## Why
Users have been seeing opaque Windows sandbox setup refresh failures
such as `windows sandbox: spawn setup refresh`, including reports in
#24391 and #21208. The setup refresh path already runs the Windows
sandbox setup helper, but it was not using the same structured
`setup_error.json` reporting path that elevated setup uses. As a result,
when the helper exited non-zero, Codex only surfaced a generic refresh
status instead of the helper's `SetupFailure` code and message.
## What changed
- Clear stale `setup_error.json` before non-elevated setup refresh
launches the helper.
- When the refresh helper exits non-zero, read the helper-written report
through the existing `report_helper_failure` path.
- Keep a parent-side launch diagnostic for cases where the helper never
starts, including the helper path, cwd, sandbox log path, and spawn
error.
- Clear the setup error report after a successful refresh.
- Add regression coverage for report consumption and stale-report
avoidance.
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox setup::tests::`
# Why
When an organization requires the elevated Windows sandbox, Codex
launches an elevated helper to provision users, configure firewall and
ACL rules, and lock persistent sandbox directories.
We observed that closing the helper after setup started could leave the
machine partially initialized while the TUI still announced **Sandbox
ready**. Model-only turns continued to work, but the first shell command
retried setup and failed with Windows cancellation error `1223`.
This was not an enforcement bypass; command execution continued to fail
closed. The issue was a false readiness signal: `setup_marker.json` was
written during user provisioning, before the remaining setup stages had
completed.
# What
Treat `setup_marker.json` as the commit record for Windows sandbox
setup:
1. Before full or provisioning setup begins, remove the existing marker
and create the final marker path with a protected ACL.
2. Keep the marker empty and therefore invalid while setup is in
progress. Sandbox users cannot read, modify, or replace it.
3. Run every synchronous setup stage.
4. After setup succeeds, write the valid marker contents without
changing its ACL.
5. After the helper exits successfully, verify the existing readiness
check before enabling the sandbox.
If setup is canceled or fails, the marker remains invalid and Codex
reports setup as incomplete instead of announcing readiness.
Refresh-only and read-ACL-only helper runs continue to leave the marker
untouched. The setup version remains `5` to avoid forcing all existing
Windows users through elevated setup again.
# Verification
- Added coverage confirming sandbox users cannot read or modify the
setup marker after elevated setup.
- Added coverage confirming a successful helper exit without complete
setup artifacts is rejected.
- Ran `just test -p codex-windows-sandbox`.
## Why
Some Windows users do not have local admin access, so they cannot
complete the elevated portion of the Windows sandbox setup when Codex
first needs it. This adds an alpha provisioning path that an admin or IT
deployment script can run ahead of time for the Codex user.
The intended managed-deployment shape is:
```powershell
codex sandbox setup --elevated --user "$env:COMPUTERNAME\Alice" --codex-home "C:\Users\Alice\.codex"
```
`--elevated` is treated as the requested sandbox setup level, not as
proof that the process is elevated. The Windows sandbox setup
orchestration still checks that the caller is actually elevated before
launching the helper without a UAC prompt.
## What changed
- Added `codex sandbox setup --elevated` with explicit user selection
via either `--current-user` or `--user ... --codex-home ...`.
- Moved the CLI implementation into `cli/src/sandbox_setup.rs` instead
of growing `cli/src/main.rs`.
- Added a Windows sandbox `ProvisionOnly` helper mode that runs the
elevation-required provisioning work without requiring a workspace cwd
or runtime sandbox policy.
- Reused the existing elevated helper path for creating/updating sandbox
users, configuring firewall/WFP rules, and applying sandbox directory
ACLs.
- Persisted `windows.sandbox = "elevated"` into the target `CODEX_HOME`
so the desktop app does not show the initial sandbox setup banner after
pre-provisioning succeeds.
## Validation
- `cargo fmt -p codex-windows-sandbox -p codex-core -p codex-cli`
- `cargo test -p codex-cli sandbox_setup --target-dir
target\sandbox-setup-check`
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox
payload_accepts_provision_only_mode --target-dir
target\sandbox-setup-check`
- `git diff --check`
- Manual Windows alpha flow with a standard local user (`Mandi Lavida`):
ran the new setup command from an admin shell, verified the target
`.codex` contents, sandbox marker/secrets, ACLs, firewall rules, and
desktop startup without the sandbox setup banner once experimental
network proxy requirements were disabled.
## Notes
This intentionally does not solve later elevated update coordination for
IT-managed deployments. The setup command can still apply provisioning
updates when run again, but a broader coordination/process story is out
of scope for this alpha.
## Why
The Windows Bazel job on `main` started failing after #24108 because one
Windows-only capture test still passed `cwd.as_path()` to
`run_windows_sandbox_capture`. That helper now expects the explicit
`workspace_roots` slice introduced by #24108, so the Windows test target
no longer compiled.
## What Changed
- Updates `legacy_capture_cancellation_is_not_reported_as_timeout` to
pass `workspace_roots_for(cwd.as_path()).as_slice()`, matching the
adjacent capture test and the new runner signature.
## Verification
- GitHub Actions CI is the important validation for this Windows-only
compile path.
- Created quickly to get Windows CI running while the separate Ubuntu
`compact_resume_fork` timeout is still under investigation.
## Why
#23813 switches the Windows sandbox runner path to `PermissionProfile`,
but it still left one runtime anchor for resolving symbolic
`:workspace_roots` entries. That is not enough once a turn has multiple
effective workspace roots: exact entries and deny globs under
`:workspace_roots` need to be materialized for every runtime root before
the command runner chooses token mode or builds ACL plans.
## What Changed
- Replaces the Windows runner/setup `permission_profile_cwd` plumbing
with `workspace_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>`.
- Resolves Windows-local `PermissionProfile` data with
`materialize_project_roots_with_workspace_roots(...)` instead of the
single-cwd helper.
- Threads `Config::effective_workspace_roots()` through core execution,
unified exec, TUI setup/read-grant flows, app-server setup, app-server
`command/exec`, and `debug sandbox` on Windows.
- Preserves those workspace roots through the zsh-fork escalation
executor instead of rebuilding them from `sandbox_policy_cwd`.
- Makes `ExecRequest::new(...)` and the remaining
`build_exec_request(...)` helper path take
`windows_sandbox_workspace_roots` explicitly so new call sites cannot
silently fall back to `vec![cwd]`.
- Clarifies the `debug sandbox` non-Windows comment: remaining
cwd-dependent resolution still uses `sandbox_policy_cwd`, while
`:workspace_roots` entries are already materialized from config roots.
- Updates elevated runner IPC `SpawnRequest` to send `workspace_roots`
and bumps the framed IPC protocol version to `3` for the payload shape
change.
- Adds Windows-local resolver coverage for expanding exact and glob
`:workspace_roots` entries across multiple roots, plus core helper
coverage proving explicit roots are preserved.
## Verification
- `cargo check -p codex-windows-sandbox -p codex-core -p codex-tui -p
codex-cli -p codex-app-server`
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- `cargo test -p codex-core windows_sandbox`
- `cargo test -p codex-core unix_escalation`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server windows_sandbox`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui windows_sandbox`
- `cargo test -p codex-cli debug_sandbox`
- `just test -p codex-core unified_exec`
- `just test -p codex-core
build_exec_request_preserves_windows_workspace_roots`
- `env -u CODEX_NETWORK_PROXY_ACTIVE -u
CODEX_NETWORK_ALLOW_LOCAL_BINDING just test -p codex-app-server --lib
command_exec`
- `just test -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- `just test -p codex-exec sandbox`
- `just fix -p codex-core -p codex-app-server -p codex-windows-sandbox`
A local macOS cross-check with `cargo check --target
x86_64-pc-windows-msvc ...` did not reach crate Rust code because native
dependencies require Windows SDK headers (`windows.h` / `assert.h`) in
this environment; Windows CI remains the real target validation.
Two local targeted filters compile but do not run assertions on macOS:
`env -u CODEX_NETWORK_PROXY_ACTIVE -u CODEX_NETWORK_ALLOW_LOCAL_BINDING
just test -p codex-app-server --lib command_exec_processor` matched zero
tests, and `just test -p codex-linux-sandbox landlock` matched zero
tests because the landlock suite is Linux-only.
## Why
When Guardian or the sandbox network proxy detects and denies a network
attempt, core cancels the associated execution through `ExecExpiration`.
The Windows sandbox capture path was only forwarding the timeout
component of that expiration state. As a result, a sandboxed Windows
command whose network attempt had already been denied could keep running
until its timeout elapsed rather than terminating promptly in response
to the denial.
This change closes that cancellation-propagation gap for Windows sandbox
execution.
## What changed
- Added `WindowsSandboxCancellationToken` as the cancellation hook
exposed to Windows capture backends.
- Extracted the cancellation token from `ExecExpiration` in core and
passed it to both the direct and elevated Windows sandbox capture paths
alongside the existing timeout.
- Updated direct capture to poll for either process exit, timeout, or
cancellation and to terminate cancelled processes without reporting them
as timed out.
