                        readable_roots: dedup_absolute_paths(
                            readable_roots,
                            /*normalize_effective_paths*/ false,
                        ),
                    }
                };

                if workspace_root_writable {
                    SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
                        writable_roots: dedup_absolute_paths(
                            writable_roots,
                            /*normalize_effective_paths*/ false,
                        ),
                        read_only_access,
                        network_access: network_policy.is_enabled(),
                        exclude_tmpdir_env_var: !tmpdir_writable,
                        exclude_slash_tmp: !slash_tmp_writable,
                    }
                } else if !writable_roots.is_empty() || tmpdir_writable || slash_tmp_writable {
                    return Err(io::Error::new(
                        io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
                        "permissions profile requests filesystem writes outside the workspace root, which is not supported until the runtime enforces FileSystemSandboxPolicy directly",
                    ));
                } else {
                    SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly {
                        access: read_only_access,
                        network_access: network_policy.is_enabled(),
                    }
                }
            }
        })
    }

    fn resolved_entries_with_cwd(&self, cwd: &Path) -> Vec<ResolvedFileSystemEntry> {
        let cwd_absolute = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(cwd).ok();
        self.entries
            .iter()
            .filter_map(|entry| {
                resolve_entry_path(&entry.path, cwd_absolute.as_ref()).map(|path| {
                    ResolvedFileSystemEntry {
                        path,
                        access: entry.access,
                    }
                })
            })
            .collect()
    }

    fn semantic_signature(&self, cwd: &Path) -> FileSystemSemanticSignature {
        FileSystemSemanticSignature {
            has_full_disk_read_access: self.has_full_disk_read_access(),
            has_full_disk_write_access: self.has_full_disk_write_access(),
            include_platform_defaults: self.include_platform_defaults(),
            readable_roots: self.get_readable_roots_with_cwd(cwd),
            writable_roots: self.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(cwd),
            unreadable_roots: self.get_unreadable_roots_with_cwd(cwd),
        }
    }
}

impl From<&SandboxPolicy> for NetworkSandboxPolicy {
    fn from(value: &SandboxPolicy) -> Self {
        if value.has_full_network_access() {
            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled
        } else {
            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted
        }
    }
}

impl From<&SandboxPolicy> for FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
    fn from(value: &SandboxPolicy) -> Self {
        match value {
            SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess => FileSystemSandboxPolicy::unrestricted(),
            SandboxPolicy::ExternalSandbox { .. } => FileSystemSandboxPolicy::external_sandbox(),
            SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly { access, .. } => {
                let mut entries = Vec::new();
                match access {
                    ReadOnlyAccess::FullAccess => entries.push(FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                        path: FileSystemPath::Special {
                            value: FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
                        },
                        access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
                    }),
                    ReadOnlyAccess::Restricted {
                        include_platform_defaults,
                        readable_roots,
                    } => {
                        entries.push(FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                            path: FileSystemPath::Special {
                                value: FileSystemSpecialPath::CurrentWorkingDirectory,
                            },
                            access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
                        });
                        if *include_platform_defaults {
                            entries.push(FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                                path: FileSystemPath::Special {
                                    value: FileSystemSpecialPath::Minimal,
                                },
                                access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
                            });
                        }
                        entries.extend(readable_roots.iter().cloned().map(|path| {
                            FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                                path: FileSystemPath::Path { path },
                                access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
                            }
                        }));
                    }
                }
                FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(entries)
            }
            SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
                writable_roots,
                read_only_access,
                exclude_tmpdir_env_var,
                exclude_slash_tmp,
                ..
            } => {
                let mut entries = Vec::new();
                match read_only_access {
                    ReadOnlyAccess::FullAccess => entries.push(FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                        path: FileSystemPath::Special {
                            value: FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
                        },
                        access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
                    }),
                    ReadOnlyAccess::Restricted {
                        include_platform_defaults,
                        readable_roots,
                    } => {
                        if *include_platform_defaults {
                            entries.push(FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                                path: FileSystemPath::Special {
                                    value: FileSystemSpecialPath::Minimal,
                                },
                                access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
                            });
                        }
                        entries.extend(readable_roots.iter().cloned().map(|path| {
                            FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                                path: FileSystemPath::Path { path },
                                access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
                            }
                        }));
                    }
                }

