24 Commits

• feat(sandbox): add glob deny-read platform enforcement (#18096)

  ## Summary
  - adds macOS Seatbelt deny rules for unreadable glob patterns
  - expands unreadable glob matches on Linux and masks them in bwrap,
  including canonical symlink targets
  - keeps Linux glob expansion robust when `rg` is unavailable in minimal
  or Bazel test environments
  - adds sandbox integration coverage that runs `shell` and `exec_command`
  with a `**/*.env = none` policy and verifies the secret contents do not
  reach the model
  
  ## Linux glob expansion
  
  ```text
  Prefer:   rg --files --hidden --no-ignore --glob <pattern> -- <search-root>
  Fallback: internal globset walker when rg is not installed
  Failure:  any other rg failure aborts sandbox construction
  ```
  
  ```
  [permissions.workspace.filesystem]
  glob_scan_max_depth = 2
  
  [permissions.workspace.filesystem.":project_roots"]
  "**/*.env" = "none"
  ```
  
  
  This keeps the common path fast without making sandbox construction
  depend on an ambient `rg` binary. If `rg` is present but fails for
  another reason, the sandbox setup fails closed instead of silently
  omitting deny-read masks.
  
  ## Platform support
  - macOS: subprocess sandbox enforcement is handled by Seatbelt regex
  deny rules
  - Linux: subprocess sandbox enforcement is handled by expanding existing
  glob matches and masking them in bwrap
  - Windows: policy/config/direct-tool glob support is already on `main`
  from #15979; Windows subprocess sandbox paths continue to fail closed
  when unreadable split filesystem carveouts require runtime enforcement,
  rather than silently running unsandboxed
  
  ## Stack
  1. #15979 - merged: cross-platform glob deny-read
  policy/config/direct-tool support for macOS, Linux, and Windows
  2. This PR - macOS/Linux subprocess sandbox enforcement plus Windows
  fail-closed clarification
  3. #17740 - managed deny-read requirements
  
  ## Verification
  - Added integration coverage for `shell` and `exec_command` glob
  deny-read enforcement
  - `cargo check -p codex-sandboxing -p codex-linux-sandbox --tests`
  - `cargo check -p codex-core --test all`
  - `cargo clippy -p codex-linux-sandbox -p codex-sandboxing --tests`
  - `just bazel-lock-check`
  
  ---------
  
  Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>

  viyatb-oai · 2026-04-16 17:35:16 -07:00
  0d0abe839a
• feat(permissions): add glob deny-read policy support (#15979)

  ## Summary
  - adds first-class filesystem policy entries for deny-read glob patterns
  - parses config such as :project_roots { "**/*.env" = "none" } into
  pattern entries
  - enforces deny-read patterns in direct read/list helpers
  - fails closed for sandbox execution until platform backends enforce
  glob patterns in #18096
  - preserves split filesystem policy in turn context only when it cannot
  be reconstructed from legacy sandbox policy
  
  ## Stack
  1. This PR - glob deny-read policy/config/direct-tool support
  2. #18096 - macOS and Linux sandbox enforcement
  3. #17740 - managed deny-read requirements
  
  ## Verification
  - just fmt
  - cargo check -p codex-core -p codex-sandboxing --tests
  
  ---------
  
  Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>

  viyatb-oai · 2026-04-16 10:31:51 -07:00
  6862b9c745
• Support Unix socket allowlists in macOS sandbox (#17654)

  ## Changes
  
  Allows sandboxes to restrict overall network access while granting
  access to specific unix sockets on mac.
  
  ## Details
  
  - `codex sandbox macos`: adds a repeatable `--allow-unix-socket` option.
  - `codex-sandboxing`: threads explicit Unix socket roots into the macOS
  Seatbelt profile generation.
  - Preserves restricted network behavior when only Unix socket IPC is
  requested, and preserves full network behavior when full network is
  already enabled.
  