- Updated elevated capture to watch for cancellation and send the
existing `Terminate` IPC frame to the elevated runner. The watcher parks
for 50 ms between checks to bound response latency without a tight busy
wait.
- Added Windows regression coverage for a long-running PowerShell
command: cancellation ends capture before its timeout and does not set
`timed_out`.
- Added a visible skip diagnostic when that PowerShell-dependent
regression test cannot execute, and consolidated the duplicated
expiration-policy branch identified in review.
## Security
This improves enforcement after a denied network attempt has been
attributed to a Windows sandboxed execution: the command no longer
remains alive simply because Windows capture lost the cancellation
signal.
This PR does not claim to make Windows offline mode an airtight
no-network or no-exfiltration boundary. It does not introduce
AppContainer or change how network denial is detected; it makes an
already-detected denial promptly stop the affected sandboxed command.
## Validation
### Commands run
- `just fmt`
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- `cargo test -p codex-core network_denial`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-core -p codex-windows-sandbox --tests --no-deps
-- -D warnings`
- `just argument-comment-lint -p codex-windows-sandbox -p codex-core`
The new capture regression is `cfg(target_os = "windows")`, so Windows
CI is the execution coverage for that test path. The local macOS test
runs validate the host-runnable crate and core network-denial behavior.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Why
Windows sandbox diagnostics are currently hard to recover from
`/feedback` even though they are often the most useful artifact when
debugging sandbox behavior. Now that sandbox logging uses daily rolling
files, feedback can safely include the current day's sandbox log without
uploading the old ever-growing legacy `sandbox.log`.
## What changed
- Add a `codex-windows-sandbox` helper that resolves the current daily
sandbox log from `codex_home`.
- When feedback is submitted with logs enabled on Windows, app-server
attaches today's sandbox log if it exists.
- Upload the attachment under the stable filename `windows-sandbox.log`,
independent of the dated on-disk filename.
- Keep existing raw `extra_log_files` behavior unchanged for rollout and
desktop log attachments.
## Verification
- `cargo fmt -p codex-app-server -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox
current_log_file_path_for_codex_home_uses_sandbox_dir`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server
windows_sandbox_log_attachment_uses_current_log`
- Manual CLI/TUI `/feedback` test confirmed Sentry received
`windows-sandbox.log`.
## Why
The Windows sandbox runner still carried the old `SandboxPolicy`
compatibility path even though core now computes `PermissionProfile`.
That meant Windows command-runner execution could only see the legacy
projection, so profile-only filesystem rules such as deny globs were not
part of the runner input.
## What Changed
- Removed the Windows-local `SandboxPolicy` parser/export and deleted
`windows-sandbox-rs/src/policy.rs`.
- Changed restricted-token capture/session setup, elevated setup,
world-writable audit, read-root grant, and command-runner session APIs
to accept `PermissionProfile` plus the profile cwd.
- Bumped the elevated command-runner IPC protocol to version 2 because
`SpawnRequest` now carries `permission_profile` /
`permission_profile_cwd` instead of the legacy `policy_json_or_preset` /
`sandbox_policy_cwd` fields.
- Updated core exec, unified exec, debug-sandbox, TUI setup/grant flows,
and app-server setup to pass the actual effective `PermissionProfile`.
- Left regression coverage asserting the old IPC policy fields are
absent and the runner serializes tagged `PermissionProfile` JSON.
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- `cargo test -p codex-core windows_sandbox`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server
request_processors::windows_sandbox_processor`
- `just fix -p codex-windows-sandbox -p codex-core -p codex-app-server
-p codex-cli -p codex-tui`
- `just fix -p codex-cli -p codex-tui`
- `just fix -p codex-windows-sandbox -p codex-tui`
- `rg "\\bSandboxPolicy\\b" codex-rs/windows-sandbox-rs` returned no
matches.
Note: `cargo test -p codex-cli` was attempted but did not reach crate
tests because local disk filled while compiling dependencies (`No space
left on device`). The targeted clippy pass compiled the affected CLI/TUI
surfaces afterward.
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/23813).
* #24108
* __->__ #23813
## Why
Windows sandbox diagnostics currently append to a single `sandbox.log`
under `CODEX_HOME/.sandbox`. That file never rolls over, which makes it
hard to safely include sandbox diagnostics in future feedback reports
without risking unbounded growth.
## What changed
- Replaced direct append-open sandbox logging with
`tracing_appender::rolling::RollingFileAppender`.
- Configured sandbox logs to rotate daily using names like
`sandbox.YYYY-MM-DD.log`.
- Added a conservative `MAX_LOG_FILES` cap of 90 retained matching log
files.
- Routed the Windows sandbox setup helper through the same rolling
writer.
- Added helpers for resolving the current daily sandbox log path so
future feedback upload work can use the same filename logic.
- Updated tests and test diagnostics to read the dated daily log file.
This intentionally does not include sandbox logs in `/feedback` yet;
scrubbing and attachment behavior can happen in a follow-up.
## Testing
- `cargo fmt -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- `cargo check -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox logging::tests`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-windows-sandbox --all-targets -- -D warnings`
## Why
This is the next step after #23167 in the Windows sandbox
`PermissionProfile` migration. The elevated Windows backend still
exposed policy-string entry points, which forced callers to pass a
compatibility `SandboxPolicy` before the command-runner IPC could
receive a profile.
Adding profile-native APIs first keeps the core switch in the next PR
small: reviewers can see that the Windows crate can prepare elevated
setup, capability SIDs, and runner IPC from a resolved
`PermissionProfile` without changing core behavior yet.
## What
- Adds `ElevatedSandboxProfileCaptureRequest` and
`run_windows_sandbox_capture_for_permission_profile_elevated` for
one-shot elevated capture.
- Adds `spawn_windows_sandbox_session_elevated_for_permission_profile`
for unified exec sessions.
- Factors elevated spawn prep through
`prepare_elevated_spawn_context_for_permissions`, so both new APIs
operate from `ResolvedWindowsSandboxPermissions` directly.
- Keeps the existing legacy policy-string APIs as adapters for callers
that have not moved yet.
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox`
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/23714).
* #23715
* __->__ #23714
## Why
This is the next step in the Windows sandbox migration away from the
legacy `SandboxPolicy` abstraction. #22923 moved write-root and token
decisions onto `ResolvedWindowsSandboxPermissions`, but setup and
identity still accepted `SandboxPolicy` and converted internally. This
PR pushes that conversion outward so the setup path consumes the
resolved Windows permission view directly.
## What Changed
- Changed `SandboxSetupRequest` to carry
`ResolvedWindowsSandboxPermissions` instead of `SandboxPolicy` plus
policy cwd.
- Updated setup refresh/elevation and identity credential preparation to
use resolved permissions for read roots, write roots, network identity,
and deny-write payload planning.
- Removed the production `allow.rs` legacy wrapper; allow-path
computation now takes resolved permissions directly.
- Added a permissions-based world-writable audit entry point while
keeping the existing legacy wrapper for compatibility.
- Updated legacy ACL setup and the core Windows setup bridge to
construct resolved permissions at the boundary.
- Hardened the Windows sandbox integration test helper staging so Bazel
retries can reuse an already-staged helper if a prior sandbox helper
process still has the executable open.
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --test all --no-run`
- `just fix -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- `just fix -p codex-core`
- Attempted `cargo check -p codex-windows-sandbox --target
x86_64-pc-windows-gnullvm`, but the local machine is missing
`x86_64-w64-mingw32-clang`; Windows CI should cover that target.
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/23167).
* #23715
* #23714
* __->__ #23167
## Why
This is the third PR in the Windows sandbox `SandboxPolicy` ->
`PermissionProfile` migration stack.
#22896 introduced `ResolvedWindowsSandboxPermissions`, and #22918 moved
elevated runner IPC to carry `PermissionProfile`. This PR starts moving
the remaining setup/spawn helpers away from asking legacy enum questions
like “is this `WorkspaceWrite`?” and toward resolved runtime permission
questions like “does this profile require write capability roots?”
## What changed
- Added resolved-permissions helpers for network identity and
write-capability detection.
- Moved setup write-root gathering to operate on
`ResolvedWindowsSandboxPermissions`, with the legacy `SandboxPolicy`
wrapper left in place for existing call sites.
- Updated identity setup, elevated capture setup, and world-writable
audit denies to use resolved write roots.
- Updated spawn preparation to carry resolved permissions in
`SpawnContext` and use them for network blocking, setup write roots,
elevated capability SID selection, and legacy capability roots.
- Removed a now-unused legacy write-root helper.
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- `just fix -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- Existing stack checks are green on #22896 and #22918; CI has started
for this PR.
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/22923).
* #23715
* #23714
* #23167
* __->__ #22923
## Summary
Follow-up to #23636 review feedback: the Windows sandbox had two copies
of the same bundled-helper lookup order, one for
`codex-command-runner.exe` in `helper_materialization.rs` and one for
`codex-windows-sandbox-setup.exe` in `setup.rs`.
This PR centralizes that lookup in
`helper_materialization::bundled_executable_path_for_exe()` and has
setup reuse it for `codex-windows-sandbox-setup.exe`. The lookup
behavior is unchanged: direct sibling first, package-root
`codex-resources/` when running from `bin/`, then legacy sibling
`codex-resources/`.
