Commit Graph
6 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
iceweasel-oaiandGitHub aabe0f259c implement per-workspace capability SIDs for workspace specific ACLs (#10189)
Today, there is a single capability SID that allows the sandbox to write
to
* workspace (cwd)
* tmp directories if enabled
* additional writable roots

This change splits those up, so that each workspace has its own
capability SID, while tmp and additional roots, which are
installation-wide, are still governed by the "generic" capability SID

This isolates workspaces from each other in terms of sandbox write
access.
Also allows us to protect <cwd>/.codex when codex runs in a specific
<cwd>
2026-02-03 12:37:51 -08:00
Max KongandGitHub e2bd9311c9 fix(windows-sandbox): remove request files after read (#9316)
## Summary
- Remove elevated runner request files after read (best-effort cleanup
on errors)
- Add a unit test to cover request file lifecycle

## Testing
- `cargo test -p codex-windows-sandbox` (Windows)

Fixes #9315
2026-01-24 10:23:37 -08:00
iceweasel-oaiandGitHub 07f077dfb3 best effort to "hide" Sandbox users (#8492)
The elevated sandbox creates two new Windows users - CodexSandboxOffline
and CodexSandboxOnline. This is necessary, so this PR does all that it
can to "hide" those users. It uses the registry plus directory flags (on
their home directories) to get them to show up as little as possible.
2026-01-05 12:29:10 -08:00
iceweasel-oaiandGitHub d65fe38b2c use a junction for the cwd while read ACLs are being applied (#8444)
The elevated setup synchronously applies read/write ACLs to any
workspace roots.

However, until we apply *read* permission to the full path, powershell
cannot use some roots as a cwd as it needs access to all parts of the
path in order to apply it as the working directory for a command.

The solution is, while the async read-ACL part of setup is running, use
a "junction" that lives in C:\Users\CodexSandbox{Offline|Online} that
points to the cwd.

Once the read ACLs are applied, we stop using the junction.

-----

this PR also removes some dead code and overly-verbose logging, and has
some light refactoring to the ACL-related functions
2025-12-22 12:23:13 -08:00
Anton PanasenkoandGitHub 3429de21b3 feat: introduce ExternalSandbox policy (#8290)
## Description

Introduced `ExternalSandbox` policy to cover use case when sandbox
defined by outside environment, effectively it translates to
`SandboxMode#DangerFullAccess` for file system (since sandbox configured
on container level) and configurable `network_access` (either Restricted
or Enabled by outside environment).

as example you can configure `ExternalSandbox` policy as part of
`sendUserTurn` v1 app_server API:

```
 {
            "conversationId": <id>,
            "cwd": <cwd>,
            "approvalPolicy": "never",
            "sandboxPolicy": {
                  "type": ""external-sandbox",
                  "network_access": "enabled"/"restricted"
            },
            "model": <model>,
            "effort": <effort>,
            ....
        }
```
2025-12-18 17:02:03 -08:00
iceweasel-oaiandGitHub 3e81ed4b91 Elevated Sandbox 3 (#7809)
dedicated sandbox command runner exe.
2025-12-11 13:51:27 -08:00