  ## Verification
  
  - `cargo test -p codex-cli -p codex-sandboxing`
  - `cargo build -p codex-cli --bin codex`
  - verified that `codex sandbox macos --allow-unix-socket /tmp/test.sock
  -- test-client` grants access as expected

  aaronl-openai · 2026-04-15 00:53:24 -07:00
  2e1003728c
• fix(sandboxing): reject WSL1 bubblewrap sandboxing (#17559)

  ## Summary
  
  - detect WSL1 before Codex probes or invokes the Linux bubblewrap
  sandbox
  - fail early with a clear unsupported-operation message when a command
  would require bubblewrap on WSL1
  - document that WSL2 follows the normal Linux bubblewrap path while WSL1
  is unsupported
  
  ## Why
  
  Codex 0.115.0 made bubblewrap the default Linux sandbox. WSL1 cannot
  create the user namespaces that bubblewrap needs, so shell commands
  currently fail later with a raw bwrap namespace error. This makes the
  unsupported environment explicit and keeps non-bubblewrap paths
  unchanged.
  
  The WSL detection reads /proc/version, lets an explicit WSL<version>
  marker decide WSL1 vs WSL2+, and only treats a bare Microsoft marker as
  WSL1 when no explicit WSL version is present.
  
  addresses https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/16076
  
  ---------
  
  Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>

  viyatb-oai · 2026-04-12 14:08:14 -07:00
  cb870a169a
• fix: unblock private DNS in macOS sandbox (#17370)

  ## Summary
  - keep hostname targets proxied by default by removing hostname suffixes
  from the managed `NO_PROXY` value while preserving private/link-local
  CIDRs
  - make the macOS `allow_local_binding` sandbox rules match the local
  socket shape used by DNS tools by allowing wildcard local binds
  - allow raw DNS egress to remote port 53 only when `allow_local_binding`
  is enabled, without opening blanket outbound network access
  
  ## Root cause
  Raw DNS tools do not honor `HTTP_PROXY` or `ALL_PROXY`, so the
  proxy-only Seatbelt policy blocked their resolver traffic before it
  could reach host DNS. In the affected managed config,
  `allow_local_binding = true`, but the existing rule only allowed
  `localhost:*` binds; `dig`/BIND can bind sockets in a way that needs
  wildcard local binding. Separately, hostname suffixes in `NO_PROXY`
  could force internal hostnames to resolve locally instead of through the
  proxy path.
  
  ---------
  
  Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>

  viyatb-oai · 2026-04-10 20:34:04 -07:00
  8a474a6561
• fix(permissions): fix symlinked writable roots in sandbox permissions (#15981)

  ## Summary
  - preserve logical symlink paths during permission normalization and
  config cwd handling
  - bind real targets for symlinked readable/writable roots in bwrap and
  remap carveouts and unreadable roots there
  - add regressions for symlinked carveouts and nested symlink escape
  masking
  
  ## Root cause
  Permission normalization canonicalized symlinked writable roots and cwd
  to their real targets too early. That drifted policy checks away from
  the logical paths the sandboxed process can actually address, while
  bwrap still needed the real targets for mounts. The mismatch caused
  shell and apply_patch failures on symlinked writable roots.
  
  ## Impact
  Fixes #15781.
  
  Also fixes #17079:
  - #17079 is the protected symlinked carveout side: bwrap now binds the
  real symlinked writable-root target and remaps carveouts before masking.
  
  Related to #15157:
  - #15157 is the broader permission-check side of this path-identity
  problem. This PR addresses the shared logical-vs-canonical normalization
  issue, but the reported Darwin prompt behavior should be validated
  separately before auto-closing it.
  
  This should also fix #14672, #14694, #14715, and #15725:
  - #14672, #14694, and #14715 are the same Linux
  symlinked-writable-root/bwrap family as #15781.
  - #15725 is the protected symlinked workspace path variant; the PR
  preserves the protected logical path in policy space while bwrap applies
  read-only or unreadable treatment to the resolved target so
  file-vs-directory bind mismatches do not abort sandbox setup.
  