## Test plan
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox`
## Notes
I also attempted `cargo check -p codex-windows-sandbox --target
x86_64-pc-windows-gnullvm`, but this local host is missing
`x86_64-w64-mingw32-clang`.
## Why
This is the next PR in the Windows sandbox migration stack after #22896.
The bottom PR introduces a Windows-local resolved permissions helper
while existing callers still start from legacy `SandboxPolicy`. This PR
moves the elevated runner IPC boundary to `PermissionProfile`, which
makes the direction of the stack visible without changing the public
core call sites yet.
Because that changes the CLI-to-command-runner message shape, the framed
IPC protocol version is bumped in the same PR so the boundary change is
explicit.
## What changed
- Replaced elevated IPC `policy_json_or_preset`/`sandbox_policy_cwd`
fields with `permission_profile`/`permission_profile_cwd`.
- Bumped the elevated command-runner IPC protocol to
`IPC_PROTOCOL_VERSION = 2` and switched parent/runner frames to use the
shared constant.
- Converted the parent elevated paths from the parsed legacy policy into
a materialized `PermissionProfile` before sending the runner request.
- Added `WindowsSandboxTokenMode` resolution for managed
`PermissionProfile` values and made the runner choose read-only vs
writable-root capability tokens from that resolved profile.
- Rejected disabled, external, unrestricted, and full-disk-write
profiles before token selection.
- Added IPC JSON coverage for tagged `PermissionProfile` payloads and
token-mode unit coverage for the resolved permission helper.
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- `just fix -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- `cargo check -p codex-windows-sandbox --target x86_64-pc-windows-msvc
--tests` was attempted locally but blocked before crate type-checking
because the macOS compiler environment lacks Windows C headers such as
`windows.h` and `assert.h`; GitHub Windows CI is the required
verification for the runner path.
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/22918).
* #23715
* #23714
* #23167
* #22923
* __->__ #22918
## Summary
Standalone installs should exercise the same canonical package archive
layout that release builds produce, rather than unpacking npm platform
packages and reconstructing a parallel install tree.
This updates `install.sh` and `install.ps1` to prefer
`codex-package-<target>.tar.gz` plus `codex-package_SHA256SUMS`
introduced in https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/23635, authenticate
the checksum manifest against GitHub release metadata, verify the
selected package archive against the authenticated manifest, and install
the package archive directly.
## Compatibility Notes
Package installs still leave a compatibility command at `current/codex`
for managed daemon flows, while visible command shims point at
`bin/codex` inside the package layout.
Recent releases that predate package archives still publish per-platform
npm artifacts, so both installers keep a legacy platform npm fallback
for those versions and verify those archives against release metadata
directly.
Releases old enough to publish only the single root
`codex-npm-<version>.tgz` archive are intentionally out of scope. The
installers fail clearly when neither package archives nor per-platform
npm archives are present.
On Windows, the runtime helper lookups now recognize package-layout
installs where `codex.exe` runs from `bin/`, so
`codex-command-runner.exe` and `codex-windows-sandbox-setup.exe` resolve
from the top-level `codex-resources/` directory. The direct-sibling and
older sibling-resource fallbacks are preserved.
## Test plan
- `sh -n scripts/install/install.sh`
- `bash -n scripts/install/install.sh`
- `pwsh -NoProfile -Command '$tokens=$null; $errors=$null; $null =
[System.Management.Automation.Language.Parser]::ParseFile("scripts/install/install.ps1",
[ref]$tokens, [ref]$errors); if ($errors.Count) { $errors | Format-List
*; exit 1 }'`
- `HOME="$home_dir" CODEX_HOME="$tmp_dir/codex-home"
CODEX_INSTALL_DIR="$bin_dir" PATH="$bin_dir:$PATH" sh
scripts/install/install.sh --release 0.125.0`
- Verified the 0.125.0 isolated install leaves the visible command
pointed at `current/codex` and includes the legacy `codex-resources/rg`
payload.
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- `just fix -p codex-windows-sandbox`
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/23636).
* #23638
* #23637
* __->__ #23636
## Why
The Windows sandbox migration away from the legacy `SandboxPolicy`
abstraction needs a small local bridge before IPC and core wiring can
move to `PermissionProfile`. Leaf helpers currently branch directly on
`WorkspaceWrite`, which spreads legacy assumptions through path planning
and token setup code.
This PR introduces a Windows-local resolved permissions view so those
helpers can ask Windows-specific questions about runtime
filesystem/network permissions without matching on the legacy policy
enum everywhere.
## What changed
- Added `ResolvedWindowsSandboxPermissions` in
`windows-sandbox-rs/src/resolved_permissions.rs`, with legacy
`SandboxPolicy` constructors for the current call sites.
- Moved `allow.rs` writable-root and read-only-subpath planning onto the
resolved permissions type.
- Preserved Windows `TEMP`/`TMP` writable-root behavior when the
effective policy includes writable tmpdir access.
- Avoided resolving Unix `:slash_tmp` or parent-process `TMPDIR` while
computing Windows writable roots.
- Reused the shared allow-path result for setup write-root gathering and
routed network-block selection through the resolved abstraction.
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- `just fix -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- GitHub CI restarted on the amended commit; Windows Bazel is the
required signal for the Windows-only code paths.
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/22896).
* #23715
* #23714
* #23167
* #22923
* #22918
* __->__ #22896
## Why
Filesystem permission profiles used `none` for deny-read entries, which
is less direct than the action the entry actually represents. This
change makes `deny` the canonical filesystem permission spelling while
preserving compatibility for older configs that still send `none`.
## What changed
- rename `FileSystemAccessMode::None` to `Deny`
- serialize and generate schemas with `deny` as the canonical value
- retain `none` only as a legacy input alias for temporary config
compatibility
- update filesystem glob diagnostics and regression coverage to use the
canonical spelling
- refresh config and app-server schema fixtures to match the new wire
shape
## Validation
- `cargo test -p codex-protocol`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol`
- `cargo test -p codex-core config_toml_deserializes_permission_profiles
--lib`
- `cargo test -p codex-core
read_write_glob_patterns_still_reject_non_subpath_globs --lib`
Earlier in the session, a broad `cargo test -p codex-core` run reached
unrelated pre-existing failures in timing/snapshot/git-info tests under
this environment; the targeted surfaces touched by this PR passed
cleanly.
## Why
The legacy Windows sandbox still carried a `persist_aces` mode switch,
even though the only path that meaningfully applies filesystem ACEs
today is `workspace-write`, which already uses the persistent behavior.
Legacy read-only sessions rely on the read-only capability SID rather
than per-command filesystem ACE mutation, so the temporary cleanup
branch had become conceptual overhead without a corresponding behavioral
need.
Removing that split makes the ACL lifecycle match the current sandbox
model more directly and trims the guard/revocation plumbing from the
legacy launcher paths.
## What changed
- Removed the `persist_aces` parameter from legacy ACL preparation.
- Made legacy deny-read handling always use the persistent
reconciliation path.
- Dropped guard tracking and post-exit ACE revocation from both capture
and unified-exec legacy flows.
- Kept workspace `.codex` / `.agents` protection tied directly to
`WorkspaceWrite` instead of an intermediate persistence flag.
## Verification
- `cargo fmt -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- `git diff --check`
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- 85 passed, 2 ignored, 2 (unrelated) failed locally.
## Summary
- remove two redundant `PathBuf` clones in Windows sandbox setup tests
- fix current `rust-ci-full` Windows clippy failures on `main`
## Validation
- `just fmt`
- attempted on `dev`: `cargo clippy --target x86_64-pc-windows-msvc
--tests --profile dev --timings -- -D warnings`
- blocked by missing MSVC cross toolchain on the Linux devbox (`lib.exe`
/ MSVC C toolchain unavailable)
- live failure evidence: main `rust-ci-full` runs 25880209898 and
25879137967 failed on `windows-sandbox-rs/src/bin/setup_main/win.rs`
with `clippy::redundant_clone` at the two edited callsites
## Why
Elevated Windows sandbox setup currently assumes that the firewall rules
it writes will take effect. On managed Windows hosts, local firewall
policy changes can be ignored or only partially apply across the active
profiles, which means setup can appear to succeed without providing the
expected network isolation.
## What changed
- Query `INetFwPolicy2::LocalPolicyModifyState` before configuring the
elevated sandbox firewall rules.
- Fail setup when Windows reports that local firewall policy edits are
ineffective or only apply to some current profiles.
- Surface that condition with a dedicated
`helper_firewall_policy_ineffective` setup error code so support and
IT-facing diagnostics can distinguish it from COM access failures.
- Add focused coverage for effective policy, group-policy override, and
partial-profile coverage cases.
## Testing
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox --bin
codex-windows-sandbox-setup`
## Why
The split filesystem policy stack already supports exact and glob
`access = none` read restrictions on macOS and Linux. Windows still
needed subprocess handling for those deny-read policies without claiming
enforcement from a backend that cannot provide it.