                entries.push(FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                    path: FileSystemPath::Special {
                        value: FileSystemSpecialPath::CurrentWorkingDirectory,
                    },
                    access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
                });
                if !exclude_slash_tmp {
                    entries.push(FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                        path: FileSystemPath::Special {
                            value: FileSystemSpecialPath::SlashTmp,
                        },
                        access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
                    });
                }
                if !exclude_tmpdir_env_var {
                    entries.push(FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                        path: FileSystemPath::Special {
                            value: FileSystemSpecialPath::Tmpdir,
                        },
                        access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
                    });
                }
                entries.extend(
                    writable_roots
                        .iter()
                        .cloned()
                        .map(|path| FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                            path: FileSystemPath::Path { path },
                            access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
                        }),
                );
                FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(entries)
            }
        }
    }
}

fn resolve_file_system_path(
    path: &FileSystemPath,
    cwd: Option<&AbsolutePathBuf>,
) -> Option<AbsolutePathBuf> {
    match path {
        FileSystemPath::Path { path } => Some(path.clone()),
        FileSystemPath::Special { value } => resolve_file_system_special_path(value, cwd),
    }
}

fn resolve_entry_path(
    path: &FileSystemPath,
    cwd: Option<&AbsolutePathBuf>,
) -> Option<AbsolutePathBuf> {
    match path {
        FileSystemPath::Special {
            value: FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
        } => cwd.map(absolute_root_path_for_cwd),
        _ => resolve_file_system_path(path, cwd),
    }
}

fn resolve_candidate_path(path: &Path, cwd: &Path) -> Option<AbsolutePathBuf> {
    if path.is_absolute() {
        AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(path).ok()
    } else {
        AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base(path, cwd).ok()
    }
}

/// Returns true when two config paths refer to the same exact target before
/// any prefix matching is applied.
///
/// This is intentionally narrower than full path resolution: it only answers
/// the "can one entry shadow another at the same specificity?" question used
/// by `has_write_narrowing_entries`.
fn file_system_paths_share_target(left: &FileSystemPath, right: &FileSystemPath) -> bool {
    match (left, right) {
        (FileSystemPath::Path { path: left }, FileSystemPath::Path { path: right }) => {
            left == right
        }
        (FileSystemPath::Special { value: left }, FileSystemPath::Special { value: right }) => {
            special_paths_share_target(left, right)
        }
        (FileSystemPath::Path { path }, FileSystemPath::Special { value })
        | (FileSystemPath::Special { value }, FileSystemPath::Path { path }) => {
            special_path_matches_absolute_path(value, path)
        }
    }
}

/// Compares special-path tokens that resolve to the same concrete target
/// without needing a cwd.
fn special_paths_share_target(left: &FileSystemSpecialPath, right: &FileSystemSpecialPath) -> bool {
    match (left, right) {
        (FileSystemSpecialPath::Root, FileSystemSpecialPath::Root)
        | (FileSystemSpecialPath::Minimal, FileSystemSpecialPath::Minimal)
        | (
            FileSystemSpecialPath::CurrentWorkingDirectory,
            FileSystemSpecialPath::CurrentWorkingDirectory,
        )
        | (FileSystemSpecialPath::Tmpdir, FileSystemSpecialPath::Tmpdir)
        | (FileSystemSpecialPath::SlashTmp, FileSystemSpecialPath::SlashTmp) => true,
        (
            FileSystemSpecialPath::CurrentWorkingDirectory,
            FileSystemSpecialPath::ProjectRoots { subpath: None },
        )
        | (
            FileSystemSpecialPath::ProjectRoots { subpath: None },
            FileSystemSpecialPath::CurrentWorkingDirectory,
        ) => true,
        (
            FileSystemSpecialPath::ProjectRoots { subpath: left },
            FileSystemSpecialPath::ProjectRoots { subpath: right },
        ) => left == right,
        (
            FileSystemSpecialPath::Unknown {
                path: left,
                subpath: left_subpath,
            },
            FileSystemSpecialPath::Unknown {
                path: right,
                subpath: right_subpath,
            },
        ) => left == right && left_subpath == right_subpath,
        _ => false,
    }
}