  ## Notes
  - Added Linux-only regressions for symlinked writable ancestors and
  protected symlinked directory targets, including nested symlink escape
  masking without rebinding the escape target writable.
  
  ---------
  
  Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>

  viyatb-oai · 2026-04-10 17:00:58 -07:00
  b114781495
• Use AbsolutePathBuf for exec cwd plumbing (#17063)

  ## Summary
  - Carry `AbsolutePathBuf` through tool cwd parsing/resolution instead of
  resolving workdirs to raw `PathBuf`s.
  - Type exec/sandbox request cwd fields as `AbsolutePathBuf` through
  `ExecParams`, `ExecRequest`, `SandboxCommand`, and unified exec runtime
  requests.
  - Keep `PathBuf` conversions at external/event boundaries and update
  existing tests/fixtures for the typed cwd.
  
  ## Validation
  - `cargo check -p codex-core --tests`
  - `cargo check -p codex-sandboxing --tests`
  - `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core --lib tools::handlers::`
  - `just fix -p codex-sandboxing`
  - `just fix -p codex-core`
  - `just fmt`
  
  Full `codex-core` test suite was not run locally; per repo guidance I
  kept local validation targeted.

  pakrym-oai · 2026-04-08 10:54:12 -07:00
  35b5720e8d
• [codex] Make AbsolutePathBuf joins infallible (#16981)

  Having to check for errors every time join is called is painful and
  unnecessary.

  pakrym-oai · 2026-04-07 10:52:08 -07:00
  f1a2b920f9
• fix: warn when bwrap cannot create user namespaces (#15893)

  ## Summary
  - add a Linux startup warning when system `bwrap` is present but cannot
  create user namespaces
  - keep the Linux-specific probe, sandbox-policy gate, and stderr
  matching in `codex-sandboxing`
  - polish the missing-`bwrap` warning to point users at the sandbox
  prerequisites and OS package-manager install path
  
  ## Details
  - probes system `bwrap` with `--unshare-user`, `--unshare-net`, and a
  minimal bind before command execution
  - detects known bubblewrap setup failures for `RTM_NEWADDR`,
  `RTM_NEWLINK`, uid-map permission denial, and `No permissions to create
  a new namespace`
  - preserves the existing suppression for sandbox-bypassed policies such
  as `danger-full-access` and `external-sandbox`
  - updates the Linux sandbox docs to call out the user-namespace
  requirement
  
  ---------
  
  Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>

  viyatb-oai · 2026-04-06 19:19:35 -07:00
  806e5f7c69
• [codex] Allow PyTorch libomp shm in Seatbelt (#16945)

  ## Summary
  - Add a targeted macOS Seatbelt allow rule for PyTorch/libomp KMP
  registration shared-memory objects.
  - Scope the rule to read/create/unlink operations on names matching
  `^/__KMP_REGISTERED_LIB_[0-9]+$`.
  - Add a base-policy regression assertion in `seatbelt_tests.rs`.
  
  ## Why
  Importing PyTorch on macOS under the Codex sandbox can abort when libomp
  attempts to create the KMP registration POSIX shm object and Seatbelt
  denies `ipc-posix-shm-write-create`.
  
  ## Validation
  - `just fmt`
  - `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing`
  - `cargo clippy -p codex-sandboxing --all-targets`
  - `just argument-comment-lint`
  - `git diff --check`
  - End-to-end PyTorch import under `codex sandbox macos` exited `0` with
  no KMP shm denial
  - `cargo clean`

  viyatb-oai · 2026-04-06 22:12:30 +00:00
  36cd163504
• Suppress bwrap warning when sandboxing is bypassed (#16667)

  Addresses #15282
  
  Problem: Codex warned about missing system bubblewrap even when
  sandboxing was disabled.
  
  Solution: Gate the bwrap warning on the active sandbox policy and skip
  it for danger-full-access and external-sandbox modes.