## Key finding
The unelevated restricted-token backend cannot safely enforce deny-read
overlays. Its `WRITE_RESTRICTED` token model is authoritative for write
checks, not read denials, so this PR intentionally fails that backend
closed when deny-read overrides are present instead of claiming
unsupported enforcement.
## What changed
This PR adds the Windows deny-read enforcement layer and makes the
backend split explicit:
- Resolves Windows deny-read filesystem policy entries into concrete ACL
targets.
- Preserves exact missing paths so they can be materialized and denied
before an enforceable sandboxed process starts.
- Snapshot-expands existing glob matches into ACL targets for Windows
subprocess enforcement.
- Honors `glob_scan_max_depth` when expanding Windows deny-read globs.
- Plans both the configured lexical path and the canonical target for
existing paths so reparse-point aliases are covered.
- Threads deny-read overrides through the elevated/logon-user Windows
sandbox backend and unified exec.
- Applies elevated deny-read ACLs synchronously before command launch
rather than delegating them to the background read-grant helper.
- Reconciles persistent deny-read ACEs per sandbox principal so policy
changes do not leave stale deny-read ACLs behind.
- Fails closed on the unelevated restricted-token backend when deny-read
overrides are present, because its `WRITE_RESTRICTED` token model is not
authoritative for read denials.
## Landed prerequisites
These prerequisite PRs are already on `main`:
1. #15979 `feat(permissions): add glob deny-read policy support`
2. #18096 `feat(sandbox): add glob deny-read platform enforcement`
3. #17740 `feat(config): support managed deny-read requirements`
This PR targets `main` directly and contains only the Windows deny-read
enforcement layer.
## Implementation notes
- Exact deny-read paths remain enforceable on the elevated path even
when they do not exist yet: Windows materializes the missing path before
applying the deny ACE, so the sandboxed command cannot create and read
it during the same run.
- Existing exact deny paths are preserved lexically until the ACL
planner, which then adds the canonical target as a second ACL target
when needed. That keeps both the configured alias and the resolved
object covered.
- Windows ACLs do not consume Codex glob syntax directly, so glob
deny-read entries are expanded to the concrete matches that exist before
process launch.
- Glob traversal deduplicates directory visits within each pattern walk
to avoid cycles, without collapsing distinct lexical roots that happen
to resolve to the same target.
- Persistent deny-read ACL state is keyed by sandbox principal SID, so
cleanup only removes ACEs owned by the same backend principal.
- Deny-read ACEs are fail-closed on the elevated path: setup aborts if
mandatory deny-read ACL application fails.
- Unelevated restricted-token sessions reject deny-read overrides early
instead of running with a silently unenforceable read policy.
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-core
windows_restricted_token_rejects_unreadable_split_carveouts`
- `just fmt`
- `just fix -p codex-core`
- `just fix -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- GitHub Actions rerun is in progress on the pushed head.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Summary
In https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/21584, we disabled doctests for
crates that lack any doctests. We can enforce that property via `cargo
shear --deny-warnings`: crates that lack doctests will be flagged if
doctests are enabled, and crates with doctests will be flagged if
doctests are disabled.
A few additional notes:
- By adding `--deny-warnings`, `cargo shear` also flagged a number of
modules that were not reachable at all. Some of those have been removed.
- This PR removes a usage of `windows_modules!` (since `cargo shear` and
`rustfmt` couldn't see through it) in favor of simple `#[cfg(target_os =
"windows")]` macros. As a consequence, many of these files exhibit churn
in this PR, since they weren't being formatted by `rustfmt` at all on
main.
- Again, to make the code more analyzable, this PR also removes some
usages of `#[path = "cwd_junction.rs"]` in favor of a more standard
module structure. The bin sidecar structure is still retained, but,
e.g., `windows-sandbox-rs/src/bin/command_runner.rs` was moved to
`windows-sandbox-rs/src/bin/command_runner/main.rs`, and so on.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
Add Codex config for static trace span attributes and structured W3C
tracestate field upserts. The config flows through OtelSettings so
callers can attach trace metadata without touching every span call site.
Apply span attributes with an SDK span processor so every exported
trace span carries the configured metadata. Model tracestate as nested
member fields so configured keys can be upserted while unrelated
propagated state in the same member is preserved.
Validate configured tracestate before installing provider-global state,
including header-unsafe values the SDK does not reject by itself. This
keeps Codex from propagating malformed trace context from config.
Update the config schema, public docs, and OTLP loopback coverage for
config parsing, span export, propagation, and invalid-header rejection.
## Why
Codex desktop copies bundled Windows binaries out of `WindowsApps` into
a LocalAppData runtime cache before launching `codex.exe`. Sandboxed
commands can then need to execute helpers from that cache, but the
sandbox user group may not have read/execute access to the runtime bin
directory.
This makes the Windows sandbox refresh path repair that access directly
so the packaged desktop runtime remains usable from sandboxed sessions.
## What changed
- Added `setup_runtime_bin` to locate `%LOCALAPPDATA%\OpenAI\Codex\bin`,
matching the desktop bundled-binaries destination path, with the same
`USERPROFILE\AppData\Local` fallback shape.
- During refresh setup, check whether `CodexSandboxUsers` already has
read/execute access to the runtime bin directory.
- If access is missing, grant `CodexSandboxUsers` `OI/CI/RX` inheritance
on that directory.
- If the runtime bin directory does not exist, no-op cleanly.
## Verification
- `cargo build -p codex-windows-sandbox --bin
codex-windows-sandbox-setup`
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox --bin
codex-windows-sandbox-setup`
- Manual Windows ACL exercise against the installed packaged runtime
bin:
- existing inherited `CodexSandboxUsers:(I)(OI)(CI)(RX)` no-ops without
changing SDDL
- after disabling inheritance and removing the group ACE, setup adds
`CodexSandboxUsers:(OI)(CI)(RX)`
- with `LOCALAPPDATA` pointed at a fake location without
`OpenAI\Codex\bin`, setup exits successfully and does not create the
directory
- restored the real runtime bin with inherited ACLs and confirmed the
final SDDL matched the baseline exactly
## Why
Windows sandboxed commands run as a sandbox user, while workspace
repositories are usually owned by the real user. The sandbox compensates
by injecting a temporary Git `safe.directory` entry into the child
environment.
That injection was still broken for linked worktrees because the helper
followed the `.git` file's `gitdir:` pointer and injected the internal
`.git/worktrees/...` location. Git's dubious-ownership check expects the
worktree root instead, so sandboxed Git commands still failed in
worktree-based Codex checkouts.
## What changed
- Treat any `.git` marker, directory or file, as the worktree root for
`safe.directory` injection.
- Keep the safe-directory logic in
`windows-sandbox-rs/src/sandbox_utils.rs` and have the one-shot elevated
path reuse it.
- Add regression coverage for both normal `.git` directories and
gitfile-based worktrees.
## Validation
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox sandbox_utils::tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox` built and ran; the new
`sandbox_utils` tests passed, while two pre-existing legacy sandbox
tests failed locally with `Access is denied`:
`session::tests::legacy_non_tty_cmd_emits_output` and
`spawn_prep::tests::legacy_spawn_env_applies_offline_network_rewrite`.
## Why
On Windows, background terminals could stay visible after their shell
process had already exited. The elevated runner waits for the PTY output
reader to reach EOF before it sends the final exit message, but the
ConPTY helper was reducing ownership down to raw handles too early. That
left the pseudoconsole's borrowed pipe handles alive past teardown, so
EOF never propagated and the session stayed `running`.
## What changed
- change `utils/pty/src/win/conpty.rs` to hand off owned ConPTY
resources instead of leaking only raw handles
- make `windows-sandbox-rs/src/conpty/mod.rs` keep the pseudoconsole
owner and the backing pipe handles together until teardown
- update the elevated runner and the legacy unified-exec backend to keep
that `ConptyInstance` alive, take only the specific pipe handles they
need, and drop the owner at teardown instead of trying to close a
detached pseudoconsole handle later
## Testing
- desktop app in `Auto-review`: 11 x `cmd /c "ping -n 3 google.com"` all
exited cleanly and did not accumulate in the UI
- desktop app in `Auto-review`: 5 x `cmd /c "ping -n 30 google.com"`
appeared in the UI and drained back out on their own
## Status
This is the Bazel PR-CI cross-compilation follow-up to #20485. It is
intentionally split from the Cargo/cargo-xwin release-build PoC so
#20485 can stay as the historical release-build exploration. The
unrelated async-utils test cleanup has been moved to #20686, so this PR
is focused on the Windows Bazel CI path.
The intended tradeoff is now explicit in `.github/workflows/bazel.yml`:
pull requests get the fast Windows cross-compiled Bazel test leg, while
post-merge pushes to `main` run both that fast cross leg and a fully
native Windows Bazel test leg. The native main-only job keeps full
V8/code-mode coverage and gets a 40-minute timeout because it is less
latency-sensitive than PR CI. All other Bazel jobs remain at 30 minutes.
## Why
Windows Bazel PR CI currently does the expensive part of the build on
Windows. A native Windows Bazel test job on `main` completed in about
28m12s, leaving very little headroom under the 30-minute job timeout and
making Windows the slowest PR signal.
