Commit Graph

13 Commits

  • refactor: remove proxy admin endpoint (#13687)
    ## Summary
    - delete the network proxy admin server and its runtime listener/task
    plumbing
    - remove the admin endpoint config, runtime, requirement, protocol,
    schema, and debug-surface fields
    - update proxy docs to reflect the remaining HTTP and SOCKS listeners
    only
  • feat(network-proxy): add embedded OTEL policy audit logging (#12046)
    **PR Summary**
    
    This PR adds embedded-only OTEL policy audit logging for
    `codex-network-proxy` and threads audit metadata from `codex-core` into
    managed proxy startup.
    
    ### What changed
    - Added structured audit event emission in `network_policy.rs` with
    target `codex_otel.network_proxy`.
    - Emitted:
    - `codex.network_proxy.domain_policy_decision` once per domain-policy
    evaluation.
      - `codex.network_proxy.block_decision` for non-domain denies.
    - Added required policy/network fields, RFC3339 UTC millisecond
    `event.timestamp`, and fallback defaults (`http.request.method="none"`,
    `client.address="unknown"`).
    - Added non-domain deny audit emission in HTTP/SOCKS handlers for
    mode-guard and proxy-state denies, including unix-socket deny paths.
    - Added `REASON_UNIX_SOCKET_UNSUPPORTED` and used it for unsupported
    unix-socket auditing.
    - Added `NetworkProxyAuditMetadata` to runtime/state, re-exported from
    `lib.rs` and `state.rs`.
    - Added `start_proxy_with_audit_metadata(...)` in core config, with
    `start_proxy()` delegating to default metadata.
    - Wired metadata construction in `codex.rs` from session/auth context,
    including originator sanitization for OTEL-safe tagging.
    - Updated `network-proxy/README.md` with embedded-mode audit schema and
    behavior notes.
    - Refactored HTTP block-audit emission to a small local helper to reduce
    duplication.
    - Preserved existing unix-socket proxy-disabled host/path behavior for
    responses and blocked history while using an audit-only endpoint
    override (`server.address="unix-socket"`, `server.port=0`).
    
    ### Explicit exclusions
    - No standalone proxy OTEL startup work.
    - No `main.rs` binary wiring.
    - No `standalone_otel.rs`.
    - No standalone docs/tests.
    
    ### Tests
    - Extended `network_policy.rs` tests for event mapping, metadata
    propagation, fallbacks, timestamp format, and target prefix.
    - Extended HTTP tests to assert unix-socket deny block audit events.
    - Extended SOCKS tests to cover deny emission from handler deny
    branches.
    - Added/updated core tests to verify audit metadata threading into
    managed proxy state.
    
    ### Validation run
    - `just fmt`
    - `cargo test -p codex-network-proxy` 
    - `cargo test -p codex-core` ran with one unrelated flaky timeout
    (`shell_snapshot::tests::snapshot_shell_does_not_inherit_stdin`), and
    the test passed when rerun directly 
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: viyatb-oai <viyatb@openai.com>
  • feat(network-proxy): add MITM support and gate limited-mode CONNECT (#9859)
    ## Description
    - Adds MITM support (CA load/issue, TLS termination, optional body
    inspection).
    - Adds `codex-network-proxy init` to create
    `CODEX_HOME/network_proxy/mitm`.
    - Enforces limited-mode HTTPS correctly: `CONNECT` requires MITM,
    otherwise blocked with `mitm_required`.
    - Keeps `origin/main` layering/reload semantics (managed layers included
    in reload checks).
    - Centralizes block reasons (`REASON_MITM_REQUIRED`) and removes
    `println!`.
    - Scope is MITM-only (no SOCKS changes).
    
    gated by `mitm=false` (default)
  • feat(core): persist network approvals in execpolicy (#12357)
    ## Summary
    Persist network approval allow/deny decisions as `network_rule(...)`
    entries in execpolicy (not proxy config)
    
    It adds `network_rule` parsing + append support in `codex-execpolicy`,
    including `decision="prompt"` (parse-only; not compiled into proxy
    allow/deny lists)
    - compile execpolicy network rules into proxy allow/deny lists and
    update the live proxy state on approval
    - preserve requirements execpolicy `network_rule(...)` entries when
    merging with file-based execpolicy
    - reject broad wildcard hosts (for example `*`) for persisted
    `network_rule(...)`
  • Refactor network approvals to host/protocol/port scope (#12140)
    ## Summary
    Simplify network approvals by removing per-attempt proxy correlation and
    moving to session-level approval dedupe keyed by (host, protocol, port).
    Instead of encoding attempt IDs into proxy credentials/URLs, we now
    treat approvals as a destination policy decision.
    
    - Concurrent calls to the same destination share one approval prompt.
    - Different destinations (or same host on different ports) get separate
    prompts.
    - Allow once approves the current queued request group only.
    - Allow for session caches that (host, protocol, port) and auto-allows
    future matching requests.
    - Never policy continues to deny without prompting.
    