  Eric Traut · 2026-04-03 10:54:30 -07:00
  0f7394883e
• extract models manager and related ownership from core (#16508)

  ## Summary
  - split `models-manager` out of `core` and add `ModelsManagerConfig`
  plus `Config::to_models_manager_config()` so model metadata paths stop
  depending on `core::Config`
  - move login-owned/auth-owned code out of `core` into `codex-login`,
  move model provider config into `codex-model-provider-info`, move API
  bridge mapping into `codex-api`, move protocol-owned types/impls into
  `codex-protocol`, and move response debug helpers into a dedicated
  `response-debug-context` crate
  - move feedback tag emission into `codex-feedback`, relocate tests to
  the crates that now own the code, and keep broad temporary re-exports so
  this PR avoids a giant import-only rewrite
  
  ## Major moves and decisions
  - created `codex-models-manager` as the owner for model
  cache/catalog/config/model info logic, including the new
  `ModelsManagerConfig` struct
  - created `codex-model-provider-info` as the owner for provider config
  parsing/defaults and kept temporary `codex-login`/`codex-core`
  re-exports for old import paths
  - moved `api_bridge` error mapping + `CoreAuthProvider` into
  `codex-api`, while `codex-login::api_bridge` temporarily re-exports
  those symbols and keeps the `auth_provider_from_auth` wrapper
  - moved `auth_env_telemetry` and `provider_auth` ownership to
  `codex-login`
  - moved `CodexErr` ownership to `codex-protocol::error`, plus
  `StreamOutput`, `bytes_to_string_smart`, and network policy helpers to
  protocol-owned modules
  - created `codex-response-debug-context` for
  `extract_response_debug_context`, `telemetry_transport_error_message`,
  and related response-debug plumbing instead of leaving that behavior in
  `core`
  - moved `FeedbackRequestTags`, `emit_feedback_request_tags`, and
  `emit_feedback_request_tags_with_auth_env` to `codex-feedback`
  - deferred removal of temporary re-exports and the mechanical import
  rewrites to a stacked follow-up PR so this PR stays reviewable
  
  ## Test moves
  - moved auth refresh coverage from `core/tests/suite/auth_refresh.rs` to
  `login/tests/suite/auth_refresh.rs`
  - moved text encoding coverage from
  `core/tests/suite/text_encoding_fix.rs` to
  `protocol/src/exec_output_tests.rs`
  - moved model info override coverage from
  `core/tests/suite/model_info_overrides.rs` to
  `models-manager/src/model_info_overrides_tests.rs`
  
  ---------
  
  Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>

  Ahmed Ibrahim · 2026-04-02 23:00:02 -07:00
  6fff9955f1
• chore: clean up argument-comment lint and roll out all-target CI on macOS (#16054)

  ## Why
  
  `argument-comment-lint` was green in CI even though the repo still had
  many uncommented literal arguments. The main gap was target coverage:
  the repo wrapper did not force Cargo to inspect test-only call sites, so
  examples like the `latest_session_lookup_params(true, ...)` tests in
  `codex-rs/tui_app_server/src/lib.rs` never entered the blocking CI path.
  
  This change cleans up the existing backlog, makes the default repo lint
  path cover all Cargo targets, and starts rolling that stricter CI
  enforcement out on the platform where it is currently validated.
  
  ## What changed
  
  - mechanically fixed existing `argument-comment-lint` violations across
  the `codex-rs` workspace, including tests, examples, and benches
  - updated `tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh` and
  `tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh` so non-`--fix` runs default to
  `--all-targets` unless the caller explicitly narrows the target set
  - fixed both wrappers so forwarded cargo arguments after `--` are
  preserved with a single separator
  - documented the new default behavior in
  `tools/argument-comment-lint/README.md`
  - updated `rust-ci` so the macOS lint lane keeps the plain wrapper
  invocation and therefore enforces `--all-targets`, while Linux and
  Windows temporarily pass `-- --lib --bins`
  
  That temporary CI split keeps the stricter all-targets check where it is
  already cleaned up, while leaving room to finish the remaining Linux-
  and Windows-specific target-gated cleanup before enabling
  `--all-targets` on those runners. The Linux and Windows failures on the
  intermediate revision were caused by the wrapper forwarding bug, not by
  additional lint findings in those lanes.
  