#20485 showed that Windows cross-compilation can be materially faster
for Cargo release builds, but PR CI needs Bazel because Bazel owns our
test sharding, flaky-test retries, and integration-test layout. This PR
applies the same high-level shape we already use for macOS Bazel CI:
compile with remote Linux execution, then run platform-specific tests on
the platform runner.
The compromise is deliberately signal-aware: code-mode/V8 changes are
rare enough that PR CI can accept losing the direct V8/code-mode
smoke-test signal temporarily, while `main` still runs the native
Windows job post-merge to catch that class of regression. A follow-up PR
should investigate making the cross-built Windows gnullvm V8 archive
pass the direct V8/code-mode tests so this tradeoff can eventually go
away.
## What Changed
- Adds a `ci-windows-cross` Bazel config that targets
`x86_64-pc-windows-gnullvm`, uses Linux RBE for build actions, and keeps
`TestRunner` actions local on the Windows runner.
- Adds explicit Windows platform definitions for
`windows_x86_64_gnullvm`, `windows_x86_64_msvc`, and a bridge toolchain
that lets gnullvm test targets execute under the Windows MSVC host
platform.
- Updates the Windows Bazel PR test leg to opt into the cross-compile
path via `--windows-cross-compile` and `--remote-download-toplevel`.
- Adds a `test-windows-native-main` job that runs only for `push` events
on `refs/heads/main`, uses the native Windows Bazel path, includes
V8/code-mode smoke tests, and has `timeout-minutes: 40`.
- Keeps fork/community PRs without `BUILDBUDDY_API_KEY` on the previous
local Windows MSVC-host fallback, including
`--host_platform=//:local_windows_msvc` and `--jobs=8`.
- Preserves the existing integration-test shape on non-gnullvm
platforms, while generating Windows-cross wrapper targets only for
`windows_gnullvm`.
- Resolves `CARGO_BIN_EXE_*` values from runfiles at test runtime,
avoiding hard-coded Cargo paths and duplicate test runfiles.
- Extends the V8 Bazel patches enough for the
`x86_64-pc-windows-gnullvm` target and Linux remote execution path.
- Makes the Windows sandbox test cwd derive from `INSTA_WORKSPACE_ROOT`
at runtime when Bazel provides it, because cross-compiled binaries may
contain Linux compile-time paths.
- Keeps the direct V8/code-mode unit smoke tests out of the Windows
cross PR path for now while native Windows CI continues to cover them
post-merge.
## Command Shape
The fast Windows PR test leg invokes the normal Bazel CI wrapper like
this:
```shell
./.github/scripts/run-bazel-ci.sh \
--print-failed-action-summary \
--print-failed-test-logs \
--windows-cross-compile \
--remote-download-toplevel \
-- \
test \
--test_tag_filters=-argument-comment-lint \
--test_verbose_timeout_warnings \
--build_metadata=COMMIT_SHA=${GITHUB_SHA} \
-- \
//... \
-//third_party/v8:all \
-//codex-rs/code-mode:code-mode-unit-tests \
-//codex-rs/v8-poc:v8-poc-unit-tests
```
With the BuildBuddy secret available on Windows, the wrapper selects
`--config=ci-windows-cross` and appends the important Windows-cross
overrides after rc expansion:
```shell
--host_platform=//:rbe
--shell_executable=/bin/bash
--action_env=PATH=/usr/bin:/bin
--host_action_env=PATH=/usr/bin:/bin
--test_env=PATH=${CODEX_BAZEL_WINDOWS_PATH}
```
The native post-merge Windows job intentionally omits
`--windows-cross-compile` and does not exclude the V8/code-mode unit
targets:
```shell
./.github/scripts/run-bazel-ci.sh \
--print-failed-action-summary \
--print-failed-test-logs \
-- \
test \
--test_tag_filters=-argument-comment-lint \
--test_verbose_timeout_warnings \
--build_metadata=COMMIT_SHA=${GITHUB_SHA} \
--build_metadata=TAG_windows_native_main=true \
-- \
//... \
-//third_party/v8:all
```
## Research Notes
The existing macOS Bazel CI config already uses the model we want here:
build actions run remotely with `--strategy=remote`, but `TestRunner`
actions execute on the macOS runner. This PR mirrors that pattern for
Windows with `--strategy=TestRunner=local`.
The important Bazel detail is that `rules_rs` is already targeting
`x86_64-pc-windows-gnullvm` for Windows Bazel PR tests. This PR changes
where the build actions execute; it does not switch the Bazel PR test
target to Cargo, `cargo-nextest`, or the MSVC release target.
Cargo release builds differ from this Bazel path for V8: the normal
Windows Cargo release target is MSVC, and `rusty_v8` publishes prebuilt
Windows MSVC `.lib.gz` archives. The Bazel PR path targets
`windows-gnullvm`; `rusty_v8` does not publish a prebuilt Windows
GNU/gnullvm archive, so this PR builds that archive in-tree. That
Linux-RBE-built gnullvm archive currently crashes in direct V8/code-mode
smoke tests, which is why the workflow keeps native Windows coverage on
`main`.
The less obvious Bazel detail is test wrapper selection. Bazel chooses
the Windows test wrapper (`tw.exe`) from the test action execution
platform, not merely from the Rust target triple. The outer
`workspace_root_test` therefore declares the default test toolchain and
uses the bridge toolchain above so the test action executes on Windows
while its inner Rust binary is built for gnullvm.
The V8 investigation exposed a Windows-client gotcha: even when an
action execution platform is Linux RBE, Bazel can still derive the
genrule shell path from the Windows client. That produced remote
commands trying to run `C:\Program Files\Git\usr\bin\bash.exe` on Linux
workers. The wrapper now passes `--shell_executable=/bin/bash` with
`--host_platform=//:rbe` for the Windows cross path.
The same Windows-client/Linux-RBE boundary also affected
`third_party/v8:binding_cc`: a multiline genrule command can carry CRLF
line endings into Linux remote bash, which failed as `$'\r'`. That
genrule now keeps the `sed` command on one physical shell line while
using an explicit Starlark join so the shell arguments stay readable.
## Verification
Local checks included:
```shell
bash -n .github/scripts/run-bazel-ci.sh
bash -n workspace_root_test_launcher.sh.tpl
ruby -e "require %q{yaml}; YAML.load_file(%q{.github/workflows/bazel.yml}); puts %q{ok}"
RUNNER_OS=Linux ./scripts/list-bazel-clippy-targets.sh
RUNNER_OS=Windows ./scripts/list-bazel-clippy-targets.sh
RUNNER_OS=Linux ./tools/argument-comment-lint/list-bazel-targets.sh
RUNNER_OS=Windows ./tools/argument-comment-lint/list-bazel-targets.sh
```
The Linux clippy and argument-comment target lists contain zero
`*-windows-cross-bin` labels, while the Windows lists still include 47
Windows-cross internal test binaries.
CI evidence:
- Baseline native Windows Bazel test on `main`: success in about 28m12s,
https://github.com/openai/codex/actions/runs/25206257208/job/73907325959
- Green Windows-cross Bazel run on the split PR before adding the
main-only native leg: Windows test 9m16s, Windows release verify 5m10s,
Windows clippy 4m43s,
https://github.com/openai/codex/actions/runs/25231890068
- The latest SHA adds the explicit PR-vs-main tradeoff in `bazel.yml`;
CI is rerunning on that focused diff.
## Follow-Up
A subsequent PR should investigate making a cross-built Windows binary
work with V8/code-mode enabled. Likely options are either making the
Linux-RBE-built `windows-gnullvm` V8 archive correct at runtime, or
evaluating whether a Bazel MSVC target/toolchain can reuse the same
prebuilt MSVC `rusty_v8` archive shape that Cargo release builds already
use.
## Summary
This PR installs a first wave of WFP (Windows Filtering Platform)
filters that reduce the surface area of network egress vulnerabilities
for the Windows Sandbox.
- Add persistent Windows Filtering Platform provider, sublayer, and
filters for the Windows sandbox offline account.
- Install WFP filters during elevated full setup, log failures
non-fatally, and emit setup metrics when analytics are enabled.
- Bump the Windows sandbox setup version so existing users rerun full
setup and receive the new filters.
## What WFP is
Windows Filtering Platform (WFP) is the low-level Windows networking
policy engine underneath things like Windows Firewall. It lets
privileged code install persistent filtering rules at specific network
stack layers, with conditions like "only traffic from this Windows
account" or "only this remote port," and an action like block.
In this change, we create a Codex-owned persistent WFP provider and
sublayer, then install block filters scoped to the Windows sandbox's
offline user account via `ALE_USER_ID`. That means the filters are
targeted at sandboxed processes running as that account, rather than
globally affecting the host.
