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85fd52f7e4
## Why `codex sandbox` can start a network proxy from a configured permission profile. Previously, sandbox-level containment was tied to managed network requirements rather than whether a proxy was actually active. This meant config-driven proxy policies were not consistently enforced as the sandbox's only network path. ## What changed - Enable proxy-only network containment whenever `codex sandbox` starts a network proxy. - Apply the same active-proxy check to the macOS and Linux sandbox paths. - Add a Linux regression test that verifies a sandboxed command cannot establish a direct connection while the configured proxy is active. ## Test plan - `just test -p codex-cli debug_sandbox::tests` - `sandbox_with_network_proxy_blocks_direct_loopback_access` runs on Linux to cover the config-driven proxy path end to end.
96 lines
2.5 KiB
Rust
96 lines
2.5 KiB
Rust
use super::*;
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use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
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#[test]
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fn legacy_landlock_flag_is_included_when_requested() {
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let command = vec!["/bin/true".to_string()];
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let command_cwd = Path::new("/tmp/link");
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let cwd = Path::new("/tmp");
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let default_bwrap = create_linux_sandbox_command_args(
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command.clone(),
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command_cwd,
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cwd,
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/*use_legacy_landlock*/ false,
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/*allow_network_for_proxy*/ false,
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);
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assert_eq!(
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default_bwrap.contains(&"--use-legacy-landlock".to_string()),
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false
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);
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let legacy_landlock = create_linux_sandbox_command_args(
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command,
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command_cwd,
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cwd,
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/*use_legacy_landlock*/ true,
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/*allow_network_for_proxy*/ false,
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);
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assert_eq!(
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legacy_landlock.contains(&"--use-legacy-landlock".to_string()),
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true
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);
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}
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#[test]
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fn proxy_flag_takes_precedence_over_legacy_landlock() {
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let command = vec!["/bin/true".to_string()];
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let command_cwd = Path::new("/tmp/link");
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let cwd = Path::new("/tmp");
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let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::read_only();
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let args = create_linux_sandbox_command_args_for_permission_profile(
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command,
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command_cwd,
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&permission_profile,
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cwd,
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/*use_legacy_landlock*/ true,
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/*allow_network_for_proxy*/ true,
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);
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assert_eq!(
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args.contains(&"--allow-network-for-proxy".to_string()),
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true
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);
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assert_eq!(args.contains(&"--use-legacy-landlock".to_string()), false);
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}
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#[test]
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fn permission_profile_flag_is_included() {
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let command = vec!["/bin/true".to_string()];
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let command_cwd = Path::new("/tmp/link");
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let cwd = Path::new("/tmp");
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let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::read_only();
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let args = create_linux_sandbox_command_args_for_permission_profile(
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command,
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command_cwd,
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&permission_profile,
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cwd,
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/*use_legacy_landlock*/ true,
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/*allow_network_for_proxy*/ false,
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);
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assert_eq!(
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args.windows(2)
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.any(|window| { window[0] == "--permission-profile" && !window[1].is_empty() }),
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true
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);
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assert_eq!(
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args.windows(2)
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.any(|window| window[0] == "--command-cwd" && window[1] == "/tmp/link"),
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true
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);
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}
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#[test]
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fn proxy_network_requires_managed_requirements() {
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assert_eq!(
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allow_network_for_proxy(/*enforce_managed_network*/ false),
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false
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);
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assert_eq!(
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allow_network_for_proxy(/*enforce_managed_network*/ true),
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true
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);
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}
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