## Why
#18274 made `PermissionProfile` the canonical file-system permissions
shape, but the round-trip from `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` to
`PermissionProfile` still dropped one piece of policy metadata:
`glob_scan_max_depth`.
That field is security-relevant for deny-read globs such as `**/*.env`.
On Linux, bubblewrap sandbox construction uses it to bound unreadable
glob expansion. If a profile copied from active runtime permissions
loses this value and is submitted back as an override, the resulting
`FileSystemSandboxPolicy` can behave differently even though the visible
permission entries look equivalent.
## What changed
- Add `glob_scan_max_depth` to protocol `FileSystemPermissions` and
preserve it when converting to/from `FileSystemSandboxPolicy`.
- Keep legacy `read`/`write` JSON for simple path-only permissions, but
force canonical JSON when glob scan depth is present so the metadata is
not silently dropped.
- Carry `globScanMaxDepth` through app-server
`AdditionalFileSystemPermissions`, generated JSON/TypeScript schemas,
and app-server/TUI conversion call sites.
- Preserve the metadata through sandboxing permission normalization,
merging, and intersection.
- Carry the merged scan depth into the effective
`FileSystemSandboxPolicy` used for command execution, so bounded
deny-read globs reach Linux bubblewrap materialization.
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing glob_scan -- --nocapture`
- `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing policy_transforms -- --nocapture`
- `just fix -p codex-sandboxing`
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18713).
* #18288
* #18287
* #18286
* #18285
* #18284
* #18283
* #18282
* #18281
* #18280
* #18279
* #18278
* #18277
* #18276
* #18275
* __->__ #18713
## Why
`PermissionProfile` needs stable, canonical file-system semantics before
it can become the primary runtime permissions abstraction. Without a
canonical form, callers have to keep re-deriving legacy sandbox maps and
profile comparisons remain lossy or order-dependent.
## What changed
This adds canonicalization helpers for `FileSystemPermissions` and
`PermissionProfile`, expands special paths into explicit sandbox
entries, and updates permission request/conversion paths to consume
those canonical entries. It also tightens the legacy bridge so root-wide
write profiles with narrower carveouts are not silently projected as
full-disk legacy access.
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-protocol
root_write_with_read_only_child_is_not_full_disk_write -- --nocapture`
- `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing permission -- --nocapture`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui permissions -- --nocapture`
## Summary
request_permissions flows should support persisting results for the
session.
Open Question: Still deciding if we need within-turn approvals - this
adds complexity but I could see it being useful
## Testing
- [x] Updated unit tests
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
Adds a built-in `request_permissions` tool and wires it through the
Codex core, protocol, and app-server layers so a running turn can ask
the client for additional permissions instead of relying on a static
session policy.
The new flow emits a `RequestPermissions` event from core, tracks the
pending request by call ID, forwards it through app-server v2 as an
`item/permissions/requestApproval` request, and resumes the tool call
once the client returns an approved subset of the requested permission
profile.
Michael Bolin ·
Jack Mousseau ·
Leo Shimonaka ·
Dylan Hurd ·