/// Matches cwd-independent special paths against absolute `Path` entries when
/// they name the same location.
///
/// We intentionally only fold the special paths whose concrete meaning is
/// stable without a cwd, such as `/` and `/tmp`.
fn special_path_matches_absolute_path(
    value: &FileSystemSpecialPath,
    path: &AbsolutePathBuf,
) -> bool {
    match value {
        FileSystemSpecialPath::Root => path.as_path().parent().is_none(),
        FileSystemSpecialPath::SlashTmp => path.as_path() == Path::new("/tmp"),
        _ => false,
    }
}

/// Orders resolved entries so the most specific path wins first, then applies
/// the access tie-breaker from [`FileSystemAccessMode`].
fn resolved_entry_precedence(entry: &ResolvedFileSystemEntry) -> (usize, FileSystemAccessMode) {
    let specificity = entry.path.as_path().components().count();
    (specificity, entry.access)
}

fn absolute_root_path_for_cwd(cwd: &AbsolutePathBuf) -> AbsolutePathBuf {
    let root = cwd
        .as_path()
        .ancestors()
        .last()
        .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("cwd must have a filesystem root"));
    AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(root)
        .unwrap_or_else(|err| panic!("cwd root must be an absolute path: {err}"))
}

fn resolve_file_system_special_path(
    value: &FileSystemSpecialPath,
    cwd: Option<&AbsolutePathBuf>,
) -> Option<AbsolutePathBuf> {
    match value {
        FileSystemSpecialPath::Root
        | FileSystemSpecialPath::Minimal
        | FileSystemSpecialPath::Unknown { .. } => None,
        FileSystemSpecialPath::CurrentWorkingDirectory => {
            let cwd = cwd?;
            Some(cwd.clone())
        }
        FileSystemSpecialPath::ProjectRoots { subpath } => {
            let cwd = cwd?;
            match subpath.as_ref() {
                Some(subpath) => {
                    AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base(subpath, cwd.as_path()).ok()
                }
                None => Some(cwd.clone()),
            }
        }
        FileSystemSpecialPath::Tmpdir => {
            let tmpdir = std::env::var_os("TMPDIR")?;
            if tmpdir.is_empty() {
                None
            } else {
                let tmpdir = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(PathBuf::from(tmpdir)).ok()?;
                Some(tmpdir)
            }
        }
        FileSystemSpecialPath::SlashTmp => {
            #[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
            let slash_tmp = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path("/tmp").expect("/tmp is absolute");
            if !slash_tmp.as_path().is_dir() {
                return None;
            }
            Some(slash_tmp)
        }
    }
}

fn dedup_absolute_paths(
    paths: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
    normalize_effective_paths: bool,
) -> Vec<AbsolutePathBuf> {
    let mut deduped = Vec::with_capacity(paths.len());
    let mut seen = HashSet::new();
    for path in paths {
        let dedup_path = if normalize_effective_paths {
            normalize_effective_absolute_path(path)
        } else {
            path
        };
        if seen.insert(dedup_path.to_path_buf()) {
            deduped.push(dedup_path);
        }
    }
    deduped
}

fn normalize_effective_absolute_path(path: AbsolutePathBuf) -> AbsolutePathBuf {
    let raw_path = path.to_path_buf();
    for ancestor in raw_path.ancestors() {
        let Ok(canonical_ancestor) = ancestor.canonicalize() else {
            continue;
        };
        let Ok(suffix) = raw_path.strip_prefix(ancestor) else {
            continue;
        };
        if let Ok(normalized_path) =
            AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(canonical_ancestor.join(suffix))
        {
            return normalized_path;
        }
    }
    path
}

fn default_read_only_subpaths_for_writable_root(
    writable_root: &AbsolutePathBuf,
) -> Vec<AbsolutePathBuf> {
    let mut subpaths: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf> = Vec::new();
    #[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
    let top_level_git = writable_root
        .join(".git")
        .expect(".git is a valid relative path");
    // This applies to typical repos (directory .git), worktrees/submodules
    // (file .git with gitdir pointer), and bare repos when the gitdir is the
    // writable root itself.
    let top_level_git_is_file = top_level_git.as_path().is_file();
    let top_level_git_is_dir = top_level_git.as_path().is_dir();
    if top_level_git_is_dir || top_level_git_is_file {
        if top_level_git_is_file
            && is_git_pointer_file(&top_level_git)
            && let Some(gitdir) = resolve_gitdir_from_file(&top_level_git)
        {
            subpaths.push(gitdir);
        }
        subpaths.push(top_level_git);
    }