## Initial filter set
We are starting with 12 concrete WFP filters across a few high-value
bypass surfaces. The table below describes the filter families rather
than one filter per row:
| Area | Concrete filters | Purpose |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ICMP | 4 filters: ICMP v4/v6 on `ALE_AUTH_CONNECT` and
`ALE_RESOURCE_ASSIGNMENT` | Block direct ping-style network reachability
checks from the offline account. |
| DNS | 2 filters: remote port `53` on `ALE_AUTH_CONNECT_V4/V6` | Block
direct DNS queries that bypass our intended proxy/offline path. |
| DNS-over-TLS | 2 filters: remote port `853` on
`ALE_AUTH_CONNECT_V4/V6` | Block encrypted DNS attempts that could
bypass ordinary DNS interception. |
| SMB / NetBIOS | 4 filters: remote ports `445` and `139` on
`ALE_AUTH_CONNECT_V4/V6` | Block Windows file-sharing/network share
traffic from sandboxed processes. |
For IPv4/IPv6 coverage, the port-based filters are installed on both
`ALE_AUTH_CONNECT_V4` and `ALE_AUTH_CONNECT_V6`. ICMP also gets both
connect-layer and resource-assignment-layer coverage because ICMP
traffic is shaped differently from ordinary TCP/UDP port traffic.
## Validation
- `cargo fmt -p codex-windows-sandbox` (completed with existing
stable-rustfmt warnings about `imports_granularity = Item`)
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox wfp::tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox` (fails in existing legacy
PowerShell sandbox tests because `Microsoft.PowerShell.Utility` could
not be loaded; WFP tests passed before that failure)
## Summary
- add elevated-only token constructors that include the current token
user SID in the restricted SID list
- switch the elevated Windows command runner to use those constructors
- leave the unelevated restricted-token path unchanged
## Why
Windows named pipes created by tools like Ninja use the platform's
default named-pipe ACL when no explicit security descriptor is provided.
In the elevated sandbox, the pipe owner has access, but the
write-restricted token can still fail its restricted-SID access check
because the sandbox user SID was not in the restricting SID set. That
causes child processes to exit successfully while Ninja never receives
the expected pipe completion/close behavior and hangs.
Including the elevated sandbox user's SID in the restricting SID list
lets the restricted check succeed for these owner-scoped pipe objects
without broadening the unelevated sandbox to the real signed-in user.
## Impact
- fixes the minimal Ninja hang repro in the elevated Windows sandbox
- preserves the existing unelevated sandbox behavior and write
protections
- keeps the change scoped to the elevated runner rather than changing
shared token semantics
- this does not affect file-writes for the sandbox because the sandbox
users themselves do not receive any additional permissions over what the
capability SIDs already have. In fact we don't even explicitly grant the
sandbox user ACLs anywhere.
## Validation
- `cargo build -p codex-windows-sandbox --quiet`
- verified the stock `ninja.exe` minimal repro exits normally on host
and in the elevated sandbox
- verified the same repro still hangs in the unelevated sandbox, which
is the intended scope of this change
## Summary
Some improvements to Windows process-management issues from
https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/15578
- bound the elevated runner pipe-connect handshake instead of waiting
forever on blocking pipe connects
- terminate the spawned runner if that handshake fails, so timeout/error
paths do not leave a stray `codex-command-runner.exe`
- loop on partial `WriteFile` results when forwarding stdin in the
elevated runner, so input is not silently truncated
- fix the concrete HANDLE/SID cleanup paths in the runner setup code
- keep draining driver-backed stdout/stderr after exit until the backend
closes, instead of dropping the tail after a fixed 200ms grace period
- reuse `LocalSid` for SID ownership and add more explanatory comments
around the ownership/concurrency-sensitive code paths
## Why
The original PR fixed a lot of Windows session plumbing, but there were
still a few sharp process-lifecycle edges:
- some elevated runner handshakes could block forever
- the new timeout path could still orphan the spawned runner process
- stdin forwarding still assumed a single `WriteFile` consumed the whole
buffer
- a few raw HANDLE/SID error paths still leaked
- driver-backed output could still lose the last chunk of stdout/stderr
on slower backends
## Validation
- `cargo fmt -p codex-windows-sandbox -p codex-utils-pty`
- `cargo test -p codex-utils-pty`
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox finish_driver_spawn`
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox runner_`
Ran a local test matrix of unified-exec and shell_tool tests, all
passing
## Summary
Fix the Windows sandbox PTY spawn path to pass the pseudoconsole handle
value directly into `UpdateProcThreadAttribute`.
## Why
Sandboxed `unified_exec` PTY sessions on Windows were failing during
child process startup with `0xc0000142` (`STATUS_DLL_INIT_FAILED`). In
practice this showed up as PowerShell DLL init popups when the sandboxed
background-terminal path tried to launch an interactive shell.
The root cause was that we were passing a pointer to a local `isize`
variable instead of the pseudoconsole handle value in the form Windows
expects for `PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_PSEUDOCONSOLE`.
## Validation
- `cargo build -p codex-windows-sandbox --bins`
- Reproduced the real sandboxed `codex exec` flow with
`windows.sandbox_private_desktop=true`
- Verified a `tty=true` interactive session launched through the normal
PowerShell wrapper, printed `READY`, accepted follow-up stdin, and
exited cleanly
- Confirmed no new `0xc0000142` / `Application Popup` events appeared
after the successful repro
## Why
`ReadOnlyAccess` was a transitional legacy shape on `SandboxPolicy`:
`FullAccess` meant the historical read-only/workspace-write modes could
read the full filesystem, while `Restricted` tried to carry partial
readable roots. The partial-read model now belongs in
`FileSystemSandboxPolicy` and `PermissionProfile`, so keeping it on
`SandboxPolicy` makes every legacy projection reintroduce lossy
read-root bookkeeping and creates unnecessary noise in the rest of the
permissions migration.
This PR makes the legacy policy model narrower and explicit:
`SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly` and `SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite` represent
the old full-read sandbox modes only. Split readable roots, deny-read
globs, and platform-default/minimal read behavior stay in the runtime
permissions model.
## What changed
- Removes `ReadOnlyAccess` from
`codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy`, including the generated
`access` and `readOnlyAccess` API fields.
- Updates legacy policy/profile conversions so restricted filesystem
reads are represented only by `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` /
`PermissionProfile` entries.
- Keeps app-server v2 compatible with legacy `fullAccess` read-access
payloads by accepting and ignoring that no-op shape, while rejecting
legacy `restricted` read-access payloads instead of silently widening
them to full-read legacy policies.
- Carries Windows sandbox platform-default read behavior with an
explicit override flag instead of depending on
`ReadOnlyAccess::Restricted`.
- Refreshes generated app-server schema/types and updates tests/docs for
the simplified legacy policy shape.
## Verification
- `cargo check -p codex-app-server-protocol --tests`
- `cargo check -p codex-windows-sandbox --tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol sandbox_policy_`
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/19449).
* #19395
* #19394
* #19393
* #19392
* #19391
* __->__ #19449
## Why
The elevated Windows command runner currently trusts the first process
that connects to its parent-created named pipes. Tightening the pipe ACL
already narrows who can reach that boundary, but verifying the connected
client PID gives the parent one more fail-closed check: it only accepts
the exact runner process it just spawned.
## What changed
- validate `GetNamedPipeClientProcessId` after `ConnectNamedPipe` and
reject clients whose PID does not match the spawned runner
- also did some code de-duplication to route the one-shot elevated
capture flow in `windows-sandbox-rs/src/elevated_impl.rs` through
`spawn_runner_transport()` so both elevated codepaths use the same pipe
bootstrap and PID validation
Using the transport unification here also reduces duplication in the
elevated Windows IPC bootstrap, so future hardening to the runner
handshake only needs to land in one place.
## Validation
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- manual testing: one-shot elevated path via `target/debug/codex.exe
exec` running a randomized shell command and confirming captured output
- manual testing: elevated session path via `target/debug/codex.exe -c
'windows.sandbox="elevated"' sandbox windows -- python -u -c ...` with
stdin/stdout round-trips (`READY`, then `GOT:...` for two input lines)
---------
Co-authored-by: viyatb-oai <viyatb@openai.com>
We used to attempt a read-ACL on the same dir as `codex.exe` to grant
the sandbox user the ability to invoke `codex-command-runner.exe`. That
worked for the CLI case but it always fails for the installed desktop
app.
We have another solution already in place that copies
`codex-command-runner.exe` to `CODEX_HOME/.sandbox-bin` so we don't even
need this anymore. It causes a scary looking error in the logs that is a
non-issue and is therefore confusing
we copy `codex-command-runner.exe` into `CODEX_HOME/.sandbox-bin/` so
that it can be executed by the sandbox user.
We also detect if that version is stale and copy a new one in if so.
This can fail when you are running multiple versions of the app - the
file in `.sandbox-bin` can look stale because it comes from another app
build.
This change allows us to have multiple versions in there for different
CLI versions, and it fallsback to a `size+mtime` hash in the filename
for dev builds that don't report a real CLI version.
`codex sandbox windows` previously did a one-shot spawn for all
commands.
This change uses the `unified_exec` session to spawn long-lived
processes instead, and implements a simple bridge to forward stdin to
the spawned session and stdout/stderr from the spawned session back to
the caller.
It also fixes a bug with the new shared spawn context code where the
"no-network env" was being applied to both elevated and unelevated
sandbox spawns. It should only be applied for the unelevated sandbox
because the elevated one uses firewall rules instead of an env-based
network suppression strategy.
