Commit Graph

26 Commits

  • chore(approvals) More approvals scenarios (#11660)
    ## Summary
    Add some additional tests to approvals flow
    
    ## Testing
    - [x] these are tests
  • feat: introduce Permissions (#11633)
    ## Why
    We currently carry multiple permission-related concepts directly on
    `Config` for shell/unified-exec behavior (`approval_policy`,
    `sandbox_policy`, `network`, `shell_environment_policy`,
    `windows_sandbox_mode`).
    
    Consolidating these into one in-memory struct makes permission handling
    easier to reason about and sets up the next step: supporting named
    permission profiles (`[permissions.PROFILE_NAME]`) without changing
    behavior now.
    
    This change is mostly mechanical: it updates existing callsites to go
    through `config.permissions`, but it does not yet refactor those
    callsites to take a single `Permissions` value in places where multiple
    permission fields are still threaded separately.
    
    This PR intentionally **does not** change the on-disk `config.toml`
    format yet and keeps compatibility with legacy config keys.
    
    ## What Changed
    - Introduced `Permissions` in `core/src/config/mod.rs`.
    - Added `Config::permissions` and moved effective runtime permission
    fields under it:
      - `approval_policy`
      - `sandbox_policy`
      - `network`
      - `shell_environment_policy`
      - `windows_sandbox_mode`
    - Updated config loading/building so these effective values are still
    derived from the same existing config inputs and constraints.
    - Updated Windows sandbox helpers/resolution to read/write via
    `permissions`.
    - Threaded the new field through all permission consumers across core
    runtime, app-server, CLI/exec, TUI, and sandbox summary code.
    - Updated affected tests to reference `config.permissions.*`.
    - Renamed the struct/field from
    `EffectivePermissions`/`effective_permissions` to
    `Permissions`/`permissions` and aligned variable naming accordingly.
    
    ## Verification
    - `just fix -p codex-core -p codex-tui -p codex-cli -p codex-app-server
    -p codex-exec -p codex-utils-sandbox-summary`
    - `cargo build -p codex-core -p codex-tui -p codex-cli -p
    codex-app-server -p codex-exec -p codex-utils-sandbox-summary`
  • feat: make sandbox read access configurable with ReadOnlyAccess (#11387)
    `SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly` previously implied broad read access and could
    not express a narrower read surface.
    This change introduces an explicit read-access model so we can support
    user-configurable read restrictions in follow-up work, while preserving
    current behavior today.
    
    It also ensures unsupported backends fail closed for restricted-read
    policies instead of silently granting broader access than intended.
    
    ## What
    
    - Added `ReadOnlyAccess` in protocol with:
      - `Restricted { include_platform_defaults, readable_roots }`
      - `FullAccess`
    - Updated `SandboxPolicy` to carry read-access configuration:
      - `ReadOnly { access: ReadOnlyAccess }`
      - `WorkspaceWrite { ..., read_only_access: ReadOnlyAccess }`
    - Preserved existing behavior by defaulting current construction paths
    to `ReadOnlyAccess::FullAccess`.
    - Threaded the new fields through sandbox policy consumers and call
    sites across `core`, `tui`, `linux-sandbox`, `windows-sandbox`, and
    related tests.
    - Updated Seatbelt policy generation to honor restricted read roots by
    emitting scoped read rules when full read access is not granted.
    - Added fail-closed behavior on Linux and Windows backends when
    restricted read access is requested but not yet implemented there
    (`UnsupportedOperation`).
    - Regenerated app-server protocol schema and TypeScript artifacts,
    including `ReadOnlyAccess`.
    
    ## Compatibility / rollout
    
    - Runtime behavior remains unchanged by default (`FullAccess`).
    - API/schema changes are in place so future config wiring can enable
    restricted read access without another policy-shape migration.
  • Fix: update parallel tool call exec approval to approve on request id (#11162)
    ### Summary
    
    In parallel tool call, exec command approvals were not approved at
    request level but at a turn level. i.e. when a single request is
    approved, the system currently treats all requests in turn as approved.
    
    ### Before
    
    https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d50ed129-b3d2-4b2f-97fa-8601eb11f6a8
    
    ### After
    
    https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/36528a43-a4aa-4775-9e12-f13287ef19fc
  • feat(core) RequestRule (#9489)
    ## Summary
    Instead of trying to derive the prefix_rule for a command mechanically,
    let's let the model decide for us.
    