    // Make .agents/skills and .codex/config.toml and related files read-only
    // to the agent, by default.
    for subdir in &[".agents", ".codex"] {
        #[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
        let top_level_codex = writable_root.join(subdir).expect("valid relative path");
        if top_level_codex.as_path().is_dir() {
            subpaths.push(top_level_codex);
        }
    }

    dedup_absolute_paths(subpaths, /*normalize_effective_paths*/ false)
}

fn is_git_pointer_file(path: &AbsolutePathBuf) -> bool {
    path.as_path().is_file() && path.as_path().file_name() == Some(OsStr::new(".git"))
}

fn resolve_gitdir_from_file(dot_git: &AbsolutePathBuf) -> Option<AbsolutePathBuf> {
    let contents = match std::fs::read_to_string(dot_git.as_path()) {
        Ok(contents) => contents,
        Err(err) => {
            error!(
                "Failed to read {path} for gitdir pointer: {err}",
                path = dot_git.as_path().display()
            );
            return None;
        }
    };

    let trimmed = contents.trim();
    let (_, gitdir_raw) = match trimmed.split_once(':') {
        Some(parts) => parts,
        None => {
            error!(
                "Expected {path} to contain a gitdir pointer, but it did not match `gitdir: <path>`.",
                path = dot_git.as_path().display()
            );
            return None;
        }
    };
    let gitdir_raw = gitdir_raw.trim();
    if gitdir_raw.is_empty() {
        error!(
            "Expected {path} to contain a gitdir pointer, but it was empty.",
            path = dot_git.as_path().display()
        );
        return None;
    }
    let base = match dot_git.as_path().parent() {
        Some(base) => base,
        None => {
            error!(
                "Unable to resolve parent directory for {path}.",
                path = dot_git.as_path().display()
            );
            return None;
        }
    };
    let gitdir_path = match AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base(gitdir_raw, base) {
        Ok(path) => path,
        Err(err) => {
            error!(
                "Failed to resolve gitdir path {gitdir_raw} from {path}: {err}",
                path = dot_git.as_path().display()
            );
            return None;
        }
    };
    if !gitdir_path.as_path().exists() {
        error!(
            "Resolved gitdir path {path} does not exist.",
            path = gitdir_path.as_path().display()
        );
        return None;
    }
    Some(gitdir_path)
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;
    use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
    #[cfg(unix)]
    use std::fs;
    use std::path::Path;
    use tempfile::TempDir;

    #[cfg(unix)]
    const SYMLINKED_TMPDIR_TEST_ENV: &str = "CODEX_PROTOCOL_TEST_SYMLINKED_TMPDIR";

    #[cfg(unix)]
    fn symlink_dir(original: &Path, link: &Path) -> std::io::Result<()> {
        std::os::unix::fs::symlink(original, link)
    }

    #[test]
    fn unknown_special_paths_are_ignored_by_legacy_bridge() -> std::io::Result<()> {
        let policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![FileSystemSandboxEntry {
            path: FileSystemPath::Special {
                value: FileSystemSpecialPath::unknown(":future_special_path", None),
            },
            access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
        }]);

        let sandbox_policy = policy.to_legacy_sandbox_policy(
            NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
            Path::new("/tmp/workspace"),
        )?;

        assert_eq!(
            sandbox_policy,
            SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly {
                access: ReadOnlyAccess::Restricted {
                    include_platform_defaults: false,
                    readable_roots: Vec::new(),
                },
                network_access: false,
            }
        );
        Ok(())
    }

    #[cfg(unix)]
    #[test]
    fn effective_runtime_roots_canonicalize_symlinked_paths() {
        let cwd = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
        let real_root = cwd.path().join("real");
        let link_root = cwd.path().join("link");
        let blocked = real_root.join("blocked");
        let codex_dir = real_root.join(".codex");

        fs::create_dir_all(&blocked).expect("create blocked");
        fs::create_dir_all(&codex_dir).expect("create .codex");
        symlink_dir(&real_root, &link_root).expect("create symlinked root");