  ## Validation
  
  - `bash -n tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh`
  - `bash -n tools/argument-comment-lint/run-prebuilt-linter.sh`
  - shell-level wrapper forwarding check for `-- --lib --bins`
  - shell-level wrapper forwarding check for `-- --tests`
  - `just argument-comment-lint`
  - `cargo test` in `tools/argument-comment-lint`
  - `cargo test -p codex-terminal-detection`
  
  ## Follow-up
  
  - Clean up remaining Linux-only target-gated callsites, then switch the
  Linux lint lane back to the plain wrapper invocation.
  - Clean up remaining Windows-only target-gated callsites, then switch
  the Windows lint lane back to the plain wrapper invocation.

  Michael Bolin · 2026-03-27 19:00:44 -07:00
  61dfe0b86c
• fix(sandbox): fix bwrap lookup for multi-entry PATH (#15973)

  ## Summary
  - split the joined `PATH` before running system `bwrap` lookup
  - keep the existing workspace-local `bwrap` skip behavior intact
  - add regression tests that exercise real multi-entry search paths
  
  ## Why
  The PATH-based lookup added in #15791 still wrapped the raw `PATH`
  environment value as a single `PathBuf` before passing it through
  `join_paths()`. On Unix, a normal multi-entry `PATH` contains `:`, so
  that wrapper path is invalid as one path element and the lookup returns
  `None`.
  
  That made Codex behave as if no system `bwrap` was installed even when
  `bwrap` was available on `PATH`, which is what users in #15340 were
  still hitting on `0.117.0-alpha.25`.
  
  ## Impact
  System `bwrap` discovery now works with normal multi-entry `PATH` values
  instead of silently falling back to the vendored binary.
  
  Fixes #15340.
  
  ## Validation
  - `just fmt`
  - `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing`
  - `cargo test -p codex-linux-sandbox`
  - `just fix -p codex-sandboxing`
  - `just argument-comment-lint`

  viyatb-oai · 2026-03-27 08:41:06 -07:00
  ec089fd22a
• fix: make MACOS_DEFAULT_PREFERENCES_POLICY part of MACOS_SEATBELT_BASE_POLICY (#15931)
  Michael Bolin · 2026-03-26 18:23:14 -07:00
  d76124d656
• permissions: remove macOS seatbelt extension profiles (#15918)

  ## Why
  
  `PermissionProfile` should only describe the per-command permissions we
  still want to grant dynamically. Keeping
  `MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions` in that surface forced extra macOS-only
  approval, protocol, schema, and TUI branches for a capability we no
  longer want to expose.
  
  ## What changed
  
  - Removed the macOS-specific permission-profile types from
  `codex-protocol`, the app-server v2 API, and the generated
  schema/TypeScript artifacts.
  - Deleted the core and sandboxing plumbing that threaded
  `MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions` through execution requests and seatbelt
  construction.
  - Simplified macOS seatbelt generation so it always includes the fixed
  read-only preferences allowlist instead of carrying a configurable
  profile extension.
  - Removed the macOS additional-permissions UI/docs/test coverage and
  deleted the obsolete macOS permission modules.
  - Tightened `request_permissions` intersection handling so explicitly
  empty requested read lists are preserved only when that field was
  actually granted, avoiding zero-grant responses being stored as active
  permissions.