    ## Testing
    - [x] tested locally
  • feat(core) update Personality on turn (#9644)
    ## Summary
    Support updating Personality mid-Thread via UserTurn/OverwriteTurn. This
    is explicitly unused by the clients so far, to simplify PRs - app-server
    and tui implementations will be follow-ups.
    
    ## Testing
    - [x] added integration tests
  • Add text element metadata to types (#9235)
    Initial type tweaking PR to make the diff of
    https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/9116 smaller
    
    This should not change any behavior, just adds some fields to types
  • fix: implement 'Allow this session' for apply_patch approvals (#8451)
    **Summary**
    This PR makes “ApprovalDecision::AcceptForSession / don’t ask again this
    session” actually work for `apply_patch` approvals by caching approvals
    based on absolute file paths in codex-core, properly wiring it through
    app-server v2, and exposing the choice in both TUI and TUI2.
    - This brings `apply_patch` calls to be at feature-parity with general
    shell commands, which also have a "Yes, and don't ask again" option.
    - This also fixes VSCE's "Allow this session" button to actually work.
    
    While we're at it, also split the app-server v2 protocol's
    `ApprovalDecision` enum so execpolicy amendments are only available for
    command execution approvals.
    
    **Key changes**
    - Core: per-session patch approval allowlist keyed by absolute file
    paths
    - Handles multi-file patches and renames/moves by recording both source
    and destination paths for `Update { move_path: Some(...) }`.
    - Extend the `Approvable` trait and `ApplyPatchRuntime` to work with
    multiple keys, because an `apply_patch` tool call can modify multiple
    files. For a request to be auto-approved, we will need to check that all
    file paths have been approved previously.
    - App-server v2: honor AcceptForSession for file changes
    - File-change approval responses now map AcceptForSession to
    ReviewDecision::ApprovedForSession (no longer downgraded to plain
    Approved).
    - Replace `ApprovalDecision` with two enums:
    `CommandExecutionApprovalDecision` and `FileChangeApprovalDecision`
    - TUI / TUI2: expose “don’t ask again for these files this session”
    - Patch approval overlays now include a third option (“Yes, and don’t
    ask again for these files this session (s)”).
        - Snapshot updates for the approval modal.
    
    **Tests added/updated**
    - Core:
    - Integration test that proves ApprovedForSession on a patch skips the
    next patch prompt for the same file
    - App-server:
    - v2 integration test verifying
    FileChangeApprovalDecision::AcceptForSession works properly
    
    **User-visible behavior**
    - When the user approves a patch “for session”, future patches touching
    only those previously approved file(s) will no longer prompt gain during
    that session (both via app-server v2 and TUI/TUI2).
    
    **Manual testing**
    Tested both TUI and TUI2 - see screenshots below.
    
    TUI:
    <img width="1082" height="355" alt="image"
    src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/adcf45ad-d428-498d-92fc-1a0a420878d9"
    />
    
    
    TUI2:
    <img width="1089" height="438" alt="image"
    src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/dd768b1a-2f5f-4bd6-98fd-e52c1d3abd9e"
    />
  • feat: support allowed_sandbox_modes in requirements.toml (#8298)
    This adds support for `allowed_sandbox_modes` in `requirements.toml` and
    provides legacy support for constraining sandbox modes in
    `managed_config.toml`. This is converted to `Constrained<SandboxPolicy>`
    in `ConfigRequirements` and applied to `Config` such that constraints
    are enforced throughout the harness.
    
    Note that, because `managed_config.toml` is deprecated, we do not add
    support for the new `external-sandbox` variant recently introduced in
    https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/8290. As noted, that variant is not
    supported in `config.toml` today, but can be configured programmatically
    via app server.
  • feat: Constrain values for approval_policy (#7778)
    Constrain `approval_policy` through new `admin_policy` config.
    
    This PR will:
    1. Add a `admin_policy` section to config, with a single field (for now)
    `allowed_approval_policies`. This list constrains the set of
    user-settable `approval_policy`s.
    2. Introduce a new `Constrained<T>` type, which combines a current value
    and a validator function. The validator function ensures disallowed
    values are not set.
    3. Change the type of `approval_policy` on `Config` and
    `SessionConfiguration` from `AskForApproval` to
    `Constrained<AskForApproval>`. The validator function is set by the
    values passed into `allowed_approval_policies`.
    4. `GenericDisplayRow`: add a `disabled_reason: Option<String>`. When
    set, it disables selection of the value and indicates as such in the
    menu. This also makes it unselectable with arrow keys or numbers. This
    is used in the `/approvals` menu.
    