        let link_root =
            AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(&link_root).expect("absolute symlinked root");
        let link_blocked = link_root.join("blocked").expect("symlinked blocked path");
        let expected_root = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(
            real_root.canonicalize().expect("canonicalize real root"),
        )
        .expect("absolute canonical root");
        let expected_blocked = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(
            blocked.canonicalize().expect("canonicalize blocked"),
        )
        .expect("absolute canonical blocked");
        let expected_codex = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(
            codex_dir.canonicalize().expect("canonicalize .codex"),
        )
        .expect("absolute canonical .codex");

        let policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
            FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                path: FileSystemPath::Path { path: link_root },
                access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
            },
            FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                path: FileSystemPath::Path { path: link_blocked },
                access: FileSystemAccessMode::None,
            },
        ]);

        assert_eq!(
            policy.get_unreadable_roots_with_cwd(cwd.path()),
            vec![expected_blocked.clone()]
        );

        let writable_roots = policy.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(cwd.path());
        assert_eq!(writable_roots.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(writable_roots[0].root, expected_root);
        assert!(
            writable_roots[0]
                .read_only_subpaths
                .contains(&expected_blocked)
        );
        assert!(
            writable_roots[0]
                .read_only_subpaths
                .contains(&expected_codex)
        );
    }

    #[cfg(unix)]
    #[test]
    fn current_working_directory_special_path_canonicalizes_symlinked_cwd() {
        let cwd = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
        let real_root = cwd.path().join("real");
        let link_root = cwd.path().join("link");
        let blocked = real_root.join("blocked");
        let agents_dir = real_root.join(".agents");
        let codex_dir = real_root.join(".codex");

        fs::create_dir_all(&blocked).expect("create blocked");
        fs::create_dir_all(&agents_dir).expect("create .agents");
        fs::create_dir_all(&codex_dir).expect("create .codex");
        symlink_dir(&real_root, &link_root).expect("create symlinked cwd");

        let link_blocked =
            AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(link_root.join("blocked")).expect("link blocked");
        let expected_root = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(
            real_root.canonicalize().expect("canonicalize real root"),
        )
        .expect("absolute canonical root");
        let expected_blocked = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(
            blocked.canonicalize().expect("canonicalize blocked"),
        )
        .expect("absolute canonical blocked");
        let expected_agents = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(
            agents_dir.canonicalize().expect("canonicalize .agents"),
        )
        .expect("absolute canonical .agents");
        let expected_codex = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(
            codex_dir.canonicalize().expect("canonicalize .codex"),
        )
        .expect("absolute canonical .codex");

        let policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
            FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                path: FileSystemPath::Special {
                    value: FileSystemSpecialPath::Minimal,
                },
                access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
            },
            FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                path: FileSystemPath::Special {
                    value: FileSystemSpecialPath::CurrentWorkingDirectory,
                },
                access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
            },
            FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                path: FileSystemPath::Path { path: link_blocked },
                access: FileSystemAccessMode::None,
            },
        ]);

        assert_eq!(
            policy.get_readable_roots_with_cwd(&link_root),
            vec![expected_root.clone()]
        );
        assert_eq!(
            policy.get_unreadable_roots_with_cwd(&link_root),
            vec![expected_blocked.clone()]
        );

        let writable_roots = policy.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(&link_root);
        assert_eq!(writable_roots.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(writable_roots[0].root, expected_root);
        assert!(
            writable_roots[0]
                .read_only_subpaths
                .contains(&expected_blocked)
        );
        assert!(
            writable_roots[0]
                .read_only_subpaths
                .contains(&expected_agents)
        );
        assert!(
            writable_roots[0]
                .read_only_subpaths
                .contains(&expected_codex)
        );
    }

    #[cfg(unix)]
    #[test]
    fn writable_roots_preserve_symlinked_protected_subpaths() {
        let cwd = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
        let root = cwd.path().join("root");
        let decoy = root.join("decoy-codex");
        let dot_codex = root.join(".codex");
        fs::create_dir_all(&decoy).expect("create decoy");
        symlink_dir(&decoy, &dot_codex).expect("create .codex symlink");

        let root = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(&root).expect("absolute root");
        let expected_dot_codex = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(
            root.as_path()
                .canonicalize()
                .expect("canonicalize root")
                .join(".codex"),
        )
        .expect("absolute .codex symlink");
        let unexpected_decoy =
            AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(decoy.canonicalize().expect("canonicalize decoy"))
                .expect("absolute canonical decoy");

        let policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![FileSystemSandboxEntry {
            path: FileSystemPath::Path { path: root },
            access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
        }]);

        let writable_roots = policy.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(cwd.path());
        assert_eq!(writable_roots.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(
            writable_roots[0].read_only_subpaths,
            vec![expected_dot_codex]
        );
        assert!(
            !writable_roots[0]
                .read_only_subpaths
                .contains(&unexpected_decoy)
        );
    }