  Michael Bolin · 2026-03-26 17:12:45 -07:00
  e6e2999209
• chore: move bwrap config helpers into dedicated module (#15898)

  ## Summary
  - move the bwrap PATH lookup and warning helpers out of config/mod.rs
  - move the related tests into a dedicated bwrap_tests.rs file
  
  ## Validation
  - git diff --check
  - skipped heavier local tests per request
  
  Follow-up to #15791.

  viyatb-oai · 2026-03-26 15:15:59 -07:00
  b52abff279
• sandboxing: use OsString for SandboxCommand.program (#15897)

  ## Why
  
  `SandboxCommand.program` represents an executable path, but keeping it
  as `String` forced path-backed callers to run `to_string_lossy()` before
  the sandbox layer ever touched the command. That loses fidelity earlier
  than necessary and adds avoidable conversions in runtimes that already
  have a `PathBuf`.
  
  ## What changed
  
  - Changed `SandboxCommand.program` to `OsString`.
  - Updated `SandboxManager::transform` to keep the program and argv in
  `OsString` form until the `SandboxExecRequest` conversion boundary.
  - Switched the path-backed `apply_patch` and `js_repl` runtimes to pass
  `into_os_string()` instead of `to_string_lossy()`.
  - Updated the remaining string-backed builders and tests to match the
  new type while preserving the existing Linux helper `arg0` behavior.
  
  ## Verification
  
  - `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing`
  - `just argument-comment-lint -p codex-core -p codex-sandboxing`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core` currently fails in unrelated existing
  config tests: `config::tests::approvals_reviewer_*` and
  `config::tests::smart_approvals_alias_*`

  Michael Bolin · 2026-03-26 20:38:33 +00:00
  dfb36573cd
• Protect first-time project .codex creation across Linux and macOS sandboxes (#15067)

  ## Problem
  
  Codex already treated an existing top-level project `./.codex` directory
  as protected, but there was a gap on first creation.
  
  If `./.codex` did not exist yet, a turn could create files under it,
  such as `./.codex/config.toml`, without going through the same approval
  path as later modifications. That meant the initial write could bypass
  the intended protection for project-local Codex state.
  
  ## What this changes
  
  This PR closes that first-creation gap in the Unix enforcement layers:
  
  - `codex-protocol`
  - treat the top-level project `./.codex` path as a protected carveout
  even when it does not exist yet
  - avoid injecting the default carveout when the user already has an
  explicit rule for that exact path
  - macOS Seatbelt
  - deny writes to both the exact protected path and anything beneath it,
  so creating `./.codex` itself is blocked in addition to writes inside it
  - Linux bubblewrap
  - preserve the same protected-path behavior for first-time creation
  under `./.codex`
  - tests
  - add protocol regressions for missing `./.codex` and explicit-rule
  collisions
  - add Unix sandbox coverage for blocking first-time `./.codex` creation
    - tighten Seatbelt policy assertions around excluded subpaths
  
  ## Scope
  
  This change is intentionally scoped to protecting the top-level project
  `.codex` subtree from agent writes.
  
  It does not make `.codex` unreadable, and it does not change the product
  behavior around loading project skills from `.codex` when project config
  is untrusted.
  
  ## Why this shape
  
  The fix is pointed rather than broad:
  - it preserves the current model of “project `.codex` is protected from
  writes”
  - it closes the security-relevant first-write hole
  - it avoids folding a larger permissions-model redesign into this PR
  
  ## Validation
  
  - `cargo test -p codex-protocol`
  - `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing seatbelt`
  - `cargo test -p codex-exec --test all
  sandbox_blocks_first_time_dot_codex_creation -- --nocapture`
  
  ---------
  
  Co-authored-by: Michael Bolin <mbolin@openai.com>

  rreichel3-oai · 2026-03-26 16:06:53 -04:00
  86764af684
• fix: fix old system bubblewrap compatibility without falling back to vendored bwrap (#15693)

  Fixes #15283.
  
  ## Summary
  Older system bubblewrap builds reject `--argv0`, which makes our Linux
  sandbox fail before the helper can re-exec. This PR keeps using system
  `/usr/bin/bwrap` whenever it exists and only falls back to vendored
  bwrap when the system binary is missing. That matters on stricter
  AppArmor hosts, where the distro bwrap package also provides the policy
  setup needed for user namespaces.
  