    Follow ups are:
    1. Do the same thing to `sandbox_policy`.
    2. Propagate the allowed set of values through app-server for the
    extension (though already this should prevent app-server from setting
    this values, it's just that we want to disable UI elements that are
    unsettable).
    
    Happy to split this PR up if you prefer, into the logical numbered areas
    above. Especially if there are parts we want to gavel on separately
    (e.g. admin_policy).
    
    Disabled full access:
    <img width="1680" height="380" alt="image"
    src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1fb61c8c-1fcb-4dc4-8355-2293edb52ba0"
    />
    
    Disabled `--yolo` on startup:
    <img width="749" height="76" alt="image"
    src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0a1211a0-6eb1-40d6-a1d7-439c41e94ddb"
    />
    
    CODEX-4087
  • fix: policy/*.codexpolicy -> rules/*.rules (#7888)
    We decided that `*.rules` is a more fitting (and concise) file extension
    than `*.codexpolicy`, so we are changing the file extension for the
    "execpolicy" effort. We are also changing the subfolder of `$CODEX_HOME`
    from `policy` to `rules` to match.
    
    This PR updates the in-repo docs and we will update the public docs once
    the next CLI release goes out.
    
    Locally, I created `~/.codex/rules/default.rules` with the following
    contents:
    
    ```
    prefix_rule(pattern=["gh", "pr", "view"])
    ```
    
    And then I asked Codex to run:
    
    ```
    gh pr view 7888 --json title,body,comments
    ```
    
    and it was able to!
  • refactoring with_escalated_permissions to use SandboxPermissions instead (#7750)
    helpful in the future if we want more granularity for requesting
    escalated permissions:
    e.g when running in readonly sandbox, model can request to escalate to a
    sandbox that allows writes
  • Refactor execpolicy fallback evaluation (#7544)
    ## Refactor of the `execpolicy` crate
    
    To illustrate why we need this refactor, consider an agent attempting to
    run `apple | rm -rf ./`. Suppose `apple` is allowed by `execpolicy`.
    Before this PR, `execpolicy` would consider `apple` and `pear` and only
    render one rule match: `Allow`. We would skip any heuristics checks on
    `rm -rf ./` and immediately approve `apple | rm -rf ./` to run.
    
    To fix this, we now thread a `fallback` evaluation function into
    `execpolicy` that runs when no `execpolicy` rules match a given command.
    In our example, we would run `fallback` on `rm -rf ./` and prevent
    `apple | rm -rf ./` from being run without approval.
  • whitelist command prefix integration in core and tui (#7033)
    this PR enables TUI to approve commands and add their prefixes to an
    allowlist:
    <img width="708" height="605" alt="Screenshot 2025-11-21 at 4 18 07 PM"
    src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/56a19893-4553-4770-a881-becf79eeda32"
    />
    
    note: we only show the option to whitelist the command when 
    1) command is not multi-part (e.g `git add -A && git commit -m 'hello
    world'`)
    2) command is not already matched by an existing rule
  • Update defaults to gpt-5.1 (#6652)
    ## Summary
    - update documentation, example configs, and automation defaults to
    reference gpt-5.1 / gpt-5.1-codex
    - bump the CLI and core configuration defaults, model presets, and error
    messaging to the new models while keeping the model-family/tool coverage
    for legacy slugs
    - refresh tests, fixtures, and TUI snapshots so they expect the upgraded
    defaults
    
    ## Testing
    - `cargo test -p codex-core
    config::tests::test_precedence_fixture_with_gpt5_profile`
    
    
    ------
    [Codex
    Task](https://chatgpt.com/codex/tasks/task_i_6916c5b3c2b08321ace04ee38604fc6b)
  • Add unified exec escalation handling and tests (#6492)
    Similar implementation to the shell tool
  • Add ItemStarted/ItemCompleted events for UserInputItem (#5306)
    Adds a new ItemStarted event and delivers UserMessage as the first item
    type (more to come).
    
    
    Renames `InputItem` to `UserInput` considering we're using the `Item`
    suffix for actual items.