## Summary
This is the runtime/foundation half of the Windows sandbox unified-exec
work.
- add Windows sandbox `unified_exec` session support in
`windows-sandbox-rs` for both:
- the legacy restricted-token backend
- the elevated runner backend
- extend the PTY/process runtime so driver-backed sessions can support:
- stdin streaming
- stdout/stderr separation
- exit propagation
- PTY resize hooks
- add Windows sandbox runtime coverage in `codex-windows-sandbox` /
`codex-utils-pty`
This PR does **not** enable Windows sandbox `UnifiedExec` for product
callers yet because hooking this up to app-server comes in the next PR.
Windows sandbox advertising is intentionally kept aligned with `main`,
so sandboxed Windows callers still fall back to `ShellCommand`.
This PR isolates the runtime/session layer so it can be reviewed
independently from product-surface enablement.
---------
Co-authored-by: jif-oai <jif@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Stack
1. Base PR: #18443 stops granting ACLs on `USERPROFILE`.
2. This PR: filters additional SSH-owned profile roots discovered from
SSH config.
## Bug
The base PR removes the broadest bad grant: `USERPROFILE` itself.
That still leaves one important case. A user profile child can be
SSH-owned even when its name is not one of our fixed exclusions.
For example:
```sshconfig
Host devbox
IdentityFile ~/.keys/devbox
CertificateFile ~/.certs/devbox-cert.pub
UserKnownHostsFile ~/.known_hosts_custom
Include ~/.ssh/conf.d/*.conf
```
After profile expansion, the sandbox might see these as normal profile
children:
```text
C:\Users\me\.keys
C:\Users\me\.certs
C:\Users\me\.known_hosts_custom
C:\Users\me\.ssh
```
Those paths have another owner: OpenSSH and the tools that manage SSH
identity and host-key state. Codex should not add sandbox ACLs to them.
OpenSSH describes this dependency tree in
[`ssh_config(5)`](https://man.openbsd.org/ssh_config.5), and the client
parser follows the same shape in `readconf.c`:
- `Include` recursively reads more config files and expands globs
- `IdentityFile` and `CertificateFile` name authentication files
- `UserKnownHostsFile`, `GlobalKnownHostsFile`, and `RevokedHostKeys`
name host-key files
- `ControlPath` and `IdentityAgent` can name profile-owned sockets or
control files
- these path directives can use forms such as `~`, `%d`, and `${HOME}`
## Change
This PR adds a small SSH config dependency scanner.
It starts at:
```text
~/.ssh/config
```
Then it returns concrete paths named by `Include` and by path-valued SSH
config directives:
```text
IdentityFile
CertificateFile
UserKnownHostsFile
GlobalKnownHostsFile
RevokedHostKeys
ControlPath
IdentityAgent
```
For example:
```sshconfig
IdentityFile ~/.keys/devbox
CertificateFile ~/.certs/devbox-cert.pub
Include ~/.ssh/conf.d/*.conf
```
returns paths like:
```text
C:\Users\me\.keys\devbox
C:\Users\me\.certs\devbox-cert.pub
C:\Users\me\.ssh\conf.d\devbox.conf
```
The setup code then maps those paths back to their top-level
`USERPROFILE` child and filters matching sandbox roots out of both the
writable and readable root lists.
## Why this shape
The parser reports what SSH config references. The sandbox setup code
decides which `USERPROFILE` roots are unsafe to grant.
That keeps the policy simple:
1. expand broad profile grants
2. remove the profile root
3. remove fixed sensitive profile folders
4. remove profile folders referenced by SSH config dependencies
If a path has two possible owners, the sandbox steps back. SSH keeps
control of SSH config, keys, certificates, known-hosts files, sockets,
and included config files.
## Tests
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox --lib`
- `just bazel-lock-check`
- `just fix -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- `git diff --check`
## Stack
1. This PR: expand and filter `USERPROFILE` roots.
2. Follow-up: #18493 filters SSH config dependency roots on top of this
base.
## Bug
On Windows, Codex can grant the sandbox ACL access to the whole user
profile directory.
That means the sandbox ACL can be applied under paths like:
```text
C:\Users\me\.ssh
C:\Users\me\.tsh
```
This breaks SSH. Windows OpenSSH checks permissions on SSH config and
key material. If Codex adds a sandbox group ACL to those files, OpenSSH
can reject the config or keys.
The bad interaction is:
1. Codex asks the Windows sandbox to grant access to `USERPROFILE`.
2. The sandbox applies ACLs under that root.
3. SSH-owned files get an extra ACL entry.
4. OpenSSH rejects those files because their permissions are no longer
strict enough.
## Why this happens more now
Codex now has more flows that naturally start in the user profile:
- a new chat can start in the user directory
- a project can be rooted in the user directory
- a user can start the Codex CLI from the user directory
Those are valid user actions. The bug is that `USERPROFILE` is too broad
a sandbox root.
## Change
This PR keeps the useful behavior of starting from the user profile
without granting the profile root itself.
The new flow is:
1. collect the normal read and write roots
2. if a root is exactly `USERPROFILE`, replace it with the direct
children of `USERPROFILE`
3. remove `USERPROFILE` itself from the final root list
4. apply the existing user-profile read exclusions to both read and
write roots
5. add `.tsh` and `.brev` to that exclusion list
So this input:
```text
C:\Users\me
```
becomes roots like:
```text
C:\Users\me\Desktop
C:\Users\me\Documents
C:\Users\me\Downloads
```
and does not include:
```text
C:\Users\me
C:\Users\me\.ssh
C:\Users\me\.tsh
C:\Users\me\.brev
```
If `USERPROFILE` cannot be listed, expansion falls back to the profile
root and the later filter removes it. That keeps the failure mode closed
for this bug.
## Why this shape
The sandbox still gets access to ordinary profile folders when the user
starts from home.
The sandbox no longer grants access to the profile root itself.
All filtering happens after expansion, for both read and write roots.
That gives us one simple rule: expand broad profile grants first, then
remove roots the sandbox must not own.
## Tests
- `just fmt`
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- `just fix -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- `git diff --check`
## Summary
This PR significantly improves the standalone installer experience.
The main changes are:
1. We now install the codex binary and other dependencies in a
subdirectory under CODEX_HOME.
(`CODEX_HOME/packages/standalone/releases/...`)
2. We replace the `codex.js` launcher that npm/bun rely on with logic in
the Rust binary that automatically resolves its dependencies (like
ripgrep)
## Motivation
A few design constraints pushed this work.
1. Currently, the entrypoint to codex is through `codex.js`, which
forces a node dependency to kick off our rust app. We want to move away
from this so that the entrypoint to codex does not rely on node or
external package managers.
2. Right now, the native script adds codex and its dependencies directly
to user PATH. Given that codex is likely to add more binary dependencies
than ripgrep, we want a solution which does not add arbitrary binaries
to user PATH -- the only one we want to add is the `codex` command
itself.
3. We want upgrades to be atomic. We do not want scenarios where
interrupting an upgrade command can move codex into undefined state (for
example, having a new codex binary but an old ripgrep binary). This was
~possible with the old script.
4. Currently, the Rust binary uses heuristics to determine which
installer created it. These heuristics are flaky and are tied to the
`codex.js` launcher. We need a more stable/deterministic way to
determine how the binary was installed for standalone.
5. We do not want conflicting codex installations on PATH. For example,
the user installing via npm, then installing via brew, then installing
via standalone would make it unclear which version of codex is being
launched and make it tough for us to determine the right upgrade
command.
## Design
### Standalone package layout
Standalone installs now live under `CODEX_HOME/packages/standalone`:
```text
$CODEX_HOME/
packages/
standalone/
current -> releases/0.111.0-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl
releases/
0.111.0-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl/
codex
codex-resources/
rg
```
where `standalone/current` is a symlink to a release directory.
On Windows, the release directory has the same shape, with `.exe` names
and Windows helpers in `codex-resources`:
```text
%CODEX_HOME%\
packages\
standalone\
current -> releases\0.111.0-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc
releases\
0.111.0-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc\
codex.exe
codex-resources\
rg.exe
codex-command-runner.exe
codex-windows-sandbox-setup.exe
```
This gives us:
- atomic upgrades because we can fully stage a release before switching
`standalone/current`
- a stable way for the binary to recognize a standalone install from its
canonical `current_exe()` path under CODEX_HOME
- a clean place for binary dependencies like `rg`, Windows sandbox
helpers, and, in the future, our custom `zsh` etc
### Command location
On Unix, we add a symlink at `~/.local/bin/codex` which points directly
to the `$CODEX_HOME/packages/standalone/current/codex` binary. This
becomes the main entrypoint for the CLI.
On Windows, we store the link at
`%LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs\OpenAI\Codex\bin`.
### PATH persistence
This is a tricky part of the PR, as there's no ~super reliable way to
ensure that we end up on PATH without significant tradeoffs.
Most Unix variants will have `~/.local/bin` on PATH already, which means
we *should* be fine simply registering the command there in most cases.
However, there are cases where this is not the case. In these cases, we
directly edit the profile depending on the shell we're in.