  For old system bwrap, we avoid `--argv0` instead of switching binaries:
  - pass the sandbox helper a full-path `argv0`,
  - keep the existing `current_exe() + --argv0` path when the selected
  launcher supports it,
  - otherwise omit `--argv0` and re-exec through the helper's own
  `argv[0]` path, whose basename still dispatches as
  `codex-linux-sandbox`.
  
  Also updates the launcher/warning tests and docs so they match the new
  behavior: present-but-old system bwrap uses the compatibility path, and
  only absent system bwrap falls back to vendored.
  
  ### Validation
  
  1. Install Ubuntu 20.04 in a VM
  2. Compile codex and run without bubblewrap installed - see a warning
  about falling back to the vendored bwrap
  3. Install bwrap and verify version is 0.4.0 without `argv0` support
  4. run codex and use apply_patch tool without errors
  
  <img width="802" height="631" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-25 at 11 48 36 PM"
  src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/77248a29-aa38-4d7c-9833-496ec6a458b8"
  />
  <img width="807" height="634" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-25 at 11 47 32 PM"
  src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5af8b850-a466-489b-95a6-455b76b5050f"
  />
  <img width="812" height="635" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-25 at 11 45 45 PM"
  src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/438074f0-8435-4274-a667-332efdd5cb57"
  />
  <img width="801" height="623" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-25 at 11 43 56 PM"
  src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0dc8d3f5-e8cf-4218-b4b4-a4f7d9bf02e3"
  />
  
  ---------
  
  Co-authored-by: Michael Bolin <mbolin@openai.com>

  viyatb-oai · 2026-03-25 23:51:39 -07:00
  937cb5081d
• Extract sandbox manager and transforms into codex-sandboxing (#15603)

  Extract sandbox manager

  pakrym-oai · 2026-03-24 08:20:57 -07:00
  f49eb8e9d7
• Move sandbox policy transforms into codex-sandboxing (#15599)

  ## Summary
  - move the pure sandbox policy transform helpers from `codex-core` into
  `codex-sandboxing`
  - move the corresponding unit tests with the extracted implementation
  - update `core` and `app-server` callers to import the moved APIs
  directly, without re-exports or proxy methods
  
  ## Testing
  - cargo test -p codex-sandboxing
  - cargo test -p codex-core sandboxing
  - cargo test -p codex-app-server --lib
  - just fix -p codex-sandboxing
  - just fix -p codex-core
  - just fix -p codex-app-server
  - just fmt
  - just argument-comment-lint

  pakrym-oai · 2026-03-23 22:22:44 -07:00
  9deb8ce3fc
• Move macOS sandbox builders into codex-sandboxing (#15593)

  ## Summary
  - move macOS permission merging/intersection logic and tests from
  `codex-core` into `codex-sandboxing`
  - move seatbelt policy builders, permissions logic, SBPL assets, and
  their tests into `codex-sandboxing`
  - keep `codex-core` owning only the seatbelt spawn wrapper and switch
  call sites to import the moved APIs directly
  
  ## Notes
  - no re-exports added
  - moved the seatbelt tests with the implementation so internal helpers
  could stay private
  - local verification is still finishing while this PR is open

  pakrym-oai · 2026-03-23 21:26:35 -07:00
  431af0807c
• Extract landlock helpers into codex-sandboxing (#15592)

  ## Summary
  - add a new `codex-sandboxing` crate for sandboxing extraction work
  - move the pure Linux sandbox argv builders and their unit tests out of
  `codex-core`
  - keep `core::landlock` as the spawn wrapper and update direct callers
  to use `codex_sandboxing::landlock`
  
  ## Testing
  - `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing`
  - `cargo test -p codex-core landlock`
  - `cargo test -p codex-cli debug_sandbox`
  - `just argument-comment-lint`
  
  ## Notes
  - this is step 1 of the move plan aimed at minimizing per-PR diffs
  - no re-exports or no-op proxy methods were added

  pakrym-oai · 2026-03-23 20:56:15 -07:00
  2227248cd6