    #[cfg(unix)]
    #[test]
    fn writable_roots_preserve_explicit_symlinked_carveouts_under_symlinked_roots() {
        let cwd = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
        let real_root = cwd.path().join("real");
        let link_root = cwd.path().join("link");
        let decoy = real_root.join("decoy-private");
        let linked_private = real_root.join("linked-private");
        fs::create_dir_all(&decoy).expect("create decoy");
        symlink_dir(&real_root, &link_root).expect("create symlinked root");
        symlink_dir(&decoy, &linked_private).expect("create linked-private symlink");

        let link_root =
            AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(&link_root).expect("absolute symlinked root");
        let link_private = link_root
            .join("linked-private")
            .expect("symlinked linked-private path");
        let expected_root = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(
            real_root.canonicalize().expect("canonicalize real root"),
        )
        .expect("absolute canonical root");
        let expected_linked_private = expected_root
            .join("linked-private")
            .expect("expected linked-private path");
        let unexpected_decoy =
            AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(decoy.canonicalize().expect("canonicalize decoy"))
                .expect("absolute canonical decoy");

        let policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
            FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                path: FileSystemPath::Path { path: link_root },
                access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
            },
            FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                path: FileSystemPath::Path { path: link_private },
                access: FileSystemAccessMode::None,
            },
        ]);

        let writable_roots = policy.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(cwd.path());
        assert_eq!(writable_roots.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(writable_roots[0].root, expected_root);
        assert_eq!(
            writable_roots[0].read_only_subpaths,
            vec![expected_linked_private]
        );
        assert!(
            !writable_roots[0]
                .read_only_subpaths
                .contains(&unexpected_decoy)
        );
    }

    #[cfg(unix)]
    #[test]
    fn writable_roots_preserve_explicit_symlinked_carveouts_that_escape_root() {
        let cwd = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
        let real_root = cwd.path().join("real");
        let link_root = cwd.path().join("link");
        let decoy = cwd.path().join("outside-private");
        let linked_private = real_root.join("linked-private");
        fs::create_dir_all(&decoy).expect("create decoy");
        fs::create_dir_all(&real_root).expect("create real root");
        symlink_dir(&real_root, &link_root).expect("create symlinked root");
        symlink_dir(&decoy, &linked_private).expect("create linked-private symlink");

        let link_root =
            AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(&link_root).expect("absolute symlinked root");
        let link_private = link_root
            .join("linked-private")
            .expect("symlinked linked-private path");
        let expected_root = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(
            real_root.canonicalize().expect("canonicalize real root"),
        )
        .expect("absolute canonical root");
        let expected_linked_private = expected_root
            .join("linked-private")
            .expect("expected linked-private path");
        let unexpected_decoy =
            AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(decoy.canonicalize().expect("canonicalize decoy"))
                .expect("absolute canonical decoy");

        let policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
            FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                path: FileSystemPath::Path { path: link_root },
                access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
            },
            FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                path: FileSystemPath::Path { path: link_private },
                access: FileSystemAccessMode::None,
            },
        ]);

        let writable_roots = policy.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(cwd.path());
        assert_eq!(writable_roots.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(writable_roots[0].root, expected_root);
        assert_eq!(
            writable_roots[0].read_only_subpaths,
            vec![expected_linked_private]
        );
        assert!(
            !writable_roots[0]
                .read_only_subpaths
                .contains(&unexpected_decoy)
        );
    }

    #[cfg(unix)]
    #[test]
    fn writable_roots_preserve_explicit_symlinked_carveouts_that_alias_root() {
        let cwd = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
        let root = cwd.path().join("root");
        let alias = root.join("alias-root");
        fs::create_dir_all(&root).expect("create root");
        symlink_dir(&root, &alias).expect("create alias symlink");

        let root = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(&root).expect("absolute root");
        let alias = root.join("alias-root").expect("alias root path");
        let expected_root = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(
            root.as_path().canonicalize().expect("canonicalize root"),
        )
        .expect("absolute canonical root");
        let expected_alias = expected_root
            .join("alias-root")
            .expect("expected alias path");

        let policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
            FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                path: FileSystemPath::Path { path: root },
                access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
            },
            FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                path: FileSystemPath::Path { path: alias },
                access: FileSystemAccessMode::None,
            },
        ]);

        let writable_roots = policy.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(cwd.path());
        assert_eq!(writable_roots.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(writable_roots[0].root, expected_root);
        assert_eq!(writable_roots[0].read_only_subpaths, vec![expected_alias]);
    }