    Example:
    - 3 calls: 
      - a.com (line 443)
      - b.com (line 443)
      - a.com (line 443)
    => 2 prompts total (a, b), second a waits on the first decision.
    - a.com:80 is treated separately from a.com line 443
    
    ## Testing
    - `just fmt` (in `codex-rs`)
    - `cargo test -p codex-core tools::network_approval::tests`
    - `cargo test -p codex-core` (unit tests pass; existing
    integration-suite failures remain in this environment)
  • feat(core): add structured network approval plumbing and policy decision model (#11672)
    ### Description
    #### Summary
    Introduces the core plumbing required for structured network approvals
    
    #### What changed
    - Added structured network policy decision modeling in core.
    - Added approval payload/context types needed for network approval
    semantics.
    - Wired shell/unified-exec runtime plumbing to consume structured
    decisions.
    - Updated related core error/event surfaces for structured handling.
    - Updated protocol plumbing used by core approval flow.
    - Included small CLI debug sandbox compatibility updates needed by this
    layer.
    
    #### Why
    establishes the minimal backend foundation for network approvals without
    yet changing high-level orchestration or TUI behavior.
    
    #### Notes
    - Behavior remains constrained by existing requirements/config gating.
    - Follow-up PRs in the stack handle orchestration, UX, and app-server
    integration.
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: Codex <199175422+chatgpt-codex-connector[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
  • feat(network-proxy): structured policy signaling and attempt correlation to core (#11662)
    ## Summary
    When network requests were blocked, downstream code often had to infer
    ask vs deny from free-form response text. That was brittle and led to
    incorrect approval behavior.
    This PR fixes the proxy side so blocked decisions are structured and
    request metadata survives reliably.
    
    ## Description
    - Blocked proxy responses now carry consistent structured policy
    decision data.
    - Request attempt metadata is preserved across proxy env paths
    (including ALL_PROXY flows).
    - Header stripping was tightened so we still remove unsafe forwarding
    headers, but keep metadata needed for policy handling.
    - Block messages were clarified (for example, allowlist miss vs explicit
    deny).
    - Added unified violation log entries so policy failures can be
    inspected in one place.
    - Added/updated tests for these behaviors.
    
    ---------
    
    Co-authored-by: Codex <199175422+chatgpt-codex-connector[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
  • feat: retain NetworkProxy, when appropriate (#11207)
    As of this PR, `SessionServices` retains a
    `Option<StartedNetworkProxy>`, if appropriate.
    
    Now the `network` field on `Config` is `Option<NetworkProxySpec>`
    instead of `Option<NetworkProxy>`.
    
    Over in `Session::new()`, we invoke `NetworkProxySpec::start_proxy()` to
    create the `StartedNetworkProxy`, which is a new struct that retains the
    `NetworkProxy` as well as the `NetworkProxyHandle`. (Note that `Drop` is
    implemented for `NetworkProxyHandle` to ensure the proxies are shutdown
    when it is dropped.)
    
    The `NetworkProxy` from the `StartedNetworkProxy` is threaded through to
    the appropriate places.
    
    
    ---
    [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
    Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
    with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/11207).
    * #11285
    * __->__ #11207
  • feat(sandbox): enforce proxy-aware network routing in sandbox (#11113)
    ## Summary
    - expand proxy env injection to cover common tool env vars
    (`HTTP_PROXY`/`HTTPS_PROXY`/`ALL_PROXY`/`NO_PROXY` families +
    tool-specific variants)
    - harden macOS Seatbelt network policy generation to route through
    inferred loopback proxy endpoints and fail closed when proxy env is
    malformed
    - thread proxy-aware Linux sandbox flags and add minimal bwrap netns
    isolation hook for restricted non-proxy runs
    - add/refresh tests for proxy env wiring, Seatbelt policy generation,
    and Linux sandbox argument wiring
  • chore: introduce *Args types for new() methods (#10009)
    Constructors with long param lists can be hard to reason about when a
    number of the args are `None`, in practice. Introducing a struct to use
    as the args type helps make things more self-documenting.
  • feat(network-proxy): add a SOCKS5 proxy with policy enforcement (#9803)
    ### Summary
    - Adds an optional SOCKS5 listener via `rama-socks5`
    - SOCKS5 is disabled by default and gated by config
    - Reuses existing policy enforcement and blocked-request recording
    - Blocks SOCKS5 in limited mode to prevent method-policy bypass
    - Applies bind clamping to the SOCKS5 listener
    
    ### Config
    New/used fields under `network_proxy`:
    - `enable_socks5`
    - `socks_url`
    - `enable_socks5_udp`
    
    ### Scope
    - Changes limited to `codex-rs/network-proxy` (+ `codex-rs/Cargo.lock`)
    
    ### Testing
    ```bash
    cd codex-rs
    just fmt
    cargo test -p codex-network-proxy --offline
  • feat: introducing a network sandbox proxy (#8442)
    This add a new crate, `codex-network-proxy`, a local network proxy
    service used by Codex to enforce fine-grained network policy (domain
    allow/deny) and to surface blocked network events for interactive
    approvals.
    
    - New crate: `codex-rs/network-proxy/` (`codex-network-proxy` binary +
    library)
    - Core capabilities:
      - HTTP proxy support (including CONNECT tunneling)
      - SOCKS5 proxy support (in the later PR)
    - policy evaluation (allowed/denied domain lists; denylist wins;
    wildcard support)
      - small admin API for polling/reload/mode changes
    - optional MITM support for HTTPS CONNECT to enforce “limited mode”
    method restrictions (later PR)
    
    Will follow up integration with codex in subsequent PRs.
    
    ## Testing
    
    - `cd codex-rs && cargo build -p codex-network-proxy`
    - `cd codex-rs && cargo run -p codex-network-proxy -- proxy`