- macOS zsh: `~/.zprofile`
- macOS bash: `~/.bash_profile`
- Linux zsh: `~/.zshrc`
- Linux bash: `~/.bashrc`
- fallback: `~/.profile`
On Windows, we update the User `Path` environment variable directly and
we don't need to worry about shell profiles.
### Standalone runtime detection
This PR adds a new shared crate, `codex-install-context`, which computes
install ownership once per process and caches it in a `OnceLock`.
That context includes:
- install manager (`Standalone`, `Npm`, `Bun`, `Brew`, `Other`)
- the managed standalone release directory, when applicable
- the managed standalone `codex-resources` directory, when present
- the resolved `rg_command`
The standalone path is detected by canonicalizing `current_exe()`,
canonicalizing CODEX_HOME via `find_codex_home()`, and checking whether
the binary is running from under
`$CODEX_HOME/packages/standalone/releases`.
We intentionally do not use a release metadata file. The binary path is
the source of truth.
### Dependency resolution
For standalone installs, `grep_files` now resolves bundled `rg` from
`codex-resources` next to the Codex binary.
For npm/bun/brew/other installs, `grep_files` falls back to resolving
`rg` from PATH.
For Windows standalone installs, Windows sandbox helpers are still found
as direct siblings when present. If they are not direct siblings, the
lookup also checks the sibling `codex-resources` directory.
### TUI update path
The TUI now has `UpdateAction::StandaloneUnix` and
`UpdateAction::StandaloneWindows`, which rerun the standalone install
commands.
Unix update command:
```sh
sh -c "curl -fsSL https://chatgpt.com/codex/install.sh | sh"
```
Windows update command:
```powershell
powershell -c "irm https://chatgpt.com/codex/install.ps1|iex"
```
The Windows updater runs PowerShell directly. We do this because `cmd
/C` would parse the `|iex` as a cmd pipeline instead of passing it to
PowerShell.
## Additional installer behavior
- standalone installs now warn about conflicting npm/bun/brew-managed
`codex` installs and offer to uninstall them
- same-version reruns do not redownload the release if it is already
staged locally
## Testing
Installer smoke tests run:
- macOS: fresh install into isolated `HOME` and `CODEX_HOME` with
`scripts/install/install.sh --release latest`
- macOS: reran the installer against the same isolated install to verify
the same-version/update path and PATH block idempotence
- macOS: verified the installed `codex --version` and bundled
`codex-resources/rg --version`
- Windows: parsed `scripts/install/install.ps1` with PowerShell via
`[scriptblock]::Create(...)`
- Windows: verified the standalone update action builds a direct
PowerShell command and does not route the `irm ...|iex` command through
`cmd /C`
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Summary
This updates the Windows elevated sandbox setup/refresh path to include
the legacy `compute_allow_paths(...).deny` protected children in the
same deny-write payload pipe added for split filesystem carveouts.
Concretely, elevated setup and elevated refresh now both build
deny-write payload paths from:
- explicit split-policy deny-write paths, preserving missing paths so
setup can materialize them before applying ACLs
- legacy `compute_allow_paths(...).deny`, which includes existing
`.git`, `.codex`, and `.agents` children under writable roots
This lets the elevated backend protect `.git` consistently with the
unelevated/restricted-token path, and removes the old janky hard-coded
`.codex` / `.agents` elevated setup helpers in favor of the shared
payload path.
## Root Cause
The landed split-carveout PR threaded a `deny_write_paths` pipe through
elevated setup/refresh, but the legacy workspace-write deny set from
`compute_allow_paths(...).deny` was not included in that payload. As a
result, elevated workspace-write did not apply the intended deny-write
ACLs for existing protected children like `<cwd>/.git`.
## Notes
The legacy protected children still only enter the deny set if they
already exist, because `compute_allow_paths` filters `.git`, `.codex`,
and `.agents` with `exists()`. Missing explicit split-policy deny paths
are preserved separately because setup intentionally materializes those
before applying ACLs.
## Validation
- `cargo fmt --check -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- `cargo build -p codex-cli -p codex-windows-sandbox --bins`
- Elevated `codex exec` smoke with `windows.sandbox='elevated'`: fresh
git repo, attempted append to `.git/config`, observed `Access is
denied`, marker not written, Deny ACE present on `.git`
- Unelevated `codex exec` smoke with `windows.sandbox='unelevated'`:
fresh git repo, attempted append to `.git/config`, observed `Access is
denied`, marker not written, Deny ACE present on `.git`
## Summary
- preserve legacy Windows elevated sandbox behavior for existing
policies
- add elevated-only support for split filesystem policies that can be
represented as readable-root overrides, writable-root overrides, and
extra deny-write carveouts
- resolve those elevated filesystem overrides during sandbox transform
and thread them through setup and policy refresh
- keep failing closed for explicit unreadable (`none`) carveouts and
reopened writable descendants under read-only carveouts
- for explicit read-only-under-writable-root carveouts, materialize
missing carveout directories during elevated setup before applying the
deny-write ACL
- document the elevated vs restricted-token support split in the core
README
## Example
Given a split filesystem policy like:
```toml
":root" = "read"
":cwd" = "write"
"./docs" = "read"
"C:/scratch" = "write"
```
the elevated backend now provisions the readable-root overrides,
writable-root overrides, and extra deny-write carveouts during setup and
refresh instead of collapsing back to the legacy workspace-only shape.
If a read-only carveout under a writable root is missing at setup time,
elevated setup creates that carveout as an empty directory before
applying its deny-write ACE; otherwise the sandboxed command could
create it later and bypass the carveout. This is only for explicit
policy carveouts. Best-effort workspace protections like `.codex/` and
`.agents/` still skip missing directories.
A policy like:
```toml
"/workspace" = "write"
"/workspace/docs" = "read"
"/workspace/docs/tmp" = "write"
```
still fails closed, because the elevated backend does not reopen
writable descendants under read-only carveouts yet.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Summary
- reduce public module visibility across Rust crates, preferring private
or crate-private modules with explicit crate-root public exports
- update external call sites and tests to use the intended public crate
APIs instead of reaching through module trees
- add the module visibility guideline to AGENTS.md
## Validation
- `cargo check --workspace --all-targets --message-format=short` passed
before the final fix/format pass
- `just fix` completed successfully
- `just fmt` completed successfully
- `git diff --check` passed
## Why
Follow-up to #16345, the Bazel clippy rollout in #15955, and the cleanup
pass in #16353.
`cargo clippy` was enforcing the workspace deny-list from
`codex-rs/Cargo.toml` because the member crates opt into `[lints]
workspace = true`, but Bazel clippy was only using `rules_rust` plus
`clippy.toml`. That left the Bazel lane vulnerable to drift:
`clippy.toml` can tune lint behavior, but it cannot set
allow/warn/deny/forbid levels.
This PR now closes both sides of the follow-up. It keeps `.bazelrc` in
sync with `[workspace.lints.clippy]`, and it fixes the real clippy
violations that the newly-synced Windows Bazel lane surfaced once that
deny-list started matching Cargo.
## What Changed
- added `.github/scripts/verify_bazel_clippy_lints.py`, a Python check
that parses `codex-rs/Cargo.toml` with `tomllib`, reads the Bazel
`build:clippy` `clippy_flag` entries from `.bazelrc`, and reports
missing, extra, or mismatched lint levels
- ran that verifier from the lightweight `ci.yml` workflow so the sync
check does not depend on a Rust toolchain being installed first
- expanded the `.bazelrc` comment to explain the Cargo `workspace =
true` linkage and why Bazel needs the deny-list duplicated explicitly
- fixed the Windows-only `codex-windows-sandbox` violations that Bazel
clippy reported after the sync, using the same style as #16353: inline
`format!` args, method references instead of trivial closures, removed
redundant clones, and replaced SID conversion `unwrap` and `expect`
calls with proper errors
- cleaned up the remaining cross-platform violations the Bazel lane
exposed in `codex-backend-client` and `core_test_support`
## Testing
Key new test introduced by this PR:
`python3 .github/scripts/verify_bazel_clippy_lints.py`
## Why
The initial `argument-comment-lint` rollout left Windows on
default-target coverage because there were still Windows-only callsites
failing under `--all-targets`. This follow-up cleans up those remaining
Windows-specific violations so the Windows CI lane can enforce the same
stricter coverage, leaving Linux as the remaining platform-specific
follow-up.
## What changed
- switched the Windows `rust-ci` argument-comment-lint step back to the
default wrapper invocation so it runs full-target coverage again
- added the required `/*param_name*/` annotations at Windows-gated
literal callsites in:
- `codex-rs/windows-sandbox-rs/src/lib.rs`
- `codex-rs/windows-sandbox-rs/src/elevated_impl.rs`
- `codex-rs/tui_app_server/src/multi_agents.rs`
- `codex-rs/network-proxy/src/proxy.rs`
## Validation
- Windows `argument comment lint` CI on this PR
iceweasel-oai ·
Abhinav ·
Michael Bolin ·
viyatb-oai ·
starr-openai ·
Adrian ·
Charlie Marsh ·
bbrown-oai ·
Dylan Hurd ·
efrazer-oai ·
pakrym-oai ·