    #[cfg(unix)]
    #[test]
    fn tmpdir_special_path_canonicalizes_symlinked_tmpdir() {
        if std::env::var_os(SYMLINKED_TMPDIR_TEST_ENV).is_none() {
            let output = std::process::Command::new(std::env::current_exe().expect("test binary"))
                .env(SYMLINKED_TMPDIR_TEST_ENV, "1")
                .arg("--exact")
                .arg("permissions::tests::tmpdir_special_path_canonicalizes_symlinked_tmpdir")
                .output()
                .expect("run tmpdir subprocess test");

            assert!(
                output.status.success(),
                "tmpdir subprocess test failed\nstdout:\n{}\nstderr:\n{}",
                String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout),
                String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr)
            );
            return;
        }

        let cwd = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
        let real_tmpdir = cwd.path().join("real-tmpdir");
        let link_tmpdir = cwd.path().join("link-tmpdir");
        let blocked = real_tmpdir.join("blocked");
        let codex_dir = real_tmpdir.join(".codex");

        fs::create_dir_all(&blocked).expect("create blocked");
        fs::create_dir_all(&codex_dir).expect("create .codex");
        symlink_dir(&real_tmpdir, &link_tmpdir).expect("create symlinked tmpdir");

        let link_blocked =
            AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(link_tmpdir.join("blocked")).expect("link blocked");
        let expected_root = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(
            real_tmpdir
                .canonicalize()
                .expect("canonicalize real tmpdir"),
        )
        .expect("absolute canonical tmpdir");
        let expected_blocked = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(
            blocked.canonicalize().expect("canonicalize blocked"),
        )
        .expect("absolute canonical blocked");
        let expected_codex = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(
            codex_dir.canonicalize().expect("canonicalize .codex"),
        )
        .expect("absolute canonical .codex");

        unsafe {
            std::env::set_var("TMPDIR", &link_tmpdir);
        }

        let policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
            FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                path: FileSystemPath::Special {
                    value: FileSystemSpecialPath::Tmpdir,
                },
                access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
            },
            FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                path: FileSystemPath::Path { path: link_blocked },
                access: FileSystemAccessMode::None,
            },
        ]);

        assert_eq!(
            policy.get_unreadable_roots_with_cwd(cwd.path()),
            vec![expected_blocked.clone()]
        );

        let writable_roots = policy.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(cwd.path());
        assert_eq!(writable_roots.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(writable_roots[0].root, expected_root);
        assert!(
            writable_roots[0]
                .read_only_subpaths
                .contains(&expected_blocked)
        );
        assert!(
            writable_roots[0]
                .read_only_subpaths
                .contains(&expected_codex)
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn resolve_access_with_cwd_uses_most_specific_entry() {
        let cwd = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
        let docs =
            AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base("docs", cwd.path()).expect("resolve docs");
        let docs_private = AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base("docs/private", cwd.path())
            .expect("resolve docs/private");
        let docs_private_public =
            AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base("docs/private/public", cwd.path())
                .expect("resolve docs/private/public");
        let policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
            FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                path: FileSystemPath::Special {
                    value: FileSystemSpecialPath::CurrentWorkingDirectory,
                },
                access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
            },
            FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                path: FileSystemPath::Path { path: docs.clone() },
                access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
            },
            FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                path: FileSystemPath::Path {
                    path: docs_private.clone(),
                },
                access: FileSystemAccessMode::None,
            },
            FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                path: FileSystemPath::Path {
                    path: docs_private_public.clone(),
                },
                access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
            },
        ]);

        assert_eq!(
            policy.resolve_access_with_cwd(cwd.path(), cwd.path()),
            FileSystemAccessMode::Write
        );
        assert_eq!(
            policy.resolve_access_with_cwd(docs.as_path(), cwd.path()),
            FileSystemAccessMode::Read
        );
        assert_eq!(
            policy.resolve_access_with_cwd(docs_private.as_path(), cwd.path()),
            FileSystemAccessMode::None
        );
        assert_eq!(
            policy.resolve_access_with_cwd(docs_private_public.as_path(), cwd.path()),
            FileSystemAccessMode::Write
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn split_only_nested_carveouts_need_direct_runtime_enforcement() {
        let cwd = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
        let docs =
            AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base("docs", cwd.path()).expect("resolve docs");
        let policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
            FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                path: FileSystemPath::Special {
                    value: FileSystemSpecialPath::CurrentWorkingDirectory,
                },
                access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
            },
            FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                path: FileSystemPath::Path { path: docs },
                access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
            },
        ]);

        assert!(
            policy.needs_direct_runtime_enforcement(NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted, cwd.path(),)
        );

        let legacy_workspace_write =
            FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&SandboxPolicy::new_workspace_write_policy());
        assert!(
            !legacy_workspace_write
                .needs_direct_runtime_enforcement(NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted, cwd.path(),)
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn root_write_with_read_only_child_is_not_full_disk_write() {
        let cwd = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
        let docs =
            AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base("docs", cwd.path()).expect("resolve docs");
        let policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
            FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                path: FileSystemPath::Special {
                    value: FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
                },
                access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
            },
            FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                path: FileSystemPath::Path { path: docs.clone() },
                access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
            },
        ]);

        assert!(!policy.has_full_disk_write_access());
        assert_eq!(
            policy.resolve_access_with_cwd(docs.as_path(), cwd.path()),
            FileSystemAccessMode::Read
        );
        assert!(
            policy.needs_direct_runtime_enforcement(NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted, cwd.path(),)
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn root_deny_does_not_materialize_as_unreadable_root() {
        let cwd = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
        let docs =
            AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base("docs", cwd.path()).expect("resolve docs");
        let expected_docs = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(
            cwd.path()
                .canonicalize()
                .expect("canonicalize cwd")
                .join("docs"),
        )
        .expect("canonical docs");
        let policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
            FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                path: FileSystemPath::Special {
                    value: FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
                },
                access: FileSystemAccessMode::None,
            },
            FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                path: FileSystemPath::Path { path: docs.clone() },
                access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
            },
        ]);

        assert_eq!(
            policy.resolve_access_with_cwd(docs.as_path(), cwd.path()),
            FileSystemAccessMode::Read
        );
        assert_eq!(
            policy.get_readable_roots_with_cwd(cwd.path()),
            vec![expected_docs]
        );
        assert!(policy.get_unreadable_roots_with_cwd(cwd.path()).is_empty());
    }

    #[test]
    fn duplicate_root_deny_prevents_full_disk_write_access() {
        let cwd = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
        let root = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(cwd.path())
            .map(|cwd| absolute_root_path_for_cwd(&cwd))
            .expect("resolve filesystem root");
        let policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
            FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                path: FileSystemPath::Special {
                    value: FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
                },
                access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
            },
            FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                path: FileSystemPath::Special {
                    value: FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
                },
                access: FileSystemAccessMode::None,
            },
        ]);

        assert!(!policy.has_full_disk_write_access());
        assert_eq!(
            policy.resolve_access_with_cwd(root.as_path(), cwd.path()),
            FileSystemAccessMode::None
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn same_specificity_write_override_keeps_full_disk_write_access() {
        let cwd = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
        let docs =
            AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base("docs", cwd.path()).expect("resolve docs");
        let policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
            FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                path: FileSystemPath::Special {
                    value: FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
                },
                access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
            },
            FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                path: FileSystemPath::Path { path: docs.clone() },
                access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
            },
            FileSystemSandboxEntry {
                path: FileSystemPath::Path { path: docs.clone() },
                access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
            },
        ]);

        assert!(policy.has_full_disk_write_access());
        assert_eq!(
            policy.resolve_access_with_cwd(docs.as_path(), cwd.path()),
            FileSystemAccessMode::Write
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn file_system_access_mode_orders_by_conflict_precedence() {
        assert!(FileSystemAccessMode::Write > FileSystemAccessMode::Read);
        assert!(FileSystemAccessMode::None > FileSystemAccessMode::Write);
    }
}